Judge: John J. Kralik, Case: 23BBCV02597, Date: 2024-07-26 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23BBCV02597 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: NCB
North
Central District
|
dorothy mattia, by and through
her Successor-in-Interest, Elizabeth White, et al., Plaintiffs, v. vineland post
acute, llc,
dba Vineland Post Acute, et al.,
Defendants. |
Case No.: 23BBCV02597 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 [TENTATIVE]
order RE: motion to compel arbitration; and
demurrer and motion to strike |
BACKGROUND
A.
Allegations
Plaintiff Dorothy Mattia (“Mattia,” born
May 31, 1928) died on July 6, 2023 and brings this action through her
Successor-in-Interest and daughter Plaintiff Elizabeth White (“White”). Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Vineland
Post Acute, LLC dba Vineland Post Acute (“Vineland”) provided long-term
custodial care as a licensed 24-hour skilled nursing facility located at 10830
Oxnard Street in North Hollywood.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Belmont Village Burbank Tenant, LLC
dba Belmont Village Burbank and Belmont Three, LLC dba Belmont Village Burbank
(collectively “Belmont Defendants”) provide long-term custodial care and are
located at 455 E. Angeleno Avenue in Burbank.
Plaintiffs allege that Mattia was admitted
into the Belmont Defendants facility on September 6, 2022 for care and that
Belmont Defendants knew at all times that Mattia was a “high risk” for falls,
had limited mobility, and needed a walker with an escort to ambulate. Plaintiffs allege that Mattia had unwitnessed
falls on January 15, 2023 and April 3, 2023, and that she was found on her
bathroom floor on May 10, 2023.
Plaintiffs allege that Mattia complained of severe back pain on May 11,
2023 and was sent to the emergency department at Providence St. Joseph Medical
Care (“Providence”) for her bathroom fall and was then admitted to Vineland for
rehabilitation on May 17, 2023. On May
17, 2023, Plaintiff sustained another fall and was admitted to Providence. On May 18, 2023, Plaintiff had surgery to
repair a closed displaced spiral fracture of her right femur. On July 6, 2023, Plaintiff passed away.
The complaint, filed November 3, 2023,
alleges causes of action for: (1) elder abuse (Welfare & Institutions Code
§§ 15600 et al.) against all Defendants; (2) negligence against all
Defendants; (3) violation of Resident Rights (Health & Safety Code §
1430(b)) against Vineland; and (4) wrongful death against all Defendants.
B.
Motions on Calendar
On December 12, 2023, Belmont Defendants
filed a motion to compel binding arbitration and to stay the Superior Court
matter pending the hearing on the petition.
On May 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition brief. On July 24, 2024, Belmont Defendants filed a
reply brief.
On January 23, 2024, Vineland filed a
demurrer and motion to strike portions of the complaint. On May 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed opposition
briefs. On June 24, 2024, Vineland filed
reply briefs.
DISCUSSION
RE MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
Belmont Defendants move to compel
arbitration against Plaintiffs and for a stay.
A.
Terms of the Agreement to Arbitration
Belmont Defendants
provide the declaration of counsel Jeffrey S. Healey, which includes a copy of
the Belmont Village Residence and Services Agreement pertaining to Mattia. (Mot., Ex. A.) Appendix I includes the “ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION AGREEMENT,” which states in relevant part:
OPTIONAL
Signing
this alternate dispute resolution agreement is not a precondition of the admission
to or furnishing of services by Belmont Village.
ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR)
It
is understood that any and all legal claims or civil actions arising out of or
relating to care or services provided to you at Belmont Village Burbank, LP
(“Belmont Village”) (including but not limited to claims for negligence, elder
or dependent adult abuse/neglect, unfair business practices, refund, breach of
contract, intentional tort) … will be determined by good faith mediation and,
if necessary, followed by submission to arbitration as provided by:
(1)
the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services ("Hereinafter referred to
JAMS") or (2) pursuant to California law, in the event a court determines
that the JAMS does not apply. This includes claims and actions regarding
whether the care or services you received, or lack of care or services, was
unnecessary or unauthorized or was improperly, negligently, or incompetently
rendered. This includes claims or actions against Belmont Village, its
employees, agents, directors, or any parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of the
Belmont Village (Hereinafter referred to "affiliates"). … The
parties to this Alternative Dispute Resolution Agreement, by entering into it,
are giving up their constitutional right to have any such dispute decided in a
court of law before a judge or jury, and instead are accepting the use of
mediation and arbitration. …
This
Agreement is binding on all parties hereto, including the Resident's
representatives, agents, executors, family members, and heirs who execute this
Agreement below on the "Resident Representative/Agent Signature"
line. Those who execute this Agreement on the "Resident
Representative/Agent Signature" line are doing so not only in their
representative capacity for the Resident, but also in their individual capacity
and thus agree that any claims subject to binding arbitration.
RULES
OF ADR
…
The
parties agree that California Code of Civil Procedure §1281.2(c) is excluded
from this Agreement as the parties mutually desire to have any and all disputes
submitted to binding arbitration. The parties do not want any claims not
subject to arbitration to impede any and all other claims from being
adjudicated in binding arbitration.
…
NOTICE:
BY SIGNING THIS ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION AGREEMENT YOU ARE AGREEING TO
HAVE ANY LEGAL CLAIM OR CIVIL ACTION ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO YOUR
RESIDENCE OR ANY SERVICES RENDERED UNDER THE RSA DECIDED BY NEUTRAL MEDIATION
AND ARBITRATION. YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR RIGHT TO A COURT TRIAL OR JURY.
(Residence and Services Agreement,
Appendix I at I-1, I-2, I-3, I-5 [bold in original] [underline added].) The arbitration agreement is electronically signed
by “Elizabeth White, Responsible Person for Dorothy Mattia” on August 30, 2022. Under the signature line, the arbitration
agreement states:
By virtue
of the Resident's consent, instruction and/or durable power of attorney, I
hereby
certify I
am authorized to act as Resident's agent in executing and delivering this
Agreement. If signed by a Legal Representative, the representative certifies
that Belmont Village may reasonably rely upon the validity and authority of the
representative's signature based upon actual, implied or apparent authority to
execute this Agreement as granted by the Resident.
(Id.
at I-5.) White electronically signed
this portion of the agreement as the “Legal Representative.”
Belmont Defendants argue that the
arbitration agreement should be enforced because White voluntarily signed the
agreement on behalf of Mattia and the arbitration agreement stated that it
would be binding on all parties—Mattia (the resident), her agent/representative
White (in her representative and individual capacity), and Belmont
Defendants. Belmont Defendants also
argue that the scope of the arbitration agreement covers Plaintiffs’ claims for
elder abuse, negligence, and wrongful death (the 3rd cause of action
for violation of Resident Rights is alleged against Vineland only).
In opposition, Plaintiffs first argue
that the arbitration agreement is invalid as it has not been legally
authenticated. However, Plaintiffs do
not deny that White signed the Residence and Services Agreement on Mattia
behalf. While they argue that White did
not sign the arbitration agreement, White’s declaration statements denying her
signature are refuted by Belmont Defendants’ evidence in reply as discussed
below. Further, with the reply brief,
Belmont Defendants provide the declaration of Mary Jane Rodriguez, who is the
Executive Director of Belmont Village Burbank and she states that she is
familiar with and oversees resident records and files. (Rodriguez Decl., ¶1.) Her declaration includes White’s DocuSign
Certificate of Completion and a copy of the Residence and Services Agreement
with its Appendices. As such, the
documents have been properly authenticated and will be admissible for the
purposes of this motion.
Second, Plaintiffs argue that White
did not execute the arbitration agreement.
In her declaration, White states that upon her review the arbitration
agreement, she has never received the arbitration agreement to sign and did not
sign it electronically. (White Decl.,
¶1.) She states that the signature in
the arbitration agreement is not her signature and believes that the purported
signature was done without her consent, knowledge, or authorization. (Id., ¶2.)
However, White does not deny that she
electronically signed the rest of the Residence and Services Agreement. The Court has reviewed the Residence and
Services Agreement and it shows that she electronically signed the Residence
and Services Agreement on August 30, 2022 with DocuSign with unique stamp
“33BC9A6622DD4BD.” (See Residence and
Services Agreement at pp.19-20.)
Appendices A to L are also electronically signed with the same DocuSign
ID number/stamp. (See id.,
Appendix A at A-4; Appendix B at B-3; Appendix C at C-6; Appendix D at D-7;
Appendix E at E-2; Appendix F at F-3; Appendix I at I-5; Appendix J at J-2;
Appendix K at K-4; Appendix L at L-1; Appendix N at N-2.) Other than her declaration, there is no other
proof that she did not sign the arbitration agreement or that she did not sign
the Residence and Services Agreement or the Appendices with the same electronic
signature. With the reply brief, Belmont
Defendants provide White’s emails showing that she requested the “lease
agreement” documents on August 30, 2022 and had sent them over to Juliet
Connaughton of Belmont Village. (See
Reply at Ex. A.) Belmont Defendants also
provide the DocuSign Certificate of Completion, showing that White reviewed 70
pages of documents with 25 signatures regarding the “RSA for Dorothy Mattia”;
this document also shows White’s DocuSign signature and the unique
stamp/number. (Reply at Ex. B.) Thus, this will not be an argument upon which
the motion will be denied.
Third, Plaintiffs
argue that the arbitration agreement is a waiver of the patient’s legal rights
and thus violates Health & Safety Code, § 1569.269(c). Subsection (c) states: “No provision of a
contract of admission, including all documents that a resident or his or her
representative is required to sign as part of the contract for, or as a
condition of, admission to a residential care facility for the elderly, shall
require that a resident waive benefits or rights to which he or she is entitled
under this chapter or provided by federal or other state law or regulation.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 1569.269(c).) Health &
Safety Code, § 1599.81 states:
(a) All contracts of admission that contain an
arbitration clause shall clearly indicate that agreement to arbitration is not
a precondition for medical treatment or for admission to the facility.
(b) All arbitration clauses shall be included on a
form separate from the rest of the admission contract. This attachment shall
contain space for the signature of any applicant who agrees to arbitration of
disputes.
(Health & Saf. Code, § 1599.81.) The arbitration agreement is provided on a
separate form from the Residence and Services Agreement and clearly states at
the top in bold: “Signing
this alternate dispute resolution agreement is not a precondition of the
admission to or furnishing of services by Belmont Village.”
(Residence
and Services Agreement, Appendix I at I-1 [bold in original].) Thus, signing the arbitration agreement was
optional/voluntary and there was no requirement for Plaintiffs to have signed
the arbitration agreement as a requirement to obtain services.
Fourth, Plaintiffs
argue that White did not have legal authority to bind Mattia to the arbitration
agreement. They argue that Mattia did
not sign the arbitration agreement, White only signed on behalf of Mattia as
the “Responsible Person,” and no power of attorney has been provided to show
that White has the capacity to contract on behalf of Mattia.
The Court of Appeal’s
discussion in Hutcheson v. Eskaton FountainWood Lodge (2017) 17
Cal.App.5th 937, 944–945 is instructive:
“As the Flores court
explained, ‘Generally, a person who is not a party to an arbitration agreement
is not bound by it. (Buckner v. Tamarin, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at
p. 142 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 489].) However, there are exceptions. For example,
a patient who signs an arbitration agreement at a health care
facility can bind relatives who present claims arising from the patient's
treatment. (Mormile v. Sinclair (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1508,
1511-1516 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 725]; Bolanos v. Khalatian (1991)
231 Cal.App.3d 1586, 1591 [283 Cal.Rptr. 209].) Further, a person who is
authorized to act as the patient's agent can bind the patient
to an arbitration agreement.
(Hutcheson, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th
at 944–945.) In Hutcheson, the
decedent signed a healthcare power of attorney, naming her niece as
attorney-in-fact to make healthcare decisions for her. The decedent thereafter signed a personal
care power of attorney designating her sister and niece as her
attorneys-in-fact. The decedent’s sister
then voluntarily admitted decedent to defendant residential care facility and
the sister signed the admission agreement, which contained an arbitration
clause, on the decedent’s behalf. In
determining whether compelling arbitration was proper, the Court of Appeal
concluded that “admission of decedent to the residential care facility for the elderly
in this instance was a health care decision, and the attorney-in-fact who
admitted her, acting under the [Power of Attorney Law], was not authorized to
make health care decisions on behalf of the principal.” (Hutcheson v. Eskaton
FountainWood Lodge (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 937, 941.)
Here, there is no
evidence offered by the parties that White had legal authority under a power of
attorney to bind Mattia to an arbitration agreement. As stated in Pagarigan
v. Libby Care Center, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 298:
A
person cannot become the agent of another merely by representing herself as
such. To be an agent she must actually be so employed by the principal[] or
“the principal intentionally, or by want of ordinary care, [has caused]
a third person to believe another to be his agent who is not really employed by
him.”[] Defendants produced no evidence Ms. Pagarigan had
ever employed either of her daughters as her agent in any capacity. Nor did
defendants produce any evidence this comatose and mentally incompetent woman
did anything which caused them to believe either of her daughters was
authorized to act as her agent in any capacity.
(Pagarigan
v. Libby Care Center, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 298,
301-302 [footnotes omitted].) At most,
the arbitration agreement states White’s representations that she is authorized
to act as Mattia’s agent and that Belmont Defendants may reasonably rely on her
authority to sign the arbitration agreement.
However, Belmont Defendants have not shown that White in fact was
Mattia’s agent for the purposes of binding her to the arbitration agreement,
such as under a power of attorney, signed document by Mattia naming White as
her agent, etc.
As such, the motion to compel
arbitration is denied.
DISCUSSION
RE DEMURRER
Vineland demurs to each cause of
action alleged in the complaint.
A.
Uncertainty
Vineland demurs to the entirety of the
complaint, arguing that it is uncertain because the allegations mostly concern
Belmont Defendants and fails to allege specific conduct about Vineland.
The complaint alleges general facts about
Mattia, her admission to Belmont Defendants’ facility, and then her admission
to Vineland. (See Compl., ¶¶11-29.) Paragraphs 30 to 49 are regarding Belmont
Defendants’ actions and inactions.
Paragraphs 50 to 70 are regarding “ALLEGATIONS AGAINST VINELAND.” Plaintiffs allege that after Mattia was
admitted to Providence following her fall in the bathroom, she entered Vineland
for rehabilitation on May 17, 2023.
(Compl., ¶18.) Plaintiffs allege
that Mattia sustained another fall on May 17, 2023 at approximately 7:50 p.m.,
which caused her to be transferred to the emergency room on May 17, 2023. (Id., ¶¶19-20.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were aware
that Mattia had a high probability of suffering injuries and had a duty to
provide adequate care and supervision to prevent falls. (Id., ¶24.) They allege that Vineland owed Mattia a duty
to provide necessary custodial and professional care to attain or maintain her
wellbeing and to be free from mental and physical abuse; to notify a physician
of any sudden or marked adverse changes; to conduct assessments of her
functional capacity; and to provide a sufficient number of personnel for
appropriate custodial and professional services to Mattia. (Id., ¶¶50-54.) Plaintiffs allege that Mattia’s injuries were
the result of Defendants’ plan and effort to cut costs in the operation of
their facilities and that Defendants knew that they would be unable to comply
with the standards of care as a result of insufficient staffing and
training. (Id., ¶60.)
At the demurrer stage, the Court accepts
the pleading as true. Here, the
allegations are not so uncertain that Vineland cannot ascertain what facts are
being alleged against it. While Vineland
is sometimes referred to and grouped with “Defendants” generally, the Court
accepts the pleadings that Belmont Defendants and Vineland each engaged in
certain conduct (or inactions) towards Mattia.
As such, the demurrer on the basis of uncertainty is overruled.
B.
1st cause of action for elder abuse
(Welfare & Institutions Code §§ 15600 et al.)
Vineland argues that the elder abuse cause
of action fails to allege sufficient facts against it.
This cause of action is a statutory remedy
provided under Welfare and Institutions Code §15657, which is part of the Elder
Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act, enacted at Welfare &
Institutions Code §§ 15600 to 15675. In
order to protect elders, the Legislature added heightened civil remedies for
egregious elder abuse, seeking thereby to enable interested persons to engage
attorneys to take up the cause of abused elderly persons and dependent adult. (Covenant
Care, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal. 4th 771, 787.) These
heightened remedies are enacted in section 15657, which permits a plaintiff who
proves the elder abuse by clear and convincing evidence to obtain heightened
remedies, including attorney’s fees and pain and suffering for elders who have
died.
In order to obtain these heightened
remedies and show elder abuse under section 15657, the plaintiff must plead and
show that the defendant is liable for: (1) physical abuse as defined in section
15610.63; or (2) neglect as defined in Section 15610.57. In addition, section 15657 requires the
plaintiff to show that the defendant has been guilty of recklessness,
oppression, fraud, or malice in the commission of this
abuse. Accordingly, the plaintiff must show that the defendant
engaged in conduct, either physical abuse or neglect, and that the defendant
engaged in the conduct with a specific mental state, either recklessness,
oppression, fraud, or malice.
In the 1st cause of action,
Plaintiffs allege the elements of elder abuse/neglect based on CACI VF
3105. (Compl., ¶72.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were to
provide care/services to Mattia and were care custodians of Mattia. (Id., ¶73.) They allege that Mattia is an elder (born May
31, 1928) and that Defendants neglected Mattia under the definition of the
Welfare & Institutions Code by denying or withholding goods/services
necessary to meet Mattia’s basic needs.
(Id., ¶¶74-75.) They
allege that Defendants’ repetitive acts/omissions constituted negligence and
were done with malice, oppression, and fraud, such that Mattia suffered
economic and non-economic damages. (Id.,
¶¶76-77.)
The allegations fail to allege facts
showing that Vineland intended to harm Mattia and thereby caused and/or
contributed to Mattia’s injuries are lacking.
The elements of elder abuse must be pleaded with particularity for this
statutory cause of action. While
Plaintiffs incorporate all the prior allegations into their 1st
cause of action, Plaintiffs should specifically plead what allegations are
being alleged against Vineland in the 1st cause of action.
In opposition,
Plaintiffs argue that they have adequately pled “neglect.” To plead neglect, a plaintiff must allege
facts establishing that the defendant:
(1)
had responsibility for meeting the basic needs of the elder or dependent adult,
such as nutrition, hydration, hygiene or medical care;
(2)
knew of conditions that made the elder or dependent adult unable to provide for
his or her own basic needs; and
(3) denied or withheld goods
or services necessary to meet the elder or dependent adult's basic needs,
either with knowledge that injury was substantially certain to befall the elder
or dependent adult, if the plaintiff alleges oppression, fraud or malice, or
with conscious disregard of the high probability of such injury, if the
plaintiff alleges recklessness.
Carter
v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC (2011) 198 Cal. App. 4th 396,
406-407.) In addition, the plaintiff
must allege that the neglect caused the elder or dependent adult to suffer
physical harm, pain or mental suffering. (Id.) The
facts constituting the neglect and establishing the causal link between the
neglect and the injury “must be pleaded with particularity,” in accordance with
the pleading rules governing statutory claims. (Id.)
As currently alleged, Plaintiffs
have only alleged neglect in conclusory, general terms. At most, Plaintiffs have alleged that Mattia
entered Vineland for rehabilitation on May 17, 2023, but that she sustained
another fall and was transferred to Providence’s emergency room at
approximately 7:50 p.m. that same day; she then passed away on July 6,
2023. (Compl., ¶¶18-22.) While Plaintiffs allege that Vineland owed
Mattia certain types of duties, breached those duties, and understaffed its
facility, Plaintiffs have not alleged specific facts regarding what happened on
May 17, 2023 during Mattia’s short residency with Vineland, how Vineland
neglected Mattia, and how Vineland’s actions/inactions caused or contributed to
her injuries.
The demurrer to the 1st
cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.
C.
2nd cause of action for negligence
The elements of a negligence cause of
action are “duty, breach of duty, proximate cause, and damages.” (Carlsen
v. Koivumaki (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 879, 892.)
In the 2nd cause of action,
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants owed statutory, regulatory, and common law
duties to Mattia and Defendants breached those duties, which caused Mattia to
suffer injuries. (Compl., ¶¶81-83.)
This cause of action is essentially devoid
of any facts against Vineland and simply alleges the elements of a negligence
cause of action. While Plaintiffs
incorporate the prior allegations (paragraph 80), Plaintiffs have not stated
which facts apply to this cause of action against each of the Defendants. Facts should be alleged in the 2nd
cause of action to support a claim of negligence instead of simply alleging the
elements of a negligence cause of action.
The demurrer to the 2nd cause
of action is sustained with leave to amend.
D.
3rd cause of action for violation of
Resident Rights (Health & Safety Code § 1430(b))
Health
& Safety Code, § 1430(b) states in relevant part:
(1) A current or
former resident or patient, or the legal
representative, personal representative, or successor in interest of a current
or former resident or patient, of a skilled nursing facility, as defined
in subdivision (c) of Section 1250, or intermediate care facility, as defined
in subdivision (d) of Section 1250, may bring a civil action
against the licensee of a facility who violates any rights of the resident or
patient as set forth in Section 72527 or 73523
of Title 22 of the California Code of Regulations, or any other right provided
for by federal or state law or regulation. The suit shall be brought in a court
of competent jurisdiction. The licensee shall be liable for the acts of the
licensee's employees.
(Health
& Saf. Code, § 1430(b).)
In the 3rd cause of
action, Plaintiffs allege that Vineland Post Acute, LLC was the licensee of the
skilled nursing facility known as Vineland Post Acute, LLC dba Vineland Post
Acute. (Compl., ¶86.) They allege that Vineland failed to treat
Mattia with respect, consideration, and full recognition of dignity in care of
her personal needs as required by the Patient’s Bill of Rights, such that
Vineland violated her rights under 22 C.C.R. §§ 72527(a)(3), 72527(a)(12),
72527(a)(25), 72315, and 72517; and 43 C.F.R. §§ 483.25, 483.10(b)(11),
483.20(d), 483.20(k)(1), 483.20(k)(3)(i), and 483.25(h)(1). (Id., ¶87 (a)-(j).) Plaintiffs allege that while Mattia was a
resident, she suffered numerous falls with injuries and endured pain and
suffering, which Health & Safety Code, § 1430(b) is intended to protect
against. (Id., ¶¶88-89.)
For the same reasons discussed
above, the complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to constitute a cause of
action for violation of resident’s rights against Vineland. The allegations in support of the 3rd
cause of action are a recitation of the Health & Safety Code and citations
to various California Code of Regulations sections and Code of Federal
Regulations sections. No supporting
facts are actually alleged in the 3rd cause of action. The demurrer to the 3rd cause of
action is sustained with leave to amend.
E.
4th cause of action for wrongful death
The elements of a wrongful death cause of
action are: (1) a wrongful act or neglect on the part of one or more persons
that (2) causes (3) the death of another person. (Nogart
v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 390.)
In the 4th cause of action,
Plaintiffs allege that White is the surviving heir of decedent Mattia. (Compl., ¶93.) Plaintiffs allege that Vineland and Belmont
Defendants owed duties to Mattia and they failed to meet those duties, such
that Mattia died on July 6, 2023. (Id.,
¶¶94-96.) They allege that prior to
Mattia’s death, White enjoyed the love, society, comfort, and attention of
Mattia. (Id., ¶97.)
For the reasons discussed above, the
wrongful death cause of action is insufficiently pled and lacks facts against
Vineland. The demurrer to the 4th
cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.
DISCUSSION
RE MOTION TO STRIKE
Vineland moves to strike allegations for
attorney’s fees and costs and for punitive damages. In light of the ruling on the demurrer, the
motion is taken off-calendar as moot.
CONCLUSION
AND ORDER
Defendants Belmont
Village Burbank Tenant, LLC dba Belmont Village Burbank and Belmont Three, LLC
dba Belmont Village Burbank’s motion to compel arbitration is denied.
Defendants Vineland
Post Acute, LLC dba Vineland Post Acute’s demurrer is sustained with 20 days
leave to amend. In light of the ruling
on the demurrer, Defendants Vineland Post Acute, LLC dba Vineland Post Acute’s motion
to strike is taken off-calendar as moot.
Each party shall provide notice of their
respective order.
DATED: July 26, 2024 ___________________________
John
J. Kralik
Judge of the
Superior Court