Judge: John J. Kralik, Case: 24NNCV04522, Date: 2025-03-07 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24NNCV04522 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: NCB
North
Central District
|
john edj joe, et al., Plaintiffs, v. bad news
panthers, et al., Defendants. |
Case
No.: 24NNCV04522 Hearing
Date: March 7, 2025 [TENTATIVE]
order RE: demurrer; motion to strike |
BACKGROUND
A. Allegations
Plaintiffs John
EDJ Doe (“EDJ”), John EMJ Doe (“EMJ”), and John EMA Doe (“EMA”) allege that they
were minors and victims of childhood sexual abuse, assault, and harassment at
the time of the alleged incidents in the complaint.
EDJ allege that
he was approximately 13 years old when he first joined Defendant Bad News
Panthers in 2010. He alleges he wrestled
for Bad News Panthers until Defendant Herbert Ortizmonroy’s (“Ortizmonroy”) arrest
in 2012. EDJ alleges that he had to pay
fees to Bad News Panthers, be a member of Defendant United States of America
Wrestling Association (“USA Wrestling”) to join Bad News Panthers, and
practiced at Rosemead Recreation Center and Rosemead High School under the
direction of head coach Ortizmonroy.
Defendant El Monte Union High School District (“El Monte UHSD”) is
alleged to have owned, operated, and controlled Rosemead High School. EDJ alleges that he attended Bad News
Panthers practices, and USA Wrestling and Defendant California-USA Wrestling
events, such that he was entrusted to the care and control of Bad News
Panthers, El Monte UHSD, USA Wrestling, California-USA Wrestling, and
Ortizmonroy. EDJ alleges that he was
subject to repeated sexual abuse, assault, and harassment at practice and
events by Ortizmonroy.
EMJ allege that
he was approximately 15 years old when he first joined Rosemead High School’s
wrestling team in 2008 with Ortizmonroy as his wrestling coach. As a wrestler, he alleged he was a member of
USA Wrestling. He alleges that he
attended USA Wrestling and California-USA Wrestling events, such that he was
entrusted to the care and control of El Monte UHSD, USA Wrestling,
California-USA Wrestling, and Ortizmonroy.
EDJ alleges that he was subject to repeated sexual abuse, assault, and
harassment at practice and events by Ortizmonroy.
EMA allege that
he was approximately 11 years old when he first joined Defendant Rosemead Kids
Wrestling Club (“RKWC”) in 2008 with Ortizmonroy as assistant coach. He alleges he joined Bad New Panthers in 2010
with Ortizmonroy as head coach. EMA
alleges he paid fees and joined RKWC, Bad News Panthers, and USA Wrestling, and
he practiced at Rosemead Recreation Center and Rosemead High School under the
direction of head coach Ortizmonroy. EMA
alleges that he attended USA Wrestling and Defendant California-USA Wrestling
events, such that he was entrusted to the care and control of RKWC, Bad News
Panthers, El Monte UHSD, USA Wrestling, California-USA Wrestling, and
Ortizmonroy. EMA alleges that he was
subject to repeated sexual abuse, assault, and harassment at practice and
events by Ortizmonroy.
The complaint,
filed September
24, 2024, alleges causes of action for: (1) negligence;
(2) negligent supervision; (3) negligent retention; (4) negligent failure to
warn, train, or education; (5) IIED; (6) sexual harassment (Civil Code § 51.9);
(7) gender violence (Civil Code, § 52.4); (8) sexual battery (Civil Code, §
1708.5); and (9) sexual assault. The 1st
to 4th causes of action are alleged against Bad News Panthers, RKWC,
El Monte UHSD, USA Wrestling, and California-USA Wrestling. The 5th cause of action is alleged
against all Defendants. The 6th
cause of action is alleged against Bad News Panthers, RKWC, USA Wrestling,
California-USA Wrestling, and Ortizmonroy.
The 7th to 9th causes of action are alleged
against Ortizmonroy.
B. Motions
on Calendar
On February 3,
2025, El Monte UHSD filed a demurrer and motion to strike portions of the complaint.
On February 24,
2025, Plaintiffs filed opposition briefs.
On February 28,
2025, El Monte UHSD filed reply briefs.
DISCUSSION RE DEMURRER
El
Monte UHSD demurs to the entirety of the complaint on the ground that
Plaintiffs improperly mis-joined three separate claims against it by improperly
joining three distinct, separate individual claims into one complaint. The 1st to 5th causes
of action in the complaint are directed against El Monte UHSD.
CCP § 378 state:
(a) All persons
may join in one action as plaintiffs if:
(1) They assert
any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative, in respect of or
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will
arise in the action; or
(2) They have a
claim, right, or interest adverse to the defendant in the property or
controversy which is the subject of the action.
(b) It is not
necessary that each plaintiff be interested as to every cause of action or as
to all relief prayed for. Judgment may be given for one or more of the
plaintiffs according to their respective right to relief.
(CCP § 378.)
El Monte UHSD
argues that the complaint includes a series of sexual assault claims by EDJ,
EMJ, and EMA that occurred between 2008 and 2012. El Monte UHSD argues that each of the
Plaintiffs allege assaults on different dates, during different supervision,
and have limited connection with the other two Plaintiffs’ claims. It argues that while there may be overlap of
the individual abuser Ortizmonroy, the dates of abuse and applicable
supervisors vary. El Monte UHSD argues
that only EMJ was a student of Rosemead High School, making his claims
different from EDJ and EMA. It also
argues that each of the Plaintiffs will have to prove their individual claims
for their separate claims of sexual assault and that it would be unfairly
prejudiced by the improper joinder. El
Monte UHSD relies on Moe
v. Anderson (2012)
207 Cal.App.4th 826.
In Moe, the two plaintiffs were
treated by the defendant doctor in connection with separate workers’
compensation claims wherein one plaintiff was treated in May 2009 and the other
plaintiff was treated between July and September 2009. In discussing whether dismissal of the claims
against the doctor was proper, the Court of Appeal found that the events did
not constitute a single transaction nor a related series of transactions and
that the plaintiffs were suing the doctor for separate and distinct sexual assaults
during separate and distinct time periods, such that the dismissal of the
doctor was proper. (Moe, supra,
207 Cal.App.4th at 833 and 834.)
However, the Court of Appeal found that the dismissal of the claims
against the doctor’s employer (Healthworks) was improper because the claims
against Healthworks arose from the same related series of transactions (i.e.,
negligent hiring and supervision of the doctor, which exposed the plaintiffs to
the doctor’s predatory conduct). (Id.
at 835 [citing Anaya v. Superior Court (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 228 wherein
numerous employees could sue their employer/petroleum company for a course of
conduct (exposure to harmful chemicals) spanning over 20-30 years].) The Court of Appeal acknowledged that Anaya
was not entirely on point, but was instructive to show that Healthworks
allegedly engaged in a series of transactions which exposed the plaintiffs to
the doctor’s predatory conduct, such that the plaintiffs asserted a right to
relief arising out the same series of transactions. (Id. at 835-836.) The Court of Appeal stated: “We do agree with plaintiffs' contention that they were
properly joined in their lawsuit against Healthworks because their claims
against Healthworks arise from the same related series of transactions, i.e.,
the negligent hiring and supervision of Anderson.” (Id. at 835.)
El Monte UHSD relies on Moe arguing
that there is a “misjoinder of plaintiffs if they are injured in separate and
distinct events, even if by the same abuser. For example, two women sexually
assaulted by one doctor cannot join in a single lawsuit, along with their
husbands, when the assaults occurred on different occasions. (See Moe v.
Anderson (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 826).”
(Dem. at 6:3-6.) While El Monte
UHSD is correct that Moe stands for the proposition that there may be a misjoinder
where multiple plaintiffs sue a single abuser based on separate and distinct
assaults, joinder is permissible against the employer as those claims arise
from the same related series of transactions (i.e., the negligent hiring and
supervision of the employee who committed the assault).
In the complaint
Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts that they practiced at Rosemead High
School under the supervision of Ortizmonroy (whether as a student of Rosemead
High School or as participants in Bad News Panthers and RKWC). (See Compl., ¶¶13-15.) Plaintiffs have alleged that they were under
the care and supervision of, among others, El Monte UHSD and Ortizmonroy. (Id.)
Plaintiffs allege that El Monte UHSD operated Rosemead High School, Bad
News Panthers and RKWC conducted wrestling practice at Rosemead High School
under Ortizmonroy’s direction, and El Monte UHSD negligently permitted
Ortizmonroy to be a coach and volunteer at El Monte UHSD events and/or
practices despite knowing of his dangerous propensities of harming minor
children. (Id., ¶19.)
Accepting the
allegations as true at the demurrer stage, there is a permissible basis to find
that Plaintiffs were properly joined in this action as directed against El
Monte UHSD. As such, the demurrer is
overruled.
DISCUSSION
RE MOTION TO STRIKE
El
Monte UHSD moves to strike portions of the complaint.
A.
Improper Joinder
For the reasons discussed above, the
motion to strike based on misjoinder is denied.
B.
4th cause of action
El Monte UHSD moves to strike allegations
of the 4th cause of action for negligent
failure to warn, train, or education, arguing that no such cause of action can
be extended to it and that a public entity can only be held liable for duties
created by statute. El Monte UHSD argues
that the Supreme Court in Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (2000)
81 Cal.App.4th 377, held that while the Boy Scouts of America had a duty to
educate, train, and warn of the risks of sexual abuse, the Supreme Court
expressly limited the duty to the Boy Scouts only.
In the Juarez
case, the Supreme Court stated that deciding the question of duty was to be
done on a case-by-case and policy analysis and that the opinion was not meant
to serve “as a manifesto by which lower courts are to impose duties of care
upon all forms of charitable organizations engaged in volunteer youth
programs….” (Juarez, supra, 81
Cal.App.4th at 409.) However, the Court
notes that the Juarez case is factually distinguishable as it involved a
charitable organization as opposed to a public entity. In addition, the Court of Appeal in C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012)
53 Cal.4th 861 (which was after the Juarez case) held that a claim for
negligent hiring, retention, and supervision was a viable cause of action. (C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at 865.)
As such, the motion to strike the 4th
cause of action is denied.
C.
Standard of Care
El Monte UHSD moves to strike allegations that
it owed a duty to Plaintiffs to “ensure” the safety of students. (Compl., ¶60.) It argues that the only standard of care that
it owed was of “reasonable” care under the circumstances.
“[A] school district and its employees
have a special relationship with the district's pupils, a relationship arising
from the mandatory character of school attendance and the comprehensive control
over students exercised by school personnel, ‘analogous in many ways to the
relationship between parents and their children.’” (C.A. v.
William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861,
869.) “Because of
this special relationship, imposing obligations beyond what each person
generally owes others under Civil Code section 1714, the duty of care owed by
school personnel includes the duty to use reasonable measures to protect
students from foreseeable injury at the hands of third parties acting
negligently or intentionally.” (Id. at 870.)
Plaintiffs have not shown upon what legal
or statutory basis they are relying upon to impose a duty that El Monte UHSD
“ensure” the safety of students. As
stated above, there is a duty to use “reasonable measures” to protect
students. As such, the motion to strike
paragraph 30 is granted with leave to amend.
D.
Conclusory Language
El Monte UHSD moves to strike “conclusory”
allegations, arguing they should be categorically stricken for failure to plead
supporting facts. (See Mot. at
pp.16-17.) In opposition, Plaintiffs
argue that they have alleged supporting facts and cite to specific paragraphs
in the complaint.
Based on the Court’s review of the
specific allegations cited by El Monte UHSD and the complaint as a whole, the
Court denies the motion to strike these allegations.
E.
Negligence per se
El Monte UHSD moves to strike the
negligence per se theory in the complaint, arguing that Penal Code, § 11166
creates a duty for teachers, administrators, and other individuals to report
known child abuse, such that a claim cannot be maintained against the
district.
In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the
employer (such as El Monte UHSD) is required to maintain the signed documents
of its employees stating that they are aware of their duties as a mandatory
reporter under section 11166. (Penal
Code, § 11166.5(a).) They also argue
that El Monte UHSD may be held vicariously liable for the actions and inactions
of its supervisory personnel, including mandatory reporters.
There is a sufficient basis to allege a
mandatory duty or vicarious liability on the part of El Monte UHSD. As such, the motion to strike these
allegations is denied.
F.
Punitive Damages
El Monte UHSD moves to strike
the allegations for punitive damages.
“Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, a public entity is not liable for damages awarded under
Section 3294 of the Civil Code or other damages imposed primarily for the sake
of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Gov. Code, § 818.)
The motion to strike the allegations for
punitive damages against El Monte UHSD is granted without leave to amend.
G.
Irrelevant/Improper Allegations re Fiduciary Duties
El Monte UHSD moves to strike
the allegations relating to fiduciary duties, arguing merely that they are not
legally supported. (See Compl., ¶25.)
In opposition, Plaintiffs
argue that a special relationship existed between El Monte UHSD wherein it
stood in loco parentis with Plaintiffs.
Paragraph 25 alleges in part
that Defendants had a “special relationship, fiduciary relationship, and
confidential relationship with Plaintiffs and HERBERT ORTIZMONROY, stood in
loco parentis with respect to Plaintiffs….”
Paragraph 25 already alleges that Defendants had a special relationship
and stood in loco parentis with Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs, by way of their opposition brief,
have not shown how alleging a fiduciary duty adds any other separate duty in
the complaint.
As such, the motion to strike
the allegations for fiduciary duty is granted without leave to amend.
H.
IIED cause of action
El Monte UHSD argues that the IIED cause
of action is improper against it because it is a common law cause of action that
is not predicated on any statute and it is immune under Government Code, §
815.
However, as pointed out by Plaintiffs, a
public entity may be vicariously liable for the conduct of its employees. (Gov’t Code, § 815.2; Societa
Per Azioni De Navigazione Italia v. City of Los Angeles (1982) 31 Cal.3d 446, 463 [“Further, the general rule is that an employee of a public
entity is liable for his torts to the same extent as a private person (§ 820,
subd. (a)) and the public entity is vicariously liable for any injury which its
employee causes (§ 815.2, subd. (a)) to the same extent as a private employer
(§ 815, subd. (b)).”].) At this time,
the Court will allow the allegations for IIED to remain in the complaint. Whether Plaintiffs can prove their claim for
IIED will be determined at a later time in the proceedings.
The motion to strike the IIED cause
of action is denied.
I.
Four Negligence Claims
El Monte UHSD moves to strike the 1st
to 4th causes of action, arguing that they are duplicative and
should be asserted in a single cause of action.
The 1st to 4th
causes of action assert claims for negligence, negligent supervision, negligent
retention, and negligent failure to warn, train, or educate. The complaint separates the causes of action
to distinctly assert different types of negligence that occurred. The claims are not duplicative and thus will
not be stricken.
The motion to strike these causes of
action is denied.
J.
Attorney’s Fees
El Monte UHSD
moves to strike the allegations for attorney’s fees, arguing that a statutory
basis for fees has not been alleged.
Paragraph 8 of the prayer for damages in
the complaint alleges: “For attorney’s fees pursuant to California Code of
Civil Procedure §§ 1012.4, 1021.5, Civil Code § 52, § 52.4, or
otherwise as allowable by law.”
Plaintiffs argue
that they properly alleged an entitlement to attorney’s fees pursuant to CCP §
1021.5. Section 1021.5 states in
relevant part:
Upon motion, a court may award attorneys' fees to a successful
party against one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in
the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a
significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on
the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial
burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement by one public entity against another
public entity, are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees
should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any. With
respect to actions involving public entities, this section applies to allowances
against, but not in favor of, public entities, and no claim shall be required
to be filed therefor, unless one or more successful parties and one or more
opposing parties are public entities, in which case no claim shall be required
to be filed therefor under Part 3 (commencing with Section 900) of Division 3.6
of Title 1 of the Government Code.
(CCP
§ 1021.5.) “There is no
requirement that the intent to seek attorney fees under section 1021.5 must be
pleaded in the underlying action. [Citation.] Such fees are not part of the
underlying cause of action, but are incidents to the cause and are properly
awarded after entry of a ... judgment[.]” (Snatchko v. Westfield
LLC (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 469, 497 [quoting Washburn
v. City of Berkeley (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 578, 583].)
Plaintiffs have alleged a statutory
basis for seeking fees. Whether or not
they can prove their claims and show that the action resulted in the
enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest will be
determined at the conclusion of the case.
As such, the Court will not prematurely strike the request for
attorney’s fees in the complaint.
CONCLUSION AND
ORDER
Defendant El Monte
Union High School District’s demurrer to the complaint is overruled.
Defendant’s motion
to strike is granted with 20 days leave to amend as to paragraph 30 as alleged
against Defendant El Monte Union High School District. The motion to strike is granted without leave
to amend as to the allegations for punitive damages and fiduciary duty as
alleged against Defendant El Monte Union High School District. The remainder of the motion is denied.
Defendant
shall provide notice of this order.
DATED:
March 7, 2025 ___________________________
John
Kralik
Judge
of the Superior Court