Judge: John J. Kralik, Case: 23BBCV02127, Date: 2024-01-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23BBCV02127    Hearing Date: January 12, 2024    Dept: NCB

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

North Central District

Department B

BACKGROUND

A.    Allegations

Plaintiff Sergio Corona (“Plaintiff”) alleges on July 2, 2023, he was standing at the sidewalk in front of 8012 Laurel Canyon Boulevard, North Hollywood, CA 91605.  Immediately before the collision, Defendant Sevan Safyani (“Defendant”) was driving his vehicle southbound on Laurel Canyon Boulevard.  Plaintiff alleges that Defendant veered onto the opposite lanes of northbound traffic and crashed into the sidewalk and directly into Plaintiff, injuring Plaintiff.  At all times, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was in an intoxicated state and knew that probably serious injury would result to other motorists and/or pedestrians by driving a vehicle while under the influence.  Plaintiff alleges that Defendant exercised despicable conduct and conscious disregard for the safety of others and Plaintiff by knowingly driving a vehicle in an intoxicated condition on public streets. 

            The complaint, filed September 14, 2023, alleges a single cause of action for negligence.

B.     Motion on Calendar

On October 31, 2023, Defendant filed a motion to strike the allegations for punitive damages from the initial complaint. 

On December 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed an opposition brief.   

On January 8, 2024, Defendant filed an untimely reply brief.

DISCUSSION

Defendant moves to strike the allegations for punitive damages in paragraph 22 and section 3 of the prayer for relief in the complaint.  The request for punitive damages is sought in connection with the sole cause of action for negligence.

A complaint including a request for punitive damages must include allegations showing that the plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages.  (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)  A claim for punitive damages cannot be pleaded generally and allegations that a defendant acted "with oppression, fraud and malice" toward plaintiff are insufficient legal conclusions to show that the plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages.  (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.)  Specific factual allegations are required to support a claim for punitive damages.  (Id.)

Civil Code § 3294 authorizes a plaintiff to obtain an award of punitive damages when there is clear and convincing evidence that the defendant engaged in malice, oppression, or fraud.  Section 3294(c) defines the terms in the following manner:

(1)   "Malice" means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

(2)   "Oppression" means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.

(3)   "Fraud" means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. 

Defendant argues that the complaint lacks specific facts supporting a claim for punitive damages and that the allegations are conclusory. 

In the sole cause of action for negligence, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty of care to drive the vehicle in a reasonable manner, including looking for pedestrians.  (Compl., ¶14.)  Plaintiff alleges that Defendant breached his duty by failing to exercise ordinary care while driving, such that he caused Plaintiff to be struck by the vehicle.  (Id., ¶15.)  Plaintiff alleges that Defendant operated his vehicle in a reckless and dangerous manner, failed to avoid a collision, failed to observe and exercise reasonable and due care and precaution and to maintain proper and adequate control of the motor vehicle, failed to keep a proper lookout for others, failed to obey traffic laws, and was negligent in other respects.  (Id., ¶16.)  Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was in an intoxicated state, knew that probable serious injury would result to other motorists/pedestrians by driving a vehicle while under the influence, and willfully exercise despicable conduct.  (Id., ¶17.)  Plaintiff alleges that Defendant began consuming drugs and alcohol on July 2, 2023 to the point of intoxication, which sharply impaired his physical and mental state.  (Id., ¶18.)  He alleges that defendant was aware from the outset of the probable consequences of such conduct and willfully and deliberately failed to avoid the consequences and acted with conscious disregard.  (Id., ¶19.)

Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890 is instructive with respect to this set of facts.  In Taylor, the Supreme Court fell short of holding that punitive damages are always appropriate in cases involving driving while intoxicated, finding that “the act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of ‘malice’ under section 3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences.”  (Id. at p. 892.)  In the subsequent decision of Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, the Supreme Court held that driving while intoxicated does not always give rise to a claim for punitive damages.  Specifically, the Court stated that “the risk created generally by one who becomes intoxicated and decides nevertheless to drive a vehicle on the public streets is the same as the risk created by an intoxicated driver’s decision to zigzag in and out of traffic at 65 miles per hour in a crowded beach recreation area at 1:30 in the afternoon on a Sunday in June.  The risk of injury to others from ordinary driving while intoxicated is certainly foreseeable, but it is not necessarily probable.”  (Id. at p. 89.) 

Based on the rules set forth in both Taylor and Dawes, the Court finds that the allegations in the complaint regarding Defendant’s intoxication are insufficient to support the imposition of punitive damages.  The description of Defendant’s conduct can be applicable to almost any situation wherein a person consumes alcohol and then decides to drive.  The fact that the complaint alleges that Defendant consumed excessive amount of alcohol prior to driving does not necessarily show that he acted maliciously or oppressively; and the allegations regarding malice, oppression, despicable conduct, and/or conscious disregard are conclusory as currently alleged in the complaint.  As discussed in Taylor and Dawes, specific factual circumstances must be alleged which show that the risk of injury was probable, such as weaving through lanes of traffic, a previous conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol, or driving while simultaneously drinking alcohol.  The fact that an accident occurred and Defendant was found to be intoxicated, without more, has the character of ordinary negligent driving and does not show aggravating circumstances warranting punitive damages.

The motion to strike punitive damages from the complaint is granted with leave to amend.  

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

            Defendant Sevan Safyani’s motion to strike the allegations for punitive damages in the complaint is granted with 20 days leave to amend.   

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            Defendant shall provide notice of this order.

DATED: January 12, 2024                                         ___________________________

                                                                              John Kralik

                                                                              Judge of the Superior Court