Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 19STCV34046, Date: 2025-02-04 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19STCV34046    Hearing Date: February 4, 2025    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff is awarded $160,000 in attorney fees. Defendant’s motion to tax is DENIED.

On 9/24/2019, Plaintiffs Jennifer Elachkar and Deva Shaufuss (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed suit against Kia Motors America, Inc. (Defendant), alleging violations of the Song-Beverly Act.

            On 11/26/2024, Plaintiff moved for attorney fees and costs totaling $902,068.74.

            On 12/30/2024, Defendant moved to tax costs.

            For ease, the Court has consolidated its analysis into a single ruling.

I.                   Attorney Fees Motion

Legal Standard

The party claiming attorneys’ fees must establish entitlement to such fees and the reasonableness of the fees claimed.  (Civic Western Corporation v. Zila Industries, Inc. (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 1, 16.) “Except as attorney’s fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties[.]” (CCP § 1021.)

“It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.”  (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623.)  In exercising its discretion, the court should consider a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in handling the matter, the attention given, the success or failure, and the resulting judgment.  (Id.)

In determining what constitutes a reasonable compensation for an attorney who has rendered services in connection with a legal proceeding, the court may and should consider the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required and the skill employed in handling the litigation, the attention given, the success of the attorneys’ efforts, their learning, their age, and their experience in the particular type of work demanded the intricacies and importance of the litigation, the labor and necessity for skilled legal training and ability in trying the cause, and the time consumed. (Stokus v. Marsh (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 647, 657.)

In determining the proper amount of fees to award, courts use the lodestar method.  The lodestar figure is calculated by multiplying the total number of reasonable hours expended by the reasonable hourly rate.  “Fundamental to its determination … [is] a careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney … in the presentation of the case.”  (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48 (Serrano III).)  A reasonable hourly rate must reflect the skill and experience of the attorney.  (Id. at 49.)  “Prevailing parties are compensated for hours reasonably spent on fee-related issues.  A fee request that appears unreasonably inflated is a special circumstance permitting the trial court to reduce the award or deny one altogether.”  (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635 (Serrano IV); see also Weber v. Langholz (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1587 (“The trial court could make its own evaluation of the reasonable worth of the work done in light of the nature of the case, and of the credibility of counsel’s declaration unsubstantiated by time records and billing statements.”)

Reasonable attorney fees should be based on an objective standard of reasonableness, i.e., the market value of services rendered, not on some notion of cost incurred. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1090.)  The value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in which the trial court has its own expertise.  (Id. at 1096.)  The trial court may make its own determination of the value of the services contrary to, or without the necessity for, expert testimony.  (Id.)  The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.  (Id.)

Discussion

            Plaintiff seeks $902,068.74. This amount consists of (1) $554,529.00 in attorney fees for Quill & Arrow, LLP (QA); (2) a 1.50 multiplier enhancement on the attorney fees (or $277,264.50); (3) $64,275.24 in costs incurred by QA; and (4) an additional $6,000.00 for Plaintiffs’ counsel to review Defendant’s Opposition; draft the Reply; and attend the hearing on this Motion.

Rates

            Plaintiff’s counsel claims the following rates:

-         Bryan Altman: $950/hr

-         Kevin Jacobson: $500/hr.

-         Jonathan Shirian: $500/hr.

-         Andrew Weiss: $350/hr.

-         Athena Nguyen: $300/hr.

-         Gregory Sogoyan: $425/hr.

-         Sarah Pfeffer: $350/hr.

-         Andrew Jung: $400/hr.

-         Luis A. Serrano: $350/hr

-         Danja Stocca: $350/hr

-         Daniel Cox: $395/hr.

In Morris v. Hyundai Motor Am. (2019) 41 Cal. App. 5th 24, 41, the trial court reduced the rates of Bryan Altman of the Altman Law Group, who has 30-plus years of litigation experience with over 100 jury trials, of which 20-plus were as lead trial counsel in lemon law cases, from $650 to $500 per hour, reduced Steve Mikhov of the Knight Law Group from $500 to $400, and reduced all the associates’ rates that ranged from $450 to $350 to $300 per hour. (Id. at 8-9.) In support of the lower court decision, the court of appeal held that:

[E]ven if Morris established that her attorneys’ rates were generally commensurate with other consumer law attorneys with the same level of experience and skill, Morris ignores that there are a number of factors that the trial court may have taken into consideration in determining that reductions in the attorneys’ hourly rates were warranted. The court reasonably could have reduced the rates based on its finding that the matter was not complex; that it did not go to trial; that the name partners were doing work that could have been done by lower-billing attorneys; and that all the attorneys were doing work that could have been done by paralegals.

            (Id. at pp. 23-24.)

            Similarly, Judge Randolph Hammock of the Los Angeles County Superior Court recently found rates of $350 per hour appropriate for an “experienced” lawyer to take a lemon law case all the way through trial. (See Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of N. Am., LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 245-46 [“The court found the requested fee amount “was just not reasonable.”… The court decided that $350 “is a reasonable hourly rate for the services that were done.”].)

Here, the Court reduces counsels’ hourly rates to a blended rate of $400, consistent with Mikhaeilpoor.

Hours

            Plaintiff’s fee recovery is based on a claim of 990 hours expended.

            After review, the Court finds a considerable amount of padding and either excessive or unnecessary entries. For example, Daniel Cox billed nearly 6 hours to “begin” and “finalize” Plaintiff’s deposition summary. Cox then billed another 3.3 hours to “prepare deposition” summary. Cox then billed “1.7” to prepare a “PowerPoint summary of Defendant's deposition cancellations.” 11 hours on these activities is unreasonable on its face. Similarly, Andrew Jung billed 20 minutes merely to check if a reply brief was needed.

In Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal. App. 5th 24, three law firms claimed a total of $351,055.26 after a lemon law trial. (Id. at 31.) The trial court found that the claimed fees were “excessive . . . for a non-complex case.” (Id. at 34.) The trial court exercised its discretion and reduced the amount of fees by 33%. (Id.)

The trial court explained that its decision was based on the following reasons: (1) $351,055.26 was excessive for a non-complex case; (2) plaintiffs’ counsel was experienced in the area of law; (3) the plaintiff did not justify the number of attorneys working on the case; and (4) the repetitive nature of lemon law cases did not warrant the amount of time requested. (Id. at 34-35.) The Court of Appeal found that the 33% reduction was appropriate.

The plaintiff in Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240 won a $35,805.80 verdict after a six-day jury trial. The verdict was comprised of $17,902.54 in compensatory damages and $17,902.54 in a civil penalty. (Id. at 244.) Plaintiff’s attorneys then filed a motion seeking $344,639.00 in fees. This figure consisted of $226,426.00, plus a 0.5 multiplier enhancement (totaling $113,213.00), and $5,00.00 for addressing the attorney fee resolution process. (Id.)

The trial court thought the $344,639.00 was shockingly unreasonable, regardless of the damages awarded. (Id. at 252.) The court decided that it would take 225 hours for a reasonably experienced attorney, in similar circumstances, to do the tasks that plaintiffs’ trial counsel claimed to have done. The court also decided that $350.00 was “a reasonable hourly rate for the services that were done.” Ultimately, the court found that $95,900.00 was the reasonable amount of attorney fees for work performed on behalf of Mikhaeilpoor. After offsetting certain fees and costs that had been awarded to defendants, the net amount of awarded fees totaled $94,864.00. (Id. at 245-46.)

When plaintiff appealed, the Court of Appeal observed that Mikhaeilpoor’s case concerned “the simple issue of a purported engine defect in plaintiffs’ vehicle that was—in plaintiffs’ view— not fixed after multiple attempts. To prevail, plaintiff’s attorneys were only required to establish that their client purchased the vehicle, that it had a written warranty, that the vehicle had a defect, and that the vehicle was not repaired or replaced after the manufacturer had a reasonable opportunity to do so.” (Id. at 255.) The Court therefore affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that 225 hours was a reasonable number of hours to spend in prosecuting such a case and that $94,864.00 was a reasonable fee award in such a case. (Id. at 256.)

Here, the Court finds that 400 hours was a reasonable number of hours to spend prosecuting a non-complex case like this, particularly given the experience of counsel and the repetitive nature of lemon law cases. (Mikhaeilpoor, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 245-46.

Lodestar Enhancement

Plaintiffs request a 1.5 lodestar enhancement based on the contingency nature of the case and the quality of the work performed.

Relevant factors to determine whether an enhancement is appropriate include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.  (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

Here, the hourly rates set forth above capture the skill and the contingent nature. Thus, any multiplier would be duplicative of the calculations set forth above. An analysis of the relevant factors do not justify an enhancement award. The Court also declines to award a negative enhancement award.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff is awarded $160,000 in attorney fees.

II.               Motion to Tax Costs

Defendant moves to tax $45,529.17 in costs, as follows:

(1) $477.20 in filing and motion fees, claimed under Item 1;

(2) $1,392.50 in deposition costs, claimed under Item 4;

(3) $1,262.70 in service of process costs, claimed under Item 5;

(4) $30,605.70 for court reporter fees, claimed under item 11;

(5) $5,214.40 for models, the enlargements of exhibits and photocopies of exhibits, and the electronic presentation of exhibits, claimed under item 12;

(6) $809.46 in fees for electronic filing or service; and

(7) $5,767.21 in "other" costs, claimed under item 16.

            As for Item 1, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs can only reasonably recover $435.00 to file the lawsuit and $60.00 to file a fee motion, a total of $495.00. However, Defendant offers no legal authority to show that Plaintiffs may not recover for filing fees incurred for motions filed. Particularly given the outcome of trial, Plaintiffs have shown that these fees were reasonably necessary to the litigation.

            As for Item 4, Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot recover the costs Mr. Petrangelo’s cancelled deposition. However, in opposition, Plaintiff persuasively showed that the deposition was cancelled based on mutual meet and confer, in light of contributing factors created by both sides. Accordingly, the Court finds these costs to be recoverable.

            As for Item 5, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover for the depositions of service advisors and technicians. However, an assertion that Plaintiff could have obtained discovery in an alternative way, does not, on its own, establish that the deposition was unnecessary. Indeed, as indicated by Plaintiff in opposition, Defendant itself sought the deposition of a repair facility employee, Sergio Melikyan.

            As for Item 11, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claimed reporter fees are excessive on their face because “Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence to show why the court's minute orders would not control the conduct of the case, regardless of what may have been said at the hearings.” (Motion, 5: 15-16.) However, here, the Court did not have an assigned court reporter for trial, so it was Plaintiffs’ responsibility to obtain one. As is their right, Plaintiffs retained a private court reporter, whose rates are not set by the Los Angeles Superior Court fee schedule. Defendant did not submit any evidence to show that the fees claims were not actually incurred, or that court reporters costs for a jury trial were not reasonable or necessary to the litigation.

            As for Item 12, Defendant argues that “[t]he invoices provided by plaintiffs are for photocopies of unspecified documents other than exhibits.” (Motion, 6: 3-4.) However, in opposition, Plaintiff argues that the documents were exhibits included in the trial binder. While not all documents were used at trial, that Court requires full trial binders containing each exhibit prior to trial. The Court finds these costs were actually and reasonably incurred.

            As for electronic filing and service fees, Defendant argues these fees are duplicative. In opposition, Plaintiff submitted evidence that they are not, and that they were actually incurred. 

            As for Item 16, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s “Other” costs totaling $5,767.21 "binders delivery, 'CAP' appearance, Court Call, courtesy copies, records requests, [and] for travel costs” are unrecoverable. Plaintiff concedes these costs are discretionary, citing CCP section 1033.5. After review, the Court finds these costs were reasonably necessary to litigation.

            Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion to strike is denied.

It is so ordered.

Dated:  February    , 2025

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar.  For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.