Judge: John J. Kralik, Case: 24NNCV01361, Date: 2025-02-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24NNCV01361    Hearing Date: February 7, 2025    Dept: NCB

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

North Central District

Department B

BACKGROUND

A.    Allegations

Plaintiffs Daniela Arriaga and Ezequiel Arriaga, through his guardian ad litem, (“Plaintiffs”) allege that they were the tenants at Defendants’ Robert and Andrea MacKenzie’s property at 11248 Oxnard Street, Unit 4, North Hollywood, CA 91606 from November 2020 to June 2024.  Plaintiffs allege Defendants evicted the Plaintiffs from the subject property after receiving funds from the Covid 19 Relief Agency for back rents that occurred during the Covid-19 pandemic.  Plaintiffs further allege that the property was unfit for human occupation during the time of their tenancy due to Defendants’ neglect.

Plaintiffs’ complaint filed May 3, 2024, alleges causes of action for: (1) breach of implied warranty of habitability, (2) negligence, (3) nuisance, (4) breach of quiet enjoyment, (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (6) Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code § 51), (7) Anti-Harassment Statute (Civ. Code § 1940.2), and (8) Violation of LA County Municipal Code § 8.52.130, et seq.

B.     Motions on Calendar

On October 31, 2024, Defendant filed a demurrer and motion to strike portions of the complaint. 

On January 29, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an opposition brief.

DISCUSSION RE DEMURRER

            Defendant demurs to all eight causes of action on the grounds of uncertainty. 

First Cause of Action - Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability

To establish a breach of the implied warranty of habitability, Plaintiffs must establish (1) “the existence of a material defective condition affecting the premises’ habitability,” (2) “notice to the landlord of the condition within a reasonable time after the tenant’s discovery of the condition,” (3) “the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency, and” (4) “resulting damages.” (Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1297.)

Here, the complaint alleges in relevant part the following. Plaintiffs entered into a rental agreement with Defendants for the subject Unit. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs complained to Defendants or to their agents, to Robert and Andrea, of dangerous housing conditions such as defective water pipes, plumbing issues, water leaks, overfloating water from bathroom tub, bedroom windows did not close all the way, kitchen cabinets broken and infested with roaches, bedbugs, hot water would be turned off with no notice and kept turned off for more than a week, electrical outlets of living room and bedroom spark every time something is connected into it, deteriorated closet doors get stuck and do not slide, leak,  and general sanitary conditions of the Unit. (Compl. ¶¶ 24-29.) Defendants and their agents told Plaintiffs not to worry and to continue paying rent because repairs would be made; no repairs were made. (Compl. ¶ 26.) The Department of Public Health and the Housing Authority ordered Defendants to make repairs, which were done inadequately. (Compl. ¶ 45, 46.)  As a result, Plaintiffs suffers from symptoms of mold inhalation, breathing issues, restlessness, insomnia, anxiety, stress, rashes, etc. (Compl. ¶ 34.) 

Defendants argue that the cause of action is uncertain.  The argument of uncertainty is a disfavored basis for demurrer and only applies when the demurrer is sufficiently unintelligible that a responding party would have no idea how to direct their litigation efforts.¿(Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616; Ludgate Insurance Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 592, 608.) Any ambiguities as to which particular defendant entered in a rental agreement with Plaintiff and which defendants are the agents or managers of the Unit can be clarified through discovery. [See Chen v. Berenjian (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 811, 822 [“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.”].)¿ The demurrer to the first cause of action is OVERRULED. 

Second Cause of Action Negligence

In order to state a claim for negligence, Plaintiffs must allege the elements of (1) “the existence of a legal duty of care,” (2) “breach of that duty,” and (3) “proximate cause resulting in an injury.” (McIntyre v. Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.)  As provided above, the complaint has pled specific factual habitability issues afflicting the Unit, such that Defendants breached a duty of care to Plaintiffs to provide Plaintiffs a habitable premise. The complaint has pled that Defendants breached this duty by failing to effectively remedy the conditions, which caused Plaintiffs various health issues. The Court finds Plaintiffs have pled sufficient ultimate facts to support each element. Further, as already stated, any ambiguity as to the specific involvement of each defendant can be clarified through discovery. To avoid unnecessary reiteration, the Court will not address this argument again and refers Defendants to the above analysis. 

The demurrer to the second cause of action is OVERRULED. 

Third Cause of Action Nuisance

To establish an action for private nuisance, (1) “the plaintiff must prove an interference with his use and enjoyment of his property”; (2) “the invasion of the plaintiff’s interest in the use and enjoyment of the land must be substantial, that is, that it causes the plaintiff to suffer substantial actual damage”; (3) “the interference with the protected interest must not only be substantial, but it must also be unreasonable, i.e., it must be of such a nature, duration, or amount as to constitute unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the land.” (Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Resort Partners, LLC (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 248, 262-263, citations, italics, brackets, and quotation marks omitted.)  Defendants argue that this cause of action is uncertain and fails for the same reasons that the first two causes of action fail.  However, the third cause of action alleges that the “the Subject Property had mold/blackspots/mildew, holes everywhere, water leaks, mold in the hallway and closet, fungi and other dangerous housing conditions. The unit was infested with roaches, Spiders, and bed bugs climbing all over Plaintiff and members of the family while asleep.” (Compl. ¶ 111.) “Plaintiff suffered property damage and economic loss including, but not limited to, beds, clothing, pillows, linens, futon, sofas, foods and food stuffs.” (Compl. ¶ 118.)  Because Plaintiffs have pleaded this cause of action with sufficiently specific facts, the demurrer to the third cause of action is OVERRULED.

Fourth Cause of Action Breach of Quiet Enjoyment

The elements of a claim for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment are: (1) a lease agreement between plaintiff and defendant; (2) absence of language contrary to the implied covenant that tenant shall have quiet enjoyment and possession; (3) act or omission of the landlord, or anyone claiming under the landlord, which “substantially interfere[s] with a tenant[’]s right to use and enjoy the premises for the purposes contemplated by the tenancy”; and (4) an applicable remedy. (See Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 578, 588-591.)  Defendants demur to this cause of action on the grounds of uncertainty. However, for the reasons stated as to the third cause of action, Plaintiffs have stated facts sufficient to support this cause of action and the demurrer as to this cause of action is OVERRULED.

Fifth Cause of Action Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

“The elements of a prima facie case for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Wilson v. Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009, citation and ellipses omitted.)

Here, the Complaint alleges Defendants knowingly rented a defective unit to Plaintiff and told Plaintiff to vacate the premises after Plaintiff complained of the conditions and unjustly retaliated against Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶ 146.) “Anytime Plaintiff call for repairs, Defendants would yell and scream at Plaintiff. Thereafter Defendants completely ignored Plaintiff’s request for repairs and has asked Plaintiff in the following or similar words to “move out of the unit” “you are bothering me” because of Plaintiff’s continuous complaints.” (Compl. ¶ 152.) 

Reading the Complaint liberally and as a whole, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts of outrageous conduct with the intention of causing emotional distress. Plaintiff’s opposition points to allegations that Defendants knew of the uninhabitable conditions and failed to repair the conditions, threatened to evict Plaintiff, racial discrimination, and differential treatment based on race and economic status. However, the uninhabitable conditions and failure to repair allegations are grounded on negligence. The allegations of preferential treatment or discriminatory conduct based on race are conclusory without any factual allegations supporting an inference of discrimination. Lastly, in terms of the threat of eviction and yelling at Plaintiff, insulting language, including insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, and other trivialities does not constitute outrageous conduct. (Rest. 2d Torts, s 46(d); see also Newby v. Alto Riviera Apartments (1976) 60 Cal. App. 3d 288, 297 (Newby).)

“Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant (1) abuses a relation or position which gives him power to damage the plaintiff's interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through mental distress.” (Newby, supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at 297.) 

For example, in Newby, after the plaintiff tenant organized opposition to rent increases, the landlord shouted at the tenant and stated he would throw her out directly if she did not leave and directed her to vacate the premises. When the plaintiff stated she would not leave, the landlord stated, “Do you want to bet your life” and that “We are going to handle this the way we do down South.” (Id. at 297-298.) The court held this course of conduct was sufficient to meet the test of outrageous behavior. In Aweeka v. Bonds (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 278, the landlord had failed to keep the premises in good repair and the tenant exercised his “repair and deduct” remedy under Civil Code sections 1941 and 1942. The landlord thereafter increased the rent from $75 per month to $145 per month; this increase was clearly not justified by the rental value of the premises, and the landlord was aware that the tenant could not pay the increased rent. On these facts, it was held the complaint alleged a cause of action for intentional infliction of mental distress. (Id. at 281).

By comparison, the Complaint here fails to specify any specific conduct by any person or agent of Defendants that is sufficient to meet the outrageous behavior test. The demurrer to the fifth cause of action is therefore SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

Sixth Cause of Action Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code § 51)

The elements of a claim for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act are (1) defendant is a business establishment, (2) defendant intentionally denied plaintiff accommodations, advantages, privileges, facilities, or services, (3) defendant was motivated to do so based on its perception that plaintiff belonged to a statutorily defined group, (4) plaintiff was harmed, and (5) defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s harm. (See Civ. Code, § 51; In re Cox (1970) 3 Cal.3d 205, 216.) “The objective of the Act is to prohibit businesses from engaging in unreasonable, arbitrary or invidious discrimination. Therefore, the Act applies not merely in situations where businesses exclude individuals altogether, but also where treatment is unequal.” (Pizarro v. Lamb’s Players Theatre (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1174, citations omitted.)  As with the other causes of action, Defendants argue that this cause of action is uncertain.  The Court agrees that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled discrimination, whether it be based on race or familial status. Here, the Complaint alleges Plaintiffs are Hispanic Americans (Compl. ¶ 2) and alleges that Defendants’ refused to fix the conditions due to their race and familial status “with children.” (Compl. ¶ 167.) A conclusory allegation that Plaintiffs were subject to discrimination or differential treatment, without any specific supporting facts, is insufficient. The demurrer to the sixth cause of action is therefore SUSTAINED with leave to amend. 

Seventh Cause of Action Anti-Harassment Statute (Civ. Code § 1940.2)

Civil Code section 1940.2 makes it unlawful for a landlord to commit certain specified acts “for the purpose of influencing a tenant to vacate a dwelling.” (Civ. Code, § 1940.2, subd. (a).) The purpose of Civil Code section 1940.2 is to prohibit a landlord's use of “‘constructive’ self-help eviction” techniques such as theft, extortion, interference with a tenant's quiet enjoyment, or trespass “for the purpose of influencing a tenant to vacate a dwelling” (Civ. Code, § 1940.2, subd. (a)).  (Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC, (2014) 226 Cal. App. 4th 1281, 1300-1301(citations omitted).)  The Los Angeles Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance permits a tenant to bring civil proceedings against a landlord who engages in any “knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific tenant or tenants that causes detriment and harm, and that serves no lawful purpose.” (L.A. Municipal Code Ord. No. 187109.)¿Examples of harassment for purposes of the Los Angeles Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance includes “[f]ailing to perform and timely complete necessary repairs and maintenance required by Federal, State, County, or local housing, health, or safety laws,” “[t]hreatening or taking action to terminate any tenancy including service of any notice to quit or other eviction notice or bringing action to recover possession of a rental unit based on facts which the landlord has no reasonable cause to believe to be true”; “Threatening to or engaging in any act or omission which interferes with the tenant’s right to use and enjoy the rental unit or whereby the premises are rendered unfit for human habitation and occupancy.” Here, the Complaint alleges that Defendants and their agents failed to make necessary repairs to the unit. The demurrer to the seventh cause of action is OVERRULED.

Eighth Cause of Action Violation of LA County Municipal Code § 8.52.130, et seq.

            The eighth cause of action is for violation of the California Anti-Harassment Statute, L.A. County, Cal., Mun. Code § 8.52.130 et seq. The Los Angeles Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance permits a tenant to bring civil proceedings against a landlord who engages in any “knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific tenant or tenants that causes detriment and harm, and that serves no lawful purpose.” (L.A. Municipal Code Ord. No. 187109.) Examples of harassment for purposes of the Los Angeles Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance includes “[f]ailing to perform and timely complete necessary repairs and maintenance required by Federal, State, County, or local housing, health, or safety laws,” “[t]hreatening or taking action to terminate any tenancy including service of any notice to quit or other eviction notice or bringing action to recover possession of a rental unit based on facts which the landlord has no reasonable cause to believe to be true”; “Threatening to or engaging in any act or omission which interferes with the tenant’s right to use and enjoy the rental unit or whereby the premises are rendered unfit for human habitation and occupancy.”¿For the same reasons as the seventh cause of action, the demurrer to the eighth cause of action is OVERRULED.

DISCUSSION RE MOTION TO STRIKE

Defendant moves to strike from the prayer of relief the fifth request for reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to Civ. Code § 1942.4(b), and references to fraud in paragraph 3, 26, 36, 42, 143, 150, 163, 167, 168, 174, 180, and 181.

            The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)

Plaintiffs have not alleged causes of action for Civ. Code § 1942.4(b) or fraud, rendering these references irrelevant.  The motion to strike is granted.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

            Defendants’ demurrer to the Fifth and Sixth causes of action in the complaint is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.  Defendants’ demurrer is OVERRULED as to the first, second, third, fourth, seventh and eighth causes of action.

            The Defendants’ motion to strike is GRANTED.

Plaintiffs have twenty days’ leave to amend. Plaintiffs’ counsel should be sure that there is good cause for attempting to amend the causes of action as to which the demurrer was sustained.

The Court is not pleased by the perfunctory effort to meet and confer on this motion. In many ways the demurrer was a perfunctory exercise as to most causes of action, with some merit buried within it. The Plaintiffs’ opposition was at times a completely generic exercise—a form document not even adapted to this case. Plaintiffs sent a letter only, without following up on the telephone. The Plaintiffs’ counsel did not respond to the letter. Both courses of action are insufficient before presenting the court with a largely unnecessary exercise covering every cause of action, some of which are duplicative and unnecessary in themselves. Attorneys’ fees were wasted on both sides of a case where the clients on both sides do not seem (at least on the face of the pleadings) to be able to afford attorney waste. The Court’s time was also wasted, although the taxpayers are unfortunately bearing that cost.

Defendants shall give notice of this order.  

DATED: February 7, 2025                                                     ___________________________

                                                                                          John Kralik

                                                                                          Judge of the Superior Court