Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 20STCV37230, Date: 2022-09-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV37230    Hearing Date: September 6, 2022    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

On 9/29/2020, Plaintiffs Tammy and Janae Fennel (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed suit against Todrys and Katarzyna Lang (collectively, Defendants), alleging: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment; (3) breach of implied warranty of habitability; (4) breach of statutory warranty of habitability; (5) negligence; (6) nuisance; (7) fraud; (8) violation of Civil Code section 1942.4; (9) violation of Civil Code section 1950.5; (10) violation of Civil Code section 52.1; (11) violation of Los Angeles Municipal Code section 151.09; (12) unfair business practices; (13) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200; (14) tenant harassment; and (15) intentional infliction of emotional distress.

            Now, Defendants move for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication, of Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

Discussion

            As for Defendant Katarzyna Lang (Ms. Lang), Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot establish a claim against her because: (1) she was not a party to the rental agreement and thus holds no liability for any cause of action related to the lease or ownership/management of her husband’s rental property; (2) Plaintiffs’ personal injury claims are barred by the statute of limitations; and (3) Plaintiffs’ fraud cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations and because Plaintiffs cannot show Ms. Lang made representations of any kind.  

            As for Defendant Todrys Lang (Mr. Lang), Defendants argue that he is entitled to summary adjudication of all causes of action but the tenth because: (1) Plaintiffs claims are barred by the terms of the UD Stipulated Judgment and the doctrine of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel; and (3) Plaintiffs denied in their form interrogatory responses that any agreement alleged in the pleadings was breached.

            The Court addresses these arguments in turn.

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that in opposition Plaintiffs agreed to dismiss the negligence, fraud, and IIED causes of action. Accordingly, the Court excludes these claims from its analysis.

I.                   The 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd, 4^th, 8^th, 9^th,11^th, 12^th, 13^th, and 14^th causes of action

As set forth above, Defendants argue that Defendant Todrys Lang is entitled to summary adjudication of all causes of action but the tenth because: (1) Plaintiffs lease-related claims are barred by the terms of the UD Stipulated Judgment and the doctrine of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel; and (2) Plaintiffs denied in their form interrogatory responses that any agreement alleged in the pleadings was breached.

As for the first contention, Defendants submitted evidence that on 12/4/2017, Mr. Lang filed an unlawful detainer (UD) action against Plaintiffs for breach of the Lease Agreement for past due rent of $15,050.00. (SS ¶ 6.) The UD Answer included:

(1) an affirmative defense alleging breach of the warranty to provide habitable premises (SS ¶ 8);

(2) an allegation that the Fennels were instructed by the Rent Stabilization Division of the Housing and Community Investment Department of Los Angeles to withhold payment to Todrys Lang due to an illegal housing unit. (SS ¶ 9);

(3) an allegation that the Subject Property had been cited for at least 20 code violations (SS ¶ 10); and

(4) an affirmative defense that the eviction notice was “in retaliation for approved restraining order against defendant (case#17CHRO00286) and complaints filed with the Housing and Community Investment Department of Los Angeles.” (SS ¶ 11.)

On 2/8/2018, an Unlawful Detainer Stipulation and Judgment was entered in favor of Mr. Lang and against Plaintiffs. (SS ¶ 13.) By the terms of the UD Stipulated Judgment:

(1)  Mr. Lang agreed to waive his claim for $15,050.00 in unpaid rent, and in exchange, the Fennels agreed in writing to forfeit all their rights under the Lease Agreement. (SS ¶ 14.);

(2)  Mr. Lang was awarded possession of the Subject Premises. (SS ¶ 15.);

(3)  The Fennels’ security deposit for the Subject Premises was to be retained by Todrys Lang and the Fennels waived any claim to its return. (SS ¶ 16.); and

(4)  The Fennels agreed to vacate the Subject Premises by March 25, 2018. (SS ¶ 17.)

Defendants argue that this evidence indicates that the 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd, 4^th, 8^th, 9^th,11^th, 12^th, 13^th, and 14^th cause of action—those which relate to the lease and the alleged uninhabitable conditions at the Subject Premises—are barred by the res judicata doctrine.

Res judicata prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them.  (Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 675, 683.)  Res judicata requires three elements to be met: “(1) the issues decided in the prior adjudication are identical with those presented in the later action; 2) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior action; and 3) the party against whom the plea is raised was a party or was in privity with a party to the prior adjudication.”  (Id. at 686.)   

Here, Defendants’ evidence supports a reasonable inference that the 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd, 4^th, 8^th, 9^th,11^th, 12^th, 13^th, and 14^th causes of action are barred by the doctrine of res judicata because the issues here are identical to those presented in the UD action between the same parties, and a final stipulated judgment was entered in that action. (Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc., supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 683.)

Accordingly, the burden shifts to Plaintiffs to disclose a triable issue of material fact.

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that res judicata does not apply because “the stipulation never asserts that the affirmative defenses raised were litigated and determined or that a trial on the merits was heard. Moreover, the stipulation does not address any of the Plaintiffs’’ tort-based claims or that Plaintiffs were waiving any claims.” (Opp., 11: 19-21.) Plaintiffs also argue that the lease is void because it was for an illegal purpose.

In Needelman v. DeWolf Realty Co., Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 750, the parties resolved a UD case by entering into a stipulated judgment. In Needelman’s subsequent action, he argued that the UD stipulated judgment should have limited res judicata effect because he “signed the stipulation prepared by counsel for the lessors prior to trial and never had an opportunity to litigate the matter.”

The Needelman Court expressly rejected this contention writing, “Needelman incorrectly claims that he never had an opportunity to litigate the unlawful detainer action. He appeared in the unlawful detainer action when he filed his answer. [] Furthermore, he had an opportunity to litigate his defenses to the unlawful detainer action; instead, he decided to settle…..” Because Needelman had been given ‘the opportunity to litigate the unlawful detainer action and all of his claims were based on defenses that could have been raised in this action or were specifically addressed and settled in the stipulated judgment,’ the Court concluded that the doctrine of res judicata barred all of his claims. (Needelman, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 757.)

It is worth noting that a significant factor in the Court’s reasoning was whether or not the stipulated judgment manifested an objective intention to resolve the issues underlying the subsequent action.

 For example, in Chacon v. Litke (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1254, the unlawful detainer judgment did not preclude the tenant's subsequent wrongful eviction claims because the stipulation did not “manifest the objective intention of the parties to award permanent possession to [the landlord] or to constitute a waiver of the [tenants'] right to reoccupy the apartment.

In Landeros v. Pankey (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1167, the Court concluded that although the issue of breach of warranty of habitability was raised as an affirmative defense, and the parties entered into a stipulated judgment, the record failed to show that the issue of habitability was litigated and determined. This is because “the unlawful detainer was resolved by a stipulated judgment giving the landlord less than the relief prayed. The prior stipulated judgment contains no language of comprehensive settlement of all matters between the parties arising from the lease. It basically states only that the landlord shall have $300 and possession by December 1, 1992.”

            Accordingly, the determinative question before the Court here is whether or not it can be said that the stipulated judgments in the UD here indicates that Plaintiffs had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claims now raised here, and whether the stipulated judgment manifests an objective intent to resolve the claims now raised here.

            Here, the undisputed evidence is that the Plaintiff’s own UD Answer raised affirmative defenses of breach of the warranty of habitability, and advanced claims that the Subject Premises was an illegal housing unit, that they had been instructed by the Rent Stabilization Division of the Housing and Community Investment Department of Los Angeles to withhold payment on that basis, and that the property had been cited for at least 20 code violations. (SS ¶ 8-11.) As such, the issue of the rental unit’s habitability and illegality was central to the UD action—Defendant Todrys Lang sued for outstanding rent, and Plaintiffs contended that they had withheld based on habitability concerns and at the direct instruction of the Rent Stabilization Division of the Housing and Community Investment Department of Los Angeles. Rather than proceed to trial, the parties waived that right and formulated the following settlement: Todrys Lang agreed to waive his claim for $15,050.00 in unpaid rent, and in exchange, the Fennels agreed in writing to forfeit all their rights under the Lease Agreement. Todrys Lang was awarded possession of the Subject Premises, and the Fennels agreed to vacate the property by March 25, 2018. Moreover, the Fennels’ security deposit for the Subject Premises was to be retained by Todrys Lang and the Fennels waived any claim to its return. (SS ¶¶ 12-16.)

            As such, Plaintiffs raised the allegations contained in their 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd, 4^th, 8^th, 9^th,11^th, 12^th, 13^th, and 14^th causes of action, and had the opportunity to litigate those arguments.  Instead, they opted to entered into a stipulated judgment. Unlike in Landeroes, where the stipulated judgment merely stated that the “landlord shall have $300 and possession by December 1, 1991” the stipulated judgment here comprehensively addressed issues of possession, the distribution of monies owed, and, again, expressly included a waiver of rights under the lease. As such, Plaintiffs conduct resembles that in Needelman where the Court concluded that a subsequent action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata because Needelman had been given “the opportunity to litigate the unlawful detainer action and all of his claims were based on defenses that could have been raised in this action or were specifically addressed and settled in the stipulated judgment.” (Needelman, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 757.)

            This conclusion is compounded by the fact that an intention to subsequently litigate issues arising out of the lease agreement is inherently incompatible with a waiver of rights under the lease. Thus, the only reasonable inference supported by Plaintiffs’ agreement to waive their rights under the lease is that they understood that they were waiving their right to sue for issues such as breach of contract, breach of warranty of habitability, etc.

            While Plaintiffs also argue that the lease is void because it was for an illegal purpose, Plaintiffs cannot utilize the lease agreement as both a sword and shield, suing for claims arising out of the contract (including breach of contract), yet claiming that the contract is void for purposes of rent forgiveness providing bargained-for consideration in the UD action. Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiffs contend that the lease is void, Plaintiffs answer in the UD action raised allegations that the rental unit was illegal and that they had been instructed by the Rent Stabilization Division of the Housing and Community Investment Department of Los Angeles to withhold payment on that basis. As set forth above, rather than litigate that claim, Plaintiffs entered into a stipulated judgment. The fact that Plaintiffs agreed to waive their claim to return of their security deposit, while Defendant Todrys Lang waived a claim to the outstanding rent, reflects a clear intention by the parties to settle the issue of whether or not rent was owed due to the condition or illegality of the unit, rather than litigate those issues.

            Taken together, the only reasonable inference supported by the evidence is that the stipulated judgment here was intended to be a comprehensive and final settlement of claims arising out of the lease agreement. As part of that settlement, Plaintiff expressly waived all rights under the lease. Because Plaintiffs were provided an opportunity to litigate the unlawful detainer action and all of their claims here are based on defenses that could have been raised in the UD action, the Court concludes that the claims here are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.  (Needelman, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 757.)

II.               Katarzyna Lang’s Liability

            Given the conclusion set forth above, the Court need not determine whether or not Katarzyna Lang holds liability for any cause of action related to the lease or ownership/management of her husband’s rental property.

III.            Nuisance Claim

Plaintiffs’ nuisance claim is based on allegations “that Defendants’ actions were specifically injurious to Plaintiffs’ health, namely that the illegal construction of the Subject Property and failure to remedy defects with the plumbing, gas and electrical facilities were injurious to Plaintiffs’ health, constituting a private nuisance under Cal. Civ. Code § 3479.” (Complaint ¶ 80; Opp., 20-21.)

            Defendants seem to argue that this claim arises out of allegations that Fennel was injured while walking down the stairs while the vacating the property. Defendants contend that the claim is time barred because Plaintiffs vacated the property on 3/25/2018, and, despite a two year statute of limitations, did not file this action until 9/29/2020.

However, the statute of limitations for a nuisance claim is three years, not two. (Shamsian v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2003) 107 Cla.App.4th 967.) Moreover, Plaintiffs’ own allegations make clear that the cause of action is based on the same allegations of uninhabitability that inform the 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd, 4^th, 8^th, 9^th,11^th, 12^th, 13^th, and 14^th causes of action. Plaintiffs confirm this in opposition. (See Opp., 13: 20-26.)

Because Plaintiffs’ nuisance cause of action arises out of the same allegations raised in the UD action, the Court’s conclusion above regarding the doctrine of res judicata applies here.  Plaintiffs had an opportunity to litigate claims based on the conditions of the unit, and instead opted to enter into a settlement of those claims, and waived her rights under the lease. As such, the parties manifested an objective intention to resolve all issues related to the lease agreement. Plaintiffs’ nuisance claim derives from “a diminution in the value of their leasehold” and thus arises out of theirs rights under the lease.

Accordingly, this claim is barred the doctrine of res judicata. (Shamsian v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2003) 107 Cla.App.4th 967.)

            Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted. 

It is so ordered.

Dated:  September    , 2022

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. 

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