Judge: John J. Kralik, Case: 20STCV18606, Date: 2022-09-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV18606    Hearing Date: September 9, 2022    Dept: NCB

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

North Central District

Department B

BACKGROUND

A.    Allegations

Plaintiffs Ryan Larson and Matthew Hinerfeld (“Plaintiffs”) allege that on December 19, 2019, Plaintiffs used Defendant Lyft, Inc.’s (“Lyft”) app to request transportation to Hinerfeld’s work Christmas party.  Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Ian Woeber (“Woeber”) arrived in a Toyota Corolla and, upon entering the vehicle, they observed a noticeable smoke smell that could not readily be identified as marijuana.  Plaintiffs allege that though they were concerned Woeber was drunk, they relied on Lyft’s zero-tolerance policy for the consumption of drugs and alcohol while driving.  As Woeber was driving, Plaintiffs allege that he hit the brakes and slammed into a Lexus Sedan in front of him.  Thereafter, Plaintiffs allege that Woeber engaged the child locks on the doors, preventing Plaintiffs from exiting the vehicle, and he started to drive away from the scene of the collision.  They allege Woeber let them out about 100 feet from the collision site and fled the collision site. 

The third amended complaint (“TAC”), filed June 2, 2022, alleges causes of action for: (1) negligence; (2) negligence per se; (3) negligent hiring, supervision, or retention; (4) common carrier negligence; (5) willful and wanton negligence; (6) intentional misrepresentation; (7) negligent misrepresentation; (8) breach of contract; and (9) strict products liability.    

B.     Motions on Calendar

On April 7, 2022, Lyft filed a motion to strike portions of the TAC.  On August 26, 2022, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the motion. On September 1, 2022, Lyft filed a reply brief.

On July 29, 2022, Woeber filed a demurrer and a motion to strike portions of the TAC.  On August 26, 2022, Plaintiffs filed oppositions to the demurrer and motion to strike.  On September 1, 2022, Woeber filed reply briefs.  

DISCUSSION RE LYFT’S MOTION TO STRIKE

Lyft moves to strike the allegations for punitive damages in paragraphs 196 (6^th cause of action for intentional misrepresentation) and the prayer for damages at paragraph 8 (with respect to the 6^th cause of action) in the TAC.   

A complaint including a request for punitive damages must include allegations showing that the plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages.  (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)  A claim for punitive damages cannot be pleaded generally and allegations that a defendant acted "with oppression, fraud and malice" to\\ward plaintiff are insufficient legal conclusions to show that the plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages.  (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.)  Specific factual allegations are required to support a claim for punitive damages.  (Id.)

Civil Code § 3294 authorizes a plaintiff to obtain an award of punitive damages when there is clear and convincing evidence that the defendant engaged in malice, oppression, or fraud.  Section 3294(c) defines the terms in the following manner:

(1)   "Malice" means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

(2)   "Oppression" means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.

(3)   "Fraud" means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. 

With respect to a corporate employer, section 3294(b) requires that the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.

Lyft argues that Plaintiffs have had multiple opportunities to allege punitive damages against Lyft and two motions to strike the allegations for punitive damages have already been stricken with leave to amend.[1]

In paragraph 196, Plaintiffs allege:

196. As a result of the false representations made by Defendant Lyft by and through one or more of Defendant Lyft’s executives, managers, corporate officers, employees, agents and/or representatives, as authorized by one or more of Defendant Lyft’s officers, directors and/or managing agents, upon which Mr. Hinerfeld reasonably relied, pursuant to California Civil Code § 3294, Mr. Hinerfeld is entitled to exemplary and punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish and set an example of Defendant Lyft and DOES 7 through 20.

(TAC, ¶196.) 

            The Court considers this paragraph in the context of the other allegations when assessing punitive damages.  Plaintiffs allege that Lyft had a “Help” and “Report Safety Issue or Accident” sections on its website and app that touted the zero-tolerance policy for its drivers, such that passengers were led to believe these representations.  (TAC, ¶¶162, 168.)  They also allege that Lyft was aware of Woeber’s previous violation of Lyft’s policies and his history of drinking and driving, but they failed to adequately investigate such complaints to confirm if the policy had been violated.  (Id., ¶¶168-171.)  Following the demurrer and motion to strike portions of the SAC, Plaintiffs amended the allegations of the 6^th cause of action to include additional facts that Hinerfeld was informed and believed that Lyft’s representations contained in its zero-tolerance policy on Lyft’s website and app were authorized and/or directed by one or more corporate officers, directors, and/or managing agents of Lyft (Does 7-20).  (Id., ¶193.)  Hinerfeld alleges that the conduct constituted malice, oppression, or fraud by Lyft’s officers, directors, and/or managing agents who were authorized to act on Lyft’s behalf.  (Id., ¶¶194-195.) 

At the pleading stage, the Court finds that Plaintiffs still lack sufficient allegations to show that Defendants acted with malice, oppression, and/or fraud to warrant punitive damages.  While there are allegations that Lyft allowed Woeber to continue as a driver despite prior complaints or possible violations of the policy and that Lyft made representations about the policy on their website and app, Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts showing that punitive damages are proper against this corporate defendant.  Further, pleadings against a corporation must allege the names of the persons at the corporation and their authority to act on behalf of the corporation. (Tarmann v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157.)  At best, the current allegations are conclusory regarding authorization and ratification by Lyft’s corporate agent.  While Plaintiffs need now show by clear and convincing evidence that their punitive damages claim is meritorious at the pleading stage, Plaintiffs still must allege facts with the requisite particularity and specificity when seeking punitive damages against a corporate employer.

            At this time, Plaintiffs allegations are mostly upon information and belief and lack specific factual allegations. 

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that they have propounded special interrogatories to acquire information about the corporation’s knowledge of the drafting, implementation, monitoring, and enforcement of Lyft’s zero-tolerance policy, investigation of complaints of breaches, and the conduct and knowledge of its officers, directors, and/or managing agents regarding that information, but that Plaintiffs have not yet received responses from Lyft.  (Opp. at p.7.) While it is possible that evidence of malice could later be obtained, it is apparent that Plaintiffs do not now have that information, and the Court will not grant leave to amend. In the event evidence is later discovered, the Court can consider that later discovered evidence on a motion to amend that is properly brought and supported.  

Lyft’s motion to strike is granted without leave to amend.

DISCUSSION RE WOEBER’S DEMURRER AND MOTION TO STRIKE

A.    Demurrer

Woeber demurs to the 5^th cause of action for willful and wanton negligence. 

            First, Woeber argues that the 5^th cause of action is not a separate, standalone cause of action and cites to law discussing gross negligence. 

The Supreme Court distinguished gross negligence and willful and wanton negligence as follows:

“Gross negligence” long has been defined in California and other jurisdictions as either a “want of even scant care” or “an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of conduct.”  …

By contrast, “wanton” or “reckless” misconduct (or “willful and wanton negligence”) describes conduct by a person who may have no intent to cause harm, but who intentionally performs an act so unreasonable and dangerous that he or she knows or should know it is highly probable that harm will result.

(City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 747, 754, fn.4.) 

            The Court of Appeal in New v. Consolidated Rock Products Co. (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 681 further stated:

“ ‘Wilful or wanton misconduct’ travels under several other names. Its aliases include ‘serious and wilful misconduct,’ ‘wanton misconduct,’ ‘reckless disregard,’ ‘recklessness,’ and combinations of some or all of these. These terms are interchangeable because they all identify the same thing—‘an aggravated form of negligence, differing in quality rather than degree from ordinary lack of care’ ….

“Three essential elements must be present to raise a negligent act to the level of wilful misconduct: (1) actual or constructive knowledge of the peril to be apprehended, (2) actual or constructive knowledge that injury is a probable, as opposed to a possible, result of the danger, and (3) conscious failure to act to avoid the peril.

(New v. Consolidated Rock Products Co. (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 681, 689-690.) 

            There is conflicting case law on whether gross negligence or willful misconduct are separate causes of action from negligence or are a subset of negligence.  However, at this time, the Court will recognize the cause of action for willful and wanton negligence.

            Next, Woeber argues that the allegations are insufficient to state a cause of action against him because the 5^th cause of action is grounded upon the Vehicle Code, but the allegations are conclusory and are contradictory with respect to whether Woeber was under the influence or not.  Woeber also argues that the Vehicle Code forms a basis for criminal prosecution and does not provide an independent statutory basis for gross negligence.

            The allegations are sufficient to allege a willful and wanton negligence cause of action.  In the 5^th cause of action, Plaintiffs allege that Woeber violated Vehicle Code, § 23152(a) and (f)[2] when he transported Lyft’s customers while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, and/or other substances that impaired his ability to drive.  (TAC, ¶154.)  Plaintiffs allege that Woeber intended to transport Plaintiffs as Lyft’s customers while knowing that he was under the influence and said risk created an unreasonable risk of harm significantly greater than ordinary negligence.  (Id., ¶¶155-156.)  They allege that Woeber’s driving under the influence is a direct and proximate cause of their injuries.  (Id., ¶159.)  Although Plaintiffs are not criminally prosecuting Woeber by way of this civil action, Plaintiffs have at least shown that by Woeber’s alleged driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs impaired his ability to drive and violated the statute that was put in place for the safety of the public. 

            At the pleading stage, the allegations are sufficient.  Whether Woeber did in fact engage in willful and wanton negligent behavior will be determined beyond the pleading stage upon the consideration of evidence.  And whether this is or is not a cause of action is of no consequence as it may still be brought under a negligence claim.  “If the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against a demurrer.” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38.)

            The demurrer to the 5^th cause of action is overruled. 

B.     Motion to Strike

Woeber moves to strike the 5^th cause of action in its entirety, paragraphs 56, 57, 65, 68, 71,  76, 77 (as to page 12, lines 22-25), 79, 82, 84, 86, 107, 111 (at page 17, line 8), 112, 124 (at page 18, lines 22-23), 16, 127, 133, 134 (at page 19, lines  29-31), 137 (at page 20, lines 7-8), 165 (at page 23, lines 25-26), 167 (at page 24, lines 5-6), 171 (page 24, line 22), 176 (at page 25, lines 15-19), 191 (at page 28, line 2), 196 (at page 28, lines 2-4), 201 (at page 29 lines 23-25), 203 (at page 30, lines 3-4), 209 (at page 30, line 28), 2214 (at page 31, lines 20-23), 223 (at page 32, line 29), and 223 (at page 32, lines 29-31), and the prayer for damages at paragraph 7.

For the reasons discussed above, the motion to strike the 5^th cause of action in its entirety is denied.

Woeber moves to strike paragraph 65, 68, 111, 166, 176, 202, and 214 arguing that Plaintiffs’ allegations that the vehicle’s smell “may have been marijuana” and that Woeber was driving under the influence (in paragraphs 68, 71, 176, and 214)  are conclusory allegations and whether or not a vehicle may smell like marijuana cannot form the basis for negligence because Plaintiffs did not allege that Woeber was the person responsible for the smell.  The motion to strike these allegations is denied.  Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the initial smell from the vehicle and allegations regarding Woeber driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol while fulfilling a Lyft app request are relevant to this action and form the basis for Plaintiffs’ complaint. 

Next, Woeber argues that Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding his past misdemeanor convictions, citations, and drunk driving history are improper character evidence and inadmissible hearsay.  Woeber argues that even if the allegations are true, they cannot form the basis of Plaintiffs’ claim against him for his operation of the vehicle in this action.  However, references to Woeber’s past driving history is potentially relevant to this action as it shows whether Woeber knowingly and recklessly drove the vehicle with passengers while under the influence, as well as supports allegations that Lyft may or may not have been on notice of Woeber’s qualification to drive as a Lyft driver.  Such evidence may be excluded based on a thorough review of all applicable Evidence Code provisions, but that will be determined prior to trial through motions in limine.  The Court will not determine at the pleading stage whether Plaintiffs’ allegations in the complaint constitute hearsay or otherwise inadmissible evidence.  The motion to strike these allegations is denied.

Woeber also argues that any allegations regarding false imprisonment, Plaintiffs’ fear that Woeber may have had a gun, etc. are inflammatory and should be stricken.  The Court will allow the allegations regarding Woeber’s alleged actions of child-locking the car doors following the accident, but will strike the allegations regarding Plaintiffs’ fear that Woeber may have had a gun at paragraph 79.

Woeber moves to strike allegations that he has a history of driving while incapacitated or under the influence and was driving impaired at the time of the incident.  (TAC, ¶¶56, 57, 133, 134, 167, 171, 201; 82, 107, 124, 191, 204, 223.)  For the same reasons discussed above, the Court denies the motion to strike these allegations. 

Finally, Woeber moves to strike allegations regarding punitive damages, arguing that Plaintiffs only allege negligence against Woeber and that the allegations lack a showing that he acted with malice.  The motion to strike the allegations for punitive damages against Woeber is denied.  The allegations regarding the willful and wonton negligence cause of action sufficiently allege that Woeber knowingly engaged in conduct that was in willful and conscious disregard of Plaintiffs’ right or safety.  The allegations are sufficient to rise to the level of malice or oppression.  Again, whether the facts and evidence will show whether punitive damages are actually proper will be determined beyond the pleading stage upon the consideration of evidence at the summary judgment and/or trial stage.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER 

Defendant Lyft, Inc.’s motion to strike the allegations for punitive damages in the Third Amended Complaint is granted without leave to amend.  If Plaintiff later obtains evidence to allege factual allegations to support a request for punitive damages, Plaintiff may file a motion for leave to amend the complaint at that time.

Defendant Ian Wober’s demurrer to the 5^th cause of action in the Third Amended Complaint is overruled.  Defendant Ian Woeber’s motion to strike is granted without leave to amend with respect to allegations about Plaintiffs’ fear that Defendant Ian Woeber might have had a gun at the time of the subject incident.  The remainder of the motion to strike is denied.

Defendants shall provide notice of their respective orders.