Judge John J. Kralik, Case Number: 23BBCV02576, Date: 2024-11-08 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff C.C. (“Plaintiff”) alleges that he was a high school student at South El Monte High School (“High School”), which is part of Defendant El Monte Union High School District (“Defendant”). Plaintiff alleges that he was a minor at the time of his claims in this action.

Plaintiff alleges that on March 22, 2023, he was assaulted, battered, and stabbed by another student while on campus of the High School. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant had prior notice of the existence of inappropriate, harassing, violent conduct occurring at the High School or the dangerous propensities of the assailant, and were therefore aware of the potential danger and direct threat to students including Plaintiff.

The complaint, filed January 26, 2024, alleges causes of action for: (1) negligence based on Government Code, §§ 815.2, 815.6, and 820; and (2) negligent hiring, supervision, training, and retention based on Government Code, §§ 815.2, 815.6, and 820.

On January 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Amendment to the Complaint, stating that when he filed the complaint, he was a minor, but he is now an adult and no longer needs a guardian ad litem to continue the litigation. As such, the complaint’s case caption has been amended from “C.C., a minor, by and through his guardian ad litem, S.R.” to “C.C.”

On October 7, 2024, Defendant filed a demurrer and motion to strike portions of the complaint.

Defendant demurs to the 2^nd cause of action for negligent hiring, supervision, training, and retention in the complaint, arguing that it fails to plead sufficient facts to state a cause of action. Defendant argues that the 2^nd cause of action is a direct, common law claim against Defendant, which is precluded as a matter of law since government tort liability must be based upon statute. Defendant also argues that the Education Code sections cited by Plaintiff fail to show a mandatory duty owed by Defendant to Plaintiff.

Under the statutory scheme in California, all government tort liability must be based on statute. (Duarte v. City of San Jose (1980) 100 Cal.App.3d 648, 653.) Government Code § 815, enacted in 1963, abolished all common law or judicially declared forms of liability for public entities, except for such liability as may be required by the federal or state Constitution. (Cochran v. Herzog Engraving Co. (1984) 155 Cal. App. 3d 405, 409.) Accordingly, in the absence of some constitutional requirement, public entities may be liable only if a statute declares them to be liable. (Id.) Further, in order to state a cause of action for government tort liability, every fact essential to the existence of statutory liability must be pleaded with particularity, including the existence of a statutory duty. (Zuniga v. Housing Authority (1995) 41 Cal. App. 4th 82, 96.) Since the duty of a public entity can only be created by statute, the statute claimed to establish the duty must be identified. (Id.)

“[A] school district and its employees have a special relationship with the district's pupils, a relationship arising from the mandatory character of school attendance and the comprehensive control over students exercised by school personnel, ‘analogous in many ways to the relationship between parents and their children.’” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 869.) “Because of this special relationship, imposing obligations beyond what each person generally owes others under Civil Code section 1714, the duty of care owed by school personnel includes the duty to use reasonable measures to protect students from foreseeable injury at the hands of third parties acting negligently or intentionally.[] This principle has been applied in cases of employees' alleged negligence resulting in injury to a student by another student [citation], injury to a student by a nonstudent [citation] and—on facts remarkably close to the present case—injuries to a student resulting from a teacher's sexual assault [citation].” (Id. at 870 [internal quotation marks and footnote omitted]; see also Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 619 [“Similarly, a duty to warn or protect may be found if the defendant has a special relationship with the potential victim that gives the victim a right to expect protection.”].)

In the 2^nd cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that he is bringing the claim based on Government Code, §§ 815.2 (vicarious liability for employee/agent negligence), 815.6 (public entity liable where there is a mandatory duty), and 820 (public employee liability). (Compl., ¶39.) Plaintiff also alleges that the 2^nd cause of action is based on Education Code, §§ 44660, 44662, 44664, 44830, 44870, 44932, 56031, and 56345, which provide for specific qualifications for the hiring, supervising, evaluating, and assessing of teachers. (Id., ¶9.)[1] Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s employees were school officers and agents acting in the course and scope of their employment. (Id., ¶40.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to adequately supervise Plaintiff and the violent attacker while they were on campus during school hours. (Id., ¶41.) He alleges that Defendant’s employees were incompetent and unfit to be Defendant’s employees. (Id., ¶42.) He alleges that Defendant had a duty to supervise Plaintiff and all students, take reasonable steps to protect students, and investigate their staff and employees. (Id., ¶43.) Plaintiff alleges that the negligent acts or omissions of Defendant included: (a)-(b) failing to screen all potential employees to ensure they could properly supervise students and the violent attacker; (c) failing to provide proper training to all teachers, administrators, or supervisory personnel before placing Plaintiff and the violent attacker under the direct supervision of said administrators, teachers, and supervisory personnel who had a duty to supervise Plaintiff at all times relevant; (d) failing to supervise teachers, administrators, or supervisory personnel adequately, or to provide adequate follow-up measures to ensure they were appropriately protecting students like Plaintiff, supervising Plaintiff and the student assailant at all relevant times including, but not limited to, during school hours on school grounds; (e) filing to take reasonable, adequate, and appropriate measures to ensure that its teachers, administrators, and supervisory personnel were fit to supervise minor students like Plaintiff, the violent attacker, and other students, particularly after Defendant had reason to know that such acts of threats, harassment, assault, and battery had occurred to other student(s) on school grounds in the past; (f) failing to take reasonable, adequate, and appropriate measures to ensure that Plaintiff would be safe on school grounds during school hours; (g) failing to properly or sufficiently warn, train, or educate teachers and students regarding the detection and reporting of harassment, bullying, threats, and abuse, as well as other similar tortious and criminal conduct within the High School by other students, teachers or other supervisory adults; and (h) failing to take reasonable and effective action to terminate or discipline EMUHSD employees or agents for poor or improper student supervision. (Id., ¶45.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant breached its duties, which proximately caused Plaintiff’s injuries. (Id., ¶¶46-48.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff is attempting to impose direct, common-law liability against Defendant (citing to paragraphs 23 and 24 in the complaint), such that the demurrer must be sustained. However, Plaintiff has identified Government Code, §§ 815.2, 815.6, and 820 as the basis for liability against Defendant. (See e.g., C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 879 [“[A] public school district may be vicariously liable under section 815.2 for the negligence of administrators or supervisors in hiring, supervising and retaining a school employee who sexually harasses and abuses a student.”].) Plaintiff has alleged facts that Defendant’s officials/administrators had reason to know of the threats, harassment, assault, and battery of the attacker as it had occurred to other students on the school ground in the past, and that Defendant failed to provide adequate supervision or properly warn and train its teachers and students about such tortious and criminal conduct. (Compl., ¶45.) Thus, the demurrer to the 2^nd cause of action will not be sustained on the basis that it lacks a statutory basis.

Next, Defendant argues that Education Code, §§ 44660, 44662, 44664, 44830, 44870, 44932, 56031, and 56345 are not applicable and fail to show a mandatory duty. Defendant argues that these sections discuss general actions and do not specifically obligate Defendant to preclude the actions alleged here (i.e., Plaintiff being stabbed in the hallway during school hours). In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Education Code, § 44807 and California Code of Regulations, Title 5, § 5531 state mandatory duties. (The Court notes that Plaintiff does not rely on Education Code, §§ 44660, 44662, 44664, 44830, 44870, 44932, 56031, and 56345 in its opposition brief. Rather Education Code, § 44807 and California Code of Regulations, Title 5, § 5531 were alleged in connection with the 1^st cause of action for negligence in the complaint at paragraph 8.)

Government Code, § 815.6 states: “Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.” “Thus, the government may be liable when (1) a mandatory duty is imposed by enactment, (2) the duty was designed to protect against the kind of injury allegedly suffered, and (3) breach of the duty proximately caused injury.” (State Dept. of State Hospitals v. Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 339, 348.) The California Supreme Court stated:

Courts have delineated what is necessary to establish a mandatory duty. “First and foremost, ... the enactment at issue [must] be obligatory, rather than merely discretionary or permissive, in its directions to the public entity; it must require, rather than merely authorize or permit, that a particular action be taken or not taken.” [Citation.] “It is not enough, moreover, that the public entity or officer have been under an obligation to perform a function if the function itself involves the exercise of discretion.” [Citation.] Moreover, “[c]ourts have ... [found] a mandatory duty only if the enactment ‘affirmatively imposes the duty and provides implementing guidelines.’ ” [Citation.] “ ‘ “[T]he mandatory nature of the duty must be phrased in explicit and forceful language.” [Citation.] “It is not enough that some statute contains mandatory language. In order to recover plaintiffs have to show that there is some specific statutory mandate that was violated by the [public entity].” ’ [Citations.]” [Citation.]

(State Dept. of State Hospitals v. Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 339, 348–349 [citations omitted].)

Every teacher in the public schools shall hold pupils to a strict account for their conduct on the way to and from school, on the playgrounds, or during recess. A teacher, vice principal, principal, or any other certificated employee of a school district, shall not be subject to criminal prosecution or criminal penalties for the exercise, during the performance of his duties, of the same degree of physical control over a pupil that a parent would be legally privileged to exercise but which in no event shall exceed the amount of physical control reasonably necessary to maintain order, protect property, or protect the health and safety of pupils, or to maintain proper and appropriate conditions conducive to learning. The provisions of this section are in addition to and do not supersede the provisions of Section 49000.

(Edu. Code, § 44807.) California Code of Regulations, § 5531 states: “All social activities of pupils, wherever held, if conducted under the name or auspices of a public school or of any class or organization thereof, shall be under the direct supervision of certificated employees of a district or an office of a county superintendent of schools.”

The mandatory duty expressed in section 44807 is with respect to conduct to and from school, on the playground, or during recess. The allegations of the complaint do not make specific allegations of when Plaintiff was attacked and whether this was on his way to and from school or during recess; at most, he alleges that he was stabbed during school hours while in the hallway during school hours. (See Compl., ¶¶13-14.) In addition, section 5531 only states that social activities under the auspices of a public school shall be under the direct supervision of the district employees, but this section does not specifically impose a mandatory duty that was intended to protect against the risk or injury suffered by Plaintiff. As such, the Court will sustain the demurrer to the 2^nd cause of action with leave to amend so that Plaintiff may allege further facts and statutory grounds that impose a mandatory duty on Defendant.

Defendant moves to strike the 2^nd cause of action and any prayer for relief related to the 2^nd cause of action. In light of the ruling on the demurrer, the motion to strike is taken off-calendar as moot.

Defendant El Monte Union High School District’s demurrer is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.

Defendant El Monte Union High School District’s motion to strike is taken off-calendar as moot in light of the ruling on the demurrer.

[1] Paragraph 8 of the complaint alleges that Plaintiff’s negligence claim is based on the Government Code sections, Education Code, § 44807, and California Code of Regulations section 5531 regarding the mandatory supervision of students at school.

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department B