Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

North Central District

Department B

FRANCISCO ROMAN CERVANTES,

Plaintiff,

FORD MOtor company, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 23GDCV00781

Hearing Date: December 6, 2024

[TENTATIVE] order RE:

Motion to compel further responses

BACKGROUND

A. Allegations of Complaint

This is a lemon law action. Plaintiff Francisco Roman Cervantes (“Plaintiff” or “Mr. Cervantes”) alleges that, on September 30, 2021, he purchased a 2021 Ford Explorer bearing the vehicle identification number 1FMSK7DH1MGB70954 (the “Subject Vehicle”). At the time of purchase, the Subject Vehicle was covered by a written warranty contract issued by Defendant Ford Motor Company (“Ford”), the manufacturer and/or distributor of the Subject Vehicle. Mr. Cervantes contends that the Subject Vehicle was delivered to him with serious defects and nonconformities with the applicable warranty and, through regular use, developed other serious defects and nonconformities with the applicable warranty. However, Ford was unable to conform the Subject Vehicle to the applicable warranty after a reasonable number of repair attempts. Mr. Cervantes contends that, to date, Ford has failed to either promptly make adequate restitution or replace the Subject Vehicle, in accordance with Ford’s duties under the Song-Beverly Act.

The complaint, filed April 19, 2023, alleges causes of action for: (1) violation of Song-Beverly Act – breach of express warranty; (2) violation of Song-Beverly Act – breach of implied warranty; (3) violation of Song-Beverly Act section 1793.2; and (4) negligent repair.

B. Motion on Calendar

On October 30, 2024, Mr. Cervantes filed a motion to compel Ford’s further responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set Two (“RPD”).

On November 21, 2024, Ford filed an opposition brief.

On November 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply brief.

DISCUSSION

Mr. Cervantes moves to compel Ford’s further responses to RPD Nos. 1-83. Mr. Cervantes does not seek any monetary sanctions.

In opposition, Ford argues that the motion is substantively moot because Mr. Cervantes failed to meet and confer in good faith.

On August 29, 2024, Mr. Cervantes served on Ford its RPD, which sought documents in Ford’s possession that fall under the Addendum to Case Management Conference Order for Song-Beverly Litigation.

Ford contends that it initially provided responses to Mr. Cervantes’s RPD on September 30, 2024, and provided verifications on October 3, 2024. (Declaration of Gregory Sogoyan (“Sogoyan Decl.”), Exh. 4.) Ford contends that it agreed to produce all remaining documents responsive to Case Management Order request but would only do so subject to a Protective Order, which it attached in its response to Mr. Cervantes’s Meet and Confer correspondence on October 15, 2024. (Sogoyan Decl., Exh 6; Declaration of Natalie Cabibi (“Cabibi Decl.”) ¶ 3.) Ford contends that, after another exchange of Meet and Confer correspondence, and without signing the Protective Order, Mr. Cervantes filed the instant motion on October 30, 2024. (Cabibi Decl., ¶ 4.)

On November 14, 2024, after Mr. Cervantes filed the instant motion, the Stipulated Protective Order, signed by both parties, was filed with the Court.

In its Reply, however, Mr. Cervantes notes that even after the Protective Order was filed with this Court, Ford has still failed to produce sufficient discovery responses and documents.

Accordingly, the Court declines to deny the motion to compel further responses as moot.

However, a motion to compel further responses to an RPD, unlike other motions to compel further responses, requires the party propounding discovery and moving for further responses to meet an initial burden of “set[ting] forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand[.]” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310(b).) Essentially, the burden is initially on the moving party to show both relevance to the subject matter (e.g., how the information in the specific discovery request would tend to prove or disprove some issue in the case), and specific facts justifying discovery (e.g., why such information is necessary for trial preparation or to prevent surprise at trial). (Id., § 2031.310(b)(1).)

To satisfy this fact-specific inquiry, the movant must identify a disputed fact that is of consequence in the action and explain how the discovery sought will tend in reason to prove or disprove that fact or lead to other evidence that will tend to prove or disprove the fact. (Calcor Space Facility v. Super. Ct. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 224 (“Calcor”) (directing trial court to vacate its order compelling the defendant to produce records because the plaintiff failed to provide specific facts showing good cause for their production).)

Here, Mr. Cervantes has failed to set forth specific facts justifying the Court to compel further responses to each of the objected discovery responses. In fact, Mr. Cervantes’s Separate Statement facially states that it does not set forth such specific facts to demonstrate good cause by stating “Plaintiff groups and addresses the RFPs by category to significantly reduce the length of the Separate Statement in the interest of judicial efficiency. Plaintiff takes this approach in an effort to state the reasons to compel further responses and production in only a single time for each category of documents.” (Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents, Set Two (“Plaintiff’ Separate Statement”), p. 2:15-18.)

Further, Mr. Cervantes’s separate statement only lays out his reasons to compel further response and production once, in response to request No. 1; in response to every other request, Mr. Cervantes’s statement merely “incorporates by reference the Reasons to Compel Further Response and Production set forth under RFP No. 1, supra.” Despite Mr. Cervantes’s purported attempt to preserve judicial efficiency, such a generalized and unspecific separate statement cannot satisfy his initial burden to demonstrate specific facts supporting further responses to each discovery request. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310(b)(1); Calcor, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 224; TBG Ins. Servs. Corp. v. Super. Ct. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)

Accordingly, the Court denies the motion to compel Ford’s further responses to RPD based on Mr. Cervantes’s failure to identify good cause for such further responses.

In its opposition, Ford also requests monetary sanction against Mr. Cervantes and his counsel for no less than $1,000.00. Ford contends that the actions of Mr. Cervantes and his counsel demonstrate a willful misuse of the discovery process; by refusing the withdraw the instant motion after Ford produced and agreed to produce, subject to a protective order, the materials Mr. Cervantes sought in his motion, Mr. Cervantes failed to meet and confer in good faith.

Here, the Court finds that the imposition of monetary sanctions is not warranted. Ford filed its opposition on November 21, 2024, a week after the Stipulated Protective Order was filed with this Court. However, Ford did not file any evidence of the supplemental responses that Ford purportedly agreed to produce subject to the Protective Order. Further, as of the time of that the Reply was filed, Mr. Cervantes contends that no further responses were received. Accordingly, the Court finds that Mr. Cervantes did not misuse the discovery process by failing to withdraw the instant motion as Ford seemingly has not provided the responses justifying the motion.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Francisco Roman Cervantes’s motion to compel Defendant Ford Motor Company’s further responses to RPD Nos. 1-83 is denied.

No sanctions will be awarded.

Plaintiff shall provide notice of this order.

DATED: December 6, 2024 ___________________________

John J. Kralik

Judge of the Superior Court