Judge: John J. Kralik, Case: 21STCV25682, Date: 2023-06-23 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV25682    Hearing Date: March 1, 2024    Dept: NCB

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

North Central District

Department B

BACKGROUND

A.   Allegations

Plaintiff Rashyn R. Reynolds (“Plaintiff”) filed the third amended complaint (“TAC”) on December 6, 2023.  The TAC is a three-page document: the first two pages include allegations and the third page includes a proof of service.  It alleges a single cause of action for “infliction of emotional distress.”

Plaintiff alleges that the outrageous conduct includes intentionally advising her to sign a defective release of information, which caused her to sign the document and jeopardize the probability of an outcome in her favor.  She alleges that she lost time with her minor son, family stability, mother-son bond, and educational decision-making for her minor son.  She alleges that she suffered from loss of sleep, panic attacks, loss of hope and control, etc.  She references Defendant Hillsides’ release of information in the original complaint.   

B.    Demurrer on Calendar

On January 9, 2024, Hillsides filed a demurrer to the TAC.

The Court is not in receipt of an opposition brief.  

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Hillsides requests judicial notice of: (1) the Notice of Ruling filed on June 26, 2023; (2)the Minute Order from the Case Management Conference on July 18, 2023; (3) the Notice of Ruling filed November 14, 2023; (4) the Minute Order from the Case Management Conference on November 6, 2023; (5) the Notice of Ruling filed on November 14, 2023; and (6) the TAC filed on December 6, 2023.  The request is granted.  (Evid. Code, § 452(d).)

DISCUSSION

            Hillsides demurs to the IIED cause of action alleged in the TAC, arguing that Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts. 

The elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s intention of causing or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff suffered severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) the plaintiff’s injuries were actually and proximately caused by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.  (Vasquez v. Franklin Mgmt. Real Estate Fund, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 819, 832.)  In order to avoid a demurrer, the plaintiff must allege with great specificity, the acts which she believes are so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.  (Id.)

Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.  (Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903.)  In addition, the outrageous conduct must be of a nature which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress of a very serious kind.  (Id.)  “Although emotional distress may consist of any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as fright, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment or worry [citation], to make out a claim, the plaintiff must prove that emotional distress was severe and not trivial or transient.”  (Wong v. Tai Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1376.)  Such distress must be “of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable person in civilized society should be expected to endure it.”  (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 1004.)

First, to the extent that Plaintiff attempts to incorporate prior pleadings into the TAC, this is improper.  The TAC should be complete in and of itself. 

Second, the allegations of the TAC fail to rise to a showing that Hillsides’ conduct was extreme and outrageous.  At most, Plaintiff alleges that Hillsides instructed her to sign a document.  The allegations also fail to allege facts that Hillsides’ instructions/conduct were done with the intent or reckless disregard to cause Plaintiff emotional distress.  The Court has afforded Plaintiff multiple opportunities to amend the complaint, but she has been unable to do so properly.  In its prior ruling on the demurrer to the SAC, the Court stated that the TAC would be Plaintiff’s final attempt at the pleading.  As such, the demurrer is sustained without leave to amend. 

In the alternative to the demurrer, Hillsides moves to dismiss the action for Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute.  As the demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, the alternative request is denied as moot. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Defendant Hillsides’ demurrer to the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action in the third amended complaint is sustained without leave to amend.