Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 20STCV39600, Date: 2023-08-30 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV39600    Hearing Date: August 30, 2023    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant’s demurrer is SUSTAINED, WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, as to the housing assignment allegations supporting the fourth cause of action. Defendant’s demurrer is OVERRUELD as to the failure to provide medical care allegations supporting the fourth cause of action. 

On 10/15/2020, Plaintiff Whitney Rolland Reed II (Plaintiff or Mr. Reed) filed suit against the County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sherriff’s Department, Sheriff Alex Villanueva, Sergeant Rodriguez, Sergeant L. Raymond, Deputy D. Auner, Deputy Hussainian, Deputy M. Salomon, and Deputy J. Stern (collectively, Defendants) . On 5/26/2023, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint (SAC) alleging: (1) breach of mandatory duties; (2) failure to summon medical care; (3) negligence; and (4) violation of the Bane Act.

            Now, Defendants demur to Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action.

Discussion 

            Defendants argue that Plaintiff still cannot establish a claim for a violation of the Bane Act because: (1) the County is immune; (2) Plaintiff did not have a legal right to a specific housing assignment in the jail due to his mental illness; and (3) Although Plaintiff had a right to receive medical care, a housing assignment for a prisoner is not medical care. Thus, the County Defendants’ liability under the Bane Act cannot be premised upon a decision to assign Plaintiff to general population or the failure to assign Plaintiff to housing in TTCF.

As for the County’s immunity, the Court already addressed this argument in the previous round of demurrer. While the Court agrees with Defendants that typically a public entity cannot be liable for an injury proximately caused by any prisoner or to any prisoner, there is an exception to Gov’t Code section 844.6 that creates limited public-entity liability when (1) the public employee knows or has reason to know of the need for immediate medical care; and (2) fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical care. (Gov. Code § 845.6.) Here, Plaintiff alleges that he required, and did not receive, immediate medical on three different occasions despite knowledge of his need for such care. (SAC ¶¶ 16-19.) Accordingly, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts which could show that the facts here qualify for the exception to section 844.6 liability. 

            The Court also declines to conclude at the pleading stage that, as a matter of law, the individual Defendants are entitled to discretionary immunity. The immunity for discretionary acts under section 820.2 “‘confers immunity only with respect to those ‘basic policy decisions’ which have been committed to coordinate branches of government, and does not immunize government entities from liability for subsequent ministerial actions taken in the implementation of those basic policy decisions. This distinction is sometimes characterized as that between the ‘planning’ and the ‘operational’ levels of decision-making.’” (San Mateo Union High School Dist. v. County of San Mateo (2013) 213 Cal. App. 4th 418, 433-34 (citing Johnson v. State of California (1968) 69 Cal. 2d 782, 793-94 (1968) Here, Plaintiffs allegations do not concern policy or planning issues, but operational decisions made about when and whether to provide emergency medical care. As such, the decisions do not, on their face, fall within the immunity provided for by section 820.2.)

            Similarly, the immunity provided by section 856 provides absolute immunity for decisions related to whether or not to confine a person for mental illness or addiction, and the terms and conditions of that confinement. However, here Plaintiff is not challenging the determination to confine him—he was already in County custody when the conduct occurred. While the Court understands Defendants’ point that Plaintiff contends he should have been housed in a different unit due to his mental illness, Defendants did not cite any case law or include any statutory language to demonstrate that this housing decision constitutes a confinement decision within the meaning of the statute. Moreover, as noted by Plaintiff, there is an exception to section 856 where a public entity or public employee negligently carries out its determination.” (McDowell v. County of Alameda (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 321, 327.) In light of this, the Court cannot conclude at this stage that individual Defendants’ conduct is immunized.

            This leaves the question of whether or not Plaintiff has alleged facts which could show actionable coercion, threats, or intimidation. The Court concludes that he has, in part.

            While Plaintiff’s opposition and SAC often equate medical treatment with assignment to mental health housing, these actions are not the same. Plaintiff’s opposition does not persuasively rebut Defendant’s contention that an assignment to mental health housing is not medical treatment, nor has Plaintiff showed that the failure to assign to mental health housing rises to the level of coercion. The only case cited by Plaintiff, McKibben v. McMahon (C.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2015) 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176696, at *4 is readily distinguishable from the facts here. Plaintiff has had multiple opportunities to allege facts which could show that the housing assignment issue could support a Bane Act violation. Plaintiff still has not done so.

            However, the Court does find Plaintiff’s allegations related to the failure to provide immediate medical treatment to sufficient at this stage to state a claim under the Bane Act. Plaintiff alleges that he had a right to emergency medical care after being attacked on three occasions, and despite Defendant’s knowledge of this, officials were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s needs.  (SAC ¶ ¶  16-19.) “[A] prisoner who successfully proves that prison officials acted or failed to act with deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of his constitutional rights…adequately states a claim for relief under the Bane Act.” M.H. v. Cty. of Alameda (N.D. Cal.2013) 90 F. Supp. 3d 889, 898; see also Atayde v. Napa State Hosp. (E.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2016)  2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126639, at *8 (adopting reasoning of M.H. and finding that “threats, coercion, and intimidation are inherent in a deliberate indifference claim”).

            Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s demurrer is sustained, without leave to amend, as to the housing assignment allegations supporting the fourth cause of action. Defendant’s demurrer is overruled as to the failure to provide medical care allegations supporting the fourth cause of action. 

It is so ordered.

Dated:  August    , 2023

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

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