Judge John J. Kralik, Case Number: 24NNCV03378, Date: 2025-05-02 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Blanca Romero (“Plaintiff”) alleges that on September 15, 2022, she was involved in a motor vehicle accident while riding as a passenger in a vehicle driven by Defendant Jianfeng Wu (“Wu”), who was employed by Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc., Rasier, LLC, and Rasier-CA, LLC (“Uber Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges that at the time of the incident, Wu was driving for Uber and Plaintiff was his Uber passenger. Plaintiff alleges that the accident involved a collision between Wu’s vehicle and a vehicle driven by Defendant Byron Leonardo Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”), which was owned by Defendant Jose David Hernandez (“Hernandez”).

The first amended complaint (“FAC”), filed October 10, 2024, alleges causes of action for: (1) negligence; (2) negligent hiring, training, and supervision; (3) negligent entrustment of motor vehicle; and (4) strict products liability.

On November 12, 2024, Plaintiff dismissed without prejudice the 4^th cause of action from the complaint.

On March 12, 2025, Defendants Uber, Rasier, LLC, and Rasier-CA, LLC (hereinafter, “Uber Defendants”) filed a motion to compel arbitration against Plaintiff.

Uber Defendants move to compel Plaintiff to arbitrate her claims against them based on the Terms of Use and pursuant to the FAA.

Uber Defendants argue that Plaintiff expressly agreed to arbitrate any claims against Uber Defendants when he agreed to Uber’s December 2021 and January 2023 Terms on April 1, 2022 and January 21, 2023, respectively. Uber Defendants argue that Plaintiff signed up as an Uber rider on March 22, 2017, and thereby registered for the November 2016 Terms of Use. (Yu Decl., Ex. A [Plaintiff’s Sign-Up Confirmation]; Ex. B [Nov. 2016 Terms].) Uber Defendants also argue that Plaintiff agreed to the updated terms on April 1, 2022 and January 21, 2023 through the app and by clicking “Confirm” to the terms, which included the arbitration agreement. (Id., Ex. D [December 2021 and January 2023 Terms].)

Section 2 of the December 16, 2021 version of the Terms of Use is entitled “Arbitration Agreement.” It states that by agreeing to the Terms, Plaintiff agrees that she is required to resolve any claim that she may have against Uber or an individual basis in arbitration. (12/16/21 Terms at § 2.) The parties agreed that Plaintiff and Uber agree that “any dispute, claim, or controversy in any way arising out of or relating to (i) these Terms and prior versions of these Terms, or the existence, breach, termination, enforcement, interpretation, scope, waiver, or validity thereof; (ii) your access to or use of the Services at any time; (iii) incidents or accidents resulting in personal injury to you or anyone else that you allege occurred in connection with your use of the Services … , regardless whether the dispute, claim, or controversy occurred or accrued before or after the date you agreed to the Terms, and regardless whether you allege that the personal injury was experienced by you or anyone else; and (iv) your relationship with Uber, will be settled by binding individual arbitration between you and Uber, and not in a court of law. This Arbitration Agreement survives after your relationship with Uber ends.” (Id., § 2(a)(1).) The Arbitration Agreement states that only an arbitrator shall have the exclusive authority to resolve any dispute arising out of or relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability, or formation of the Arbitration Agreement. (Id., § 2(a)(4).) The Arbitration Agreement states that the agreement to arbitrate is governed by the FAA, the arbitration will be administered by ADR Service, Inc. in accordance with ADR’s Arbitration Rules, the process for resolving disputes and initiating arbitration, and has terms about arbitration fees/costs and awards. (Id., § 2(c)-(d), (g)-(h).)

Plaintiff’s claims are regarding a motor vehicle accident and negligent conduct on the part of Uber Defendants, Wu (who was driving on behalf of Uber), Gonzalez (the other vehicle operator involved in the accident), and Hernandez (the owner of the vehicle driven by Gonzalez), while Plaintiff was riding in an Uber vehicle. According to the Arbitration Agreement, claims subject to arbitration include incidents or accidents resulting in personal injury to Plaintiff, regardless of whether the dispute, claim, or controversy occurred or accrued before or after the date Plaintiff agreed to these Terms. (12/16/21 Terms of Use at § 2(a)(1).) Based on the terms of the Arbitration Agreement, Plaintiff’s claims are covered by the broad scope of the Arbitration Agreement.

The Court notes that in the opposition brief, Plaintiff does not dispute that she signed the Arbitration Agreement.

Accordingly, the Court finds there is an enforceable agreement to arbitrate the claims asserted in the complaint and the scope of the arbitration provisions are sufficiently broad to cover the claims in this action between Plaintiff and Uber Defendants.

Plaintiff argues that the arbitration agreement is procedurally and substantively unconscionable.

The parties dispute whether the arbitrator should determine the enforceability of the arbitration agreement and whether it is unconscionable. The terms of the arbitration agreement include a delegation clause, which states that such questions are reserved for arbitrator. Thus, such arguments may be raised to the arbitrator at the time of the arbitration. However, even if the Court were to consider whether the terms were unconscionable, the Court finds low levels of unconscionability such that it would and will compel the Uber Defendants and Plaintiff to arbitrate their claims. The Court briefly addresses unconscionability.

First, Plaintiff argues that the Arbitration Agreement is procedurally unconscionable because it is a contract of adhesion that was presented on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis, as a user of the Uber app could not use the services unless agreeing to the terms. Plaintiff argues that she cannot simply just use a different transportation service because Uber and Lyft have dominated the third-party transportation industry and Lyft, too, has arbitration requirements for its users. In reply, Uber Defendants argue that nothing prevented Plaintiff from using alternative means of transportation, such as ordering a taxi or taking public transportation, and that Plaintiff had the choice to choose or reject Uber’s terms. Here, Plaintiff was not without a meaningful choice or option to obtain transportation. The use of Uber’s rideshare service is optional and was not mandatory for Plaintiff to obtain transportation. The Court finds little-to-no degree of procedural unconscionability.

Second, Plaintiff argues that the arbitration provision is substantively unconscionable because the provisions are not within the reasonable expectation of Plaintiff and it is unreasonably favorable to Uber.

Plaintiff argues that updates to Uber’s Terms of Use pop up on the app when the customer is updating the app or when they are using the app. Plaintiff argues that no reasonable consumer would not expect to open their Uber app to seek transportation services while simultaneously foregoing their right to a jury trial. However, the pop-up on the app provide notice to Plaintiff (and other users) that Uber’s Terms have been updated and, thus, its users have the option to review the terms and agree to the new terms in order to use Uber’s rideshare services—app users like Plaintiff could not use Uber’s service until clicking her consent. (See e.g., B.D. v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 931, 933.)[1] As pointed out by Uber, Plaintiff was not required to submit to the terms and had unlimited time to review the terms on her own. Thus, the Court does not find that the terms of the Arbitration Agreement were surprising or outside the reasonable expectations of a consumer using Uber’s app.

Plaintiff also argues that Arbitration Agreement is one-sided and non-mutual, was entered without any consideration provided by Uber, imposes terms that no consumer would expect, and is inherently unfair “as a clear effort by a market monopolist to shift all dispute to its preferred (and at least an oligopolistic) arbitration provider….” (Opp. at p.8.) However, these arguments by Plaintiff are conclusory. Plaintiff has not specifically stated what terms were outside the reasonable expectations of a consumer, how the terms are non-mutual, or how they were inherently unfair. As such, the Court finds a low degree of procedural unconscionability.

There are low-to-no degrees of procedural and substantive unconscionability. Thus, the arbitration agreement is not unconscionable and the Arbitration Agreement is enforceable.

Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the complaint is alleged against several Defendants who are not involved in the Arbitration Agreement and thus there is a risk of inconsistent results and a possibility that each Defendant will seek to escape liability. Plaintiff cites to CCP § 1281.2(c), arguing that where there are several defendants, the Court has discretion to refuse to compel arbitration.

On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that:

(c) A party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. For purposes of this section, a pending court action or special proceeding includes an action or proceeding initiated by the party refusing to arbitrate after the petition to compel arbitration has been filed, but on or before the date of the hearing on the petition. This subdivision shall not be applicable to an agreement to arbitrate disputes as to the professional negligence of a health care provider made pursuant to Section 1295.

CCP § 1281.2(c) gives this Court discretion to deny a motion to compel arbitration. However, the California Code of Civil Procedure does not apply here as the arbitration agreement invokes the Federal Arbitration Act. Even if the Court were to consider CCP § 1281.2(c), the Court would decline to exercise its discretion under the section to deny arbitration. Rather, the Court will impose a stay on the remainder of the action as the case between Plaintiff and Uber Defendants proceeds to arbitration.

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Uber, Rasier, LLC, and Rasier-CA, LLC shall proceed to arbitration and the remainder of the claims alleged against Defendant Byron Leonardo Gonzalez and Jose David Hernandez shall be stayed pending the outcome of the arbitration.

The Court sets a Status Conference re: Status of Arbitration for November 12, 2025 at 8:30 a.m.

[1] In B.D. v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., the Court of Appeal stated:

As for notice of the 2018 License Agreement generally, the pop-up provided sufficiently conspicuous notice. It consisted primarily of a scrollable text box that contained the entire 2018 License Agreement. Thus, unlike in Sellers, users did not need “ ‘to ferret out hyperlinks to terms and conditions.’ ” (Sellers, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 483, 289 Cal.Rptr.3d 1; see Specht, supra, 306 F.3d at p. 32 [“a reference to the existence of license terms on a submerged screen is not sufficient to place consumers on inquiry or constructive notice of those terms”].) Blizzard directly provided those terms and conditions.

Blizzard also made clear the significance of clicking the “Continue” button in the pop-up. Immediately above the button, in white text contrasting against a dark background, the pop-up notice stated: “By clicking ‘Continue’, I acknowledge that I have read and understand the Blizzard [License Agreement] applicable to my country of residence.” The portion of the 2018 License Agreement immediately visible in the text box advised users to “CAREFULLY READ TH[E] AGREEMENT,” and admonished that they “MAY NOT INSTALL OR OTHERWISE ACCESS THE PLATFORM” if they “DO NOT AGREE WITH ALL OF THE TERMS OF TH[E] AGREEMENT.” This provided sufficiently conspicuous notice to users that by clicking the “Continue” button on the pop-up, they were agreeing to be bound by the 2018 License Agreement.

As for notice of the arbitration agreement specifically, we further conclude the pop-up provided sufficiently conspicuous notice. The portion of the 2018 License Agreement immediately visible in the scrollable text box also advised that the agreement contains a dispute resolution section that, in turn, contains an arbitration agreement and class action waiver:

“PLEASE NOTE THAT THE SECTION BELOW TITLED DISPUTE RESOLUTION CONTAINS A BINDING ARBITRATION AGREEMENT AND CLASS ACTION WAIVER. THEY AFFECT YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS. PLEASE READ THEM.”

Because this notice appeared in a scrollable text box that contained the entire 2018 License Agreement, a user could scroll through the agreement to find a section clearly titled “Dispute Resolution.” …

The Dispute Resolution section of the 2018 License Agreement, in turn, provided sufficiently conspicuous notice that it incorporated by reference the Dispute Resolution Policy, which contains an arbitration provision.

(B.D. v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 931, 951–952.)

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department B