Judge John J. Kralik, Case Number: 22BBCV00099, Date: 2023-09-01 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Fond Land Preservation Foundation (“Plaintiff”) alleges it is a nonprofit public benefit corporation that has a specific purpose to acquire, preserve, and maintain one or more parks or open spaces in the Los Angeles or Ventura Counties for the use and enjoyment of the general public to be named in honor of Charles Fond and Rosemary Ann Fond. Plaintiff alleges that it owns 600 acres located in the Shadow Hills Community and land adjacent to the community. Plaintiff alleges that it has a number of easements for its benefit from Sunland Boulevard up Teazle Canyon Road for ingress and egress purposes.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Linda Sherdel, Edward Avakian, Richard and Mary Quacquarini, Ante Vukic, Raul and Martha Benitez, Jim Wrenn and Nanci B. Roberts, Dennis and Alice Teague Brandt, Sharon and Norman N. Griffin, Edris Issaagholian and Setanyan Lusine, Tonya McCann and Daniel Sanowski Jr., Nicole and David A. Schwimmer, Pedro and Edith Leiva, and Eric and Nancy Insua are residents of the Shadow Hills Community.

Plaintiff alleges that when Linda Sherdel purchased her property in 2013, she was aware that Plaintiff owned property adjacent to hers, as well as the easements. However, Linda Sherdel allegedly prevented Plaintiff’s volunteers and personnel from being at Fond Park and claimed they were trespassing. Plaintiff alleges that it hired a surveyor and built a fence next to Linda Sherdel’s property, but she blocked and impeded the surveyor’s activities. The other resident Defendants also put up “No Trespassing” signs at the entrance of Teazle Canyon Road and installed a self-help security gate at the entrance of Teazle Canyon Road in order to deter anyone entering Fond Park.

The Complaint, filed February 14, 2022, alleges causes of action for: (1) quiet title; (2) trespass and intentional tort; (3) trespass; (4) private nuisance; (5) declaratory relief; (6) injunctive relief; and (7) violation of Fish & Game Code, § 1602.

On July 7, 2022, Plaintiff dismissed: (1) with prejudice all causes of action against Defendants Tonya McCann and Daniel Sanowski, Jr. only; (2) without prejudice all causes of action against Defendants Pedro Leiva and Edith Leiva only; (3) with prejudice all causes of action against Defendants Sharon Griffin and Norman N. Griffin only; and (4) without prejudice the 2^nd, 3^rd, and 7^th causes of action against Defendants Richard Quacquarini, Co-Trustee of the Quacquarini Family Trust dated June 14, 2004, Mary Quacquarini, Co-Trustee of the Quacquarini Family Trust dated June 14, 2004, Edward Avakian, Raul Benitez, Martha Benitez, Jim Wrenn, Nanci B. Roberts, Nicole Schwimmer, Co-Trustee of the David and Nicole Schwimmer Family Trust, and David A. Schwimmer, Co-Trustee of the David and Nicole Schwimmer Family Trust.

On August 19, 2022, Defendants/Cross-Complainants Eric and Nancy Insua filed a cross-complaint against Plaintiff for: (1) prescriptive easement; (2) equitable easement; and (3) declaratory relief.

On October 6, 2022, Defendant/Cross-Complainant Linda Sherdel filed a cross-complaint against Plaintiff for: (1) trespass; (2) common law and statutory damage to trees; (3) quiet title; (4) private nuisance; (5) public nuisance; (6) declaratory relief; and (7) negligence. On May 16, 2023, Sherdel filed an Amendment to the Cross-Complaint naming Crescenta Valley Tree, Inc. as Roe 1.

On June 16, 2023, Plaintiff Fond Land Preservation Foundation (“FLPF”) filed a motion for summary adjudication in its favor and against Defendants Sherdel, Richard and Mary Quacquarini as Co-Trustees of the Quacquarini Family Trust dated June 14, 2004, Edward Avakian, Raul Benitez, Martha Benitez, Jim Wrenn, Nanci B. Roberts, Nicole and David A. Schwimmer as Co-Trustees of the David and Nicole Schwimmer Family Trust on the following issues:

1. FLPF is entitled to summary adjudication of its first cause of action for quiet title because FLPF can prove every element of an action for quiet title that FLPF and the public generally have an easement for ingress and egress along Teazle Canyon Road. For the same reasons, FLPF is entitled to summary adjudication of Defendant and Cross-Complainant Linda Sherdel’s (“Sherdel”) first cause of action for quiet title.

2. FLPF is entitled to summary adjudication of its fifth cause of action for declaratory relief because there is an actual controversy regarding the easement on Teazle Canyon Road and FLPF can prove that FLPF and the public generally have an easement for ingress and egress along Teazle Canyon Road.

3. FLPF is entitled to summary adjudication of its fourth cause of action for private nuisance on the grounds that there is no triable issue of that Defendants have interfered with FLPF’ use and enjoyment of the easement along Teazle Canyon Road by installing a security gate and “No Trespassing” signs and engaging in conduct to deter FLPF, its representatives and invitees from using and enjoying the easement along Teazle Canyon Road.

On August 21, 2023, Richard and Mary Quacquarini, Edward Avakian, Raul and Marth Benitz, Jim Wrenn, Nanci B. Roberts, and Nicole Schwimmer filed an untimely opposition brief. The Court notes that they did not file a separate statement or evidence.[1]

On August 28, 2023, FLPF filed reply papers to Richard and Mary Quacquarini, Edward Avakian, Raul and Marth Benitz, Jim Wrenn, Nanci B. Roberts, and Nicole Schwimmer’s opposition.

With the opposition brief, Linda Sherdel submitted evidentiary objections to the evidence provided by FLPF in its moving papers. The Court rules as follows:

· Declaration of William E. Eick (director of FLPF): Objection Nos. 1-17 are overruled.

· Declaration of Kris Rigdon (land surveyor retained by FLPF): Objection Nos. 18-27 are overruled.

· Declaration of D. Jason Davis (FLPF’s counsel): Objection Nos. 28-32 are overruled.

· FLPF’s Request for Judicial Notice, Exhibits A-E: Objection No. 33 is overruled.

With the August 25, 2023 reply brief, FLPF submitted evidentiary objections to the evidence submitted by Linda Sherdel’s opposition papers. The Court rules as follows:

With the August 28, 2023 reply brief, FLPF submitted evidentiary objections to the evidence submitted by Richard and Mary Quacquarini, Edward Avakian, Raul and Marth Benitz, Jim Wrenn, Nanci B. Roberts, and Nicole Schwimmer in their opposition papers. However, as noted above, the Court is not in receipt of any evidence in support of Defendants’ opposition papers. As such, the evidentiary objections are moot.

FLPF requests judicial notice of the following exhibits attached to the declaration of William E. Eick: (A) the Grant Deed evidencing the real property purchased by FLPF and recorded on April 29, 2005 that includes several parcels; (B) the Grant Deed evidencing purchase of land adjacent to the 2005 Grant Deed in 2011 and recorded on July 11, 2011; (C) the Deed of Easement granted by Howard G. Mitchell and Loretta M. Mitchell, Emerson W. Francis and Esie E. Francis, Ray O. Teeter and Robert E. Austin as Trustees under the Will of Esther M. Teeter, to themselves “and to neighboring and adjoining property owners, and to the public generally, an easement for public highway purposes …. On, across and through a strip of land sixty feet wide situate in City of Los Angeles; and (D) a Joint Tenancy Deed granted by Ray O. Teeter and Robert E. Austin to Amos B. Ikenberry and Ardeth Horning Ikenberry, which was recorded by the Los Angeles County Recorder on October 16, 1951. FLPF also requests judicial notice of the judgment entered on March 13, 1979 in the matter of Mitchell v. Simmons (LASC Case No. NC C 13640 B.) The Court takes judicial notice of the deeds and the court judgment. (Evid. Code, § 452(c)-(d).)

According to the notice of motion, FLPF moves for summary adjudication on the following issues: (1) FLPF’s quiet title cause of action in the complaint and Linda Sherdel’s quiet title cause of action in the cross-complaint; (2) FLPF’s declaratory relief cause of action; and (3) FLPF’s private nuisance cause of action. Although not stated in the notice of motion, FLPF also seeks summary adjudication regarding Linda Sherdel’s cause of action for trespass and common law and statutory damage to trees in her cross-complaint (issues 4 and 5 in the separate statement).

In the 1^st cause of action for quiet title in FLPF’s complaint, FLPF alleges that the Property Owner Defendants contend they have the right to restrict FLPF, its agents, representatives, and invitees’ access to Fond Park despite FLPF’s fee ownership and have thus denied use of the easement. (Compl., ¶38.) FLPF alleges that the Property Owner Defendants have no right to limit FLPF’s access to Fond Park nor limit its use of the easements, such that FLPF asks the Court to quiet title in FLPF and find FLPF is the lawful owner in fee of Fond Park and, in turn, FLPF and its agents, representatives, and invitees have the right to visit Fond Park and utilize the easements. (Id., ¶39.) In Linda Sherdel’s 3^rd cause of action for quiet title in the cross-complaint, she alleges that FLPF is claiming an unrestricted right upon the easement to have the general public use the easement to access private parcels and for general parking, which are adverse to her right, title, and interest in the easement and unreasonably overburden the easement. (Sherdel XC, ¶¶37-38.) Linda Sherdel alleges that FLPF seeks to quiet title to the easement that exceed the scope of the easement and she demands that FLPF cease and desist from further use of the easement that unreasonably burdens the easement. (Id., ¶¶39-40.)

FLPF argues that it has a right to the Teazle Canyon Easements based on the 1950 and 1951 Easements, such that Teazle Canyon Road can be used as a public highway by FLPF’s invitees and the public generally for ingress and egress purposes to access FLPF’s Property. FLPF provides the following material facts in support of the motion. FLPF was created to acquire, preserve, and maintain open spaces in Los Angeles and Ventura counties for the use and enjoyment of the public. (FLPF Fact 1.) On April 25, 2025, FLPF purchased approximately 500 acres of land located in the Shadow Hills Community in Los Angeles (“2005 Grant Deed”), which included a number of easements for FLPF’s benefit, including a nonexclusive easement for ingress and egress over Teazle Canyon Road (“Teazle Canyon Easements”). (Id. at 2, 4.) In 2011, FLPF purchased additional land adjacent to the 2005 Grant Deed (“2011 Grant Deed”). (Id. at 3.) The 2005 and 2011 Grant Deeds shall be referred to collectively as the “FLPF Property.” (Id.)

The Teazle Canyon Easements run along the entire portion of Teazle Canyon Road, beginning where Teazle Canyon Road intersects with Sunland Boulevard in Sunland, California, and terminating on the FLPF Property. (Id. at 5.) Many of the Defendants in this action must utilize some portion of the Teazle Canyon Easements to access their properties by traveling on Teazle Canyon Road. (Id. at 6.) On April 18, 1950, a Deed of Easement was recorded, wherein: “Howard G. Mitchell and Loretta M. Mitchell, his wife; Emerson W. Francis and Esie E. Francis, his wife; Ray O. Teeter and Robert E. Austin, as Trustees under the Will of Esther M. Teeter, deceased, grantors,” granted and conveyed to themselves (grantees) “and to neighboring and adjoining property owners, and to the public generally, an easement for street and public highway purposes . . . on, across and through a strip of land sixty feet wide situate[sic] in the City of Los Angeles.” (Id. at 7; RJN Ex. C [1950 Easement].) On October 16, 1951, Ray O. Teeter and Robert E. Austin granted to Amos B. Ikenberry and Ardeth Horning Ikenberry a strip of land 30 feet in width, but the grant reserved an easement for “neighboring and adjoining property owners and the public generally for street and public highway purposes….” (FLPF Fact at 8; RJN Ex. D [1951 Easement].) The 1950 and 1951 Easements cover the same area along Teazle Canyon Road as the Teazle Canyon Easements. (FLPF Fact at 9.) On March 13, 1979, Judge Robert P. Schifferman entered Judgment in Mitchell vs. Simmons in favor of plaintiffs Howard G. Mitchell and Loreta M. Mitchell, ruling that they had a “valid, subsisting 60-foot easement for public highway purposes” (the 1950 Easement), and that the defendants Ronald B. Simmons and Virginia C. Simmons were “forever barred from denying the said easement or claiming any rights therein adverse to plaintiffs”; the defendants were ordered to remove any objects they had placed on the easement and were forever prohibited from “placing any further objects on said easement.” (Id. at 10; FLPF Ex. E.)

FLPF has provided material facts and supporting evidence that it has an easement to the Teazle Canyon Road for ingress and egress purposes to access FLPF’s Property and that the easement extends not only to itself and the neighboring and adjoining property owners, but to the public generally for street and public highway purposes. However, it also argues that it has a public right of way, as opposed to a private way because of the term “public generally” in the easements. (See County of Sacramento v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 300, 313.)

In opposition, Linda Sherdel argues that Teazle Canyon Road is a private road in a residential area and has never been accepted or maintained by the government and that the non-exclusive easements only confer a private right of ingress and egress. Linda Sherdel argues that Teazle Canyon Road is a “private road” with “private easements,” relying on Schmidt v. Bank of America, N.A. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1489.

In the Schmidt case, the Schmidts owned a parcel of land, which was east of the Aragon parcel where a condominium project was being built. The parcels were once under common ownership by Rose Miller Parks, who conveyed herself an easement over the portion of the Schmidt parcel adjacent to the property she retained, which reserved to the grantor (Parks) the “right of ingress and egress for public road purposes over, along and across the Easterly 40 feet thereof.” (Schmidt v. Bank of America, N.A. (2014) 233 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1494.) Parks then sold her retained parcel, which later became the Aragon parcel, and the grant included the language for “an easement for public road purposes and incidental purposes, over the Easterly 40 feet” of the reserved easement over the Schmidt parcel. (Id.)

BOFA argued that the phrase “for public road purposes” created a public right-of-way over the reserved easement, which included the normal development of various structures and improvements (i.e., storm drains, fire gates, fire lanes, garage entryway, etc.). (Id. at 1496, 1498.) In contrast, the Schmidts argued that the grant only created a right of “ingress and egress” that entitled the Aragon parcel to use only the surface of the easement, essentially akin to a private roadway easement such that it may not be used for any nonroadway purpose. (Id. at 1498-99.)

In interpreting the language of Parks’ deed, the Schmidt Court found that the grant clearly and unambiguously granted a limited right of ingress and egress over, along, and across a portion of the Schmidt parcel, and that the phrase “for public road purposes” reflected the impetus for the reservation and reason for the right of ingress/egress. (Id. at 1500.) The latter phrase was meant to qualify and limit the right of ingress/egress, and was not meant to expand the right to include activities other than ingress/egress. (Id.) The Court found that the ingress/egress for “public road purposes” was intended to mean ingress/egress in order to reach a public road. (Id. at 1501.) The Court stated, “[l]ong ago our Supreme Court made clear the difference between public and private rights of way: ‘Public ways, as applied to ways by land, are usually termed “highways” or “public roads,” and are such ways as every citizen has a right to use. [¶] A private way relates to that class of easements in which a particular person, or particular description or class of persons, have an interest or right as distinguished from the general public.’” (Id.) Because, here, the reserved easement existed purely between private parties, the inclusion of the phrase “for public road purposes” did not transform a private easement into a public right-of-way. (Id.)

“Just like any private driveway, the easement is used only for traffic to and from the Aragon project. No broader transportation purpose is served by the easement that would benefit the public at large.” (Id. at 1505.) “In the private context, ‘[t]he conveyance of an easement limited to roadway use grants a right of ingress and egress and a right of unobstructed passage to the holder of the easement. A roadway easement does not include the right to use the easement for any other purpose.’ … ‘The owner of a dominant estate may do that which is reasonably necessary to enjoy the easement and, as an incident thereto, keep it in repair and fit for use. [Citation.] But the easement may not be substantially altered without the consent of the owner of the servient estate.’” (Id.)

Here, the Court finds there are triable issues of material fact regarding the quiet title causes of action. The language of the 1950 and 1951 Easements provide easements over Teazle Canyon Road was for ingress and egress to the neighboring and adjoining property owners and the public generally. However, as summarized above in the Schmidt case, the inclusion of terms such as the “public generally” does not automatically convert a private easement into a public right-of-way or road. There is insufficient evidence before the Court to conclude that Teazle Canyon Road has been converted into a public highway. (See Streets & Highways Code, § 941; Sherdel Additional Material Facts [AMF] 2.) (By making this statement, the Court is not making any definitive finding that the procedures to convert a private road into a public highway must be adhered to in the context of this case. This point is only raised to show that there could be possible triable issues of material fact regarding the nature of the road and easement.)

Further, there are triable issues of material fact regarding the scope of the easements and the interpretation of the term “for street and public highway purposes”—whether the original grantors of the easements intended the easements solely for ingress and egress[2] so that individuals could reach a public road/highway, or whether this included the right to use Teazle Canyon Road for more purposes, such as a parking lot. (See Sherdel AMF 3, 26-27.) Linda Sherdel also argues that there are triable issues of material fact regarding whether FLPF’s use of the easement has overburdened the easements and includes pictures of debris dumping and parked cars on the dirt road. (Id. at 28.) While the parties do not dispute that an easement over the road exists, the extent to which the easement’s scope is to be interpreted is in dispute, such that triable issues of material fact exist and summary adjudication on Issue 1 cannot be granted.

The motion for summary adjudication as to the quiet title causes of action is denied.

“A trespass is an invasion of the interest in the exclusive possession of land, as by entry upon it .... A nuisance is an interference with the interest in the private use and enjoyment of the land and does not require interference with the possession.” (McBride v. Smith (2018) 18 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1178 [internal quotation marks omitted].) The elements for a private nuisance claim are: (1) interference with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of his property; (2) the invasion of the plaintiff’s interests in the use and enjoyment of the land must be substantial (i.e., causes the plaintiff to suffer substantial actual damages); (3) the interference with the protected interest must not only be substantial, but must also be unreasonable (i.e., it must be of such a nature, duration, or amount as to constitute unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the land). (Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Resort Partners, LLC (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 248, 262–263.) “Whether a particular use of an easement by either the servient or dominant owner unreasonably interferes with the rights of the other owner is a question of fact.” (Schmidt v. Bank of America, N.A. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1504.)

In the 4^th cause of action for private nuisance in FLPF’s complaint, FLPF alleges that the Property Owner Defendants have placed a self-help security gate and “No Trespassing” signs to prevent FLPF and its agents and invitees from accessing Fond Park and thereby have interfered with the easements, which creates a nuisance. (Compl., ¶¶53-54.)

FLPF argues that Defendants have created a private nuisance by engaging in acts that interfere with FLPF’s use and enjoyment of the easements and the FLPF Property. FLPF provides the following facts. In March 2021, FLPF made an announcement in the Shadow Hills Homeowners Association (“SH HOA”) monthly newsletter that it invited residents of the Shadow Hills Community to enjoy the open space and hiking trails of the Fond Property and it published on its website that the public was welcome. (FLPF Fact 23.) Linda Sherdel is the closest neighbor residing along Teazle Canyon Road adjacent to FLPF Property and, prior to the pandemic, she was amenable to FLPF’s proposed docent program for school-aged children to visit the FLPF Property. (Id. at 24.) After FLPF made an announcement in the monthly SH Property Owners Association (“SH POA”) newsletter, Defendants became hostile towards FLPF, objected to its invitation of the public to its property, and subjected visitors to harassment and intimidation. (Id. at 25, 28.) Defendants installed a security gate and “No Trespassing” signs to deter the public from traveling on the road, which FPLF demanded be removed. (Id. at 26-27.)

In opposition, Linda Sherdel argues that FLPF cannot show at the summary adjudication stage whether the Property Owner Defendants have “unreasonably interfered” with FLPF’s rights based on the non-lockable and always-open security gate and the “No Trespassing” signs that have been in place years before and do not block or impede access on the road. (Sherdel AMF 38-40.)

As there are triable issues of material fact regarding the interpretation and scope of the easement over Teazle Canyon Road, there are also triable issues of material fact regarding what constitutes a private nuisance. As stated by case law, what constitutes an unreasonable interference is a question of fact. As such, the motion for summary adjudication as to the private nuisance cause of action is denied.

A cause of action for declaratory relief is a remedy created by CCP § 1060 and it is pleaded if it: (1) sets forth facts showing the existence of an actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties and (2) requests that the rights and duties be adjudged. (City of Tiburon v. Northwestern Pac. R.R. Co. (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 160, 170; see CCP § 1060 [identifying the remedy of declaratory relief].) If these requirements are met, the Court must declare the rights of the parties whether or not the facts alleged establish that the plaintiff is entitled to a favorable declaration. (Id.)

In the 5^th cause of action for declaratory relief in the complaint, FLPF alleges that the Property Owner Defendants contend they have the right to restrict FLP, its agents, representatives, and invitees from accessing Fond Park and using the easements, despite FLPF’s ownership of the same and have denied access to Fond Park to FLPF, its agents, representatives, and invitees. (Compl., ¶61.) Thus, FLPF seeks a judicial declaration to determine that FLPF, by virtue of its ownership of Fond Park, enjoys full use and exercise of its deeded property rights, including the use of the easements identified in the 2005 Grant Deed, equal to any other property owner who resides or owns real property along Teazle Canyon Road. (Id., ¶62.)

Based on the discussion above, there appears to be triable issues of material fact regarding the nature of the easements. As these triable issues exist, the Court cannot at this time enter a declaration of the parties’ rights in and to the easements. Thus, the motion for summary adjudication with respect to the declaratory relief cause of action is denied.

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that FLPF’s notice of motion for summary adjudication did not include the issues regarding Linda Sherdel’s causes of action for trespass and common law and statutory damages to trees. “A motion for summary adjudication tenders only those issues or causes of action specified in the notice of motion, and may only be granted as to the matters thus specified. The movant must “state[ ] specifically in the notice of motion and ... repeat[ ], verbatim, in the separate statement of undisputed material facts,” “the specific cause of action, affirmative defense, claims for damages, or issues of duty” as to which summary adjudication is sought.” (Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 728, 743–744; see CRC Rule 3.1350(b).) Here, the notice of motion did not specify that FLPF was moving for summary adjudication against Linda Sherdel’s 1^st and 2^nd causes of action in the cross-complaint. This is a basis to deny FLPF’s motion for summary adjudication as to the 1^st and 2^nd causes of action in Linda Sherdel’s cross-complaint.

However, as this objection was not raised by Linda Sherdel in her opposition papers and she addressed the causes of action in her opposition, the Court will briefly discuss the motion with respect to these causes of action.

“Trespass is an unlawful interference with possession of property.” (Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Victory Consultants, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 245, 261–262.) “The elements of trespass are: (1) the plaintiff's ownership or control of the property; (2) the defendant's intentional, reckless, or negligent entry onto the property; (3) lack of permission for the entry or acts in excess of permission; (4) harm; and (5) the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm.” (Id. [citing CACI No. 2000].) “Trees whose trunks stand wholly upon the land of one owner belong exclusively to him, although their roots grow into the land of another.” (Civ. Code, § 833.) “[T]o the extent that limbs or roots extend upon an adjoining landowner's property the latter may remove them, but only to the boundary line.” (Bonde v. Bishop (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 1, 5.)

In Linda Sherdel’s 1^st cause of action for trespass, Linda Sherdel alleges that on August 4, 2021, FLPF trespassed onto her property and destroyed trees and shrubs without her consent. (Sherdel XC, ¶23.) Her 2^nd cause of action for common law and statutory damage to trees is premised upon the same allegations. (Id., ¶29.)

FLPF provides the following facts. FLPF installed a fence on its property adjacent to Sherdel’s Property to prevent confrontations with Sherdel. (FLPF Fact 48.) FLPF hired Kris Rigdon, a licensed land surveyor, to establish the boundary line between the two properties to determine the proper location for a fence. (Id. at 49-50.) Before a fence could be installed, vegetation and shrubs had to be removed, such that FLPF hired Crescenta Valley Tree Service to remove the vegetation and shrubs on August 4, 2021. (Id. at 51-52.) On August 4, 2021, Mr. Rigdon was present to establish the physical boundary between the properties and to ensure that Crescenta Valley only removed vegetation and shrubs located on FLPF Property. (Id. at 53.) FLPF states that no vegetation, shrubs, or trees that were owned by Sherdel or located on her property were damaged, cut, or removed. (Id. at 54.) A fence was then installed on the boundary line established by Mr. Rigdon after the shrubbery and vegetation were removed. (Id. at 55.)

In opposition, Linda Sherdel argues that there are triable issues of material fact regarding whether Mr. Rigdon only directed the tree cutting service to remove vegetation and shrubbery on FLPF’s Property or whether the vegetation removed was on her property. Linda Sherdel provides her declaration and the declaration of her daughter, Samantha Sherdel, stating that they observed FLPF’s agents parking their vehicles and tree cutting equipment on her driveway without permission or consent, blocking her ingress and egress from her driveway, and observed them sawing and cutting at large branches that lay across her driveway. (Sherdel AMF 31-33.) She argues that Mr. Rigdon was sitting in his van and was not supervising the crew of four with hand tools and heavy equipment. (Id. at 34.) She argues that her property has been aesthetically and physically damaged and that four 6-foot-tall oleander trees on her property were destroyed and/or cut down by FLPF’s agents with an additional two oleander trees that were cut back and damaged. (Id. at 35-36.)

For the trespass cause of action, FLPF only addresses the alleged trespass with respect to the vegetation and shrubbery, but does not address whether FLPF’s agents trespassed onto Sherdel’s Property by way of vehicles and cut shrubbery being placed on her property and driveway. As FLPF’s arguments and evidence would not dispose of the entire cause of action, the motion for summary adjudication as to Sherdel’s trespass cause of action is denied.

With respect to the 2^nd cause of action for common law and statutory damage to trees, FLPF’s arguments and evidence in support of its motion are somewhat sparse such that the Court cannot find that FLPF established its initial burden on the motion. While FLPF provides the declaration of Mr. Rigdon, he states in a conclusory fashion that on August 4, 2021, he was present at the vegetation and shrubbery removal and that he “ensured” only shrubbery and vegetation on FLPF Property was removed by directing Crescenta Valley Tree Service of what to remove. (Tigdon Decl., ¶¶22-23.) Other than the land survey, no documentary evidence, such as photographs, were provided to support this statement. While Linda Sherdel argues that vegetation on her property was damaged, the Court cannot ascertain at this time whether this was true as she has not provided any declarations or testimony from an opposing land surveyor that the vegetation on her property was affected by FLPF’s removal of tress and shrubs. However, facts and evidence about this matter may be presented at the time of trial.

The motion for summary adjudication as to Linda Sherdel’s trespass and common law and statutory damage to trees causes of action is denied.

The Insuas filed an objection to the motion for summary adjudication, arguing that while it is not directed against them, they want to ensure that the ruling will not affect them, their property located at 9621 Sombra Valley Drive in Shadow Hills, the easements which are subject to FLPF’s complaint, and land uses and zoning of FLPF’s 600 acres. They argue that if the Court is inclined to grant FLPF’s motion, that the Court continue the hearing pursuant to CCP § 473c(h). Although the Insuas state that they are not filing an opposition brief, they argue that FLPF fails to meet its burden in establishing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (Insua Obj. at pp.3-6.) They also argue that a continuance is necessary because the depositions of the PMKs for the City of Los Angeles and FLPF have yet go forward.

In light of the ruling above, the Court denies the Insua’s request for a continuance of the motion for summary adjudication.

Plaintiff Fond Land Preservation Foundation’s motion for summary adjudication is denied.

[1] Defendants Richard and Mary Quacquarini, Edward Avakian, Raul and Marth Benitz, Jim Wrenn, Nanci B. Roberts, and Nicole Schwimmer’s memorandum of points and authorities in support of their opposition brief references their additional material facts nos. 101-119, but no separate statement was filed with the Court. Nevertheless, the arguments in Defendants’ opposition appear to mirror those of the opposition arguments made by Linda Sherdel. FLPF acknowledges that the arguments in their opposition are the “same, if not identical.” (8/28/23 Reply at p.2.) The Court will consider these Defendants’ opposition arguments together with Linda Sherdel’s opposition arguments.

[2] Taking the language of the easements themselves, the easement was only for public highway purposes for the neighboring and adjoining property owners and the public generally. While the parties argue that the easements only contemplated ingress and egress purposes, the Court notes that the terms “ingress” and “egress” were not stated in the express terms of the easements. But the Court also notes that neither party disputes that this was the purpose of the easements. However, whether the easements were intended for solely ingress and egress purposes could, in itself, be a triable issue of material fact.

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department B