Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 24NNCV01784, Date: 2024-08-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24NNCV01784    Hearing Date: August 26, 2024    Dept: X

   Tentative Ruling

Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X

HEARING DATE:     August 26, 2024                                  TRIAL DATE:  No date set.

CASE:                         GALEN HARRILL vs OKHUNDZHON KOMILOV, et al.

CASE NO.:                 24NNCV01784

MOTION TO STRIKE

MOVING PARTY:               Defendant Okhundzhon Komilov

RESPONDING PARTY:      Plaintiff Galen Harrill

SERVICE:                             Filed July 9, 2024

OPPOSITION:                     None filed.

REPLY:                                 Filed August 19, 2024

RELIEF REQUESTED

            Defendant moves to strike the punitive damages allegation and prayer for relief in Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 435 and 436.

BACKGROUND

This is a personal injury action arising from a semi-truck-versus-automobile accident on June 16, 2023. The complaint alleges Defendant Komilov operated a semi-truck at an unsafe speed, and entered Plaintiff’s lane unsafely, and as a result collided with Plaintiff’s vehicle which caused significant and debilitating injuries to Plaintiff.

TENTATIVE RULING

             Defendant’s motion to strike the punitive damages allegation and prayer for relief is GRANTED.

LEGAL STANDARD

A judge may, on a motion to strike made under Code of Civil Procedure section 435 or at any time at the judge’s discretion, strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter in a pleading, on terms the judge deems proper. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (a).) A motion to strike may be used to remove a claim for punitive damages that is not adequately supported by the facts alleged in the complaint. (Cryolife, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1145; Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. v. Superior Court (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 696.)

In ruling on a motion to strike punitive damages, “judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.”  (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)  To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege the elements set forth in the punitive damages statute, Civil Code section 3294.  (College Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.)  Per Civil Code section 3294, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.  (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)   As set forth in the Civil Code,

(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.  (2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.  (3) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

(Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1)-(3), emphasis added.) 

Further, a plaintiff must assert facts with specificity to support a conclusion that a defendant acted with oppression, fraud or malice.  To wit, there is a heightened pleading requirement regarding a claim for punitive damages.  (See Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042.)  “When nondeliberate injury is charged, allegations that the defendant's conduct was wrongful, willful, wanton, reckless or unlawful do not support a claim for exemplary damages; such allegations do not charge malice.” (G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29.) Punitive damages are not ordinarily recoverable in actions for negligence. (Ibid.) Punitive damages are only recoverable if the plaintiff establishes oppression, fraud, or malice, as defined by Civil Code section 3294(c).

In Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1212-1213, the court noted that an award of punitive damages in cases involving unintentional torts is rare, and that no California case had found “despicable” conduct in the context of an unintentional collission. “[O]rdinarily, routine negligent or even reckless disobedience of traffic laws would not justify an award of punitive damages.” (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 899-900.) To properly allege punitive damages in a motor vehicle accident action, a plaintiff needs to "establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he wilfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences." (Id. at 896; see also Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 90.)

DISCUSSION

Defendant moves to strike portions of Plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to punitive and exemplary damages and related references. Defendant argues Plaintiff’s complaint has not alleged sufficient facts to support the recovery of punitive damages. Specifically, Defendant attests that Plaintiff’s allegation of Defendant fleeing the scene of the accident is insufficient to support a prayer for punitive damages. The complaint alleges “Plaintiff’s suffering was exacerbated by the sight of defendant fleeing the scene, deepening his emotional distress and compounding his injuries” in paragraph 26. Defendant argues the allegations failed to meet the statutory and pleading requirements so punitive and exemplary damages allegations and prayer are subject to a motion to strike.

There is no opposition.

Because there is no opposition, Plaintiff cites to no authority supporting an award of punitive damages where an auto accident was negligently caused, but the at-fault driver left the scene in violation of the hit-and-run law. Taylor, cited by plaintiffs, involved a claim that the at-fault driver was intoxicated, a situation very different from an accident caused by inattentiveness.

Constitutional restrictions permit recovery of punitive damages only for conduct that harms the plaintiff. (See Holdgrafer v. Unocal Corp. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 907, 928, quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell (2003) 538 U.S. 408, 422-433.) “Punitive damages must focus on the reprehensibility of the type of conduct that harmed plaintiff.” (Haning, et al., Cal. Pract. Guide: Personal Injury (Rutter Group 2021) ¶ 3:1455.) In the Butte Fire Cases (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1176 the Court of Appeal determined that the defendant’s post-tort conduct failed to demonstrate that defendant acted with malice.

Violation of the hit-and-run statute, Vehicle Code section 20001 et seq., involves post-accident conduct. In a hit-and-run situation, it punishes the running (fleeing the scene), not the hitting (causing the accident). “[T]he conduct made criminal by Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (b) is fleeing the scene of an injury accident without providing the required information or rendering assistance, rather than causing or being involved in the accident itself.” (Corenbaum v. Lampkin (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1340.) “The occurrence of an injury accident is a condition precedent to the imposition of duties upon the driver under Vehicle Code sections 20001, subdivision (a) and 20003, but is not an element of the crime under Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (b).” (Ibid.) The damages recoverable in a civil action for violation of the statute are limited to those caused by fleeing rather than damages caused by the accident itself. (Ibid., citing People v. Corners (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 139, 148.)

Here, looking only at allegations of the complaint, Defendant’s conduct does not rise to the level of “despicable conduct” sufficient to support the award of punitive damages. The complaint states Defendant’s fleeing the scene immediately after collision demonstrated a “malicious and willful disregard” for the consequences of his actions, and necessitates punitive damages in the case. But Plaintiff only asserts minimal facts: that, having collided with Plaintiff’s vehicle, Komilov left the scene of an accident involving both personal injury and property damage. Fleeing the scene of the incident does not necessarily amount to despicable conduct. Paragraph 26 of the complaint further alleges “Plaintiff’ suffering was exacerbated by the sight of the defendant fleeing the scene, deepening his emotional distress and compounding his injuries.” These allegations are not specific enough to establish that the post-accident conduct caused any damage or injury to Plaintiff. The Court agrees with Defendant’s contention that the complaint lacks specific facts to substantiate the allegations. None of the facts alleged indicate he knew Plaintiff was injured and then left the scene, or that Defendant increased the risk or damage to Plaintiff by leaving. Komilov’s violations of the Vehicle Code, while illegal, do not automatically mean punitive damages are appropriate. The complaint has not established Plaintiff’s contention that Defendant acted with malice by willfully and consciously disregarding the rights or safety of Plaintiff.

The complaint’s allegations are conclusory and do not show the requisite degree of “malice,” “oppression,” or “fraud.” Malice requires intent to injury or despicable conduct carried on with willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others. A simple hit and run does not qualify as such. Evidence showing a possible violation of Vehicle Code section 20001 does not show that Defendant acted with malice in causing the accident and injury in the first place. The alleged post-accident conduct does not provide a basis for recovering punitive damages against Defendant. In the absence of aggravating allegations, there is no basis for punitive damages. Accordingly, sufficient grounds exist to grant the motion to strike references to punitive damages allegations.

“Conclusory allegations” that defendant’s conduct was “malicious” are insufficient and subject to being stricken. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1036.) The proper standard for determination of a motion to strike punitive damages is whether plaintiff has alleged “ultimate facts” showing an entitlement to exemplary damages. (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)

The court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to strike the punitive damages allegation and prayer for relief in items 1 and 2 of the notice of motion, because nothing in the complaint indicates that Defendant’s conduct arose to the level of malice, oppression, or fraud as those terms are defined in Civil Code section 3294.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to strike portions of the complaint pertaining to Plaintiff’s claim for exemplary/punitive damages is GRANTED with leave to amend. Plaintiff has 30 days from the date of this order to amend the complaint. The Court notes that unless a subsequent amendment cures the above defects in the pleading, the Court would consider granting a motion to strike filed thereto without leave to amend.

Moving Party to provide notice.

Dated:   August 26, 2024                                ___________________________________

                                                                                    Joel L. Lofton

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court indicating their

intention to submit.  alhdeptx@lacourt.org