Judge: John J. Kralik, Case: 24BBCV00447, Date: 2024-10-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24BBCV00447    Hearing Date: October 25, 2024    Dept: NCB

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

North Central District

Department B

 

 

joshua eisenberg,

                        Plaintiff,

            v.

 

u-haul holding company, et al.,

 

                        Defendants.

 

  Case No.:  24BBCV00447

 

  Hearing Date:  October 25, 2024

 

 [TENTATIVE] order RE:

motion to compel arbitration and to stay proceedings  

 

BACKGROUND

A.    Allegations

Plaintiffs Joshua Eisenberg (“Eisenberg”) and Thomas Moiseyev (“Moiseyev”) allege that on March 31, 2023, they were in lawful possession of a U-Haul truck that they had rented from Defendants U-Haul Holding Company (“U-Haul”) and City of Los Angeles’ (“City”) facility.  Plaintiffs allege that unbeknownst to them, U-Haul had reported the truck as being stolen to the police, such that the LAPD performed a stolen vehicle stop, stopping the U-Haul truck, ordering Plaintiffs out of the truck with guns drawn, handcuffing Plaintiffs, and having Plaintiffs remain in custody as the police searched the vehicle.  Plaintiffs allege that the LAPD discovered that U-Haul made a mistake by negligently reporting the truck as being stolen and Plaintiffs were released.

            The complaint, filed on February 22, 2024, alleges a single of action for general negligence. 

B.     Motion on Calendar

On August 16, 2024, U-Haul filed a motion to compel Eisenberg to arbitration and to stay the proceedings pending the completion of the arbitration. 

On October 11, 2024, Eisenberg filed an opposition brief. 

On October 18, 2024, U-Haul filed a reply brief.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

            U-Haul requests judicial notice of Exhibits: (1) the complaint; and (2) the answer filed in this action.  The request is granted.  (Evid. Code, § 452(d).) 

DISCUSSION

            U-Haul moves to compel Eisenberg to submit his claims to arbitration. 

A.    Terms of the Arbitration Agreement

U-Haul moves to compel arbitration based on the U-Haul Rental Equipment Contract, Rental Contract Addendum, and the Arbitration Agreement.   U-Haul provides the declaration of Ashley Fish, who is the Vice President of U-Haul Co. of California.  She states that Exhibit A includes the Rental Equipment Contract entered between U-Haul and Eisenberg on March 31, 2023, Exhibit B includes the Rental Contract Addendum effective as of March 31, 2023, and Exhibit C is the applicable Arbitration Agreement that is available on the uhaul.com/arbitration website.  (Fish Decl., ¶¶4, 6, 7.)  The documents were not attached to Ms. Fish’s declaration but were later attached as an addendum to Craig Winterman’s declaration.

The Rental Equipment Contract is dated March 31, 2023 and names Eisenberg as the customer.  It states in relevant part:

I agreed to submit all legal claims in accordance with the U-Haul Arbitration Agreement, incorporated by reference, and available at uhaul.com/arbitration or from my local U-Haul representative.

(Winterman Decl., Ex. A [Rental Equipment Contract at p.1].)  The agreement is signed by Eisenberg. 

            The Rental Contract Addendum states that the agreement is between Eisenberg (customer) and U-Haul (company) and that the Terms & Conditions, including the Arbitration Agreement, constitute the entire agreement.  (Winterman Decl., Ex. B [Rental Contract Addendum at p.1].) 

            The U-Haul Arbitration Agreement states that the Arbitration Agreement shall be construed and interpreted under the FAA.  (Winterman Decl., Ex. C [Arbitration Agreement at p. 1, § 1].)  It states that any claims between Eisenberg and U-Haul relating in any way to the rental or purchase from U-Haul shall be submitted to binding arbitration before the American Arbitration Association according to the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules and Supplemental Procedures for Consumer-Related Disputes (website links provided).  (Arbitration Agreement at p.1, § 2.)  The term “Claims” “is to be broadly interpreted to include any dispute, claim or cause of action arising out of or relating to, Your [Eisenberg’s] dealings with U-Haul, including but not limited to, the reservation and/or reservation process, use of any affiliated U-Haul website, advertising, rental or sales contract, or Equipment. Claims include any and all legal theories, including but not limited to, all statutory and tort claims, that may be asserted by You.”  (Id. at p.2.)  The Arbitration Agreement discusses the notice procedure (page 2), the exceptions to the application of the AAA rules (pages 2-3), the arbitrator’s authority (page 3), and confidentiality (page 4).  Fees are disclosed by referencing the www.adr.org website and AAA filing, administration, and arbitrator fees will be paid by U-Haul to a maximum of $5,000, and then the arbitrator will have discretion on how fees in excess of $5,000 will be attributed between U-Haul and Eisenberg.  (Id. at p.4.) 

            Eisenberg’s claim for negligence against U-Haul arises out of his dealings with U-Haul regarding the reservation and use of the truck.  As such, the negligence claim falls within the scope of the arbitration provision.  In opposition, Eisenberg argues that the Court should apply CCP § 1281.2 and deny the motion.

B.     CCP § 1281.2(c)

Eisenberg argues that the Court should apply CCP § 1281.2(c) and deny the motion because third-parties have joined the action, the claims arise out of the same set of facts/events, and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on common issues of law and fact. 

CCP § 1281.2 states in relevant part:

On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that:

(c) A party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. For purposes of this section, a pending court action or special proceeding includes an action or proceeding initiated by the party refusing to arbitrate after the petition to compel arbitration has been filed, but on or before the date of the hearing on the petition. …

(CCP § 1281.2 [underline added].) 

            Eisenberg argues that there are 4 parties to this action: Eisenberg, Moiseyev, U-Haul, and City, such that if arbitration were to proceed, it would result in: (1) an arbitration between Eisenberg and U-Haul; (2) a civil lawsuit between Moiseyev and U-Haul; and (3) a civil lawsuit between Plaintiffs and City.  Eisenberg argues that granting this motion would split the action into 3 proceedings and would create the risk of unnecessary, duplicative proceedings and inconsistent rulings.

            The Arbitration Agreement submitted by Plaintiff states that the arbitration is governed by the rules of the FAA. 

The FAA states at 9 U.S.C. § 3:

If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.

(9 U.S.C. § 3.)  While CCP § 1281.2(c) provides the Court with discretion to deny arbitration in certain circumstances, the FAA states that matters that are subject to arbitration “shall” be referred to arbitration.  “The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) does not include a provision comparable to section 1281.2(c) and therefore requires courts to enforce written arbitration agreements even if there is pending litigation involving a third party that may result in conflicting rulings.”  (Acquire II, Ltd. v. Colton Real Estate Group (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 959, 968.)  “Thus, when a complaint contains both arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims, the Act requires courts to ‘compel arbitration of pendent arbitrable claims when one of the parties files a motion to compel, even where the result would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums.’”  (KPMG LLP v. Cocchi (2011) 565 U.S. 18, 22.) 

            Despite the provisions of the FAA and the case law above, courts have recognized that the “procedural provisions of the FAA and section 1281.2 do not conflict….  (Cronus Investments, Inc. v. Concierge Services (2005) 35 Cal.4th 376, 390.)  As stated in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University (1989) 489 U.S. 468:

Application of § 1281.2(c) to stay arbitration under the parties' contract is not preempted by the FAA. The FAA contains no express preemptive provision, nor does it reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration. Moreover, since the FAA's principal purpose is to ensure that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms, it cannot be said that application of § 1281.2(c) here would undermine the Act's goals and policies. Arbitration under the Act in a matter of consent, not coercion, and the parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit. Just as they may limit by contract the issues which they will arbitrate, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 3354, 87 L.Ed.2d 444, so too may they specify by contract the rules under which the arbitration will be conducted. Where … the parties have agreed to abide by state arbitration rules, enforcing those rules according to the terms of the agreement is fully consistent with the FAA's goals, even if the result is that arbitration is stayed when the Act would otherwise permit it to go forward.

(Volt Information Sciences, supra, 489 U.S. at 469.) 

Here, based on the Arbitration Agreement submitted by U-Haul in its moving papers, the parties agreed to apply the FAA when submitting to the Arbitration Agreement. 

            However, Eisenberg argues that even if the Arbitration Agreement includes the FAA rules, a party to an arbitration agreement may rely on CCP § 1281.2(c) if the agreement incorporates a provision allowing the law of the State where the arbitration takes place.  Eisenberg cites to a different version of the Arbitration Agreement on page 4 that has been pulled from uhaul.com/arbitration (date not disclosed), which the Court notes is different from the Arbitration Agreement attached to the declaration of Mr. Winterman (which was inadvertently not attached to the declaration of Ms. Fish).  The Arbitration Agreement attached to the declaration of Plaintiffs’ counsel Shayan Rahbar Vafaee in support of the opposition papers states in relevant part:

g. Location of Arbitration Hearing/Governing Law. The Arbitration shall take place in the County (or Parish) where You reside, either at the time of the rental and/or sale or return of the Equipment, unless otherwise agreed in writing by U-Haul and You. This Agreement shall be interpreted and construed in accordance with the law of the State where the Arbitration takes place. Any and all Claims arising out of or relating to this Agreement, whether sounding in contract, tort or statute, shall be governed by the law of the State where the Arbitration takes place, including its statutes of limitations, without giving effect to any conflict-of-laws rule that would result in the application of the laws of a different jurisdiction.

(Vafaee Decl., Ex. A [Arbitration Agreement at p.4, § 7.g] [emphasis added].)  A similar provision is not provided in the Arbitration Agreement submitted with the moving papers.

            In the reply brief, U-Haul argues that Eisenberg has not shown that the different Arbitration Agreement attached to the opposition papers is the agreement that was in effect at the time of Eisenberg’s rental.   (Reply at p.2, fn.2.)  However, the Court likewise cannot ascertain if the Arbitration Agreement attached with the moving papers was the operative Arbitration Agreement at the time of Eisenberg’s rental.  Ms. Fisher’s declaration states: “The U-Haul Rental Equipment Contract refers to the ‘U-Haul Arbitration Agreement,’ which it incorporates by reference, and which is available at uhaul.com/arbitration. Attached hereto as EXHIBIT C is a true and correct copy of this ‘U-Haul Arbitration Agreement.’”  (Fish Decl., ¶7.)  When entering the “uhaul.com/arbitration” website, the version of the Arbitration Agreement that is provided is the one that is attached to the opposition brief.  The Court notes that both submitted versions of the Arbitration Agreement are not dated.

            Despite this conflict in the evidence, the Court will assume that CCP § 1281.2, can be harmonized so that both arbitration and litigation can be accommodated.  The Court would like to act practically to get this matter resolved and scheduled. In view of the Court’s schedule, this matter would be set for trial in July 2026.  The Court will order the arbitration to be held between U-Haul and Eisenberg.  The Court will expect that the arbitration be concluded within one year and will expect both parties to proceed with deliberate speed to bring it to a conclusion. There will then be adequate time to assess the results, and then complete any discovery necessary for the remaining civil action. The Court will not stay the remainder of the civil action. The parties should discuss a stipulation that will allow discovery to be used in both proceedings.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Defendant U-Haul Holding Company’s motion to compel Plaintiff Joshua Eisenberg to arbitration is granted.  The request for stay is denied. A Post Arbitration Status Conference is scheduled for September 17, 2025, at 8:30 a.m. as to the above mentioned parties only.

Defendant shall provide notice of this order.

 

 

DATED: October 25, 2024                                                     ___________________________

                                                                                          John Kralik

                                                                                          Judge of the Superior Court