Judge: John J. Kralik, Case: 24BBCV00380, Date: 2024-07-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24BBCV00380    Hearing Date: July 19, 2024    Dept: NCB

 

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

North Central District

Department B

 

 

michael bank,

                        Plaintiff,

            v.

 

elita era llc dba seal skin covers

                        Defendant.

 

  Case No.:  24BBCV00380

 

  Hearing Date:  July 19, 2024

 

[TENTATIVE] order RE:

demurrer

 

 

BACKGROUND

A.    Allegations

Plaintiff Michael Bank (“Plaintiff”) alleges Defendant Elite Era LLC dba Seal Skin Covers (“Defendant”) is in the business of manufacturing and selling full body waterproof covers for cars, trucks, and SUVs.  Plaintiff alleges that in 2021, he began working for Defendant under the job title of Chief Sales Officer.  He alleges that the parties orally agreed on a payment structure as follows: “Plaintiff would earn a $210,000.00 base salary that included a $60,000.00 draw. The first $60,000.00 in net profits generated through wholesale and third-party marketplace account sales secured by Plaintiff would be paid to Defendant to cover the $60,000.00 draw. Once the draw was repaid, Plaintiff was then entitled to 100% of additional net profits generated by the wholesale and marketplace accounts he was responsible for securing up to a total of $90,000.00[], and then an additional 5% of the gross sales after that. Plaintiff made multiple efforts to have Defendant sign a written contract memorializing these terms.”  (Compl., ¶8 [footnote omitted].)  Plaintiff alleges that he was employee of Defendant and thereby is entitled to the protections afforded to employees under the labor code.  (Id., ¶9.)  Plaintiff alleges that in 2022, he secured a series of wholesale and third-party marketplace accounts, including Amazon, and fulfilled the full $60,000 draw repayment while also earning approximately $21,000 in additional commissions via net profits.  Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff his earned 2022 commissions, Plaintiff had to pursue payment, and eventually began receiving payments in April 2023.  Plaintiff alleges that Defendant terminated Plaintiff in 2023 and had failed to issue Plaintiff any commission payments for 2023.  Plaintiff alleges that he is owed in excess of $200,000 in unpaid commissions for 2023. 

The complaint, filed February 14, 2024, alleges causes of action for: (1) breach of contract; and (2) failure to pay wages in violation of Labor Code, § 201. 

B.     Demurrer on Calendar

On May 6, 2024, Defendant filed a demurrer to the 1st and 2nd causes of action in the complaint.

On June 24, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition brief.

On July 12, 2024, Defendant filed a reply brief.

DISCUSSION

            Defendant demurs to the 1st and 2nd causes of action in the complaint.

A.    1st cause of action for breach of contract

The essential elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are: “(1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damages to plaintiff.”  (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.)  “An oral contract may be pleaded generally as to its effect, because it is rarely possible to allege the exact words.”  (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)

In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the parties entered into an oral contract with a payment schedule.  (Compl., ¶¶8, 15.)  He alleges that “Plaintiff made multiple efforts to have Defendant sign a written contract memorializing these terms. Despite representing that they would do so, Defendant’s ownership never signed the agreement.”  (Id., ¶8.)  Plaintiff alleges that he did all things required of him under the agreement.  (Id., ¶16.)  Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to make contractually agreed upon commission payments to Plaintiff, such that he was harmed in the form of unpaid commissions and lost wages.  (Id., ¶¶17-18.) 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to attach a copy of the contract or set out the material terms of the contract, despite alleging the existence of a written contract.  In the demurrer and reply papers, Defendant argues that an unsigned, written contract exists that establishes that Plaintiff is an independent contractor.  However, these are facts that are extrinsic to the facts alleged in the complaint.  As currently alleged, a review of the complaint shows that it alleges an oral contract only.  Plaintiff alleges that despite attempts at trying to obtain a written contract from Defendant, Defendant never signed the agreement.  As such, Plaintiff acknowledges that no written contract exists, and Plaintiff’s claim is based on an oral agreement. 

Nevertheless, the Court will sustain the demurrer on the 1st cause of action as the terms of the oral agreement do not lay out the material terms of the agreement.  In paragraph 8 of the complaint (quoted above in this written order’s “Allegations” section), Plaintiff alleges the amount of base salary he would earn, the repayment of the $60,000 draw, the 100% of additional net profits he would generate by accounts up to $90,000, and an additional 5% of the gross sales after that.  (Compl., ¶8.)  However, the terms of Plaintiff’s obligations, when payments would be made by Defendant, etc., have not been provided.  Thus, the Court will sustain the demurrer to the 1st cause of action with leave to amend so that Plaintiff may allege additional facts regarding the terms of the oral agreement.  

B.     2nd cause of action for failure to pay wages in violation of Labor Code, § 201

The California Supreme Court in Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 903 defined “employment” with 3 alternate definitions: “(a) to exercise control over the wages, hours or working conditions, (b) to suffer or permit to work, or (c) to engage, thereby creating a common law employment relationship.”  (Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 903, 921.)  The ABC test presumptively considers all workers to be employees, and permits workers to be classified as independent contractors only if the hiring business demonstrates that the worker in question satisfies each of three conditions: (a) that the worker is free from the control and direction of the hirer in connection with the performance of the work, both under the contract for the performance of the work and in fact; and (b) that the worker performs work that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity's business; and (c) that the worker is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as that involved in the work performed.”  (Id. at 955-956.)  The Supreme Court conclude that it “is appropriate, and most consistent with the history and purpose of the suffer or permit to work standard in California's wage orders, to interpret that standard as: (1) placing the burden on the hiring entity to establish that the worker is an independent contractor who was not intended to be included within the wage order's coverage;[] and (2) requiring the hiring entity, in order to meet this burden, to establish each of the three factors embodied in the ABC test—namely (A) that the worker is free from the control and direction of the hiring entity in connection with the performance of the work, both under the contract for the performance of the work and in fact; and (B) that the worker performs work that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity's business; and (C) that the worker is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as the work performed.”  (Id. at 956-957 [footnoted omitted].) 

The complaint alleges: “Under the laws of the state of California and specifically the employee test set forth under Dynamex, Plaintiff was an employee of Defendant. Plaintiff worked under the direction and control of Defendant’s ownership, attended regular sales meetings and regularly received direction on all matters concerning corporate strategy and development. Plaintiff was also primarily engaged in the distribution and sale of Defendant’s principal product line. Finally, Plaintiff was not engaged in any independent business or trade outside of his work for Defendant. At all relevant times herein, Plaintiff was domiciled in the state of California. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to the protections afforded to California employees under the California labor code.”  (Compl., ¶9.)  In the 2nd cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that he was an employee of Defendant.  (Compl., ¶21.)  He alleges that Labor Code, § 200(a) defines commissions as wages, he earned commissions in 2023, and Defendant failed to pay him his earned commissions.  (Id., ¶¶22-24.) 

Defendant demurs to the 2nd cause of action, arguing that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts that he is an employee of Defendant, but is instead an independent contractor.  Defendant argues that the complaint alleges in a conclusory manner that Plaintiff is an employee of Defendant, but the complaint fails to address the factors regarding whether an individual qualifies as an employee. 

At this time, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations in paragraph 9 of the complaint to be sufficient to allege that he was an employee of Defendant.  At the pleading stage, the Court accepts the truth of the allegations.  Whether Plaintiff can prove that he is an employee will be determined upon the consideration of evidence at the summary judgment or trial stage. 

The demurrer to the 2nd cause of action is overruled. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

            Defendant Elite Era LLC dba Seal Skin Covers’ demurrer to the complaint is sustained with 20 days leave to amend as to the 1st cause of action and overruled as to the 2nd cause of action. 

Defendant shall provide notice of this order. 

 

 

DATED:  July 19, 2024                                                          ___________________________

                                                                                          John J. Kralik

                                                                                          Judge of the Superior Court