Judge John J. Kralik, Case Number: 23BBCV02069, Date: 2024-04-05 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Karen Tutkhalyan (“Plaintiff”) alleges that he was a passenger aboard Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s (“LACMTA”) bus and was injured when, upon boarding, the bus driver Defendant Jane Doe accelerated rapidly without allowing Plaintiff to secure himself. Plaintiff alleges that he fell and sustained significant injuries.

The complaint, filed September 8, 2023, alleges a single cause of action for negligence and statutory liability.

On February 29, 2024, LACMTA filed a motion to strike portions of the complaint.

LACMTA moves to strike page 3, lines 5-7 from the complaint, which alleges: “carelessly and negligently trained, supervised, performed work, and selected, hired, engaged, retained and, permitted Defendant JANE DOE to operate the subject bus.” (Compl., ¶10.) LACMTA argues that there is no statutory authority for negligent entrustment or supervision against a public entity such as LACMTA.

Under the statutory scheme in California, all government tort liability must be based on statute. (Duarte v. City of San Jose (1980) 100 Cal.App.3d 648, 653.) Government Code, § 815 states that except as otherwise provided by statute, “A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.” (Gov. Code, § 815(a).) However, “A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative.” (Gov. Code, § 815.2(a).)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that common carriers like LACMTA have a heightened duty of care as provided for in Civil Code, § 2100 et seq.[1] Plaintiff cites to C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, arguing that a public entity may be vicariously liable for the negligence of its employees. (C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at 879 [“[A] public school district may be vicariously liable under section 815.2 for the negligence of administrators or supervisors in hiring, supervising and retaining a school employee who sexually harasses and abuses a student.”].) In reply, LACMTA argues that C.A. is distinguishable because a special relationship existed between the school administrators/supervisors and the students under their supervision. (Id. at 877 [“Absent such a special relationship, there can be no individual liability to third parties for negligent hiring, retention or supervision of a fellow employee, and hence no vicarious liability under section 815.2 (or, for private organizations, under common law respondeat superior principles).”].)

Here, the Court finds that the allegations are sufficient to allege a claim for negligent entrustment or supervision against LACMTA. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Defendants LACMTA and Jane Doe were common carriers operating a bus line under Civil Code, § 2168 (common carrier defined) and that they owed a duty to Plaintiff as a passenger to use the utmost care and diligent for his safe carriage. (Compl., ¶¶7-8.) The complaint alleges that Jane Doe acted within the scope of her duties as an employee of LACMTA and she was careless and negligent in the operation, maintenance, inspection, control, and driving of the LACMTA bus when she rapidly accelerated upon Plaintiff’s boarding without giving him the opportunity to sit or secure himself. (Id., ¶9.) Whether Plaintiff can prove that LACMTA’s employee, Defendant Jane Doe, was actually negligent in driving the bus at the time of the subject incident and whether this was done during the scope of her employment, will be determined beyond the pleading stage.

Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s motion to strike portions of the complaint is denied. Defendant is ordered to answer.

[1] Civil Code, § 2100 states: “A carrier of persons for reward must use the utmost care and diligence for their safe carriage, must provide everything necessary for that purpose, and must exercise to that end a reasonable degree of skill.”

Civil Code, § 2101 states: “A carrier of persons for reward is bound to provide vehicles safe and fit for the purposes to which they are put, and is not excused for default in this respect by any degree of care.”

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department B