Judge: John J. Kralik, Case: 23BBCV02555, Date: 2024-12-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23BBCV02555    Hearing Date: December 6, 2024    Dept: NCB

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

North Central District

Department B

BACKGROUND

A.    Allegations of Complaint

Plaintiff Adriana Alvarado (Plaintiff) alleges on September 8, 2023, at the Northbound 101 offramp for Lankershim Boulevard, she was in the rear passenger seat of Defendant Ernie Doe’s (Doe) vehicle. Plaintiff had hired Doe through the ride-share app owned by Defendant Lyft. While in the vehicle Doe collided with the rear end of another vehicle and fled the scene with Plaintiff still in the vehicle. Doe continued to drive recklessly by driving at an excessive and dangerous speed and by running several red lights. On information and belief, Plaintiff alleges Doe was intoxicated while driving. As a result, Plaintiff was injured. Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants Doe and Lyft.

The complaint, filed October 31, 2023, alleges causes of action for: (1) Motor Vehicle Negligence, (2) General Negligence, (3) Common Carrier Negligence, and (4) Negligent Hiring, Retention and Supervision.

B.     Relevant Background

On March 15, 2024, the court granted Lyft’s motion to compel Plaintiff to arbitrate her claims. The court did not stay the claims against Doe.

On August 13, 2024, Plaintiff amended the complaint to change fictious Doe 1 to Defendant Ernest Morales (Morales).  Plaintiff subsequently served with the complaint.

C.     Motion on Calendar

On October 8, 2024, Morales filed a motion to strike without a demurrer.

On November 21, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition brief.

On November 16, 2024, Morales filed a reply brief.  

DISCUSSION                                                                                              

A.    Legal Standard

Morales moves to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages in the prayer and the exemplary damages attachment to the complaint.

Punitive damages are available in non-contract actions where a defendant is guilty of malice, fraud, or oppression. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) Oppression is “despicable conduct with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 3294, subd. (c)(1).)  Malice is “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) Malice may be proved either expressly through direct evidence or by implication through indirect evidence from which the jury draws inferences. (Angie M. v. Superior Ct. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1228 (Angie M.) Fraud is “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. (Code Civ. Proc. § 3294, subd. (c)(3).) The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. (Grieves v. Superior Ct. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.)

Where the complaint hinges on driving well intoxicated the parties primarily rely on Dawes v Super. Ct. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82 (Dawes) and Taylor v. Super Ct. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890 (Taylor).

In Dawes, the Court of Appeal was considering the sufficiency of the allegations in a hit and run case to support a claim for punitive damages. The allegations included that plaintiff was walking in an area with heavy vehicular and pedestrian traffic, that defendant was intoxicated, that defendant was driving more than 65-mph in a 35-mph zone, and that defendant had the knowledge that probable serious injury would result to persons in the are as a result of defendant’s conduct. (Dawes, supra, 111 Cal.App.3d at p. 86.) In reversing the trial court’s order striking the allegations as insufficient, the court reasoned that if “these allegations were proved at trial, the factfinder could reasonably find that [defendant] acted with ‘malice’ – with a conscious disregard of safety and the probable injury of others as a result of his conduct.” (Id. at pp. 88-89.) However, the court explicitly noticed that

we do not agree that the risk created generally by one who becomes intoxicated and decides nevertheless to drive a vehicle on the public streets is the same as the risk created by an intoxicated driver’s decision to zigzag in and out of traffic at 65 miles per hour in a crowded beach recreation area at 1:30 in the afternoon on a Sunday in June. The risk of injury to others from ordinary driving while intoxicated is certainly foreseeable, but it is not necessarily probable.

(Id. at p. 89.) This language supports that alleging that an individual was driving while intoxicated—and nothing more—would not support a claim for punitive damages. Yet, a plaintiff may allege “specific facts from which the conscious disregard of probable injury to others may reasonably be inferred.” (Id. at p. 90)

            In Taylor, the plaintiff alleged that defendant hit plaintiff’s car and caused serious injury, that defendant had a history of alcoholism, that defendant had a habit of during under the influence, and that defendant was aware of the dangerousness of driving while intoxicated. (Taylor, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 893.) The Supreme Court reversed the trial court order granting the motion to strike after finding the allegations sufficient to show a conscious disregard for safety. The court noted that, 

[o]ne who willfully consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of others. 

(Id. at p. 897.)

Here, the court finds the present allegations insufficient to support punitive damages under both Taylor and Dawes. Even the allegations of intoxication are made “on information and belief” and have no specifics. There are no other instances of intoxicated driving, or specific facts to support the allegation. The allegations regarding his subsequent conduct are likewise alleged in the vaguest of terms.

             The motion is granted with leave to amend.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Defendant Ernest Morales’ Motion to Strike is Granted with 20 days leave to amend.  

Defendant  shall provide notice of this order.

DATED: December 6, 2024                                       ___________________________

                                                                              John J. Kralik

                                                                              Judge of the Superior Court