Judge: John J. Kralik, Case: 24NNCV04611, Date: 2025-05-30 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24NNCV04611 Hearing Date: May 30, 2025 Dept: NCB
North
Central District
|
california
automobile insurance company, Plaintiff, v. lsp products
group, inc., Defendant. |
Case
No.: 24NNCV04611 Hearing
Date: May 30, 2025 [TENTATIVE]
order RE: motion for leave to file first amended complaint |
BACKGROUND
A. Allegations
Plaintiff California
Automobile Insurance Company (“Plaintiff”) alleges that its insured, Asmik
Aryrapetyan (“Plaintiff’s Insured”) was the owner and/or occupier of property
located at 1021 Grandview Avenue, Suite A, Glendale, CA 91201, which was
insured by Plaintiff under a residential insurance policy. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant LSP Products
Group, Inc. (“Defendant”) had a duty to exercise reasonable care in the design,
manufacture, and distribution of a toilet supply line, including the component
plastic coupling nut, and to provide adequate warnings. Plaintiff alleges that on October 13, 2021, a
water supply line designed and manufactured by Defendant failed in the home of
Plaintiff’s Insured, causing substantial water damage.
The complaint,
filed September 26, 2024, alleges causes of action for: (1) general negligence;
and (2) products liability.
B. Motion
on Calendar
On May 6, 2025,
Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a First Amended Complaint
(“FAC”).
On
May 16, 2025, Defendant filed an opposition brief.
On
May 22, 2025, Plaintiff filed a reply brief.
LEGAL STANDARD
CCP § 473(a)(1) states: “The court may, in
furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to
amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any
party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any
other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or
demurrer. The court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the
adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any
pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an
answer to be made after the time limited by this code.”
CRC
rule 3.1324 requires a motion seeking leave to amend to include a copy of the
proposed pleadings, to identify the amendments, and to be accompanied by a
declaration including the following facts:
1) The effect of the amendment;
2) Why the amendment is necessary and proper;
3) When the facts giving rise to the amended allegations
were discovered; and
4) The reasons why the request for amendment was not made
earlier.
The Court’s discretion regarding granting
leave to amend is usually exercised liberally to permit amendment of
pleadings. (Nestle v. Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 939.) If a motion to amend is timely made and the
granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to
refuse permission to amend. (Morgan v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
County (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530.)
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff moves for leave to file
the proposed First Amended Complaint (“FAC”).
The FAC is attached as Exhibit B to the declaration of Plaintiff’s
counsel, Timothy E. Cary.
In
support of the motion, Plaintiff provides Mr. Cary’s declaration. Mr. Cary states that Plaintiff is one of
several insurers that his firm represents in similar litigations against
Defendant in California and other states.
(Cary Decl., ¶3.) Counsel states
that there are cases currently pending in Riverside and San Bernadino
County. (Id.) He states that Plaintiff seeks to amend the
complaint to add 2 additional losses that occurred as a result of the same mode
of failure of the same product designed, manufactured, and sold by Defendant as
alleged in the complaint. (Id.,
¶4.) The proposed FAC would include
causes of action for strict liability, negligence, breach of warranty, and
failure to warn. (Id.) Counsel states that the proposed FAC is in
the same form and format as the complaints currently pending in the Riverside
and San Bernadino cases. (Id.)
Defendant argues that the motion
should be denied as Plaintiff seeks to include three separate insureds’ claims
in one action, thus amounting to a misjoinder.
Defendant argues that joinder is limited by CCP § 578(a). Subsection (a) states:
(a) All persons may join in one action as
plaintiffs if:
(1) They assert any right to relief
jointly, severally, or in the alternative, in respect of or arising out of the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if
any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the
action; or
(2) They have a claim, right, or interest
adverse to the defendant in the property or controversy which is the subject of
the action.
(CCP § 378(a).)
In
reply, Plaintiff argues that it is not seeking a joinder since it is the only
plaintiff in this action but that it could satisfy the requirements of joinder,
if necessary.
The
proposed FAC identifies Plaintiff’s insureds as Asmik Aryrapetyan, Karina
Silva, and Julio Martinez. (Cary Decl.,
Ex. B [FAC at 1:20-21].) The FAC seeks
damages against Defendant for claims related to Mr. Aryrapetyan for his
residence in Glendale for an incident that occurred on October 13, 2021
regarding a water supply line manufactured by Defendant (FAC, ¶¶8-10); Karina
Silva for her residence in Palmdale for an incident that occurred on June 15,
2022 (FAC, ¶¶11-13); and Julio Martinez for his residence in Reseda for an
incident that occurred on April 22, 2024 (FAC ¶¶14-16) regarding a water supply
line manufactured by Defendant.
While each insureds’ claim arises
out of the water supply line manufactured by Defendant and there may be some
common questions of law and fact regarding products liability, the Court does
not find that Plaintiff has established its burden in showing that the claims
arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions and
occurrences. Each insureds’ claims arose in different
residences and at different times. For
example, the Court of Appeal in David v. Medtronic, Inc. (2015) 237
Cal.App.4th 734 discussed a similar situation but with respect to medical
devices:
While a common question
of law or fact may exist in this case, plaintiffs' claims do not arise out of the
same transaction or series of transactions. Plaintiffs in other proceedings
have been found to be within the “series of transactions” language when they
alleged a single scheme, depending on the same basic misrepresentations and
leading to a series of transactions exactly similar in kind and manner of
operation. (Anaya v. Superior Court
(1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 228, 232, 206 Cal.Rptr. 520.) This occurs, for example,
when all plaintiffs were led to purchase property in the same subdivision based
on identical misrepresentations about the property. (Aldrich
v. Transcontinental Land and Water Company (1955) 131 Cal.App.2d
788, 791–792, 281 P.2d 362.) This may also occur when plaintiffs were all
exposed to the same harmful chemicals at the same location. (Anaya, at p. 233, 206 Cal.Rptr. 520.) Here, the only
common factor is that plaintiffs each had Infuse, or the Infuse protein,
implanted in them. Plaintiffs do not allege, for example, that they each had
the same class of spinal surgery, based at least in part on the same
representation, and that the Infuse failed in each of them in the same way. On
the contrary, they had different surgeries, performed by different surgeons,
with different knowledge and exposure to different representations by
Medtronic. This is not sufficient.
(David
v. Medtronic, Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 734, 741.) Defendant also cites to Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Adams (1985) 170
Cal.App.3d 712 (disapproved by Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1989)
48 Cal.3d 395 on other grounds):
In
the instant case, joinder is inappropriate because Farmers' alleged right to
declaratory relief against the numerous Insureds did not arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence. Although it is true that the January 1982 storm
played a role in the damage to Insureds' property, it cannot be said that all
the claims of the Insureds arose out of the same transaction or occurrence.
(Cf. Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1969)
271 Cal.App.2d 744, 748 [76 Cal.Rptr. 909] [wherein court construes predecessor
statute to present § 379 of Code Civ. Proc.].) While it may be possible to join
certain of the Insureds upon more specific factual allegations, we find it
improper to label the damage herein to innumerable types of structures,
occurring at widely separated locations within the state, resulting from a
myriad of causes, and under various conditions as the “same transaction or
occurrence” within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 379. The
requirement of same transaction or occurrence has not been met and joinder may
not be had.
(Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Adams (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 712,
722–723.)
The
Court finds David and Farmers Insurance to be instructive and
relevant to the motion here. While the
Court acknowledges that there is a single Plaintiff (insurer) in this action,
Plaintiff is seeking subrogation for three separate insureds based on 3
separate events that occurred over various points in time from 2021 to 2024. This means that Plaintiff would have to prove
Defendant’s liability for each of these events on behalf of each of its
insureds, which essentially amounts to 3 separate actions. As stated above, while water lines
manufactured by Defendant are at issue in the 3 insureds’ claims, the Court
finds that it would be improper to join the claims of 3 insureds and
Plaintiff’s ability to seek subrogation on those claims in a single action when
the incidents occurred in different cities, different residences, and at
different times.
For
these reasons, the motion is denied.
CONCLUSION AND
ORDER
Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a First
Amended Complaint is denied.
Plaintiff shall give notice of
this order.
DATED:
May 30, 2025 ___________________________
John
Kralik
Judge
of the Superior Court