Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 20STCV35873, Date: 2023-02-28 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV35873 Hearing Date: February 28, 2023 Dept: 17
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
DEPARTMENT
17
TENTATIVE RULING
|
ARMINE GALOYAN, et al.
vs. WAWANESA GENERAL
INSURANCE COMPANY |
Case
No.: 20STCV35873 Hearing Date: February 28, 2023 |
Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
On
9/18/2020, Plaintiffs Armien Galoyan and Zaven Simonyan (collectively,
Plaintiffs) filed suit against Wawanesa General Insurance Company (Defendant),
alleging: (1) breach of contract; and (2) breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.
Now,
Defendant moves for summary judgment, or, summary adjudication in the
alternative, of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Evidentiary Objections
In
light of the ruling, the Court does not rule on the submitted evidentiary
objections. (CCP § 437c, sud. (q).)
Discussion
Defendant
argues that Plaintiffs cannot state a claim because the policy excludes
coverage when an insured makes a “material misrepresentation,” and requires an
insured’s full cooperation before filing a lawsuit.
The
insurance policy in question here provides the following:
C. Duties
After Loss
In case of a
loss to covered property, we have no duty to provide coverage under this policy
if the failure to comply with the following duties is prejudicial to us. These
duties must be performed either by you, an “insured” seeking coverage, or a
representative of either:
* * *
5. Cooperate
with us in the investigation of a claim;
* * *
7. As often
as we reasonably require:
a. Show the
damaged property;
b. Provide us
with records and documents we request and permit us to make copies; and
c. Submit to
examination under oath, while not in the presence of another “insured,” and
sign the name;
*
* *
H.
Suit Against Us
No action can
be brought against us unless there has been full compliance with all of the
terms under Section I of this policy and the action is started within one year
after the date of loss.
(SS
¶ 1.)
As
amended through an endorsement, the policy also provides in part:
2. With
respect to loss by a peril other than fire, we provide coverage to no
‘insureds’ under this policy, if, whether before or after a loss, any ‘insured’
has:
a. Concealed
or misrepresented any material fact or circumstance;
b. Engaged in
fraudulent conduct; or
c. Made false
statements relating to this insurance.
(SS
¶ 2.)
To show that
Plaintiffs were excluded from coverage based on these policy provisions,
Defendant submitted the following evidence:
-
On October 20, 2019, through a public
adjuster, plaintiffs notified Defendant that their water supply line under the
kitchen sink broke the day prior. On October 23, 2019, adjuster Irene Bernardo
inspected the property and collected the damaged water supply line. (SS ¶ 3.)
-
On October 23, 2019, Defendant sent the
failed water line to Diversified Products Inspection (DPI) for forensic testing
and analysis. On November 7, 2019, DPI advised Defendant of the following
finding:
Its
failure was identified as a diagonal split in the body of the line located
below the crimp sleeve. The split in the supply line’s outer jacket and inner
reinforcement braiding were relatively smooth with some fraying on the
braiding. These were indications that the supply line had been cut by a sharp
object.
DPI also reported
that the failed line showed evidence of “inward deformation indicative of
extremely imposed damage.” It also provided magnified photographs.
(SS ¶ 4.)
-
DPI found no evidence that high water
pressure was a cause of the loss. The photographs in DPI November 5, 2019
report show a “Brass Craft” water supply line with polymer braids. It is rated
for up to 125 PSI of pressure with tolerance of approximately that amount. DPI
found no evidence that the pressure exceeded 125 PSI. According to DPI, if there
were prolonged pressure in excess of 124 PSI, the couplings linking the supply
line to fixture would come off before the line would break. (SS ¶ 5.)
-
During the claim, Plaintiffs’ plumber
did not state that the water pressure was high at the time of the loss.
Plaintiffs did not know of any water leaks, and they have no opinion as to
either what the water pressure was or whether it was high at the time of the
loss. (SS ¶ 6.)
-
In January of 2020, Defendant took Plaintiffs’
recorded statements, and it obtained certain phone records. (SS ¶ 7.)
-
On April 27, 2020 and May 11, 2020, Defendant
asked Plaintiffs to produce, before their examinations under oath (EUOs),
“Records of your bank statements from every account that you have a financial
interest in, showing deposits and withdrawals for the period beginning July 1,
2019 through November 30, 2019.” (SS ¶
8.)
-
On May 22, 2020, Defendant’s counsel
took plaintiffs’ EUOs. Plaintiffs collected and gave their bank records to
their lawyer, Ms. Grun, before their EUOs. Plaintiffs allege that “The only
documents which were not presented before the Examination Under Oath were of
the bank statements since Ms. Grun was having technical difficulties on the day
of the examination.” (SS ¶ 9.)
-
On October 19, 2019, the day of the
loss, Plaintiffs left their home at or before 10:00 a.m. Before leaving, they
locked their doors and activated their alarm system with a motion detector.
Besides their children, no one else had a house key or knew their alarm code.
Plaintiffs did not discover evidence of forced entry, and their alarm system
did not go off. If someone cut their water supply line, Plaintiffs have no
suspects. Before returning to their house, Plaintiffs went to a sushi
restaurant approximately 4.5 miles from their home. They paid for their meal at
1:54 p.m. They don’t remember if they stayed after paying. After their meal, Plaintiffs
drove home. Plaintiffs collectively estimate a range of between approximately
15 and 40 minutes to drive from the restaurant to their house. If they went
straight home, they estimate that they would have arrived at their home by
approximately 2:30 p.m. When Plaintiffs arrived home, they allege that they saw
water gushing out from under their kitchen sink. Plaintiffs did not shut off
their water upon discovering the loss. At 3:12 p.m. on October 19, 2019, Plaintiffs
made their first phone call about the loss. Water continued to come out until a
plumber arrived between approximately 3:31 p.m. and 3:40 p.m. When the water
loss happened, Simonyan knew how to turn the water off under his sink. (SS ¶¶
10-16.)
-
During the EUOs, Defendant reserved its
right to continue the EUOs because plaintiffs had not produced the requested
financial records. (SS ¶ 17.)
-
On June 10, 2020, Defendant wrote to Plaintiffs’
counsel to request the missing financial records. On June 11, 2020, Plaintiffs’
counsel sent bank statements that were redacted and covered up the individual
bank transactions. Defendant contends that this failed to comply with Defendant’s
request for bank records “showing deposits and withdrawals.” It also contends
that this created substantial prejudice. It had no away to verify if Plaintiffs
made purchases in between paying for sushi and discovering the loss. Defendant
also contends that it could not use the redacted records to ask questions at a
second EUO about the redacted deposits and withdrawals. (SS ¶ 18.)
-
On August 13, 2020, Defendant denied
the claim. Among other things, Defendant alleged that Plaintiffs made material
misrepresentations of fact in the presentation of their claim, and it alleged
that they failed to cooperate with Defendant’s investigation by refusing to
produce unredacted financial records. (SS ¶ 19.)
-
In denying the claim, Defendant relied
upon DPI’s November 7, 2019 finding that “the supply line had been cut by a
sharp object.” (SS ¶ 23.)
-
On November 2, 2020, Defendant asked Plaintiffs
to provide a competing expert opinion regarding the failed water supply line.
(SS ¶ 24.) During the claim, Plaintiffs did not respond with an alternative
report for Defendant to consider. Plaintiffs have no opinion as to why their
water supply line failed. During the claim and before filing their lawsuit, no
one that they hired offered an opinion as to why the water supply line failed. (SS
¶ 25.)
-
No Defendant employee involved with the
claim determinations had authority over operating procedures that affect a
substantial portion of the company. Examples of such operating procedures
include the terms of policy coverage, the wording of a claims manual, and where
and to whom Defendant sold policies. (SS ¶ 29.)
California
courts recognize that a cooperation clause, like the one in Defendant’s policy,
is a material part of the contract: “[A] condition of a policy requiring the cooperation
and assistance of the assured . . . is material to the risk and of the utmost
importance in a practical sense.” (Belz v. Clarendon America Ins. Co.
(2007) 158 Cal. App. 4th 615, 626.) The cooperation clause provides an insurer
the means “to decide upon [its] obligations” and “to protect itself against
false claims.” (Id. at p. 617.)
It is also
established that an insured who fails to comply with any insurer’s EUO and
record requirements violates the policy’s cooperation clause and forfeits coverage.
(See, e.g., Brizuela v. CalFarm Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal. App. 4th 578,
590 (“An insured’s compliance with a policy requirement to submit to an
examination under oath is a prerequisite to the right to receive benefits under
the policy.”). An EUO is also “a condition precedent to any claim, and the
refusal to submit to such an examination causes a forfeiture of any rights
under the policy.” (Id. at p. 590; California Fair Plan Ass’n v.
Superior Court (2004) 115 Cal. App. 4th 158, 161–63 (same); Brizuela,
supra, 116 Cal. App. 4th at p.
590 (“[W]hen an insured fails to comply with the insurance policy provisions
requiring an examination under oath and the production of documents, the breach
generally results in a forfeiture of coverage, thereby relieving the insurer of
its liability to pay, and provides the insurer an absolute defense to an action
on the policy.”)
Finally,
California courts have also held that insurance companies have a broad right to
ask questions about financial records at an EUO. For example, in Abdelhamid
v. Fire Ins. Exch. (2010) 182 Cal. App. 4th 990, 1002, the Court of Appeal
affirmed summary judgment and found that the insured breached his cooperation
obligations by refusing to produce requested financial records, even though the
insured showed up for an EUO and answered questions about the claim. In Ram
v. Infinity Select Ins. (N.D. Cal. 2011) 807 F. Supp. 2d 843, 859–60,
summary judgment was granted for the insurer after the insured breached the
duty to cooperate by failing to produce full financial records. The Court there
concluded that the insurer’s inability to examine those records made “it
difficult if not impossible to determine whether Plaintiff had motive to file a
false claim.”
Here,
Defendant submitted evidence that it requested for bank records to be produced
at the EUO that showed deposits and withdrawals for the period beginning
7/1/2019-11/30/2019. Plaintiffs failed to produce financial records at the EUO.
Then on 6/10/2020, Defendant wrote to request the missing financial records.
The next day, Plaintiffs produced heavily redacted bank records which prevented
Defenadnt from seeing the details of their transaction history. Defendant
submitted evidence that with the records provided they were unable to verify if
Plaintiffs’ version of events was true at a second EUO. As a result, 8/13/2020,
Defendant denied the claim.
Defendant’s
evidence supports a reasonable inference that Plaintiffs breached their duty to
cooperate by failing to produce responsive financial records. While Plaintiffs
attempted to cure their breach by sending unredacted bank statements on
9/29/2020—11 days after filing suit against Defendant—section H of the policy
provides that “[n]o action can be brought against us unless there has been full
compliance with all of the terms under Section I of this policy….” Defendant’s
evidence also supports a reasonable inference that Plaintiffs cannot show bad
faith because there was a “genuine dispute” as to whether or not coverage
existed and as to Plaintiffs’ cooperation obligations under the policy.
Accordingly,
the burden shifts to Plaintiffs to disclose a triable issue of material fact.
In
opposition, Plaintiffs argue that there are triable issues of fact as to
whether or not they failed to cooperate under the policy. In support,
Plaintiffs submitted evidence that:
-
At the 5/22/2022 EUO, Defendant’s
counsel was provided with Plaintiffs’ bank records. However, rather than take
the time to review them, WGI counsel’s responded: “I know. And I do want them.
I just don’t want to take up the time now to talk about all of them.” (SS ¶
17.)
-
During the EUO, Defendant’s counsel
reserved her right to conduct more EUOs as necessary once she had received the
bank statements. Neither Plaintiffs nor Defendant’s counsel objected. (Grun
Decl., ¶¶ 6-7.)
-
Plaintiffs produced the redacted bank
records in June 2020. At no time after the production of these redacted bank
records did Defendant seek to conduct additional EUOs or reach out to
Plaintiffs’ counsel requesting unredacted bank records. (Grun Decl., ¶¶ 8-9.)
-
After receiving the denial letter, but
prior to filing the action, Plaintiffs’ counsel sent unredacted bank
records to Defendant’s counsel. At no time after production of the unredacted
bank records did Defendant seek to conduct additional EUOs. (Grun Decl., ¶ 11.)
-
On 1/19/2023, Plaintiffs’ counsel
forward a failure analysis report prepared by Mr. Dana Medlin of EAG
Laboratories to Defendant’s counsel.
First, as a
preliminary matter, Defendant did not contend that Plaintiffs did not produce any
bank records at the EUO. Rather, they stated that Plaintiffs brought bank
records which were redacted in such a way that they could not be used for their
stated purpose, i.e., to show deposits and withdrawals from
7/1/2019-11/30/2019. The full quote from Defendant’s counsel is consistent with
this: “I know. And I do want them. I just don’t want to take up the time now to
talk about all of them. I’d like to look at them unredacted.”
(Plaintiffs’ Exh. 1, p. 50: 23-25, emphasis added.) Moreover, as noted by
Defendant in reply, Plaintiffs admitted in sworn discovery responses that they
did not produce their bank statements to Defendant because Ms. Gunn was having
technical difficulties on the day of the examination. (Wawanesa NOL Exhs. 26
A-B, special inter. resp. no. 1, pg. 3, lines 20-21); Benavidez v. San Jose
Police Dep’t (1999) 71 Cal. App. 4th 853, 863 (affirming exclusion of
declaration that contradicted prior discovery responses). While the Court gives
Plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt that they were not intentionally trying to
mislead the Court, Plaintiffs’ selective quotation of Ms. Winston’s statement,
particularly in light of their previous discovery responses, is misleading.
Second, the
Court agrees with Defendant that the failure analysis report is insufficient to
show a triable issue of material fact. The law is clear that an "insurer's
decisions and actions must be evaluated as of the time that they were made; the
evaluation cannot fairly be made in the light of subsequent events that may
provide evidence of the insurer's errors." (Chateau Chamberay
Homeowners Ass'n v. Associated Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal. App. 4th 335, 347; Troutt
v. Colorado Western Ins Co. (9th Cir. 2001) 246 F. 3d 1150, 1161 (" In
evaluating the evidence to see if there was any unreasonable conduct by the
insurer, 'it is essential that no hindsight test be applied."'); (Austero
v. National Cas Co. (1978) 84 Cal. App. 3d 1, 32.) Plaintiff’s own evidence indicates that the
report offering some alternative explanation for the water supply line failure
was not produced until January 2023. The claim was denied in January
2020, and this suit was initiated in September 2020. As such Plaintiffs have not submitted any
evidence that Defendant was aware of, or that Plaintiffs offered, an
alternative explanation for the water supply line break at the time of denial.
Third, the
only evidence Plaintiffs submitted to show that they submitted the unredacted
bank records prior to filing suit is a statement in counsel’s
declaration that “[a]fter receiving the denial letter but prior to filing this
action, I sent unredacted bank records to Ms. Winston, counsel for WGI.” (Grun
Decl., ¶ 11.) However, the declaration does not allege a date that these
records were sent and Defendant’s evidence directly contradicts Plaintiffs’ counsel’s
contention:
-
On August 13, 2020, Defendant denied
the claim. (WUF No. 19). Later that day, Plaintiffs’ counsel wrote Defendant to
ask, “Please show me the authority which states that Defendant can deny a claim
based on redacted bank statements.” (NOL Ex. 23, pgs. 373-4; WAWA1538-9;
Roberta Winston Dec. ¶ 7).
-
On August 24, 2020, Defendant advised
that the unredacted bank records still had not arrived: “Your client did
provide some records that were redacted. We discussed that and I asked they
produce unredacted copies. They never came.” (italics added) (NOL Ex. 23, page
373; WAWA001538; Winston Dec. ¶ 7).
-
On September 18, 2020, 25 days later, Plaintiffs
sued Defendant. (WUF No. 20).
-
On September 29, 2020, 11 days after serving
their lawsuit, Plaintiffs’ counsel wrote Defendant and advised, “I have
enclosed a copy of the bank statements with only redaction of the account
numbers.” (italic added) (with bank records attached) (NOL Ex. 24, page 378;
WAWA000542; Winston Dec. ¶ 8).
Again, given
this clear timeline, and Plaintiffs’ lack of support for its contention that it
provided the bank statements prior to filing suit (indeed, they do not even
allege the specific date they claim to have sent the records), it is difficult
not to reach the conclusion that Plaintiffs are advancing misleading statements
in an attempt to manufacture a triable issue of material fact.
Defendant had
a right to question Plaintiffs about their unredacted bank records at their
EUOs. It is also established that an insured who fails to comply with any an
insurer’s EUO and record requirements violates the policy’s cooperation clause
and forfeits coverage. (Brizuela, supra, 116 Cal. App. 4th at p. 590)
(“An insured’s compliance with a policy requirement to submit to an examination
under oath is a prerequisite to the right to receive benefits under the
policy.”) Here, the undisputed evidence establishes that Defendant twice
requested unredacted bank records, which it had a right to request, and
Plaintiffs failed to produce them until 9/29/2020. By that time, the only
reasonable inference supported by the evidence is that Plaintiffs had already
filed suit. The policy in question clearly provided that no action could be
brought against Defendant unless there had been full compliance with all of the
terms of the policy. (See Section H of the Policy.) As such, the only
reasonable inference supported by the evidence is that Plaintiffs failed to
comply with the EUO requests despite an obligation to do so and then filed
suit, in violation of section H of the policy. Importantly, even assuming
Plaintiffs had provided their bank statements prior to filing of the action,
Plaintiffs’ date of filing suit would still violate the Fair Claims Practices
Act by prematurely cutting off Defendant’s right to respond. As explained by
Defendant in reply:
Even if the
Court were to ignore plaintiffs’ September 29, 2020 submission regarding the
bank records, and accept plaintiffs’ counsel’s new allegations to the contrary,
it still would not matter. Under the Fair Claims Practices Act, Wawanesa had 40
days to accept or deny the claim after plaintiffs submitted the requested
“proof of claim.” (10 Cal. Code Regs. § 2695.7). Wawanesa could then ask for
30-day extensions of time to adjust the claim and take a new EUO “until legal
action is served.” (Id. at § 2695.7(c)(1)). Thus, even if plaintiffs sent the
unredacted records the day Wawanesa denied the claim, it had 40 days, or until
September 20, 2020, to decide whether to pay the claim, deny it, or ask for
another EUO. Plaintiffs’ decision to sue on September 18, 2020 terminated
Wawanesa’s statutorily allotted time to respond. Thus, it is of no consequence
if plaintiffs are allowed to contradict their admission that they provided
their unredacted records on September 29, 2020.
(Reply,
5:21-6:3.)
In
sum, the Court concludes no triable issue exists as to the breach of contract
cause of action. As a result, Plaintiffs have necessarily failed to disclose a
triable issue as to the bad faith cause of action. Plaintiffs did not offer any
evidence that Defendant unfairly ignored expert evidence or rejected expert
opinions when it denied the claim in 2020 and bad faith can only be based upon
what the insurer knew at the time the claim was denied. (Jordan v. Allstate
Ins. Co. (2007) 148 Cal. App. 4th
1062, 1073.)
Based
on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.
It is so ordered.
Dated: February
, 2023
Hon. Jon R.
Takasugi
Judge of the
Superior Court
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