Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 20STCV09693, Date: 2024-01-18 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV09693 Hearing Date: January 18, 2024 Dept: 17
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
DEPARTMENT
17
TENTATIVE RULING
| 
   KRYSTAL RIFKIN             
  vs. NISSAN NORTH
  AMERICA, INC.     | 
  
    Case
  No.:  20STCV09693   Hearing Date: January 18, 2024  | 
 
            Plaintiff’s
motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. 
On 3/10/2020,
Plaintiff Krystal Rifkin (Plaintiff) filed suit against Nissan North America,
Inc., alleging: (1) breach of express warranty; (2) breach of implied warranty;
and (3) violation of the Song-Beverly Act section 1793.2. 
            On
1/3/2023, Plaintiff granted Defendant’s
motion to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
            Now, Plaintiff moves for
reconsideration of the Court’s ruling based on a change in law. 
Discussion
            Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of
the Court’s 1/3/2023 ruling based on the recently published decision Martha
Ochoa v. Ford Motor Company (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1324. 
            The Court agrees reconsideration is
warranted. 
            Typically, a motion for
reconsideration must be brought within 10 days of entry of the order. However,
CCP section 1008, subdivision (c), provides “If
a court at any time determines that there has been a change of law that
warrants it to reconsider a prior order it entered, it may do so on its own
motion and enter a different order.” 
            Here, the
Court’s previous ruling was based on a conclusion that
Defendant could enforce the arbitration agreement under a theory of equitable
estoppel. This was based on a conclusion that Song-Beverly claims: (1)
necessarily rely on the underlying contract, given that if a plaintiff did not enter into the RISC,
he or she would not have received the Subject Vehicle or the corresponding
warranties and certifications from the defendant; and (2) all directly relate
to the condition of the vehicle and thus are intimately founded in and
intertwined with the underlying contract and the condition of the vehicle
bought subject to that contract.
            However, in Ochoa, the
Court of Appeal directly addressed the manufacturer’s standing vis-à-vis the
Sales Contract and equitable estoppel in the newly published Martha Ochoa v.
Ford Motor Company (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1324. In rejecting the car
manufacturer’s right to enforce the Sales Contract’s arbitration agreement
under a theory of third-party beneficiary or equitable estoppel, the Court
wrote: 
We agree with
the trial court that FMC [Ford] could not compel arbitration based on
plaintiffs’ agreements with the dealers that sold them the vehicles. Equitable
estoppel does not apply because, contrary to FMC’s arguments, plaintiffs’
claims against it in no way rely on the agreements. FMC was not a third party
beneficiary of those agreements as there is no basis to conclude the plaintiffs
and their dealers entered into them with the intention of benefitting FMC.
            As such, Ochoa
reaches the opposite conclusion as Felisilda and concludes than an
automaker may not compel arbitration based on the arbitration clause contained
in the selling dealership’s contract. Given that this was the precise basis for
compelling arbitration, the Court finds that new law justifies a
reconsideration of the Court’s previous order granting the motion to compel.  
            Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s
motion for reconsideration is granted. 
 
It is so ordered. 
Dated:  January   
, 2024
                                                                                                                                                           
   Hon. Jon R.
Takasugi
   Judge of the
Superior Court
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must
send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org
by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court
website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits
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identify the party submitting on the tentative. 
If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this
tentative as the final order.  If the department
does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the
tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed
off calendar.  For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213)
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