Judge John J. Kralik, Case 22STCV18171 2022-10-14 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Arthur Tsatryan (“Plaintiff,” as self-represented litigant) alleges that he and Defendant Polina Tsatryan (“Ms. Tsatryan”) were married on August 5, 1987. Plaintiff and Ms. Tsatryan purchased community property in the city of Tarzana in 1999. Plaintiff alleges that he filed a Petition for Dissolution of Marriage on September 23, 2009 in LASC Case No. BD512645 (“Dissolution Action”). Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Tsatryan engaged in actions to bankrupt him and that she did not make mortgage payments on the Tarzana property, did not pay legal fees, etc. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Steven Fernandez (“Mr. Fernandez”), Maya Shulman (“Ms. Shulman”), and S. David Kozich (“Mr. Kozich”) were Ms. Tsatryan’s former attorneys in the Dissolution Action.

Plaintiff alleges judgment was entered in the Dissolution Action on May 21, 2015. He alleges that since September 2015, Ms. Tsatryan has litigated a procedurally improper complaint in the Family Law Court. He alleges that Ms. Tsatryan, with the aid of Mr. Fernandez, filed legal documents against him on March 11, 2016 and June 9, 2016. (Compl., ¶¶32, 36.) He also alleges Ms. Tsatryan and Mr. Fernandez accused Plaintiff and his family members of fraud. (Id., ¶38.) On June 7, 2017, Ms. Tsatryan filed a substitution of attorney, substituting Ms. Shulman as her attorney. (Id., ¶39.) He alleges that Ms. Tsatryan and Ms. Shulman engaged in fraudulent acts in the Dissolution Action. (Id., ¶¶40-45.) Ms. Shulman was relieved as counsel for Ms. Tsatryan on November 3, 2017. (Id., ¶58.) On November 28, 2017, Mr. Kozich substituted in as Ms. Tsatryan’s counsel and Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Kozich engaged in unlawful acts. (Id., ¶¶60-61.)

The complaint, filed June 3, 2022, alleges causes of action for: (1) fraud against Ms. Tsatryan, Ms. Shulman, and Mr. Kozich; (2) defamation against Ms. Tsatryan, Ms. Shulman, Mr. Kozich, and Mr. Fernandez; (3) malicious prosecution against Ms. Tsatryan, Ms. Shulman, Mr. Kozich, and Mr. Fernandez; (4) conspiracy against Ms. Tsatryan, Ms. Shulman, Mr. Kozich, and Mr. Fernandez; (5) IIED against Ms. Tsatryan, Ms. Shulman, Mr. Kozich, and Mr. Fernandez; and (6) punitive damages against Ms. Tsatryan, Ms. Shulman, Mr. Kozich, and Mr. Fernandez.

On August 10, 2022, Defendant Maya Shulman filed a special motion to strike Plaintiff’s complaint.

On September 26, 2022, Plaintiff filed an opposition brief. That same day, Plaintiff filed a request for oral testimony of Ms. Shulman, Plaintiff, Karina Yesayeva, and Svetlana Gevondyan.

On September 28, 2022, Ms. Shulman filed an objection to Plaintiff’s request for oral testimony.

CCP § 425.16 permits the Court to strike causes of action arising from an act in furtherance of the defendant's right of free speech or petition, unless the plaintiff establishes that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim. (Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 615.) In other words, “[a] court may strike a cause of action only if the cause of action (1) arises from an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech ‘in connection with a public issue,’ and (2) the plaintiff has not established ‘a probability’ of prevailing on the claim.” (Id. at 619-620.)

The defendant bears the initial burden of showing that: (1) the claims fall within the class of suits subject to a motion to strike under CCP § 425.16(e) and (2) the plaintiff’s claims in fact arise from defendant’s conduct in further of his right to free speech. (Id. at 620; Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 294, 304.) Under CCP §425.16(b)(2), the Court may consider the pleadings and supporting affidavits in making its determination. Subdivision (e) defines the “act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with at public issues” as including:

(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law;

(2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law;

(3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest; or

(4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.

If the defendant meets this initial burden, the plaintiff then has the burden of demonstrating a probability of prevailing on the claim. (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 741.) The plaintiff satisfies this burden by demonstrating that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited. (Id.) Under CCP §4 25.16(b)(2), a plaintiff may use affidavits to meet the plaintiff’s burden.

The evidentiary showing by the plaintiff must be made by competent and admissible evidence. (Morrow v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1444; Evans v. Unkow (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1497-98 [proof cannot be made by declaration based on information and belief]; Tuchscher Dev. Enters., Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1236-38 [documents submitted without proper foundation could not be considered in determining plaintiff's probability of prevailing on its claim].)

PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR ORAL TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF, MS. SHULMAN, KARINA YESAYEVA, AND SVETLANA GEVONDYAN AT THE HEARING

Plaintiff requests that he be able to present oral testimony at the hearing. He cites to CRC Rule 3.1306:

Evidence received at a law and motion hearing must be by declaration or request for judicial notice without testimony or cross-examination, unless the court orders otherwise for good cause shown.

A party seeking permission to introduce oral evidence, except for oral evidence in rebuttal to oral evidence presented by the other party, must file, no later than three court days before the hearing, a written statement stating the nature and extent of the evidence proposed to be introduced and a reasonable time estimate for the hearing. When the statement is filed less than five court days before the hearing, the filing party must serve a copy on the other parties in a manner to assure delivery to the other parties no later than two days before the hearing.

Plaintiff argues that he will present oral testimony showing that Ms. Shulman deceived the Court and committed fraud, violated the State Bar and the California Rules of Professional Conduct, and there are genuine disputes about the truth of Ms. Shulman’s statements and testimony. Thus, he seeks to “take the oral testimony” of Ms. Shulman about her motion, himself as the person most knowledgeable about the facts presented by Ms. Shulman that he believes are false, and Karina Yesayeva and Svetlana Gevondyan as the persons most knowledgeable about facts regarding service of a “fake” summons.

While the Court may hear oral arguments regarding the substantive merits of the special motions to strike at the hearing on the motions, the Court will not compel Ms. Shulman, Karina Yesayeva, and Svetlana Gevondyan to attend the hearing themselves to be presented as witnesses or to determine their credibility. Rule 3.1306 only provides that Plaintiff, as the party seeking permission to introduce oral testimony, may apply for permission to present oral evidence. However, Rule 3.1306 does not provide a basis to compel another party or witness to take the witness stand and be orally cross-examined. Further, Ms. Shulman points out in her objection to Plaintiff’s request that the notice to appear is an improper attempt to subpoena her appearance.

As such, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request, which is essentially an improper request to compel Ms. Shulman, Karina Yesayeva, and Svetlana Gevondyan to attend the hearing and be questioned by Plaintiff.

Plaintiff requests judicial notice of the California Rules of Professional Conduct. The request is denied as the Court need not take judicial notice of the Rules.

Plaintiff also requests judicial notice of documents pertaining to the Dissolution Action in Case No. BD512645: (1) Karina Yesayeva’s motion to quash service of summons; (2) Svetlana Gevondyan’s motion to quash service of summons; (3) Gayane Galstain’s motion to quash service of summons; (4) responsive declaration to the Court’s order denying the motion to quash service of summons; (5) Svetlana Gevondyan’s responsive declaration to the Court’s order denying the motion to quash; and (6) Gayane Galstain’s responsive declaration to the Court’s order denying the motion to quash. The request for judicial notice of Exhibits 1 to 6 is granted. (Evid. Code, § 452(d).)

Ms. Shulman specially moves to strike Plaintiff’s complaint and seeks an order awarding her legal expenses and/or costs in the amount of $12,852.16 pursuant to CCP § 425.16.

Ms. Shulman argues that she can establish the first prong of the anti-SLAPP statute because her litigation-related activities (i.e., making statements and writing/filing documents in the Dissolution Action) were protected activities. CCP § 425.16(e)(1) and (2) define protected activities as: “(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law” and “(2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.”

Ms. Shulman argues that all the claims asserted against her by Plaintiff arise from her brief tenure as Ms. Tsatryan’s counsel in the family law proceedings from June 7 to November 3, 2017. Plaintiff’s allegations against Ms. Shulman include facts that she fraudulently filed a summons (joinder) in the Dissolution Action, filed a proof of service, sought an order declaring that Plaintiff’s allowance of certain liens and encumbrances upon marital property awarded to Ms. Tsatryan constituted “fraudulent transfers”, attempted to seek a determination on the fraudulent transfer claim, and failed to give notice about motions to quash service. (Compl., ¶¶39-44, 51, 54, 59; Shulman Decl., ¶8, Exs. H-I.)

In her declaration, Ms. Shulman states that her involvement in the divorce proceedings was limited to post-dissolution issues which only lasted a few months in 2017. (Shulman Decl., ¶3, Exs. A-B.) She states that she represented Ms. Tsatryan in connection with a previously filed Joinder Complaint,[1] but she was not the attorney that filed the Joinder Complaint. (Id., ¶4, Exs. C-D.) She states that no judgment was rendered during her tenure as counsel for Ms. Tsatryan on the Joinder Complaint. (Id., ¶5.) She states that on October 16, 2017, the Court heard arguments on various motions to quash made by third party defendants as to the Joinder Complaint, and she gave notice of the order pursuant to the Court’s order. (Id., ¶6, Ex.s. F-G.) She states that the evidentiary trial on the Joinder Complaint occurred after she was relieved as counsel. (Id., ¶7.) Ms. Shulman states that she had no relationship or contact with Plaintiff other than in the course of acting as opposing counsel with respect to the Joinder Complaint from June 7, 2017 to November 3, 2017, she has not had contact with him since 2017 until this lawsuit, she has not defamed or spoke about him outside of judicial proceedings, and does not hold and never has held ill will toward Plaintiff. (Id., ¶9.) She states she believed that there was probable cause for Ms. Tsatryan’s claims and did not take any actions against Plaintiff with malicious intent of harming him. (Id.) Ms. Shulman explains that all activities and claims pursued by her in connection with the Joinder Complaint were handled exclusively in her representative capacity as Ms. Tsatryan’s counsel during a pending litigation and was taken in furtherance of her client’s right to petition. (Id., ¶10.) She states the actions she took in connection with the Dissolution Action involved communications and conduct in the courtroom or in filings with the Court. (Id., ¶11.)

Here, the allegations of the complaint show that Plaintiff’s allegations against Ms. Shulman are based on her conduct of engaging in litigation activities on behalf of her client with respect to the Joinder Complaint filed in the Dissolution Action. (Compl., ¶¶39-44, 51, 54, 59.) Such activities are protected are protected activities pursuant to CCP § 425.16.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Ms. Shulman was not involved in the Dissolution Action, she entered the case after the Joinder Complaint had already been filed, there is no summons for the Joinder Complaint, and Joinder Complaint was not properly served. Plaintiff also argues that Ms. Shulman’s conclusions in her moving papers are insufficient and deceptive statements to the Court. It is unclear what effect these arguments have on the issue of whether Ms. Shulman can satisfy her initial burden of showing that her alleged actions fall within the scope of protected activity pursuant to CCP § 425.16(e). Plaintiff does not deny that Ms. Shulman’s interactions with Plaintiff solely arose from her litigation activities on behalf of her client, Ms. Tsatryan, when litigating the Joinder Complaint in 2017. These types of actions are expressly protected under section 425.16 and the litigation privilege.

B. Prong 2 Probability of Prevailing on the Claims – Plaintiff’s Shifted Burden

The burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate the probability of prevailing on the merits of his 1^st to 6^th causes of action against Ms. Shulman.

The 4^th cause of action alleged in the complaint is for conspiracy. Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Tsatryan engaged in a conspiracy with the other defendants (including Mr. Fernandez) by prosecuting against Plaintiff and other claimants. (Compl., ¶155.) However, under California law, conspiracy is not a cause of action, but a legal doctrine that imposes liability on persons who, although not actually committing a tort themselves, share with the immediate tortfeasors a common plan or design in its perpetration. (Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 773, 784.) Thus, Plaintiff cannot establish the probability of prevailing on his claim for conspiracy because it is a legal doctrine as opposed to a cause of action.

The 6^th cause of action for “punitive damages” is not a valid cause of action. Punitive damages are a type of damages and do not constitute a cause of action. Thus, Plaintiff cannot establish the probability of prevailing on the “punitive damages cause of action” as no such cause of action exists. As such, the special motion to strike the 6^th cause of action for punitive damages is granted.

In the 1^st cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “fraudulently filed and kept prosecuting Civil Complaint in Family Court.” (Compl., ¶120.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants knew or should have known that service was not timely made in the action and that the Family Law Court did not have jurisdiction of a civil complaint. (Id., ¶¶121-122.) He alleges that Ms. Shulman deceived him by making him believe that on June 20, 2017, a summons was filed in family court. (Id., ¶126.)

Ms. Shulman argues that the complaint fails against her because of the litigation privilege pursuant to Civil Code, § 47. She also argues that the 1^st cause of action fails as it is barred by the statute of limitations.

Civil Code, § 47(b) states that a privileged publication or broadcast is one made “In any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding authorized by law and reviewable pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 1084) of Title 1 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” (See e.g., Brown v. Kennard (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 40, 49–50 [“[J]udgment enforcement efforts, as an extension of a judicial proceeding and related to a litigation objective, are considered to be within the litigation privilege.”].) It is undisputed by the parties that Ms. Shulman attended hearings and wrote/filed documents on behalf of Ms. Tsatryan in connection with the Joinder Complaint. Such types of actions are expressly contemplated and protected by the litigation privilege. Plaintiff has not otherwise shown that the litigation privilege does not apply. (At most, Plaintiff argues that malicious prosecution is an exception not the litigation privilege and that Ms. Shulman takes phrases out of context to deceive the Court. The Court will discuss the malicious prosecution cause of action below. In addition, Plaintiff’s argument regarding Ms. Shulman’s “confusing” moving papers is not a ground to find that he has shown the probability of prevailing on his claims.)

Next, the statute of limitations for a fraud cause of action is 3 years. (CCP § 338(d).) Ms. Shulman argues that her representation of Ms. Tsatryan ended on November 3, 2017, nearly 5 years ago. This action was filed on June 3, 2022. She argues that if there were any issues regarding her “fraudulent’ conduct in prosecuting the Joinder Complaint, Plaintiff was aware of it at that time since Plaintiff knew that the Joinder Complaint was filed and participated in the action. (See Compl., ¶49 [alleging that Plaintiff filed a cross-complaint]; Shulman Decl., Exs. E-F [notice to Plaintiff of joinder disputes and his general appearance].) Ms. Shulman also provides copies of the Summons (Joinder) and the accompanying proof of service (on Arkady Petrosyan); however, as noted above, Plaintiff had already generally appeared. (Shulman Decl., Exs. H-I.) This cause of action appears to be time-barred. In his opposition papers, Plaintiff has not refuted Ms. Shulman’s argument on the statute of limitations.

Plaintiff has not satisfied his burden in showing that he has the probability of succeeding on the 1^st cause of action. The Court notes that Plaintiff has not specifically addressed the probability of prevailing on the fraud cause of action.

In the 2^nd cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants made false representations about him, such as accusing him of not being a credible person, being involved in fraudulent activities with claimants, concealing funds, etc. (Compl., ¶140.)

However, again, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants/Ms. Shulman made representations about Plaintiff in connection with the Joinder Complaint in the Dissolution Action. Representations made during and in connection with a court proceeding would be protected by the litigation privilege under Civil Code, § 47. Ms. Shulman also states in her declaration that she did not have any interaction with Plaintiff after her representation of Ms. Tsatryan ended and did not make any defamatory statements during the representation or after.

Moreover, Ms. Shulman argues that a defamation cause of action has a 1-year statute of limitations period. (CCP § 340(c).) Taking the last day of representation of Ms. Tsatryan in November 2017, Plaintiff’s filing of the complaint on June 3, 2022 nearly 5 years later would be considered untimely.

Again, the Court notes that Plaintiff has not specifically addressed the defamation cause of action in his opposition papers. For these reasons, Plaintiff has not satisfied his burden in showing that he has the probability of succeeding on the 2^nd cause of action.

In his 5^th cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ intentional conduct caused him to suffer severe emotional distress. (Compl., ¶178.) The conduct complained of in the complaint that allegedly caused Plaintiff emotional distress was in connection with conduct, statements, and filings made to or before the court.

However, “as many cases have concluded, the litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), bars IIED claims arising out of litigation conduct.” (S.A. v. Maiden (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 27, 43.) “Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), protects communications made ‘[i]n any ... judicial proceeding.’” In this case, because the alleged wrongful conduct did ‘not involve any action outside of ordinary court proceedings [citation] calculated to humiliate or inflict emotional distress’ [citation], the litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), applies to bar [plaintiff’s] IIED cause of action against [defendant].” (Id. at 44.)

In addition, an IIED cause of action is subject to the 2-year statute of limitations under CCP §335.1. (Wassmann v. South Orange County Community College District (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 825, 852-53.) Based on the allegations that Plaintiff suffered emotional distress in connection with the Joinder Complaint and Dissolution Action and that Ms. Shulman’s representation of Ms. Tsatryan ended in November 2017, IIED cause of action would be time-barred based on Plaintiff’s date of filing the complaint on June 3, 2022.

As such, Plaintiff has not established the probability of prevailing on the IIED cause of action. Thus, the special motion to strike is granted as to the 5^th cause of action.

In the 3^rd cause of action for malicious prosecution, Plaintiff alleges that the “Malicious Complaint” filed on August 2, 2016 was terminated in his favor. (Compl., ¶149.)

The elements of a malicious prosecution cause of action are: “a lawsuit ‘(1) was commenced by or at the direction of the defendant and was pursued to a legal termination favorable to the plaintiff; (2) was brought without probable cause; and (3) was initiated with malice.’” (Nunez v. Pennisi (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 861, 872–873.)

Ms. Shulman argues that a malicious prosecution claim cannot be brought based on a family law proceeding. As stated by the Court of Appeal in Robert J. v. Catherine D. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1500, “Courts adopted a ‘bright line rule’ barring malicious prosecution claims in family law cases because such ‘cases have a unique propensity for bitterness’ (Bidna, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 35, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 251) and because family law courts have the ‘ability to swiftly discourage litigious nonsense at its source ‘ by imposing sanctions within the family law proceeding. (Ibid., citing § 271 among other statutes.).” (Robert J. v. Catherine D. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1525.)

In addition, Ms. Shulman argues that the Joinder Complaint is still pending as trial of the trifurcated issues have not yet been fully heard. (See e.g., Mot., Ex. J [8/2/22 Order overruling Plaintiff’s motion to strike/vacate the Joinder Complaint].) As a “favorable” termination has not been found in Plaintiff’s favor with respect to the Joinder Complaint, the malicious prosecution cause of action is premature and Plaintiff cannot establish the necessary elements of such a claim. In his opposition brief, Plaintiff has not shown the Court that he obtained a favorable termination in his favor.

Finally, Ms. Shulman states that she does not hold and never has held ill will toward Plaintiff and that her association with him was only in the context of being counsel for Ms. Tsatryan. (Shulman Decl., ¶9.) She states that she believed there was probable cause for Ms. Tsatryan’s claims and did not take any actions against Plaintiff with malicious intent of harming him. (Id.) This too negates the elements of malicious prosecution and Plaintiff has not otherwise shown that the second and third elements of a malicious prosecution claim can be met.

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not upheld his shifted burden on the 2^nd prong regarding the 3^rd cause of action.

For the reasons stated above, the Court is inclined to grant Ms. Shulman’s special motion to strike the complaint.

CCP § 425.16(c) authorizes the Court to award a prevailing defendant the fees and costs which will adequately compensate the defendant for the expenses of responding to the lawsuit. (Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer, & Susman (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 785.) The SLAPP statute reflects the Legislature's “strong preference for awarding attorney fees to successful defendants.” (Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 328, 338.) Further, the provision is broadly construed so as to effectuate the legislative purpose of reimbursing the prevailing defendant for expenses incurred in extracting herself from a baseless lawsuit. (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal. App. 4th 443, 448.)

The fee amount is left to the trial court's sound discretion. (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal. App. 4th 1315, 1320.) Trial judges are entrusted with this discretionary determination because they are in the best position to assess the value of the professional services rendered in their courts. (Id.)

Ms. Shulman is represented by counsel Jeffrey C. Walker. Mr. Walker states that he incurred costs of: “(i) a First Paper Filing Fee of $446.96 (consisting of the $435.00 first appearance fee and an $11.96 credit card fee); (ii) an E-filing Fee of $62.00 (estimated); and (iii) $193.20 in the LASC online charges for the retrieval of various court records from this action and the underlying divorce proceedings” in the total amount of $702.16. (Walker Decl., ¶6.) He states that he charged $300/hour in representing Ms. Shulman and has spent over 20 hours in connection with this motion and that his partner, Ronald M. Monitz, spent in excess of 7.5 hours. (Id., ¶7.) He anticipates spending an additional 8 hours to reply to Plaintiff’s opposition and 5 hours to travel to/attend the hearing. (Id.) Total, he estimates attorney’s fees to be $12,150 (= 40.5 hours x $300/hour). (Id.) In the reply brief, Ms. Walker states that he has incurred more hours, such that he seeks an additional $5,700. (Walker Reply Decl., ¶8.) Thus, Ms. Shulman seeks $18,918.13 in fees and costs (= $702.16 in costs sought in moving papers + $12,150 for fees sought in moving papers + $365.97 costs since the filing of the motion + $5,700 in additional fees since the filing of the motion). (Id., ¶¶6-9.)

The Court finds that counsel’s hourly rates are reasonable at $300/hour. However, the hours sought are partially excessive, such that the Court finds an award for 40 hours of legal services rendered is reasonable. The Court declines to award any fees and costs associated with an ex parte application filed by Plaintiff. As such, the Court will award Ms. Shulman fees and costs in the total amount of $12,986.73 (= [Fees of $300/hour x 40 hours] + [Costs of $702.16 stated in the motion + $284.57 since the filing of the motion]).

The Court is inclined to grant Defendant Maya Shulman’s special motion to strike Plaintiff Arthur Tsatryan’s complaint.

At this time, the Court will continue the hearing to October 21, 2022 at 8:30 a.m. so that it may be heard together with the special motions to strike the complaint filed by Defendant Steven Fernandez and S. David Kozich. As an accommodation to Plaintiff, the Court will allow Plaintiff to file his oral arguments in writing in response to this motion. Plaintiff is ordered to file his written arguments with the Court and electronically serve a copy of the arguments to opposing counsel by October 17, 2022 by the end of the business day.

[1] Ms. Shulman describes the Joinder Complaint as follows: “That Joinder Complaint – filed in 2016, over a year prior to Shulman’s entry into the case – sought to enforce a Family Court order awarding the parties’ home to Polina by expunging liens and encumbrances secretly placed on the property by Plaintiff in favor of friends and family in violation of the Family Code’s automatic TROs. Filed with leave of court, the Joinder Complaint sought to add those third parties to the divorce proceedings and clear title.” (Mot. at p.1.)

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department B