Judge: John J. Kralik, Case: 24BBCV00016, Date: 2024-08-16 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24BBCV00016 Hearing Date: August 16, 2024 Dept: NCB
North
Central District
|
VICKI CORONA, Plaintiff, v. J. WOODS, SERIAL #1520,
et al., Defendants. |
Case No.: 24BBCV00016 Hearing Date: August 16, 2024 [TENTATIVE] order RE: DEMURRER |
BACKGROUND
A.
Allegations
Plaintiff Vicki Corona (a
self-represented litigant, “Plaintiff”) alleges that Defendants J. Woods and
Deocampo are park rangers employed by the City of Los Angeles. She alleges that on October 18, 2023, she
returned from shopping and parked her van at Valley Plaza Recreation Center,
when Woods and other park rangers approached and cited Plaintiff for
non-registration even though she had explained that she opted out of the DMV’s
jurisdiction years earlier. She alleges
that on October 23, 2023, she returned to her van to find another citation from
Deocampo, which amounted to an unlawful, unconstitutional policy.
The complaint, filed January 3, 2024,
alleges causes of action for: (1) deprivation of constitutional unalienable
rights under color of law and color of process; and (2) conspiracy to deprive
petitioner of constitutional rights and failure to protect petitioner from such
conspiracy.
B. Demurrer on
Calendar
On July 11, 2024,
Defendants Jalen Woods and Andrei Deocampo (“Defendants”) filed a demurrer to
the complaint. On July 16, 2024,
Defendants filed a notice of errata, stating that the initially filed demurrer
papers inadvertently failed to include one page.
On July 24, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition
brief.
On August 8, 2024, Defendants filed a
reply brief.
REQUEST
FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Defendants request judicial notice
of Exhibits: (1) the Petition for Permanent
Injunction filed by Vicki Corona in Vicki Corona v. City of Los Angeles, et
al. (LASC Case No. 22BBCP00135, “the Corona
Injunction Case”); (2) the Notice of Ruling and Court’s Order filed on July 22,
2022 in the Corona Injunction Case; (3) the Court’s Order of Dismissal entered
by the Court on July 25, 2022 in the Corona Injunction Case; (4) the Remittitur
entered on March 26, 2024, and the Order dismissing the appeal entered on
January 4, 2024, by the Court of Appeal in the Corona Injunction Case; (5) the
Complaint filed by Plaintiff on June 11, 2024 in Vicki Corona v. Porat, et
al. (LASC Case No. 24NNCV02151); (6) the Minute Order entered on July 1,
2024 in the Porat action; and (7) the fact that Valley Plaza Recreation Center
is a facility that is operated by the City of Los Angeles’ Recreation and Parks
Department (https://www.laparks.org/reccenter/valley-plaza). The request is granted as to Exhibits 1-6
pursuant to Evidence Code, § 452(d). The
request is granted as to Exhibit 7 pursuant to Evidence Code, § 452(h).
DISCUSSION
Defendants demur to the 1st
and 2nd causes of action in the complaint.
Collateral
estoppel precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior
proceedings. (Hernandez v. City of Pomona
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 501, 511-512.) The doctrine applies when the following
is shown to apply:
1) the issue sought to be
precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former
proceeding;
2) this issue must have been
actually litigated in the former proceeding.
3) it must have been necessarily
decided in the former proceeding;
4) the decision in the former proceeding
must be final and on the merits.
5) the party against whom
preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the
former proceeding.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s
claims in this action are barred by collateral estoppel.
Defendants
argue that the issue in the Corona Injunction Case is the same issue in this
action—i.e., whether the issuance of traffic citations due to Plaintiff’s
failure to register her vehicle violates her constitutional or statutory
rights. In the Corona Injunction Case,
Plaintiff filed a petition for permanent injunction against deprivation of
rights unalienable under color of law and color process on April 8, 2022,
seeking a permanent injunction to prevent Defendants City of Los Angeles, LAPD/North
Hollywood Division Officers J. DeLong – Serial #36713, Dominguez – Serial
#43278, Stratton – Serial #36962, and Cerda – Serial #41521 from harassing and
ticketing her conveyance (van). (RJN,
Ex. 1 [Petition in the Corona Injunction Case].) On July 22, 2022, this Court denied
Petitioner/Plaintiff’s petition for permanent injunction and, on July 25, 2022,
entered an order dismissing the petition.
(RJN, Exs. 2-3.) In denying
Plaintiff’s petition for a permanent injunction, the Court found that the California
Legislature has the authority to enact laws prohibiting unregistered vehicles
(Veh. Code, § 4000(a)(1)); if Plaintiff opted not to register her vehicle and
pay fees, she had the option of parking her vehicle in a private garage or a
privately owned off-street parking facility; Vehicle Code, § 40202 allows a
peace officer to enforce parking laws and regulations and provide notices of
parking violations on windshields of the vehicle; and the vehicle registration
requirement is not a heavy burden on the right of travel (Halajian v. D & B Towing (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1, 13), such that respondents’
actions in placing tickets on her vehicle’s windshield for her lack of
registration and violations of parking laws were not unconstitutional or deemed
harassment. The Court in the Corona
Injunction Case discussed the constitutionality of ticketing Plaintiff for
failure to register her vehicle and adjudicated the merits of this issue. Similarly, in this action, Plaintiff argues
that her constitutional rights were violated when she found two citations on
her van for failure to register her vehicle.
(Compl., ¶¶5-6, Exs. A, C [Citations].)
The adjudication in the Corona Injunction Case was final and the Court
of Appeal dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal and issued a remittitur on March 26,
2024. (RJN, Ex. 4.) Finally, Plaintiff was the Petitioner
in the Corona Injunction Case.
Thus, the elements of
collateral estoppel have been met, such that the issues regarding the
constitutionality of issuing citations on Plaintiff’s vehicle for her lack of
registration are barred. Plaintiff does
not address the argument regarding collateral estoppel in the opposition brief.
The demurrer to the
complaint is sustained on this basis.
Defendants demur to the 1st
cause of action, arguing that Plaintiff has not alleged an actual deprivation
of her use of the motor vehicle for transportation or shelter, as she is only
required to register her vehicle annually and pay fees to park and use her
vehicle on public streets. Defendants
argue that while Plaintiff has alleged that she has renounced the law and
declared herself exempt from the Vehicle Code requirements, she has no
authority to do so. Defendants argue
that the 2nd cause of action fails for the same reason.
In the complaint, Plaintiff cites to the
California Constitution and various case law, arguing that a person may not be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, or that every citizen is afforded
freedom from police interference when driving on a public street, etc. (Compl., ¶¶9-11.) However, her citations are taken out of
context and do not consider whether Plaintiff has, in the first place, abided
by relevant laws. Instead, she alleges
that she has sent a letter to the DMV stating that she opted out of the DMV’s jurisdiction
years ago. (Id., ¶5.) By doing so, Plaintiff acknowledges that she
has not registered her vehicle or complied with the Vehicle Code.
As argued by Defendants in the demurrer, the California Legislature has the authority to
enact laws prohibiting unregistered vehicles.
(See Halajian v. D & B Towing (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1, 12
[citing Hendrick v. Maryland (1915) 235 U.S. 610, 622, 35 S.Ct.
140, 59 L.Ed. 385 [“[a state may regulate the operation of motor
vehicles on its highways by requiring the registration of vehicles and the
licensing of drivers, in the absence of national legislation covering the
subject and provided the state's action is reasonable and does not burden
interstate commerce]”]; see also Cady v. Dombrowski (1973) 413
U.S. 433, 441 [stating that local police officers engage in “community
caretaking functions”, which includes having more contact with vehicles and
vehicle operations, enforcement of state vehicle registration and licensing
requirements, and regulating the condition and manner of motor vehicles on
public streets and highways].)
Further, Vehicle Code, § 4000(a)(1) states:
(a)(1) A person shall not drive, move, or leave
standing upon a highway, or in an offstreet public parking facility, any motor
vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, pole or pipe dolly, or logging dolly, unless it
is registered and the appropriate fees have been paid under this code or
registered under the permanent trailer identification program, except that an
off-highway motor vehicle which displays an identification plate or device
issued by the department pursuant to Section 38010 may be driven, moved, or left
standing in an offstreet public parking facility without being registered or
paying registration fees.
(Veh. Code, § 4000(a)(1).)
In addition,
Vehicle Code, § 40200 states that any violation for standing or parking a
vehicle under the code allows for the collection and enforcement of civil
penalties. Section 40202 allows a peace
officer or person authorized to enforce parking laws and regulations to provide
notices of parking violations on the windshield of the vehicle. Thus, contrary to Plaintiff’s allegations
that Defendants’ citation of her vehicle for non-registration is a violation of
her rights, the Vehicle Code shows that this is not a violation of the law nor
a deprivation of her rights.
Defendants also
argue that the registration requirement does not infringe upon Plaintiff’s
constitutional or statutory rights. “[T]he vehicle registration requirement is not a heavy
burden on the right to travel.” (Halajian, supra, 209
Cal.App.4th at 13.) “Furthermore, registration is an effective,
logical way to achieve the legitimate public interest in identifying cars and
trucks, as well as their owners. Therefore, we conclude that California's
requirement that cars and trucks be registered imposes a reasonable burden on
the right to travel and, thus, is constitutional.” (Id.)
Thus, Defendants’ actions in citing Plaintiff’s vehicle for her lack of
registration and her violation of parking laws are not unconstitutional or
deemed harassment.
For
these reasons, Defendants’ demurrer to the complaint is sustained. As it does not appear that Plaintiff can
amend the pleadings, the demurrer is sustained without leave to amend.
CONCLUSION
AND ORDER
Defendants Jalen
Woods and Andrei Deocampo’s demurrer to the complaint is sustained without
leave to amend. This case is dismissed with prejudice.
Defendants shall provide notice of this
order.
DATED:
August 16, 2024 ___________________________
John
Kralik
Judge
of the Superior Court