Judge: John J. Kralik, Case: 24NNCV05813, Date: 2025-05-02 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24NNCV05813 Hearing Date: May 2, 2025 Dept: NCB
North
Central District
|
john doe, a minor by and
through his guardian ad litem Courtney Buckley, Plaintiff, v. los angeles unified school district, Defendant. |
Case
No.: 24NNCV05813 Hearing
Date: May 2, 2025 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: demurrer; motion to strike |
BACKGROUND
A.
Allegations
Plaintiff John Doe, a minor by and through
his guardian ad litem Courtney Buckley (“Plaintiff”), alleges that he was a
student at Walter Reed Middle School (“WRMS”), which is operated by Defendant
Los Angeles Unified School District (“Defendant” or “LAUSD”). “A.M.” and Does 51-60 are alleged to be the
student who perpetrated the assault against Plaintiff.
Plaintiff alleges that during the
2023-2024 school year, he was a 12-year-old, seventh grade student at WRMS. He alleges that in early April 2024, he
observed student A.M. acting suspiciously in a WRMS restroom, which included
A.M. peering over a restroom stall door, glaring at Plaintiff, and smoking an
e-cigarette. Plaintiff immediately
reported the incident and A.M. to WRMS’s employees and staff.
Plaintiff alleges that on April 25, 2024,
he was waiting in line inside the restroom when, without warning or
provocation, A.M. exited the bathroom stall and violently attacked Plaintiff by
punching and kicking him in the body and face and using a completely full,
large, metal HydroFlask water bottle to physically beat Plaintiff’s face, head,
and body. Plaintiff alleges that the
attack lasted for several minutes and no LAUSD staff or security was nearby to
intervene. Plaintiff alleges that he
tried to shield himself and escape, but he eventually lost consciousness. Plaintiff alleges he was rushed to the
Children’s Hospital of Los Angeles for emergency medical treatment and surgical
procedures. He alleges that A.M. was
arrested and convicted of a felony related to his assault of Plaintiff.
The first amended complaint (“FAC”), filed
February 14, 2025, alleges causes of action for: (1) negligence (Gov’t Code, §§
815.2, 815.4, and 820) against Defendant and Does 1-50; (2) negligent
supervision of minor (Gov’t Code, §§ 815.2, 815.4, and 820) against Defendant
and Does 1-50; (3) negligent failure to warn (Gov’t Code, §§ 815.2 and 820) against
Defendant and Does 1-50; (4) assault and battery against Does 51-60; and (5)
negligence against Does 61-70.
Does 1-30 are alleged to be employees and
agents of LAUSD. Does 31-50 are alleged
to be persons, businesses, corporations, and/or entities that owed a legal duty
to Plaintiff and his parents. A.M. and Does
51-60 are the students of WRMS. Does
61-70 are unknown to Plaintiff but who were in some way responsible for the
conduct and liabilities alleged.
B.
Motions on Calendar
On March 25, 2025, Defendant LAUSD filed a
demurrer and motion to strike portions of the FAC.
On April 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed
opposition briefs.
On April 25, 2025, Defendant filed reply
briefs.
DISCUSSION RE DEMURRER
Although
the notice of the demurrer states that Defendant demurs to the 1st,
2nd, 3rd, and 4th causes of action, the memorandum
of points and authorities only discusses the 1st, 2nd,
and 3rd causes of action.
A.
Duplicative: 1st cause of action for
negligence (Gov’t Code, §§ 815.2, 815.4, and 820); 2nd cause of
action for negligent supervision of minor (Gov’t Code, §§ 815.2, 815.4, and
820); and 3rd cause of action for negligent failure to warn (Gov’t
Code, §§ 815.2 and 820)
Defendant demurs to the 1st, 2nd,
and 3rd causes of action, arguing that they are duplicative.
In the 1st cause of action,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant had a duty to supervise and protect their
students, it knew or should have known about student harassment and bullying,
and it breached its mandatory duty to properly supervise students like A.M. and
Plaintiff so that harassment, bullying, and physical violence could be
prevented or stopped. (FAC,
¶¶24-26.) Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant and its agents/employees knew or should have known that A.M. had
previously engaged in the same or similar misconduct and that there were
significant problems with student-on-student harassment, bullying, and physical
violence at WRMS. (Id.,
¶¶27-28.) Plaintiff alleges that despite
this knowledge, Defendant failed to properly supervise and monitor its students
like A.M. and Plaintiff, failed to implement policies and procedures to prevent
campus safety rule violations, failed to ensure the safety of minor children,
etc. (Id., ¶¶30-33.)
In the 2nd cause of action,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant had a special relationship with Plaintiff and
A.M., such that it was responsible for the care, custody, control, supervision,
and protection of minors entrusted to them and it had a duty to properly supervise,
monitor, and protect Plaintiff from knowable dangers like A.M. (FAC, ¶38.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant breached its duty to properly and
adequately supervise, monitor, and protect its students and ignored clear and
obvious signs that A.M. engaged in repeated inappropriate, harassing, and
physically violent behavior. (Id.,
¶39.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
failed to supervise minors on campus and failed to implement/enforce policies
and procedures aimed at preventing/detecting harassment and bullying. (Id., ¶¶40-42.)
In the 3rd cause of action,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant had a duty to warn students in their custody,
care, and control about knowable dangers like A.M. (FAC, ¶45.)
Plaintiff alleges that prior to A.M.’s physical assault of Plaintiff,
Defendant knew about WRMS’s widespread problem with safety rule violations,
violence, and bullying and knew or should have known about A.M.’s prior
violations of school safety rules. (Id., ¶46.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant breached its
duty by failing to warn Plaintiff about the harassment and bullying at WRMS,
including A.M.’s abusive tendencies. (Id.,
¶47.)
Defendant argues that the three causes of
action are essentially the same with repeated allegations, such that they are
duplicative. Defendant argues that
alleging negligence three times is an improper attempt to increase recovery
against Defendant and to mislead the jury into believing that Plaintiff
deserves separate compensation for these three causes of action. (Dem. at p.6.) In
opposition, Plaintiff argues that the three causes of action are distinct and
provide alternate theories of liability, though there would be only one remedy
available to recover. (Opp. at pp.3-4.)
The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd
causes of action do rely on the same underlying facts but allege duty
differently. For example, the 1st
cause of action is based on a general and mandatory duty, the 2nd
cause of action is based on a special relationship between Plaintiff and
Defendant, and the 3rd cause of action is based on a duty to warn or
make disclosures. At this time, the
Court will allow Plaintiff to allege alternate theories of liability. As acknowledged by Plaintiff, these are alternate
theories of liability for which only one remedy would issue. Proper
instructions and verdict forms should prevent jury confusion.
As such, the demurrer to the 1st,
2nd, and 3rd causes of action on the grounds that they
are duplicative is overruled.
B.
3rd cause of action for negligent failure
to warn
In the notice of
the demurrer, Defendant demurs to the 4th cause of action (assault
and battery) on the grounds that it is barred by law. (Dem. at p.2.) However, the memorandum of points and
authorities does not discuss the 4th cause of action and instead argues
that the 3rd cause of action is subject to demurrer as it attempts
to plead “common law” causes of action against a public entity. (Dem. at p.7.)
Defendant argues
that a duty to warn is a duty created solely by common law, and that common law
tort liability is precluded against public entities like Defendant. (Dem. at p.7 [relying on Juarez v. Boy
Scouts of America (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377].)
Under the statutory scheme in
California, all government tort liability must be based on statute. (Duarte
v. City of San Jose (1980) 100 Cal.App.3d 648, 653.) Government Code § 815, enacted in 1963,
abolished all common law or judicially declared forms of liability for public
entities, except for such liability as may be required by the federal or state
Constitution. (Cochran v. Herzog Engraving Co. (1984) 155 Cal. App. 3d 405,
409.) Accordingly, in the absence of
some constitutional requirement, public entities may be liable only if a
statute declares them to be liable. (Id.)
Further, in order to state a cause of action for government tort
liability, every fact essential to the existence of statutory liability must be
pleaded with particularity, including the existence of a statutory duty. (Zuniga
v. Housing Authority (1995) 41 Cal. App. 4th 82, 96.) Since the duty of a public entity can only be
created by statute, the statute claimed to establish the duty must be
identified. (Id.)
“[A] school district
and its employees have a special relationship with the district's pupils, a
relationship arising from the mandatory character of school attendance and the
comprehensive control over students exercised by school personnel, ‘analogous
in many ways to the relationship between parents and their children.’” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union
High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 869.) “Because of this special relationship, imposing obligations
beyond what each person generally owes others under Civil Code section 1714,
the duty of care owed by school personnel includes the duty to use reasonable
measures to protect students from foreseeable injury at the hands of third
parties acting negligently or intentionally.[] This principle has been applied
in cases of employees' alleged negligence resulting in injury to a student by
another student [citation], injury to a student by a nonstudent [citation]
and—on facts remarkably close to the present case—injuries to a student
resulting from a teacher's sexual assault [citation].” (Id. at 870 [internal quotation marks
and footnote omitted]; see also Regents of University of
California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 619 [“Similarly,
a duty to warn or protect may be found if the defendant has a special
relationship with the potential victim that gives the victim a right to expect
protection.”].)
As discussed above, Plaintiff
alleges that there was a special relationship between Defendant and
Plaintiff. (The allegations of the 2nd
cause of action alleging a special relationship were incorporated into the 3rd
cause of action via paragraph 44.) In
addition, Plaintiff has identified Government Code, §§ 815.2 and
820 as the basis for liability against Defendant. (See e.g., C.A. v. William S. Hart Union
High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 879 [“[A] public school district
may be vicariously liable under section 815.2 for the negligence of
administrators or supervisors in hiring, supervising and retaining a school
employee who sexually harasses and abuses a student.”].) Plaintiff has alleged facts that Defendant’s and
its agents/employees knew or should have known about A.M.’s prior violations of
school safety rules, harassment, assault, and bullying of over students and
that Plaintiff had previously been harassed and bullied by A.M., but Defendant
failed to warn Plaintiff about the harassment and bullying at WRMS and A.M.’s
abusive tendencies. (FAC, ¶¶46-48.) Thus, the demurrer to the 3rd
cause of action on the basis that it is based on common law and lacks a
statutory basis, is overruled.
DISCUSSION RE MOTION TO STRIKE
Defendant moves to
strike the 2nd cause of action for negligent supervision of a minor
in its entirety (FAC, ¶¶37-43) and the 3rd cause of action for
negligent failure to warn in its entirety (FAC, ¶¶44-49). Defendant argues that the 2nd and
3rd causes of action are improper and lack legal support for
essentially the same reasons discussed in the demurrer papers.
In light of the ruling on the
demurrer, the motion to strike is denied.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Defendant Los Angeles Unified School
District’s demurrer to the FAC to the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd
causes of action is overruled.
Defendant Los Angeles Unified School
District’s motion to strike portions of the FAC is denied.
Defendant is ordered to answer.
Defendant shall provide
notice of this order.
DATED:
May 2, 2025 ___________________________
John
Kralik
Judge
of the Superior Court