Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 20STCV09693, Date: 2024-01-18 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 20STCV09693    Hearing Date: January 18, 2024    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

 

DEPARTMENT 17

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

KRYSTAL RIFKIN

 

         vs.

 

NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC.

 

 Case No.:  20STCV09693

 

 

 

 Hearing Date: January 18, 2024

 

            Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is GRANTED.

 

On 3/10/2020, Plaintiff Krystal Rifkin (Plaintiff) filed suit against Nissan North America, Inc., alleging: (1) breach of express warranty; (2) breach of implied warranty; and (3) violation of the Song-Beverly Act section 1793.2.

 

            On 1/3/2023, Plaintiff granted Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s Complaint.

 

            Now, Plaintiff moves for reconsideration of the Court’s ruling based on a change in law.

 

Discussion

 

            Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Court’s 1/3/2023 ruling based on the recently published decision Martha Ochoa v. Ford Motor Company (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1324.

 

            The Court agrees reconsideration is warranted.

 

            Typically, a motion for reconsideration must be brought within 10 days of entry of the order. However, CCP section 1008, subdivision (c), provides “If a court at any time determines that there has been a change of law that warrants it to reconsider a prior order it entered, it may do so on its own motion and enter a different order.”

 

            Here, the Court’s previous ruling was based on a conclusion that Defendant could enforce the arbitration agreement under a theory of equitable estoppel. This was based on a conclusion that Song-Beverly claims: (1) necessarily rely on the underlying contract, given that if a plaintiff did not enter into the RISC, he or she would not have received the Subject Vehicle or the corresponding warranties and certifications from the defendant; and (2) all directly relate to the condition of the vehicle and thus are intimately founded in and intertwined with the underlying contract and the condition of the vehicle bought subject to that contract.

 

            However, in Ochoa, the Court of Appeal directly addressed the manufacturer’s standing vis-à-vis the Sales Contract and equitable estoppel in the newly published Martha Ochoa v. Ford Motor Company (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1324. In rejecting the car manufacturer’s right to enforce the Sales Contract’s arbitration agreement under a theory of third-party beneficiary or equitable estoppel, the Court wrote:

 

We agree with the trial court that FMC [Ford] could not compel arbitration based on plaintiffs’ agreements with the dealers that sold them the vehicles. Equitable estoppel does not apply because, contrary to FMC’s arguments, plaintiffs’ claims against it in no way rely on the agreements. FMC was not a third party beneficiary of those agreements as there is no basis to conclude the plaintiffs and their dealers entered into them with the intention of benefitting FMC.

 

            As such, Ochoa reaches the opposite conclusion as Felisilda and concludes than an automaker may not compel arbitration based on the arbitration clause contained in the selling dealership’s contract. Given that this was the precise basis for compelling arbitration, the Court finds that new law justifies a reconsideration of the Court’s previous order granting the motion to compel.  

 

            Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is granted.

 

 

 

It is so ordered.

 

Dated:  January    , 2024

                                                                                                                                                          

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

 

 

 

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar.  For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.