Judge: John J. Kralik, Case: 20BBCV00477, Date: 2023-01-27 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20BBCV00477    Hearing Date: January 27, 2023    Dept: NCB

 

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

North Central District

Department B

 

 

Anthony Bozanich,

                        Plaintiff,

            v.

 

sang hyuk park,

 

                        Defendant.

 

  Case No.:  20BBCV00477

 

  Hearing Date:  January 27, 2023

 

 [TENTATIVE] order RE:

Demurrer; motion to strike

 

 

 

BACKGROUND

A.    Allegations

Plaintiff Anthony Bozanich (“Plaintiff”) alleges that on August 8, 2016, Plaintiff and Defendant Sang Hyuk Park (“Park”) executed a California Residential Purchase Agreement and Joint Escrow Instructions (“Purchase Agreement”) for Plaintiff’s purchase of residential property located at 12407 Moorpark Street, #105, Studio City, CA 91604.  Defendant Forward Wilshire Inc. dba Keller Williams Realty Larchmont (“Forward Wilshire”) was Park’s real estate broker.  As part of the escrow process, Park prepared and signed several California Association Realtors forms, including the Transfer Disclosure Statement (“TDS”) and Seller Property Questionnaire (“SPQ”).  In his TDS, Park stated that he was unaware of the presence of mold at the property and in the TDS and SPQ, Park did not disclose any ongoing water leaks/intrusion at the property. 

Plaintiff alleges that escrow closed on September 27, 2016 and he moved into the property in November 2016.  Plaintiff alleges that he learned about issues with the HVAC in late spring/early summer of 2017 when he first ran the unit, which created excessive moisture and pooling of water that caused mold.  Plaintiff alleges that in late-June 2017, water began pouring down from the ceiling smoke detector outside of the property’s spare bedroom, which was water leaking from the neighboring unit above the property. 

Plaintiff also alleges that he discovered construction defect issues with the exterior balcony, which included a negative slope that caused water to pool along the property’s exterior walls. 

Plaintiff alleges that he later discovered that Park had actual knowledge of the issues with the HVAC unit, the leaking water from the above unit, and the balcony defects prior to executing the Purchase Agreement. 

The first amended complaint (“FAC”), filed September 15, 2022, alleges causes of action for: (1) breach of contract against Park; (2) fraud against Park; (3) negligent misrepresentation against Park; (4) breach of duty of disclosure by seller’s agent to buyer against Forward Wilshire; and (5) conspiracy to commit fraud against Park and Forward Wilshire.

On March 24, 2021, Plaintiff amended the complaint to name Forward Wilshire Inc. dba Keller Williams Realty Larchmont as Doe 1.

B.     Motions on Calendar

On January 6, 2023, Defendant Sang Hyuk Park filed a demurrer and a motion to strike portions of the FAC.

On January 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the demurrer only.

On January 19, 2023, Park filed a reply brief to the demurrer.  Park also filed a notice of non-opposition to the motion to strike, stating that Park was not in receipt of an opposition brief from Plaintiff.

DISCUSSION RE DEMURRER

            Park demurs to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 5th causes of action in the FAC.

A.    Breach of Written Contract – 1st cause of action

The essential elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are: “(1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damages to plaintiff.”  (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.)  A written contract may be pleaded either by its terms—set out verbatim in the complaint or a copy of the contract attached to the complaint and incorporated therein by reference—or by its legal effect.”  (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1489.)

In the 1st cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that he and Park entered into the Purchase Agreement on August 8, 2016 and that he performed the material obligations of the Purchase Agreement, except those he was prevented from performing due to Park’s wrongful conduct.  (FAC, ¶¶24-25.)  Plaintiff alleges that Park failed to disclose material defects of which he was aware to Plaintiff as required by the Purchase Agreement, such that Plaintiff was damaged.  (Id., ¶¶26-27.) 

Park demurs to the 1st cause of action, arguing that the contract document is not attached to the FAC and that the material terms of the contract are not alleged.  A copy of the Purchase Agreement is not attached to the FAC.  Further, while the FAC alleges that Plaintiff and Park entered into the Purchase Agreement, Plaintiff has not alleged the material terms of the Purchase Agreement, such as terms regarding whether Park had a contractual duty to disclose material defects, Plaintiff’s duties thereto, etc.  (FAC, ¶9.)  At most, Plaintiff alleges that as a part of the escrow process, Park prepared and signed the TDS and SPQ, but he has not alleged whether this was a term of the Purchase Agreement.

The demurrer to the 1st cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.

B.     Fraud and Conspiracy to Defraud – 2nd and 5th causes of action

To allege a cause of action for fraud, the requisite elements are: (1) a representation, usually of fact, which is false; (2) knowledge of its falsity; (3) intent to defraud; (4) justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation; and (5) damage resulting from that justifiable reliance.  (Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal. App. 3d 59, 72-73.)  This cause of action is a tort of deceit and the facts constituting each element must be alleged with particularity; the claim cannot be saved by referring to the policy favoring liberal construction of pleadings.  (Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 216.)  Since the claim must be pleaded with particularity, the cause of action based on misrepresentations must allege facts showing how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the misrepresentations were tendered.  (Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 73.)

In the 2nd cause of action for fraud, Plaintiff alleges that from August 8, 2016 to September 27, 2016 (close of escrow), Defendants made fraudulent representations and concealed material facts for the express purpose of inducing Plaintiff to enter into the Purchase Agreement and close escrow.  (FAC, ¶30.)  He alleges that Defendants made false representations and intentionally concealed material defects regarding the condition of the property that were known to Defendants and that Plaintiff could not have known.  (Id., ¶31.)  Plaintiff alleges that Defendants knew from the very beginning that their representations were false, but nevertheless convinced Plaintiff to purchase the property.  (Id., ¶32.)  Plaintiff alleges he reasonably relied on the representations by executing the Purchase Agreement and closing escrow and that had he known about the true facts, he would not have executed the Purchase Agreement or closed escrow.  (Id., ¶¶33-34.)

In the 5th cause of action for conspiracy to commit fraud, Plaintiff alleges that Forward Wilshire was aware that Park planned to commit fraud with respect to concealing material defects elated to the property and Park was likewise aware that Forward Wilshire planned to commit fraud to realize commission on the sale of the property.  (FAC, ¶57.)  Plaintiff alleges that Forward Wilshire and Park agreed with one another, intended the fraud against him, and worked together so that the fraud could be accomplished.  (Id., ¶¶58-59.) 

Park demurs to the fraud causes of action, arguing that Plaintiff fails to allege facts with the requisite specificity. 

For the fraud claim alleged against Park, Plaintiff has alleged that Park prepared the TDS and SPQ during the escrow process and that this was sometime between August 8, 2016 and September 27, 2016.  (FAC, ¶¶11, 30.)  Plaintiff has alleged facts showing how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the alleged misrepresentations about the property were tendered.  As such, the demurrer on this ground will be overruled.

Next, Park argues that the FAC fails to allege facts showing that Park knew of the issues regarding the HVAC and mold.  In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges that he later discovered that Park had actual knowledge of both the issue with the HVAC and the water leak from the neighboring unit above the property, prior to executing the Purchase Agreement, but fails to allege with particularity the element of Park’s knowledge of the falsity of his representations.  Further facts should be provided to support this element of fraud.

As such, the demurrer to the 2nd cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.  As the 5th cause of action for conspiracy to defraud is essentially dependent on the 2nd cause of action for fraud, the demurrer to the 5th cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.

C.     Negligent Misrepresentation - 3rd cause of action

To allege a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation, the requisite elements are: (1) a misrepresentation of a past or existing material fact; (2) without reasonable grounds for believing it to be true; (3) with intent to induce another's reliance on the fact misrepresented; (4) ignorance of the truth and justifiable reliance thereon by the party to whom the misrepresentation was directed; and (5) damages.  (B.L.M. v. Sabo & Deitsch (1997) 55 Cal. App. 4th 823, 834.)  Negligent misrepresentation, unlike fraud, does not require knowledge of falsity.  (Apollo Capital Fund, LLC v. Roth Capital Partners, LLC (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 226, 243.)  However, like fraud, “[e]ach element in a cause of action for. . . negligent misrepresentation must be factually and specifically alleged.”  (Cadlo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 513, 519.)

The 3rd cause of action for negligent misrepresentation alleges similar facts as the fraud cause of action.  (See FAC., ¶¶38-42.) 

For the same reasons discussed above regarding the demurrer to the fraud cause of action, the Court sustains the demurrer to the 3rd cause of action with leave to amend.

DISCUSSION RE MOTION TO STRIKE

            In light of the ruling on the demurrer, the Court takes the motion to strike portions of the complaint off-calendar.   

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Defendant Sang Hyuk Park’s demurrer to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 5th causes of action in the First Amended Complaint is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.

Defendant Forward Wilshire Inc. dba Keller Williams Realty Larchmont’s motion to strike is taken off-calendar as moot, in light of the ruling on the demurrer.

Defendant shall provide notice of this order.