Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: EC064009, Date: 2023-05-18 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: EC064009 Hearing Date: May 18, 2023 Dept: X
Tentative Ruling
Judge Joel L. Lofton,
Department X
HEARING DATE: May
18, 2023 TRIAL DATE: August 24, 2022
CASE: PASQUALE ZAZA v.
PETER STOJANOV, as Administrator of the Estate of Maria Nagy; GABORATORY, INC.;
AND DOES 1 THROUGH 10
CASE NO.: EC064009
MOTION
TO SET ASIDE VACATE JUDGMENT
MOVING PARTY: Defendant Peter Stojanov, as
administrator of the estate of Maria Nagy
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff
Pasquale Zaza
SERVICE: Filed
February 17, 2023
OPPOSITION: Filed February 27,
2023
REPLY: Filed March 3, 2023
RELIEF
REQUESTED
Defendant moves to set
aside judgment.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of Plaintiff
Pasquale Zaza’s (“Plaintiff”) claim that Maria Nagy (“Maria”), who is now
deceased, had deprived him of profits relating to the sale of copyrighted
jewelry by selling the products through a different company. Plaintiff filed
the original complaint on August 24, 2015. Plaintiff filed this fourth amended
complaint (“FAC”) on August 12, 2021, alleging four causes of action for (1)
breach of contract, (2) fraud, (3) conversion, and (4) accounting.
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendant’s
motion to set aside judgment is GRANTED.
LEGAL STANDARD
“A
judgment or decree, when based upon a decision by the court, or the special
verdict of a jury, may, upon motion of the party aggrieved, be set aside and
vacated by the same court, and another and different judgment entered, for
either of the following causes, materially affecting the substantial rights of
the party and entitling the party to a different judgment: [¶] 1. Incorrect or
erroneous legal basis for the decision, not consistent with or not supported by
the facts; and in such case when the judgment is set aside, the statement of
decision shall be amended and corrected. [¶] 2. A judgment or decree not consistent with
or not supported by the special verdict.” (Code Civ. Proc section 663.)
DISCUSSION
The court previously issued a tentative decision in this matter granting
Defendant’s motion to set aside judgment. The court allowed the parties to
submit additional briefing on the issues presented by Defendant’s motion.
“Standing is a threshold issue necessary to maintain a cause
of action, and the burden to allege and establish standing lies with the
plaintiff.” [Citation.] “Standing goes to the existence of a cause of action
[citation], and the lack of standing may be raised at any time in the
proceedings.” (Spotlight on Coastal Corruption v. Kinsey (2020) 57
Cal.App.5th 874, 882.) “Lack of standing may be raised at any time in the
proceeding, including at trial or in an appeal.” (Blumhorst v. Jewish Family
Services of Los Angeles (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 993, 1000.)
“Shareholders
may bring two types of actions, ‘a direct action
filed by the shareholder individually (or on behalf of a class of shareholders to which he or she
belongs) for injury to his or her interest as a shareholder,’
or a ‘derivative action filed on behalf of the corporation for injury to the corporation for
which it has failed or refused to sue.’ ” (Schuster v. Gardner (2005)
127 Cal.App.4th 305, 311-12.)
Plaintiff primarily
relies on three cases to argue that his claim is an individual claim as opposed
to a derivative claim.
The first is
Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co. (1969) 1 Cal.3d 93,107, where the
California Supreme Court held that “[i]t is clear from the stipulated facts and
plaintiff's allegations that she does not seek to recover on behalf of the
corporation for injury done to the corporation by defendants. Although she does
allege that the value of her stock has been diminished by defendants' actions,
she does not contend that the diminished value reflects an injury to the
corporation and resultant depreciation in the value of the stock. Thus the
gravamen of her cause of action is injury to herself and the other minority
stockholders.”
However, the
facts in Jones are distinguishable from the present case. In Jones,
supra, majority shareholders of a loan association transferred their shares
to a separate financial entity. (1 Cal.3d at pp. 102-103.) The plaintiff’s
claim was that the majority shareholders “used their control of the Association
for their own advantage to the detriment of the minority when they created
United Financial, made a public market for its shares that rendered Association
stock unmarketable except to United Financial, and then refused either to purchase
plaintiff's Association stock at a fair price or exchange the stock on the same
basis afforded to the majority.” (Id. at p. 105.)
In the
present case, Plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract is based on the
shareholders agreement which apportions the stock ownership for Gaboratory,
Inc. Plaintiff argues that he is seeking “to receive his share of the profits
from sales which were withheld from him”. (Plaintiff’s Brief at p. 5:16-17.)
However, Plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract is predicated and reliant on
the valuation of his stock in the company. To recover for the harm he suffered
personally, Plaintiff first had to establish that Gaboratory, Inc. was harmed
by Maria Nagy’s transfer of Gaboratory assets to a separate corporation. In
other words, Plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract is reliant on his claim
that Maria Nagy’s action caused harm to the whole body of Gaboratory, Inc.’s
stock.
“ ‘[T]he action is derivative, i.e.,
in the corporate right, if the gravamen of the complaint is injury to the
corporation, or to the whole body of its stock and property without any
severance or distribution among individual holders, or it seeks to recover assets
for the corporation or to prevent the dissipation of its assets.’ ” (Jara v.
Supreme Meats, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1254.) “In contrast, a
stockholder's individual suit is ‘ “a suit to enforce a right against the
corporation which the stockholder possesses as an individual.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
Plaintiff
also relies on Jara to support his contention that his claim is an
individual claim. In Jara, supra, the trial court had ruled that
the plaintiff’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty based on his claim that the
majority shareholders had paid themselves excessive compensation was a
derivative claim. (121 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1242-43.) The Jara Court held
that the decision in “Jones [allows] a minority
shareholder to bring a personal action alleging ‘a majority stockholders'
breach of a fiduciary duty to minority stockholders, which resulted in the
majority stockholders retaining a disproportionate share of the corporation's
ongoing value.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1257-58.) The Court stated that the
gravamen of the plaintiff’s claim was that “he was deprived of a fair share of
the corporation's profits as a result of defendants' generous payment of
executive compensation to themselves.” (Id. at p. 1258.) The Court then
analyzed the impact on the corporation based on the breach alleged, and it held
that although “the alleged payment of excessive compensation did have the
potential of damaging the business” the company experienced extraordinary
growth. (Ibid.)
The
present case is markedly distinguishable because Plaintiff’s claim is based on
the fact that Gaboratory, Inc. suffered great harm because Maria Nagy sold
Gaboratory products through a separate entity, essentially bringing
Gaboratory’s business transactions to nothing. As previously stated,
Plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract is based on the fact that Gaboratory,
first and foremost, suffered injury based on Maria Nagy’s actions.
Lastly,
Plaintiff cites to Schrage, supra, for the proposition that “ ‘ “[i]f the injury is one to the plaintiff as a
stockholder and to him individually, and not to the corporation, as where the
action is based on a contract to which he is a party, or on a right belonging
severally to him, or on a fraud affecting him directly, it is an individual
action.” ’ ” (69 Cal.App.5th at p.150.) However, Plaintiff’s argument here
fails because he seeks to recover damages based on a contract for stock
ownership. Plaintiff does not argue or establish that the shareholder agreement
provides him a specific remedy for damages separate to the harm suffered by
Gaboratory, Inc. “If the injury is not
incidental to an injury to the corporation, an individual cause of action
exists.” (Ibid.) Plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract is more than
incidental to an injury to Gaboratory, it is wholly reliant on that injury.
Plaintiff’s
claim for breach of contract is a derivative suit because it seeks recovery of
harm Gaboratory, Inc. suffered.
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s
motion to set aside judgment is GRANTED.
Moving Party
to give notice.
Dated: May 18, 2023 ___________________________________
Joel
L. Lofton
Judge
of the Superior Court
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an
email to the court indicating their
intention to submit.
Parties intending to appear are strongly encouraged to appear remotely. alhdeptx@lacourt.org