Judge: John J. Kralik, Case: 24NNCV03525, Date: 2024-11-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24NNCV03525    Hearing Date: November 8, 2024    Dept: NCB

 

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

North Central District

Department B

 

 

mitsubishi hc capital america, inc., as successor by merger to Engs Commercial Finance Co.,

                        Plaintiff,

            v.

 

smbat tumanyan dba west to east trucking,

                        Defendant.

 

  Case No.:  24NNCV03525

 

  Hearing Date:  November 8, 2024

 

[TENTATIVE] order RE:

APPLICATION for writ of attachment

 

BACKGROUND

A.    Allegations

Plaintiff Mitsubishi HC Capital America, Inc. as successor by merger to Engs Commercial Finance Co. (“Plaintiff”) alleges that on January 24, 2022, Defendant Smbat Tumanyan dba West to East Trucking (“Defendant”) entered into a written Commercial Finance Agreement #141286 (Agreement No. 1) with Plaintiff wherein Defendant leased a 2019 Volvo VNL64T760 Sleeper Tractor from Plaintiff, which required 54 monthly payments in the amount of $3,288.89.  Plaintiff alleges that on January 26, 2022, Defendant entered into a written Commercial Finance Agreement #141430 (Agreement No. 2) with Plaintiff wherein Defendant leased a 2015 Utility 53x102 Refrigerated Trailer and Thermo King Refrigeration Unit 6001109995, which required 48 monthly payments in the amount of $1,589.49.  Plaintiff alleges that on September 12, 2023, Defendant defaulted on the Agreements by not making the payments when due. 

Plaintiff alleges that the balance due on Agreement No. 1 is $189,740.63.  Plaintiff alleges it repossessed and sold the 2019 Volvo VNL64T760 Sleeper Tractor for $15,000, such that the charges now due are $32,458.86.  The prayer for damages seeks $207,199.49 on Agreement No. 1. 

Plaintiff alleges that the balance due on Agreement No. 2 is $71,010.50.  Plaintiff alleges it repossessed and sold the 2015 Utility 53x102 Refrigerated Trailer and Thermo King Refrigeration Unit for $5,000, such that the charges now due are $250.  (Compl., ¶¶20-22.)  The prayer for damages seeks $66,260.50 on Agreement No. 2. 

The complaint, filed on August 13, 2024, alleges causes of action for: (1) breach of finance agreement; (2) breach of finance agreement; and (3) account stated.  

B.     Motion on Calendar

On August 15, 2024, Plaintiff filed an application for writ of attachment. 

The Court is not in receipt of an opposition brief.

On October 29, 2024, the default of Defendant was entered. 

LEGAL STANDARD

“Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter, the plaintiff may apply pursuant to this article for a right to attach order and a writ of attachment by filing an application for the order and writ with the court in which the action is brought.”  (CCP § 484.010.)

The application shall be executed under oath and must include:

(1)               a statement showing that the attachment is sought to secure the recovery on a claim upon which an attachment may be issued;

(2)               a statement of the amount to be secured by the attachment;

(3)               a statement that the attachment is not sought for a purpose other than the recovery on the claim upon which the attachment is based;

(4)               a statement that the applicant has no information or belief that the claim is discharged or that the prosecution of the action is stayed in a proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. section 101 et seq.); and

(5)               a description of the property to be attached under the writ of attachment and a statement that the plaintiff is informed and believes that such property is subject to attachment.

(CCP § 484.020.)

“The application [for a writ of attachment] shall be supported by an affidavit showing that the plaintiff on the facts presented would be entitled to a judgment on the claim upon which the attachment is based.”  (CCP § 484.030.)  Statutory attachment procedures are purely creations of the legislature and as such “are subject to ‘strict construction.’”  (Hobbs v. Weiss (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 76, 79 [citing Vershbow v. Reiner (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 879, 882]; see also Nakasone v. Randall (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 757, 761.)  A judge does not have authority to order any attachment that is not provided for by the attachment statutes.  (Jordan-Lyon Productions, Ltd. v. Cineplex Odeon Corp. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1466.)  “The declarations in the moving papers must contain evidentiary facts, stated ‘with particularity,’ and based on actual personal knowledge with all documentary evidence properly identified and authenticated.”  (Hobbs, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at 79–80 [citing CCP § 482.040].)  “In contested applications, the court must consider the relative merits of the positions of the respective parties and make a determination of the probable outcome of the litigation.”  (Id. at 80 [ellipses and quotation marks omitted].)  “A claim has ‘probable validity’ where it is more likely than not that the plaintiff will obtain a judgment against the defendant on that claim.”  (CCP § 481.190.) 

The Court shall issue a right to attach order if the Court finds all of the following:

(1)               The claim upon which the attachment is based is one upon which an attachment may be issued.

(2)               The plaintiff has established the probable validity of the claim upon which the attachment is based.

(3)               The attachment is not sought for a purpose other than the recovery on the claim upon which the attachment is based.

(4)               The amount to be secured by the attachment is greater than zero.

(CCP § 484.090(a).) 

A claim of exemption must describe the property to be exempted and specify the statute section supporting the claim.  (CCP § 484.070(c).)  The plaintiff has the burden of opposing the defendant’s claim of exemption, and if the plaintiff fails to oppose a claim of exemption, “no right to attach order or writ of attachment shall be issued as to the property claimed to be exempted.”  (CCP § 484.070(f).)

DISCUSSION

A.    Probable Validity of Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff applies for writ of attachment against Defendant. 

“The standard elements of a claim for breach of contract are: “(1) the contract, (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) damage to plaintiff therefrom. [Citation.]”  (Wall Street Network, Ltd. v. New York Times Co. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1178.) 

In support of the application, Plaintiff provides the declaration of Nancy Dow, who is employed by Plaintiff as a Deficiency Collections Manager and is responsible for collecting the obligation of Defendant.  (Dow Decl., ¶¶1.)  Ms. Dow states that she is the custodian of records.  (Id., ¶¶1-2.)  Ms. Dow states that on January 24, 2022, Defendant entered into Agreement No. 1with Plaintiff wherein Defendant leased a 2019 Volvo VNL64T760 Sleeper Tractor from Plaintiff, which required 54 monthly payments in the amount of $3,288.89.  (Id., ¶¶4-5.)  She states that on September 12, 2023, Defendant defaulted on Agreement No. 1, such that Plaintiff declared the entire balance due in the sum of $189,740.63 and repossessed and sold the equipment for $15,000.  (Id., ¶¶6-8.)  She states that the total amount of charges now due and payable on Agreement No. 1 is $32,458.86, plus late charges, such that Plaintiff has been damaged in the total amount of $207,199.49 plus prejudgment interest at 10% per annum.  (Id., ¶¶9-11.)   

Ms. Dow states that on January 26, 2022, Defendant entered into Agreement No. 2 with Plaintiff wherein Defendant leased a 2015 Utility 53x102 Refrigerated Trailer and Thermo King Refrigeration Unit 6001109995 from Plaintiff, which required 48 monthly payments in the amount of $1,589.49.  (Id., ¶¶12-13.)  She states that on September 12, 2023, Defendant defaulted on Agreement No. 2, such that Plaintiff declared the entire balance due in the sum of $71,010.50 and repossessed and sold the equipment for $5,000.  (Id., ¶¶14-16.)  She states that the total amount of charges now due and payable on Agreement No. 2 is $250, plus late charges, such that Plaintiff has been damaged in the total amount of $66,260.50 plus prejudgment interest at 10% per annum.  (Id., ¶¶17-19.)  

Based on the declaration of Ms. Dow, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established the probable validity of its claims for breach of the underlying loan agreements.  Plaintiff has shown each of the elements of a breach of contract claims by way of the declaration of Ms. Dow and the attached exhibits.  The motion is not opposed and no contradictory evidence has been presented.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has established the probable validity of its claims upon which the attachment is based.  However, the Court notes that the calculations for how the figures now due and owing on Agreement No. 1 and Agreement No. 2 are not provided.  The Court will inquire of Plaintiff at the hearing how the figures were calculated. 

B.     Basis of Attachment

The Court shall issue a right to attach order if the claim upon which the attachment is based is one upon which an attachment may be issued.  (CCP § 484.090.)  “[A]n attachment may be issued only in an action on a claim or claims for money, each of which is based upon a contract, express or implied, where the total amount of the claim or claims is a fixed or readily ascertainable amount not less than five hundred dollars ($500) exclusive of costs, interest, and attorney’s fees.”  (CCP § 483.010(a).)  “If the action is against a defendant who is a natural person, an attachment may be issued only on a claim which arises out of the conduct by the defendant of a trade, business, or profession.”  (CCP § 483.010(c).)

This first requirement has been met.  Plaintiff’s claim is based on Defendant’s default of the agreements and his outstanding debt owed to Plaintiff as a result of breaches of the agreements.  The amount Plaintiff seeks to be secured by the attachment is $303,543.8 (which includes $273,459.99 in the unsecured amount, $24,124.24 for interest at 10% from September 12, 2023 to July 30, 2024, $675 in costs, and $5,284.60 in attorney’s fees), which is greater than $500.00.  (See AT-105, §8; Dow Decl., ¶24.)   

C.     Purpose and Amount of Attachment

CCP § 484.090(a)(3)-(4) states that the Court shall issue a right to attach order if “the attachment is not sought for a purpose other than the recovery on the claim upon which the attachment is based . . . [and] the amount to be secured by the attachment is greater than zero.”

In this case, Plaintiff attests on Form AT-105 that the attachment is not sought for a purpose other than the recovery on a claim upon which the attachment is based.  (AT-105, §4.)  Also, it is clear from the evidence presented that the amount to be secured is greater than zero.  There is no indication that the application is sought for any other purpose, and Defendant does not argue that the action is brought for any other purpose. 

Accordingly, the Court determines that Plaintiff has complied with CCP §§ 484.020 and 484.090.

D.    Subject Property

CCP § 484.020(e) provides, as follows:

Where the defendant is a corporation, a reference to “all corporate property which is subject to attachment pursuant to subdivision (a) of Code of Civil Procedure Section 487.010” satisfies the requirements of this subdivision. Where the defendant is a partnership or other unincorporated association, a reference to “all property of the partnership or other unincorporated association which is subject to attachment pursuant to subdivision (b) of Code of Civil Procedure Section 487.010” satisfies the requirements of this subdivision. Where the defendant is a natural person, the description of the property shall be reasonably adequate to permit the defendant to identify the specific property sought to be attached.

(CCP § 484.020(e).) 

Plaintiff seeks the following property from Defendant, a natural person pursuant to CCP § 487.010.  (AT-105, ¶9(c).)  Plaintiff seeks: “1. Property including equipment and inventory of a going business pursuant to CCP Sections 488.375 and 488.395; 2. All vehicles of a going business pursuant to CCP section 488.385; 3. Deposit accounts thereof pursuant to CCP section 488.455; and 4. Any accounts receivable or general intangibles pursuant to CCP section 488.470. The specific property sought is listed in Schedule A of the application papers.”  (Id.)  

Plaintiff has properly described the property sought to be attached. (See CCP § 487.010.)

E.     Exemptions

As the motion is not opposed, Defendant has not stated whether he is claiming an entitlement to any exemptions.  Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant is not entitled to any exemptions. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The Court is inclined to grant Plaintiff’s application for writ of attachment against Defendant.  Plaintiff’s counsel is ordered to attend the hearing so that counsel may explain the calculations for the amounts due and owing on the agreements.  Alternatively, Plaintiff’s counsel may file a supplemental brief explaining the calculations prior to or immediately after the hearing.  Upon a satisfactory showing, the Court is inclined to grant the motion. 

CCP § 489.210 requires the plaintiff to file an undertaking before issuance of a writ of attachment.  CCP § 489.220 provides that “the amount of an undertaking filed pursuant to this article shall be ten thousand dollars ($10,000).”  The Court may increase this amount “to the amount it determines to be the probable recovery for wrongful attachment if it is ultimately determined that the attachment was wrongful.”  (CCP § 489.220(b).)  Accordingly, upon granting the application, Plaintiff is ordered to post an undertaking in the amount of $10,000.00 prior to the issuance of the writ of attachment against Defendant.

A Case Management Conference is scheduled for February 6, 2025, at 8:30 a.m.

Plaintiff shall provide notice of this order.

 

 

DATED:  November 1, 2024                                                  ___________________________

                                                                                          John J. Kralik

                                                                                          Judge of the Superior Court