Judge: John J. Kralik, Case: 23BBCV01140, Date: 2024-06-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23BBCV01140    Hearing Date: June 28, 2024    Dept: NCB

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

North Central District

Department B

BACKGROUND

A.    Allegations

Plaintiff Tommy Sabre Buttner (“Plaintiff”) alleges that this matter involves the deceptive sale of a used, unsafe, defective vehicle that was sold to Plaintiff by Defendant/dealer Alternative Automotive Solutions, LLC (“Defendant”).  Plaintiff alleges that the vehicle was stolen with a different VIN number so that when Plaintiff reported the issue to the California Highway Patrol, the vehicle was taken away from Plaintiff, impounded, and returned to the original owner even though Plaintiff had paid the dealership in full and had no involvement in the illegal actions of Defendant.

The complaint, filed May 22, 2023, alleges causes of action for: (1) violations of Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.); (2) conversion; (3) violations of Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Profs. Code, § 17200 et seq.); and (4) bond liability.

B.     Relevant Background

This case proceeded to trial before the Court on April 2, 2024.

The Court issued a Statement of Decision on April 5, 2024.  The Court dismissed the 2^nd, 3^rd, and 4^th causes of action based on Plaintiff’s failure to proceed at trial.  The Court stated that Plaintiff would have judgment against Defendant in the amount of $28,095 on the 1^st cause of action. 

The Court entered Judgment on April 22, 2024.  The Judgment states that judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the amount of $28,095.  Plaintiff may seeks costs by Memorandum of Costs and may seek statutory attorney’s fees by noticed motion. 

C.     Motion on Calendar

On April 15, 2024, Defendant filed a motion to vacate the judgment that was entered (CCP § 663) or the reconsider the intended judgment (CCP § 1003) or for a new trial. Alternatively, Defendant stated its intent to move for an order setting aside the judgment and modifying the judgment or granting a new trial (CCP § 659) based on new evidence and error of law/inconsistency of logic.

On May 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed opposition papers.

DISCUSSION

A.    CCP § 663

CCP § 663 states:

A judgment or decree, when based upon a decision by the court, or the special verdict of a jury, may, upon motion of the party aggrieved, be set aside and vacated by the same court, and another and different judgment entered, for either of the following causes, materially affecting the substantial rights of the party and entitling the party to a different judgment:

1. Incorrect or erroneous legal basis for the decision, not consistent with or not supported by the facts; and in such case when the judgment is set aside, the statement of decision shall be amended and corrected.

2. A judgment or decree not consistent with or not supported by the special verdict.

(CCP § 663.)

            Defendant argues that the Court improperly failed to allow an equitable setoff for Defendant on the basis that title was defective and thus Defendant had no rights.  Defendant states: “I think that defendant as innocent recipient and good faith purchaser and seller of the car did have rights against all save the true owner.”  (Mot. at p.5.)  Defendant argues that it was only entitled to pay the value of Plaintiff’s loss to make Plaintiff whole, or $19,500. 

However, this argument is essentially a re-litigation of the facts of the case and the considerations the Court already made with respect to setoff.  In its Statement of Decision, the Court stated:

At trial, Mr. Buttner did not dispute that AAS, like him, was the innocent victim of a fraud. Claims of conversion and for punitive damages were dropped, and Plaintiff did not pursue his second cause of action for conversion, third cause of action for violation of unfair competition law, and fourth cause of action for bond liability.  Plaintiff proceeded only on his first cause of action under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, et seq.). Plaintiff’s contention was that by providing a false VIN, AAS had misrepresented “the affiliation, connection, or association with, or certification by, another.” (Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a)(3).) Plaintiff sought return of the $28,095 as “restitution” under Cal. Civ. Code § 1780 (a)(3), and he sought the $832.18 he had expended as damages under Cal. Civ. Code § 1780 (a)(1). Even though the sale was made “as is,” thus waiving all implied warranties (Cal. Civ. Code § 1792.5), the vehicle identification number concededly misrepresented the legal status of the vehicle’s registration. The basic facts related above show that Plaintiff made his prima facie case without much dispute.

            AAS sought to find that Mr. Buttner’s restitution should be reduced by a credit for the use of the vehicle. While the parties argued over the value of such use, there was little doubt that Mr. Buttner did receive significant value from his use of the Subaru. Significantly, it should be noted that persons claiming defect against automobile manufacturers do have their rescission amounts reduced by a formula related to the mileage of the vehicle when the vehicle was returned. (Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(C).)

Plaintiff’s counsel ably pointed out that there are no cases under Cal. Civ. Code § 1780(a)(3) allowing for a similar credit, or really any credit with respect to a restitution award under that section. In the Court’s view this does not end the inquiry. Restitution is an equitable doctrine. In using that word, the Legislature would have expected the courts to put equitable limitations on any award of restitution.

Nevertheless, the Court does not feel it is appropriate to impose an equitable credit for use of the automobile on the award of restitution of $28,095 in this case. Undoubtedly, the Court does have the power to impose such a credit in an appropriate case:

General Principle. A party who seeks equity must do equity. Under this maxim, a court will not grant equitable relief to a plaintiff unless he or she acknowledges or provides for the equitable claims or demands of the adverse party growing out of the particular controversy or connected with the same subject matter.

(13 B. Witkin, Summary of California Law, Equity, Ch. XIX, § 6(1) (11^th ed. 2017, May 2023 Update) [citations omitted].) Nevertheless, Professor Witkin’s Treatise goes on to note that “[t]his maxim does not authorize the creation of substantive rights in favor of a person, nor the imposition of arbitrary conditions not warranted by settled doctrines of equity.”  (Id. at § 6(3).) In the case of a new automobile manufacturer, there is a legal sale of an automobile. In this case, however unwittingly, AAS sold a stolen automobile. AAS has no legal or equitable right to retain any portion of the proceeds of that sale. For that reason, the Court awards a full restitution amount of $28,095 to Mr. Buttner.

With respect to Mr. Buttner’s damage claim, however, he did receive substantial value in the use of the vehicle for 14 months. This leads to the conclusion that he was not damaged by making minor repairs during this period. The Court does not award the repair costs of the automobile.

The Court has also considered whether AAS has a defense under Cal. Civil Code § 1784. The Court agrees that AAS did not act intentionally, and the evidence indicates that the sale of this stolen vehicle was a bona fide error under section 1784(a). Nevertheless, AAS did not offer a full corrective remedy by offering to return the full amount paid for this stolen vehicle. (Cal. Civ. Code § 1784(b); see Exhibit 10.)

(Statement of Decision at pp.2-4.) 

Thus, this issue will not be relitigated and this will not be a ground to vacate or amend the judgment. 

B.     CCP § 1003

CCP § 1003 states: “Every direction of a court or judge, made or entered in writing, and not included in a judgment, is denominated an order. An application for an order is a motion.” 

Defendant cites to CCP § 1003 in its caption and on page 1 of the motion.  However, it is unclear if Defendant intended to move pursuant to section 1003 as section 1003 does not provide any ground for relief.

As section 1003 does not provide a ground for relief, the motion is denied as brought pursuant to this section. 

The Court notes that motions for reconsideration are typically brought pursuant to CCP § 1008, but section 1008 was not cited, referenced, or discussed in the motion papers. 

C.     CCP § 659

CCP § 659 states that a party may move for a new trial by serving its intent to move for new trial and designating the grounds upon which the motion is based.  CCP § 657 states that a decision may be modified or vacated and a new or further trial may be granted on all or part of issues for the causes listed in section 657, including but not limited to: “4. Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial” and “7. Error in law, occurring at the trial and excepted to by the party making the application.”  (CCP § 657.) 

Defendant argues that it recently discovered that the subject vehicle was sold with only a few thousand extra miles on it for $8,000, despite Plaintiff having testified at trial that it was worth near $26,000 and Defendant testifying it was not worth more than $17,000.  Defendant argues that the case should be reevaluated to the reasonableness of Defendant’s 30-day initial offer to Plaintiff of $19,500.  While the vehicle may have been sold recently for $8,000, no further information about the transaction has been provided.  For example, was the vehicle sale made a discount to a family member or friend? Was there any damage that occurred to the vehicle since Plaintiff and driven the car? The mere fact that the vehicle was sold for a lesser price than what Defendant had offered Plaintiff or what Plaintiff had testified about trial is not conclusive proof of the value of the vehicle.  This will not be a ground upon which the motion will be granted. 

Defendant also argues that the Court improperly found that an equitable setoff was not appropriate where two innocent parties were victimized by a third party, and thus failed to grant Defendant any setoff for the value Plaintiff received.  As discussed above (regarding CCP § 663), the Court amply discussed its reasoning regarding setoff in its Statement of Decision.  Thus, this issue will not be relitigated and this will not be a ground for a new trial. 

The alternative motion for a new trial is denied. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Defendant Alternative Automotive Solutions, LLC’s motion for reconsideration, to vacate or amend the judgment, or for a new trial is denied.

Defendant shall provide notice of this order. 

DATED: June 28, 2024                                                          ___________________________

                                                                                          John Kralik

                                                                                          Judge of the Superior Court