Judge: John J. Kralik, Case: 24NNCV04796, Date: 2025-05-23 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24NNCV04796 Hearing Date: May 23, 2025 Dept: NCB
North Central District
WILFREDO IZAGUIRRE, BY AND THROUGH HIS GUARDIAN AD LITEM BLANCA IZAGUIRRE,
Plaintiff, v.
WYNGATE NURSING CENTER, et al.,
Defendants. |
Case No.: 24NNCV04796
Hearing Date: May 23, 2025 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEMURRER; MOTION TO STRIKE |
BACKGROUND
A. Allegations
Plaintiff Wilfredo Izaguirre, by and through his guardian ad litem Blanca Izaguirre (“Plaintiff”) alleges that on October 1, 2023, Plaintiff was admitted to the care and custody of Defendants Wyngate Nursing Center (“WNC”) and Sun Mar Management Services (“SMMS”) (collectively, “Defendants”) at their facility. Plaintiff alleges that he was 82 years old at that time (date of birth: March 7, 1941). Plaintiff alleges that WNC does business as North Valley Nursing Center and was in the business of providing skilled nursing and custodial care, and that SMMS provided management services to WNC and in so doing shared control of operation of the facility.
Plaintiff alleges that prior to admission, he suffered from dementia and was totally dependent upon staff for all activities of daily living including assistance and supervision. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were to provide care or services to Plaintiff as his care custodians and based on their fiduciary relationship. Plaintiff also argues that Defendants did not meet California’s minimum staffing requirements.
Plaintiff alleges that on October 6, 2023, the facility allowed Plaintiff to fall, but Defendants failed to notify Plaintiff’s responsible party or family and failed to provide Plaintiff medical treatment for his injury. Plaintiff alleges that his responsible party only discovered Plaintiff’s injury on October 7, 2023. Plaintiff was thereafter taken to the hospital, where he was diagnosed with rib fractures related to the fall.
The complaint, filed October 3, 2024, alleges causes of action for: (1) elder abuse and neglect against Defendants; (2) violation of Health & Safety Code, § 1430(b) against WNC; and (3) negligence against Defendants.
B. Motions on Calendar
On March 25, 2025, Defendants filed a demurrer and motion to strike portions of the complaint.
On May 12, 2025, Plaintiffs filed opposition briefs.
On May 16, 2025, Defendants filed a reply brief.
DISCUSSION RE DEMURRER
Defendants demur to the entirety of the complaint and each cause of action, arguing they fail to state sufficient facts and are uncertain.
A. Uncertain
Defendants argue that the entire complaint is uncertain as to the Defendants, citing to paragraphs 13-62. Defendants argue that Plaintiff grouped all the Defendants (WNC and SMMS) together, failing to allege what specific conduct each defendant engaged in.
Paragraphs 13-62 are the allegations related to the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd causes of action. Defendants fail to allege what specific allegations are uncertain. The mere fact that Defendants are referred together does not make the complaint uncertain or vague. Further, the complaint alleges that WNC and SMMS shared control of the operations of the facility. (Compl., ¶4.) Plaintiff also alleges that the facility and Defendants each acted in concert with one another and aided and abetted one another in accomplishing the acts and omissions alleged. (Id., ¶10.) The complaint also alleges facts that both Defendants (as well as each of them) were tasked with providing care or services to Plaintiff as Plaintiff’s care custodian and that they owed Plaintiff various duties. (See Compl., ¶¶15, 17-19.) The Court will accept the truth of the allegations at the pleading stage.
The demurrer on this basis is overruled.
B. SMMS’s duty
Defendants argue that SMMS owed no duty to Plaintiff. Defendants argue that SMMS is “unequivocally not the licensee in this matter” as WNC holds the license in its own name. (Dem. at p.7.)
In the 2nd cause of action for violation of Health & Safety Code, § 1430(b), Plaintiff alleges that WNC is a licensee that was responsible for meeting statutory and regulatory duties. (Compl., ¶55.) The 2nd cause of action, which is specific to licensee duties, is alleged against WNC only. However, Defendants have not provided any case law showing that claims for elder abuse and negligence (1st and 3rd causes of action, respectively) are precluded against non-licensees. Further, the complaint alleges different types of duties to Plaintiff regarding staffing and providing for Plaintiff’s needs (daily living assistance, medical needs after his fall, etc.).
The demurrer on this basis is overruled.
C. Alter Ego
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegations for alter ego liability are lacking.
However, as pointed out by Plaintiff in opposition, the complaint does not include allegations for alter ego liability. Rather, the complaint alleges that Defendants shared in the control of the operation of the facility and provided nursing and custodial care to Plaintiff. The allegations of joint liability are not based on the alter ego doctrine, but rather on their separate and collective acts and omissions. (See Compl., ¶10.)
The demurrer on this basis is overruled.
D. 1st cause of action for Elder Abuse
Defendants argue that the elder abuse claim is insufficiently pled because SMMS, by definition, does not have custody of Plaintiff and the facts do not allege egregious misconduct.
A plaintiff must prove more than simple or even gross negligence in the provider’s care or custody of the elder or dependent adult. (Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 396, 405.) The plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that defendant was guilty of recklessness, oppression, fraud or malice in the commission of the neglect, which applies essentially the equivalent standard to support punitive damages. (Id.; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.) The enhanced remedies are available only for acts of egregious abuse against elder or dependent adult. (Carter, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at 405.) “‘Recklessness’ refers to a subjective state of culpability greater than simple negligence, which has been described as ‘deliberate disregard’ of the ‘high degree of probability’ that an injury will occur” and rises to the level of a conscious choice of a course of action with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it. (Delaney v. Baker (1999) 20 Cal.4th 23, 31-32.) Unlike negligence, recklessness involves more than inadvertence, incompetence, unskillfulness, or a failure to take precautions. (Id. at 31.)
There are several factors that must be pled with particularity, including: (1) defendants had responsibility for meeting the basic needs of the elder or dependent adult, such as nutrition, hydration, hygiene or medical care; (2) defendants knew of conditions that made the elder or dependent adult unable to provide for his or her own basic needs; (3) defendants denied or withheld goods or services necessary to meet the elder or dependent adult’s basic needs, either with knowledge that injury was substantially certain to befall the elder or dependent adult (if the plaintiff alleges oppression, fraud or malice) or with conscious disregard of the high probability of such injury (if the plaintiff alleges recklessness); and (4) the neglect caused the elder or dependent adult to suffer physical harm, pain or mental suffering. (Carter, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at 406-407.)
First, with respect to SMMS, Defendants argue that SMMS did not have custody of Plaintiff such that he was not under its care. However, Defendants’ arguments rely on their own extrinsic facts and arguments. At the demurrer stage, the Court considers the allegations of the complaint as true. In the 1st cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants each provided care or services to Plaintiff and were considered care custodians to Plaintiff. (Compl., ¶15.) The Court will consider these allegations as true at the demurrer stage. Whether Plaintiff can prove such allegations and Defendants can show that SMMS did not engage in the care or services of Plaintiff, will be determined at a later stage upon the consideration of evidence such as at the motion for summary judgment or trial stage.
Next, Defendants argue that the complaint fails to allege specific facts showing egregious conduct on the parts of Defendants as Plaintiff has not alleged Defendants’ intent to harm Plaintiff and the causal link between their misconduct and Plaintiffs’ injuries. (Dem. at p.14.) In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants lacked sufficient staffing to protect Plaintiff from safety and health hazards and the facility was chronically understaffed. (Compl., ¶¶36, 49-53.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants failed to provide care and observation by allowing Plaintiff to fall on October 6, 2023 and not sending him to the hospital until his responsible party discovered the injury the next day. (Id., ¶¶33-34.)
At this time, the Court finds that the allegations for elder abuse regarding egregious conduct are lacking. While there are some allegations regarding Plaintiff’s fall and the delay in medical treatment, the allegations currently sound in negligence. Further, while Plaintiff alleges that the facility was understaffed or not properly trained, Plaintiff has not alleged a causal connection between the understaffing issue with Plaintiff’s alleged elder abuse.
The demurrer to the 1st cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.
E. 2nd cause of action for Violation of Health & Safety Code, § 1430(b)
Defendants argue that the 2nd cause of action is directed to all Defendants but is not specific with respect to each of them. However, the 2nd cause of action is alleged against WNC and Does 1-25 only. (See Compl. at 12:23-26.) As such, there is no ambiguity regarding which defendant the 2nd cause of action refers to.
The demurrer to the 2nd cause of action is overruled.
F. 3rd cause of action for Negligence
In the 3rd cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants owed statutory, regulatory, and common law duties of care to Plaintiff, and that Defendants breached those duties. (Compl., ¶¶60-61.) Plaintiff alleges that as a proximate result, Plaintiff suffered injuries. (Id., ¶62.) The 3rd cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1-58. (Id., ¶59.)
Defendants argue that the 3rd cause of action is not specific with respect to which defendant is at issue. Further, Defendants argue that their actions must be evaluated on an appropriate standard of care, but Plaintiff has not pled if SMMS is a healthcare provider.
At currently worded, the negligence cause of action is not adequately pled. It is not clear what type of duty is being alleged against each Defendant. Further, it is unclear if this is a claim for medical malpractice/professional negligence, negligent supervision, or a different type of negligence.
As such, the demurrer to the 3rd cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.
DISCUSSION RE MOTION TO STRIKE
Defendants move to strike the prayer for punitive damages and the request for attorney’s fees with respect to the 1st and 2nd causes of action.
A. Attorney’s Fees
CCP § 1021 states that attorney’s fees are recoverable if allowed under statute and/or by agreement.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s entitlement to attorney’s fees is not adequately pled based on the same arguments raised in their demurrer papers.
As the motion to strike relies on the same arguments as the demurrer, the Court grants with leave to amend the motion to strike the prayer for attorney’s fees as to the 1st cause of action and denies the motion as to the 2nd cause of action.
B. Punitive Damages
A complaint including a request for punitive damages must include allegations showing that the plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages. (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) A claim for punitive damages cannot be pleaded generally and allegations that a defendant acted "with oppression, fraud and malice" toward plaintiff are insufficient legal conclusions to show that the plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages. (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.) Specific factual allegations are required to support a claim for punitive damages. (Id.)
Civil Code § 3294 authorizes a plaintiff to obtain an award of punitive damages when there is clear and convincing evidence that the defendant engaged in malice, oppression, or fraud. Section 3294(c) defines the terms in the following manner:
(1) "Malice" means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.
(2) "Oppression" means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.
(3) "Fraud" means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.
Based on the Court’s review of the complaint as a whole, the Court finds that the complaint does not rise to the level of particularity required for a request for punitive damages. Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to show malicious, oppressive, and/or fraudulent conduct on the part of Defendants to warrant punitive damages. As such, the motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages is granted with leave to amend.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Defendants’ demurrer to the complaint is sustained with 20 days leave to amend as to the 1st and 3rd causes of action. The demurrer to the 2nd cause of action is overruled.
Defendants’ motion to strike is granted with 20 days leave to amend as to the allegations for punitive damages (with respect to the 1st and 2nd causes of action) and attorney’s fees (with respect to the 1st cause of action). The motion to strike is denied as to the prayer for attorney’s fees with respect to the 2nd cause of action.