Judge: John J. Kralik, Case: 23BBCV00921, Date: 2023-08-04 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23BBCV00921    Hearing Date: December 8, 2023    Dept: NCB

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

North Central District

Department B

BACKGROUND

A.    Allegations

Plaintiff Natalie Ruxton (“Plaintiff”) alleges on July 1, 2022, Defendants Tyler Anne Smith and Cheyenne Hawk were operating their vehicle on the US-101 Northbound freeway in the City of Los Angeles.   She alleges she was driving directly to the left of Tyler Anne Smith.  Plaintiff alleges that Tyler Anne Smith negligently, carelessly, recklessly, and unlawfully entrusted, managed, controlled, maintained, drove, and operated the vehicle so as to swerve left and impact Plaintiff’s vehicle with great force, causing Plaintiff injuries. 

            The first amended complaint (“FAC”), filed September 18, 2023, alleges causes of action for: (1) negligence; and (2) punitive and exemplary damages.

B.     Motion on Calendar

On October 3, 2023, Defendant Tyler Anne Smith (“Smith”) filed a motion to strike the entire 2^nd cause of action (paragraphs 13-16) and the prayer for damages at paragraph 6 from the FAC.  

On October 16, 2023, Plaintiff filed an opposition brief.   

On December 1, 2023, Smith filed a reply brief.

DISCUSSION

Smith moves to strike the allegations for punitive damages in paragraphs 13-16 and the prayer for relief at paragraph 6 from the FAC.  The request for punitive damages is sought in connection with the sole cause of action for negligence.

A complaint including a request for punitive damages must include allegations showing that the plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages.  (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)  A claim for punitive damages cannot be pleaded generally and allegations that a defendant acted "with oppression, fraud and malice" toward plaintiff are insufficient legal conclusions to show that the plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages.  (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.)  Specific factual allegations are required to support a claim for punitive damages.  (Id.)

Civil Code § 3294 authorizes a plaintiff to obtain an award of punitive damages when there is clear and convincing evidence that the defendant engaged in malice, oppression, or fraud.  Section 3294(c) defines the terms in the following manner:

(1)   "Malice" means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

(2)   "Oppression" means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.

(3)   "Fraud" means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. 

Smith argues that the complaint lacks specific facts supporting a claim for punitive damages and that the allegations are conclusory. 

The 2^nd cause of action for punitive/exemplary damages incorporates the prior allegations in the negligence cause of action.  (FAC, ¶13.)  It alleges that Smith was guilty of malice, fraud, and oppression because she “knowingly and intentionally consumed a substantial amount of alcohol to the point of becoming heavily intoxicated and, therefore, unfit both physically and legally to operate a motor vehicle.”  (Id., ¶14.)  She alleges that Smith worked at her normal shift at a bar called Hot Motha Clucker in Hollywood as a bartender, got off work at 7:00 p.m., and consumed 7 tequila shots of Casa Amigos Tequila from 7 p.m. to 9:30 p.m.  (Id., ¶15.)  Plaintiff alleges that Smith knew she was intoxicated and under the influence and knowingly and intentionally got into her vehicle, began to drive, caused the car crash, and was arrested.  (Id.)  Plaintiff alleges that Smith’s Blood Alcohol Concentration was .17, which is beyond the legal limit of .08.  (Id., ¶16.)  Plaintiff alleges that despite her intentional excessive consumption of alcohol and knowledge of her unfitness to operate a motor vehicle, she nevertheless purposefully drove the motor vehicle at the time of the collision in reckless disregard for the safety of others.  (Id.) 

Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890 is instructive with respect to this set of facts.  In Taylor, the Supreme Court fell short of holding that punitive damages are always appropriate in cases involving driving while intoxicated, finding that “the act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of ‘malice’ under section 3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences.”  (Id. at p. 892.)  In the subsequent decision of Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, the Supreme Court held that driving while intoxicated does not always give rise to a claim for punitive damages.  Specifically, the Court stated that “the risk created generally by one who becomes intoxicated and decides nevertheless to drive a vehicle on the public streets is the same as the risk created by an intoxicated driver’s decision to zigzag in and out of traffic at 65 miles per hour in a crowded beach recreation area at 1:30 in the afternoon on a Sunday in June.  The risk of injury to others from ordinary driving while intoxicated is certainly foreseeable, but it is not necessarily probable.”  (Id. at p. 89.) 

Previously, the Court granted with leave to amend Smith’s motion to strike the punitive damages from the initial complaint.  The Court stated:  

Based on the rules set forth in both Taylor and Dawes, the Court finds that the allegations in the complaint regarding Smith’s intoxication are insufficient to support the imposition of punitive damages.  The description of Smith’s conduct can be applicable to almost any situation wherein a person consumes alcohol and then decides to drive.  The fact that the complaint alleges that Smith consumed excessive amount of alcohol prior to driving does not necessarily show that she acted maliciously or oppressively.  As discussed in Taylor and Dawes, specific factual circumstances must be alleged which show that the risk of injury was probable, such as weaving through lanes of traffic, a previous conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol, or driving while simultaneously drinking alcohol.  The fact that an accident occurred and Smith was found to be intoxicated, without more, has the character of ordinary negligent driving and does not show aggravating circumstances warranting punitive damages.

The motion to strike punitive damages from the complaint is granted. 

(August 4, 2023 Order at pp. 3-4.) 

            Defendant Smith argues that the punitive damages allegations should be stricken because the request must be plead with the requisite particularity and there must be ultimate facts (not mere conclusions) to support this request.  Smith argues that the allegations that she knowingly consumed alcohol in an excessive level and then purposefully drove her car in a reckless manner are not specifically pled. 

Plaintiff has added further facts to support her claim for punitive damages against Smith.  The FAC alleges that Smith drove the vehicle, knowing she was intoxicated and under the influence with reckless abandon and in reckless disregard to the safety of others.  (FAC, ¶16; Peterson v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 147, 162 [“The complaint alleges that defendant drove the vehicle with knowledge that probable serious injury to other persons would result and in conscious disregard of the safety of plaintiff.”] [finding that the complaint with a request for punitive damages was proper where it was alleged that defendant “became intoxicated and thereafter drove a car while in that condition, despite his knowledge of the safety hazard he created thereby.”].)  Whether these facts can be proven by evidence will be determined at a later stage in the proceedings.  However, at the pleading stage where the allegations are taken as true, there are sufficient facts to allege that Smith knowingly consumed alcohol to excess levels and knowingly or recklessly operated her vehicle in reckless disregard to the safety of others.

At the pleading stage, the Court finds that the FAC alleges sufficient facts to support a claim for punitive damages.  Accordingly, the motion to strike is denied.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

            Defendant Tyler Anne Smith’s motion to strike the allegations for punitive damages in the first amended complaint is denied.  Defendant is ordered to answer.

            Defendant shall provide notice of this order.