Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 20STCV26644, Date: 2022-10-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV26644    Hearing Date: October 6, 2022    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is CONTINUED.

            On 7/15/2020, Plaintiff Marta and Gabriel Padilla (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed suit against DCH Thousand Oaks-F, Inc. d/b/a DCH Ford of Thousand Oaks, and Ford Motor Company (collectively, Defendants), alleging: (1) breach of express warranty; (2) breach of implied warranty; (3) violation of the Song-Beverly Act section 1793.2; and (4) negligent repair.

            Now, Defendants move for summary judgment of Plaintiff’s Complaint.

Discussion

I.                   Song-Beverly Claims

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot establish these claims because Ford fully complied with its obligations under the Song-Beverly Act (the Act), and promptly offered to repurchase the Vehicle prior to the commencement of litigation.

The Song-Beverly Act provides in pertinent part:

If the manufacture or its representative in this state is unable to service or repair a new motor vehicle . . . to conform to the applicable express warranties after a reasonable number of repair attempts, the manufacturer shall either promptly replace the new motor vehicle in accordance with subparagraph (A) or promptly make restitution to the buyer in accordance with subparagraph (B). However, the buyer shall be free to elect restitution in lieu of replacement, and in no event shall the buyer be required by the manufacturer to accept a replacement vehicle.

 (A) In the case of replacement, the manufacturer shall replace the buyer’s vehicle with a new motor vehicle substantially identical to the vehicle replaced. The replacement vehicle shall be accompanied by all express and implied warranties that normally accompany new motor vehicles of that specific kind. The manufacturer also shall pay for, or to, the buyer the amount of any sales or use tax, license fees, registration fees, and other official fees for which the buyer is obligated to pay in connection with the replacement, plus any incidental damages to which the buyer is entitled under Section 1794, including but not limited to, reasonable repair, towing, and rental car costs actually incurred by the buyer.

(B) In the case of restitution, the manufacturer shall make restitution in an amount equal to the actual price paid or payable by the buyer, including any charges for transportation and manufacturer-installed options, but excluding nonmanufacturer installed items installed by a dealer or the buyer, and including any collateral charges such as sales or use tax, license fees, registration fees, and other official fees, plus any incidental damages to which the buyer is entitled under Section 1794, including, but not limited to, reasonable repair, towing, and rental car costs actually incurred by the buyer.

(C) . . . When restitution is made pursuant to subparagraph (B), the amount to be paid by the manufacturer to the buyer may be reduced by the manufacturer by that amount directly attributable to use by the buyer prior to the time the buyer first delivered the vehicle to the manufacturer or distributor, or its authorized service and repair facility for correction of the problem that gave rise to the nonconformity.

            (Civ. Code § 1793.2 (d)(2)(A)-(C).)

Where a manufacturer has made a compliant offer to repurchase or replace a plaintiff’s vehicle after the vehicle could not be repaired, the manufacturer is deemed to have complied with the Song-Beverly Act. (Dominguez v. American Suzuki Motor Corp. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 53, 57.)

            Thus, in order to prevail on his Song-Beverly Act claims against Ford, Plaintiff must prove that (1) his vehicle had defects that affected the use, value or safety of the vehicle that Ford could not repair to conform to the applicable warranty after a reasonable number of repair attempts, and (2) assuming Plaintiff can prove his vehicle was not repaired after a reasonable number of repair attempts, that Ford did not promptly made a compliant offer to repurchase or replace Plaintiff’s vehicle.

            To show that it complied with the requirements of Song-Beverly, Defendant submitted the following evidence:

-         On June 8, 2019, Plaintiff Marta Padilla purchased a new 2019 Ford F-150 (the “Vehicle”) from Sunrise Ford in North Hollywood, California. (SS ¶ 1.)

-         On October 2, 2019, Plaintiff Gabriel Padilla presented the Vehicle to Sunrise Ford concerning an issue with the vehicle. (SS ¶ 6.)

-         On October 31, 2019, Plaintiff Gabriel Padilla presented the Vehicle to DCH Ford of Thousand Oaks concerning an issue with the vehicle. (SS ¶ 7.)

-         On November 12, 2019, Plaintiff Gabriel Padilla presented the vehicle to DCH Ford of Thousand Oaks concerning an issue with the vehicle. (SS ¶ 8.)

-         In or around November of 2019, Plaintiffs called Ford and requested that Ford repurchase the Vehicle. (SS ¶ 9.)

-         On November 29, 2019, Ford sent Plaintiff Marta Padilla a letter offering to repurchase or replace the Vehicle. (SS ¶ 10.)

-         On December 11, 2019, Ford sent Plaintiff Marta Padilla a second letter detailing the repurchase offer amount for the Vehicle. (SS ¶ 11.)

-         Under the statutory formula, Ford offered to repurchase the vehicle for $44,264.72, and it detailed exactly how it calculated the repurchase offer. (SS ¶ 12.)

-         After receiving Ford’s Offer on December 11, 2019, Plaintiffs rejected the offer. (SS ¶ 13.)

Taken together, Defendants’ evidence supports a reasonable inference that Ford promptly offered to repurchase the vehicle with a legally compliant offer just five months after it was purchased, within two weeks from the date Plaintiffs brought in the vehicle for the third time, and immediately after Plaintiff called Ford. Rather than accept Ford’s offer or identify any supposed deficiency with the offer, Plaintiff rejected the offer and initiated this action.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the Court must continue this motion to allow Plaintiffs time to obtain additional discovery in support of their opposition.

“To be entitled to a continuance, the party opposing the motion for summary judgment must show that its proposed discovery would have led to facts essential to justify opposition.” (Scott v. CIBA Vision Corp. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 307, 325-26.) If the non-moving party shows by declaration that essential evidence “may exist but cannot, for reasons stated, be presented, the court shall deny the motion” or continue it for a reasonable period, or “make any other order as may be just.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (h); see Bahl v. Bank of America (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 389, 395.)

Here, Plaintiffs have submitted 2017-2020 California Department of Consumer Affairs (DCA) Annual Reviews of Ford Motor Company’s BBB Auto Line Program that Ford produced in another similar case that was litigated by Plaintiffs’ counsel. Plaintiffs have served a subpoena on the DCA requesting the same documents to avoid any evidence or admissibility issues. Plaintiffs have also requested additional communications between the DCA and Ford regarding negative equity. But these documents are not set to be produced until after Plaintiffs’ opposition to Ford’s motion for summary judgment is due. And on 9/21/2022, Ford sent a meet and confer letter informing Plaintiffs of its intent to file a motion to quash or a motion for protective order, and that motion is now pending. Accordingly, “there is good cause to continue the hearing on Ford’s motion because Plaintiffs contend that these documents demonstrate that the DCA has repeatedly explained to Ford that negative equity is not an allowable deduction when providing restitution to a consumer under the Song-Beverly who has gone through the third-party dispute resolution process.” (Opp., 4: 11-16.)

Given that the issue of negative equity is central to whether or not Defendant made a compliant offer, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ pending discovery may contain essential evidence to their claim.

            Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is continued pursuant to CCP section 437c.

It is so ordered.

Dated:  October    , 2022

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. 

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