Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 20STCV08464, Date: 2023-03-27 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV08464 Hearing Date: March 27, 2023 Dept: 17
Superior
Court of California
County
of Los Angeles
DEPARTMENT 17
TENTATIVE RULING
DOMINGO
LOZA vs. KIA
MOTORS AMERICA, INC. |
Case No.:
20STCV08464 Hearing
Date: March 27, 2023 |
Defendant’s
motion to tax costs is GRANTED IN PART, DECLINED IN PART, consistent with this
ruling.
The Court
taxes $1,738.28 in costs.
On 3/2/2020,
Plaintiff Domingo Loza filed suit against Kia Motors America, Inc. alleging:
(1) breach of express warranty; (2) breach of implied warranty; and (3)
violation of the Song Beverly Act section 1793.2.
Now,
Defendant moves to tax at least $86,800.10 in costs.
Discussion
Defendant
argues that the following costs should be taxed:
(1) $304.95
in filing and motion fees, claimed under item 1;
(2)
$12,197.11 in Deposition costs, claimed under Item 4;
(3) $771.00
in Service of process fees, claimed under item 5;
(4)
$12,059.64 in witness fees, claimed under item 8;
(5)
$24,091.15 in Court Reporter Fees, claimed under Item 12; and
(6)
$37,376.25 in “Other,” claimed under Item 13.
The Court
addresses each item in turn.
As
for Item 1, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims were not reasonably
incurred:
Plaintiff
claims $809.95 in filing and Motion fees with respect to Motions to compel
further document production by KA, to compel the deposition of KA’s PMK, and
Motions to submit tardy expert witness information. These claimed fees were not
reasonably incurred; they were not reasonably necessary to the conduct of the
litigation; and they are not reasonable in amount. With respect to tardy expert
witness information, Plaintiff is seeking $181.65 for a motion to submit tardy
expert witness information at $61.65, and two additional ex parte applications
regarding same at $60.00 each. These filings are clearly not reasonable as they
were filed due Plaintiff’s counsel’s unilateral mistake and would not have been
necessary absent said mistake. The Court should, therefore, strike all claimed
filing fees other than the $435.00 fee for filing the initial Complaint.
While
the Court declines to find the costs for discovery motions unnecessary, the
Court does find that it would be unreasonable to allow Plaintiff to recover the
$303.30 in costs incurred as a result of Plaintiff’s counsel’s unilateral
mistake. Notably, Plaintiff does not attempt to defend these costs in
opposition.
As
for Item 4, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claimed deposition costs are
unreasonable because they are excessive, “[a]s attorneys who specialize in this
area of the law, Plaintiff’s attorneys know there is no reason to take the
depositions of service advisors and technicians because the service advisors
and technicians keep a contemporaneous record of their work on the repair
orders they prepare each time they work on hundreds of vehicles each year and
cannot remember each one. There was no reason to incur the cost of serving
deposition subpoenas on and taking the depositions of the service advisors and
technicians in this case.” (Motion, 4:25-5:3.)
The
Court disagrees. Plaintiff is entitled to engage in discovery reasonably likely
to produce admissible evidence. Defendant does not identify any basis by which
the Court may set limitations on who may be deposed in Song-Beverly claims in
light of a firm’s specialization, or the likelihood that the technicians will
be able to recall the specific details. Moreover, the Court finds the
deposition costs claimed to be reasonable, and the deposition of Plaintiff’s
expert Thomas Lepper is recoverable under Jensen v. BMW of North America,
Inc. (1995) 25 Cal.App.4th 112, 137.)
As
for Item 5, Defendant argues that the service of process costs and witness fees
are unreasonable because they are related to the unreasonable depositions of
various individuals at Kia of Carson. However, as set forth above, the Court
finds those costs reasonable.
As
for Item 8, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim for expert witness fees is
unreasonable because Plaintiff has not provided supporting documentation or
explanation of the expert fees and because:
The plaintiff
in a Lemon Law case does not need to present expert testimony. (Oregel v.
American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1102 fn. 8.)
Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to show why experts were necessary in
this case or to show that the tie and hourly rates charged by the experts were
reasonable. Plaintiff’s claim for $11,954.64 in expert fees, split between two
(2) experts, supposedly based on 48.45 hours at unspecified, varying rates, is
unreasonable, unsubstantiated and excessive. Plaintiff has not provided any
documentation to support this claim. Where, as here, weaker and less
satisfactory evidence is offered when it is within the power of the party to
produce stronger and more satisfactory evidence, the evidence offered should be
viewed with distrust. (See Evid. Code, § 412.)
(Motion,
5: 10-18.)
In
opposition, Plaintiff cites Jensen, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at
137, wherein the Court expressly held that expert witness fees are recoverable
under the Song-Beverly Act even though CCP section 1033.5 states they are not
recoverable unless ordered by court. As such, the Court finds these costs are
recoverable.
Furthermore,
as noted by Plaintiff, verification
of the memorandum of costs by the prevailing party’s attorney establishes a
prima facie showing that the claimed costs are proper. (Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th
1258, 1267.) Plaintiff need only submit supporting documentation or explanation
for the expert fees once Defendant has met its burden to argue that the costs
are not reasonably necessary (i.e., file a motion to tax costs). (Rappenecker v. Sea-Land Service, Inc.
(1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 256, 266.) Plaintiff’s opposition includes supporting
documentation which corroborate the witness fees claimed. It also includes
substantial argument setting forth justification for those fees. (See Opp.,
9:7-9:26.) Accordingly, the Court finds
these costs reasonably incurred.
As for Item 12, Defendant argues that $24,091.15
in court reporter fees are excessive on their face:
Under the Los
Angeles Superior Court fee schedule, court reporters receive $764.00 for
proceedings over 4 hours; $382.00 for proceedings between 1 and 4 hours; and a
per diem of $30.00 for proceedings under 1 hour. All of the fees in KLG’s
Memorandum of Costs exceed these amounts, with a high of $2,095.00, nearly
three times the permitted charge.
(Motion, 6:
1-4.)
However, as
noted by Plaintiff in opposition, “Defendants stipulated to the use of these
reporters but now seeks to tax them so that Plaintiff will exclusively bear
these costs. Defendant benefited from Plaintiff’s decision to use a court
reporter inasmuch as Defendants will thereby given the option to read the
record at the hearing and order a copy if so desired.” (Opp., 11: 8-11.)
Moreover, while Defendant may contend the amount in fees is high, Defendant
does not identify any duplicate or incorrect charges to suggest the amount
sought is incorrect or inflated. As such, given that the evidence shows the
court reporter fees were actually incurred, and given that the parties
stipulated to the use of court reporters and benefitted from them, the Court declines
to reduce that amount.
Finally, as for Item 13, Defendant argues that the
$37,376.25 in costs for “Other” is unreasonable. The Court agrees in part.
Plaintiff’s opposition corroborates costs for delivery of binders, blowbacks,
and MIL binders. Moreover, the Court finds the costs of interpreters to be
reasonable. Defendant argues that: “These fees are excessive on their face.
Under the Los Angeles Superior Court fee schedule, interpreters receive $76.00
per hour. At that rate, $17,482.50 in fees would represent 230 hours. The trial
of this case did not take that long and Plaintiff obviously did not testify for
230 hours.” (Motion, 7: 20-23.) However, as noted by Plaintiff, “[i]t was
reasonable and necessary for [Plaintiff] to have the benefit of a translator
for the entire trial (not just their trial testimony) so that they could
understand what transpired.” (Opp., 14: 2-6.) Plaintiff’s opposition included
invoices which represent that this was the amount actually paid to the
interpreter, and thus the Court finds this amount to be reasonable.
However,
travel costs are not specifically enumerated as allowable costs in CCP section
1033.5(a), “[r]outine expenses for local travel by attorneys or other firm
employees are not reasonably necessary to the conduct of litigation.”.) See
Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761,
775-76.) As a result, the Court declines to award the $1,434.98 in travel
claimed by counsel.
Based on the
foregoing, Defendant’s motion to tax costs is granted in part, declined in
part. Defendant’s motion to tax is granted as to the travel costs ($1,434.98)
and a portion of the filing fees ($303.30.) Defendant’s motion is denied in all
other respects.
It is so ordered.
Dated:
March
, 2023
Hon. Jon R.
Takasugi
Judge of the
Superior Court
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must
send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org
by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court
website at www.lacourt.org. If a party submits
on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must
identify the party submitting on the tentative.
If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this
tentative as the final order. If the department
does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the
tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed
off calendar.
Due to Covid-19, the court is
strongly discouraging in-person appearances. Parties, counsel, and court reporters present
are subject to temperature checks and health inquiries, and will be denied
entry if admission could create a public health risk. The court encourages the parties wishing to
argue to appear via L.A. Court Connect.
For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213)
633-0517. Your understanding during
these difficult times is appreciated.