Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 20STCV39520, Date: 2023-03-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV39520    Hearing Date: March 16, 2023    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

            Plaintiffs are awarded $63,000 in reasonable attorney fees.

On 10/14/2020, Plaintiffs Miguel Alhuay Paucar and Maria Patino Aguirre (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed suit against American Honda Motor Co., Inc., alleging: (1) violation of Song-Beverly Act (breach of express warranty); (2) violation of Song-Beverly Act (breach of implied warranty); (3) violation of Song-Beverly Act section 1793.2; and (4) fraudulent concealment.

            Now, Plaintiffs seek to recover attorney fees totaling $193,789.50

Legal Standard

The party claiming attorneys’ fees must establish entitlement to such fees and the reasonableness of the fees claimed.  (Civic Western Corporation v. Zila Industries, Inc. (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 1, 16.) “Except as attorney’s fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties[.]” (CCP § 1021.)

“It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.”  (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623.)  In exercising its discretion, the court should consider a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in handling the matter, the attention given, the success or failure, and the resulting judgment.  (Ibid.)

In determining what constitutes a reasonable compensation for an attorney who has rendered services in connection with a legal proceeding, the court may and should consider the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required and the skill employed in handling the litigation, the attention given, the success of the attorneys’ efforts, their learning, their age, and their experience in the particular type of work demanded the intricacies and importance of the litigation, the labor and necessity for skilled legal training and ability in trying the cause, and the time consumed. (Stokus v. Marsh (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 647, 657 (Stokus).)

In determining the proper amount of fees to award, courts use the lodestar method.  The lodestar figure is calculated by multiplying the total number of reasonable hours expended by the reasonable hourly rate.  “Fundamental to its determination … [is] a careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney … in the presentation of the case.”  (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48 (Serrano III).)  A reasonable hourly rate must reflect the skill and experience of the attorney.  (Id. at 49.)  “Prevailing parties are compensated for hours reasonably spent on fee-related issues.  A fee request that appears unreasonably inflated is a special circumstance permitting the trial court to reduce the award or deny one altogether.”  (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635 (Serrano IV); see also Weber v. Langholz (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1587 (“The trial court could make its own evaluation of the reasonable worth of the work done in light of the nature of the case, and of the credibility of counsel’s declaration unsubstantiated by time records and billing statements.”)

Reasonable attorney fees should be based on an objective standard of reasonableness, i.e., the market value of services rendered, not on some notion of cost incurred. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1090.)  The value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in which the trial court has its own expertise.  (Id. at 1096.)  The trial court may make its own determination of the value of the services contrary to, or without the necessity for, expert testimony.  (Ibid.)  The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.  (Ibid.)

Discussion

Rates

Plaintiffs’ motion claims the following rates:

-         Roger Kirnos: $500/hr

-         Amy Morse: $435/hr

-         Charles Cauffman: $175/hr

-         Chris Swanson: $500/hr

-         Caitlin Rice: $295/hr

-         Diana Folia: $250/hr

-         Daniel Gopstein: $175/hr

-         Heidi Alexander: $350/hr

-         Jeffery Mukai: $350/hr

-         Jacob Cutler: $495/hr

-         Kevin Chaffin: $475/hr

-         Katherine Smith: $295/hr

-         Matthew Roberts: $385/hr

-         Maite Colon: $395/hr

-         Maxwell Kreymer: $350/hr

-         Marisa Melero: $345/hr

-         Phil A. Thomas: $400/hr

-         Samantha Doody: $175/hr

-         Scot Wilson: $595/hr  

-         Thomas Dreblow: $350/hr

-         Timothy Lupinek: $375/hr

-         Thach Tran: $350/hr

-         Zachary Powell: $425/hr

After a consideration of the relevant factors, including the duration of the litigation, the difficulty of the litigation, the skill required, and the contingency nature of the case, the Court finds that the hourly rates claimed are reasonable hourly rates for attorneys with similar skill and experience (Stokus v. Marsh (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 647, 657 (Stokus).)

Considering the large number of attorneys all billing at varied rates, for Lodestar purposes, this Court will award an average hourly rate of $350 per hour for this particular case. This determination considers the complexity of the case, the quality of services provided, and the attorneys’ experience. 

Hours

Plaintiffs’ counsel claims a total of 343 hours. A review of the billing records indicates padding and unnecessary billings. As a preliminary matter, despite this being a straightforward lemon law case, Plaintiffs’ motion claims hours for 23 different attorneys and paralegals. The billing records do not provide any support for the involvement of so many. For example, Mr. Swanson contributed only 2.9 hours to the litigation, Mr. Gopstein contributed only 2.2 hours, Ms. Melero contributed only 2.5 hours total. A substantial number of the billings records are for review, including billings to review emails, review the Court docket, and to review a memo to draft an email to a litigation assistant “re next steps.”

In sum, the Court finds some of the hours claimed to be “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” (Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434.)  Given the Court’s power to make “across-the-board percentage cuts either in the numbers of hours claimed or in the final lodestar figure,” the Court finds only $63,000 in fees reasonably recoverable (Gonzalez v. City of Maywood (9th Cir. 2013) 729 F.3d 1196, 1203.) This was calculated by multiplying the hourly rate of $350 by 180 hours, which this court deems to be the total amount of reasonable time spent in the instant case.

Lodestar Enhancement

Plaintiffs request a .5 lodestar enhancement based on the contingency nature of the case and the quality of the work performed.

Relevant factors to determine whether an enhancement is appropriate include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.  (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

Here, the hourly rates set forth above capture the skill and the contingent nature. Thus, any multiplier would be duplicative of the calculations set forth above. Furthermore, an analysis of the relevant factors do not justify an enhancement award.

It is so ordered.

Dated:  March    , 2023

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. 

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