Judge: John J. Kralik, Case: 22STCV10271, Date: 2023-09-01 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV10271    Hearing Date: September 1, 2023    Dept: NCB

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

North Central District

Department B

BACKGROUND

A.    Allegations

Plaintiffs Will Maurer and Marie Rousso (“Plaintiffs”) allege that on November 21, 2001, Maurer began leasing a single-family residence located at 12509 Milbank Street in Studio City.  Rousso moved into the property in February 2012, sharing the home with Maurer.  Plaintiffs allege that shortly after Maurer moved into the property, they learned of a rodent infestation in the attic of the property.  Plaintiffs allege that they notified Defendant Harry Watchel (“Defendant”) to make repairs.  They allege that due to the rat infestation, several air ducts and asbestos air return ducts were physically damaged and destroyed, thereby releasing harmful asbestos.  Plaintiffs allege that to repair the attic and remove the hazardous asbestos, Defendant hired an HVAC company, Green Air Care by CMS Builders.  Plaintiffs allege that Green Air Care also found visible mold growth and high levels of moisture in the drywall, baseboards, and beams.  Plaintiffs allege that Defendant failed to make any reasonable repairs to the attic to remove the mold and repair the moisture problem.  Plaintiffs allege that following this incident, they continued to inform Defendant of needed repairs, including roof remediation and bubbling/rotting of the side of the house due to water damage in July 2014 (to which Defendant sent an unlicensed worker to inspect the roof and patch the siding), bubbling paint and water damages in December 2018, and visible mold and water damage on January 30, 2019.  Plaintiffs allege Maurer paid for out-of-pocket mold testing on February 1, 2019, which confirmed the existence of high levels of toxic mold on the property.  Plaintiffs allege that they continuously attempted to speak with Defendant about possible repairs and relocation, but Defendant responded on February 16, 2019 that the old reports were inadequate to provide a clear picture of the situation.  Plaintiffs allege that Defendant led them to believe that the ongoing issues were being resolved, but they were unaware that the issues were only temporarily being covered up by unlicensed workers.  Plaintiffs allege that they were forced to fully vacate the property on February 17, 2019 for Defendant’s failure to timely respond and treat the mold repair.

The complaint was filed on March 24, 2022. 

The first amended complaint (“FAC”), filed June 20, 2023, alleges causes of action for: (1) breach of implied warranty of habitability; (2) breach of contract; (3) breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment; and (4) constructive eviction.

On August 9, 2023, Plaintiff corrected Defendant’s name from “Harry Watchel” to “Harry Wachtel.” 

B.     Demurrer on Calendar

On August 7, 2023, Defendant filed a demurrer to the FAC.  Defendant concurrently filed a motion to strike portions of the FAC. 

On August 21, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a single opposition to the demurrer and motion to strike.

On August 25, 2023, Defendant filed reply briefs.

DISCUSSION RE DEMURRER

            Defendant demurs to each cause of action alleged in the FAC on the grounds that they are barred by the applicable statute of limitations and fail to state sufficient facts.

A.    Statute of Limitations

Defendant argues that the gravamen of these causes of action is based on personal injury, such that the 2-year statute of limitations period applies.  In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that their causes of action are based on contract such that the 4-year statute of limitation applies. (The Complaint attaches a written lease, and Plaintiff’s claims are apparently based on that lease.)

In the 1^st cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability, Plaintiffs allege that every residential lease contains an implied warranty of habitability wherein the landlord is obligated to ensure that the rented dwelling unit is fit for habitation.  (FAC, ¶24.)  allege that Defendant breached the implied warranty by renting, operating, and maintaining the property in a dangerous, uninhabitable condition and failing to make the property fit for human habitation.  (Id, ¶¶24-25.)  Plaintiffs allege that Defendant had notice of the defective conditions of the property but failed to correct them.  (Id., ¶26.)  In the 2^nd cause of action for breach of contract, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant breached the agreements by failing to provide habitable dwelling to Plaintiffs and failing to remediate known harmful conditions.  (Id., ¶¶31-32.)  In the 3^rd cause of action for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant’s actions and omissions substantially interfered with Plaintiffs’ right to use and enjoy the premises during the tenancy, such that they were constructively evicted.  (Id., ¶¶36-37.)  In the 4^th cause of action for constructive eviction, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant substantially interfered with Plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of the property by failing to respond and resolve issues with the property despite notice thereof. (Id., ¶¶41-42.) 

Defendant argues that the gravamen of the complaint is for personal injury which resulted in their health problems, despite the labels Plaintiffs put on their causes of action.  However, based on the Court’s review of the FAC, Plaintiffs’ request for relief is not based on a duty independent of the lease agreement.  (See Fairchild v. Park (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 919, 925 [“The trial court expressly awarded damages based on the landlord's breach of the warranty of habitability—a warranty that is implied in every lease.”].)  By way of their FAC, Plaintiffs seek to recover non-personal injury damages, such as the return of their security deposit, reimbursement of rent paid during the period the premises was uninhabitable, destruction of personal property, moving costs, reimbursement for cots of mold testing, etc.  While their complaint may include some allegations of personal and mental injury such as colds, discomfort, anxiety, annoyance, etc., the allegations seek damages based on breaches of the lease agreement and implied warranties/covenants in the lease. To the extent that Plaintiffs are seeking damages that are not foreseeable under the contract, Defendants may be able to restrict the proof of such damages at trial.

 Plaintiffs vacated the property (February 17, 2019), the action was timely filed within 4 years.  It may be that certain breaches of the lease occurred outside the statute of limitations, but again that is not a matter for demurrer.

Thus, the demurrer on the statute of limitations grounds is overruled.

B.     Paragraph 19

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ new paragraph 19 in the FAC is inconsistent with the pleadings. 

Plaintiffs’ FAC includes the following language for paragraph 19: “Throughout the tenancy, Defendant led Plaintiffs to believe that the issues complained of were being resolved. But, unbeknownst to Plaintiffs the issues were just being temporarily covered up by the unlicensed workers, who had no experience in proper remediation.”

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ addition of paragraph 19 is a sly attempt to escape the bar of the statute of limitations.  However, as discussed above, the action was timely filed within 4 years of the alleged constructive eviction date.

Further, Defendant argues that the complaint alleged that Defendant was almost totally nonresponsive, but the addition of paragraph 19 in the FAC “changes this version of the story dramatically.”   (Dem. at p.16.)  However, the addition of paragraph 19 does not necessarily alter the underlying allegations of the facts of the case but provides clarification.  Plaintiffs have alleged facts in the FAC that they made complaints to Defendant during their tenancy and that Defendant attempted some repairs by sending an unlicensed worker to inspect to roof and patch siding.  (FAC, ¶12.)  Paragraph 19 supports this allegation.  The Court does not find that paragraph 19 in the FAC is inconsistent with the allegations of the complaint.  In addition, at the pleading stage, the Court accepts the allegation as true.  Whether or not Plaintiffs can show that Defendant, over the course of the lease, led Plaintiffs to believe that their issues were being resolved, or whether certain alleged damages are outside the statute of limitations, is better determined beyond the pleading stage at the summary judgment or trial stage. 

The demurrer to the FAC is overruled.

DISCUSSION RE MOTION TO STRIKE

            Defendant moves to strike paragraphs 13, 15 (at “and their growing health-related symptoms”), 17 (at “because of their ongoing health concerns”), 21, 28, and 29 (beginning at “Defendant’s failure to abate the long-running slum conditions at the Property…”), 29 (“Defendant failed to remedy the above-described conditions, leading to significant harm to Plaintiffs.”), and Item 10 of the Prayer for Relief for punitive damages.

            Defendant moves to strike claims for personal damages from the FAC due to the applicable statute of limitations.  In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that their allegations for concerns regarding their health “merely evidence Defendant’s breach and the need for Plaintiffs to vacate the property.”  (Opp. at p.6.)  At this time, the Court will allow the allegations regarding Plaintiffs’ health conditions to remain as background facts for the condition of the property that resulted in their eventual constructive eviction.  Thus, the motion to strike these allegations is denied.

            Defendant also moves to strike allegations for punitive damages.  The Court has reviewed the allegations of the FAC and finds that the allegations do not rise to the level of particularity required to allege punitive damages.  For example, in paragraph 29, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant was aware of the substandard condition and willfully and intentionally failed to abate the long-running slum conditions present at the property, which was done with oppression and malice.  (FAC, ¶29.)  As currently alleged, the allegation for punitive damages is conclusory and is not supported by specific facts.  The motion to strike the allegations for punitive damages is granted with leave to amend. 

            Finally, though paragraph 19 was not in the notice of the motion to strike, Defendant makes the same arguments as in the demurrer that paragraph 19 is inconsistent with the pleadings.  The Court has already discussed paragraph 19 and will allow it to remain in the FAC.  As such, to the extent Defendant intended to move to strike paragraph 19, the motion to strike paragraph 19 is denied.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

            Defendant’s demurrer to the first amended complaint is overruled.

            Defendant’s motion to strike the allegations and prayer for damages for punitive damages is granted with 20 days leave to amend.  The remainder of the motion is denied.

            Defendant shall provide notice of this order.