Judge: John J. Kralik, Case: 24NNCV03826, Date: 2025-05-09 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 24NNCV03826    Hearing Date: May 9, 2025    Dept: NCB

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

North Central District

Department B

BACKGROUND

A.    Allegations

Plaintiffs Wilson Gutierrez aka Wilson Francisco Gutierrez Martinez and Gabriela Gutierrez (“Plaintiffs”) allege that on January 19, 2020, they entered into a warranty contract with Defendant Ford Motor Company (“FMC”) regarding a new 2020 Ford Explorer for a total price of $41,455.20.  They allege that defects and nonconformities to the warranty manifested themselves within the applicable express warranty period that impaired the use, value, and/or safety of the subject vehicle.  Plaintiffs allege that they delivered the vehicle to FMC’s repair facility for repair of the nonconformities, but FMC was unable to conform the vehicle to the applicable express warranties after a reasonable number of repair attempts.  Plaintiffs allege that FMC failed to promptly offer to repurchase or replace the vehicle or make restitution.

Plaintiffs allege that they delivered the vehicle to Defendant Central Ford Automotive, Inc. dba Central Ford (“Central”) for repair during the express warranty period, but Central breached its duty by failing to properly store, prepare, and repair the vehicle.

The complaint, filed August 27, 2024, alleges causes of action for: (1) violation of Song-Beverly Act – breach of express warranty; and (2) violation of Song-Beverly Act § 1793.2; and (3) negligent repair.

B.     Motion on Calendar

On April 8, 2025, Defendant FMC filed a motion for entry of protective order to govern production of confidential materials.   

On April 28, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an opposition brief.

On April 30, 2025, Defendants filed a reply brief.

DISCUSSION

            FMC moves for a protective order, arguing that it is necessary to protect from the dissemination of its confidential, proprietary, and trade secret information and materials that are subject to discovery requests regarding its Warranty Policy & Procedure Manual, Customer Relationship Center (“CRC”) Policies & Procedures, and Reacquired Vehicle (“RAV”) Policy & Procedure Manuals.  FMC seeks to modify the model protective order at paragraphs 7, 8, and 21 as follows:

Specifically, Ford seeks to modify Paragraph 7 to clarify in sub-section (b) that the term “affiliated attorneys” mean attorneys in the same firm and that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s office personnel who have access to Ford’s confidential documents must sign Exhibit A; to include videographers and litigation support companies with court reporters in sub-section (d); to preclude mock jurors from accessing Ford’s confidential documents because Ford has no ability to identify such persons or ensure (or confirm) their compliance, as set forth in sub-section (f); and to include non-attorneys along with experts in paragraph (g), and confirm that Ford’s confidential documents may not be shown to competitors of Ford. Ford also seeks to modify Paragraph 8 to prohibit the receiving party from posting Ford’s confidential documents to any website or advertising Ford’s documents for sale. Finally, Ford seeks to modify Paragraph 21 to require Plaintiffs’ counsel to return all of Ford’s confidential documents at the conclusion of the case.

(Mot. for Protective Order at p.4.)  FMC provides modified red-lined and clean copies of the proposed amended protective order as Exhibits D and E, respectively, to the declaration of defense counsel Emma R. Maggio.

            In support of the motion for protective order, FMC provides the declaration of G. Keith Barron, who is the Program Manager for Ford’s Reacquired Vehicle operations since 2015.  He states that FMC protects its confidential information and documents from public disclosure as they are proprietary to FMC, constitute FMC’s trade secrets and business intelligence, and would be of value to FMC’s competitors.  (Barron Decl., ¶4.)  He states that FMC’s Warranty Policy & Procedure Manual, Customer Relationship Center Policies & Procedures, and the Reacquired Vehicle Policy & Procedure Manuals contain sensitive, confidential, and proprietary information.  (Id., ¶¶5-8.)  He states the CRC Policy & Procedure Manual contains proprietary information because it reveals FMC’s process and methodology to identify, document, assess, and resolve customer or product concerns; addresses the specifics of how customer calls and contacts should be handled; sets forth the process that the CRC may follow to process, document, diagnose, handle, and resolve customer concerns; addresses the role and responsibility with the CRC and reveals FMC’s process to address/resolve/elevate customer concerns; and determines how FMC classifies customer concerns and how/when to elevate a concern, repurchase a vehicle, or communicate with its customers.  (Id., ¶9.)  Mr. Barron states that the information was developed by FMC over time and after considerable investment in its staff and third-party vendors who operate FMC’s call center, and that disclosure of these documents would benefit FMC’s competitors who are training their own employees.  (Id., ¶¶9-10.)  He states that the Warranty Policy & Procedure Manual contains confidential processes for its dealers to receive, execute, document, and diagnose warranty and recall repairs in conformity with FMC’s defined processes and procedures, as well as the process when submitting warranty reimbursement requests.  (Id., ¶11.)  He states that the document includes proprietary discussions of allowances, costs, and reimbursements provided by FMC to its dealers.  (Id.)  Mr. Barron states that the RAV Policy & Procedure Manuals contain confidential processes regarding how FMC’s employees may proceed when a decision has been made to repurchase a specific vehicle.  (Id., ¶12.)  His declaration appears to support why a protective order is necessary, but does not address why the specific modification FMC seeks to make in the model protective order are necessary. 

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that they agreed to execute the Los Angeles Superior Court’s model protective order, but FMC improperly seeks to enter a protective order that deviates from the model form without good cause.  Plaintiffs argue that the motion lacks good cause and that the Court should order the parties to enter an unmodified LASC model protective order.

            Neither party disputes whether a protective order is appropriate for this case.  As stated in their opposition, Plaintiffs are amenable to entering a protective order but argue that the model protective order should not be modified and that FMC has not established good cause for the modifications.  The Court will address the proposed modifications here.

·         Paragraph 7:

o   Subsection (b) permits attorneys of record and affiliated attorneys (and other persons) to access/disclose confidential materials.  FMC seeks to narrow the term “affiliated attorneys” to those in the same firm.  Plaintiffs argue that this may hinder their ability to disclose documents to other attorneys serving as their co-counsel and trial counsel.  However, co-counsel and trial attorneys would be considered Plaintiffs’ counsel of record, such that this objection lacks merit. The addition of the language is not prejudicial, such that the Court will allow it. 

§  FMC also seeks to add language that non-lawyer individuals must execute a Certification Re Confidential Discovery Materials (Exhibit A to the model protective order).  Plaintiffs argue that requiring all hundreds of their counsel’s non-attorney employees to sign the form would be a “logistical nightmare.”  (Opp. at p.4.)  However, protective measures to ensure that these documents remain confidential should be taken in light of the protective order.  It is not clear why all persons in the law firm, apparently “hundreds” of employees, must have access to the documents, as opposed to having the electronic documents in a password-protected file (or other measures to protect confidentiality that may be taken).  Thus, the Court will allow the addition of the proposed language by FMC regarding the signing of Exhibit A for non-lawyer individuals that have access to the documents.

o   Subsection (d) permits court reporters from accessing confidential material, but FMC seeks to include videographers, litigation support consultants, and vendors retained by the parties.  Plaintiffs do not appear to dispute this subsection.  As such, this language will be permitted.

o   Subsection (f) permits mock jury participants to access the documents.  FMC seeks to strike this paragraph completely, arguing that it has no ability to identify such persons and ensure/confirm their compliance.  The Court agrees. The contentions can be summarized for mock jurors. They do not need to look at the actual evidence.  Subsection (f) will be stricken.

o   FMC’s modification of subsection (g) regarding including non-attorneys with experts is not contested by the parties.  The Court will allow the modification.

·         Paragraph 8: FMC seeks to add language to paragraph 8 regarding the use of Confidential Materials, by adding subsections (a) and (b), such that: (a) the parties may provide the Confidential Documents by electronic means, but may not be post them on websites or document repositories other than with the people mentioned in paragraph 7; and (b) all persons described in paragraph 7 shall not sell, offer for sale, advertise, or publicize the Confidential Materials or information therein.  This proposed language is perhaps redundant but covers a specific instance of conduct already prohibited by Paragraph 8. While it is, perhaps, an instance of belt and suspenders, the Court will allow it.

·         Paragraph 21: FMC seeks to modify Paragraph 21 to clarify the process for Plaintiffs’ counsel to return or destroy FMC’s confidential documents at the conclusion of the case, and to require the return of all confidential documents. Instead of requiring the documents to be returned within 30 days of a written request, FMC seeks a modification such that documents will be returned within 30 days of a settlement or termination of the action (without the necessity of a written request).  FMC also asks that all documents disclosed to any Qualified Person be returned, all Protected Documents be destroyed, and such destruction be certified in writing.  FMC seeks to strike any language allowing counsel to maintain files in compliance with the Protective Order, all work product, the pleadings, and deposition copies; language regarding the proper preservation of the materials; and the Court retaining jurisdiction to review and rule on the presentation of materials.  Plaintiffs argue that their counsel should be able to retain their complete case files and that any concerns FMC may have would be addressed through the protective order.  (Opp. at pp.6-7.)  The Court will allow the modification that FMC proposes in paragraph 21, except that FMC should make a written request so that Plaintiffs are aware of when the clock starts to run on their obligation to return documents. 

Thus, the Court grants in part and denies in part the motion for protective order as stated in this written order.

            No sanctions were requested.   

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Defendant Ford Motor Company’s motion for a protective order is granted in part and denied in part as specifically stated and limited in the Court’s written order.  The parties are ordered to cooperate in drafting the finalized version of the protective order, sign the document, and provide a copy for the Court’s signing.

Defendant shall provide notice of this order. 

DATED: May 9, 2025                                                                        ___________________________

                                                                                          John J. Kralik

                                                                                          Judge of the Superior Court