Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 21STCV06681, Date: 2023-04-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV06681    Hearing Date: April 18, 2023    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

            Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

            On 2/18/2021, Plaintiff Ali Abassi (Plaintiff) filed suit against the Regents of the University of California (Defendant). On 5/25/2021, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (FAC) alleging: (1) race/national origin discrimination; (2) harassment; (3) failure to prevent discrimination; (4) retaliation; (5) retaliation; and (6) wrongful constructive termination.

            On 7/13/2021, the parties stipulated to an order dismissing Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action for wrongful constructive termination.

            Now, Defendant moves for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s FAC. 

Evidentiary Objections

CCP section 437c, subdivision (q) provides:

In granting or denying a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court need rule only on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion. Objections to evidence that are not ruled on for purposes of the motion shall be preserved for appellate review.

            In light of CCP section 437c, subdivision (q), the Court sustains Defendant’s Objections Nos. 10, 18. The Court declines to rule on all remaining submitted objections.

Discussion

I.                   Race/National Origin Discrimination

Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish this cause of action because he cannot show he was discriminated against or that he suffered an adverse employment action.

A cause of action for discrimination consists of (1) the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class; (2) the plaintiff being qualified for the position sought, or having performed competently in the position held; (3) an adverse employment action against the plaintiff (e.g., termination, demotion, or denial of employment); and (4) some other circumstance that suggests discriminatory motive.  (Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 355.) 

Here, Defendant contends that Plaintiff cannot establish either discriminatory motive or an adverse employment action, both of which are necessary to establish a prima facie claim for discrimination.

In support of its first contention that Plaintiff cannot show that any of the conduct he experienced was based on a discriminatory motive against his race or national origin, Defendant submitted evidence to show that:

-         Plaintiff speculates as to his own value and qualifications and the salaries of his co-workers. (SS ¶¶ 36-37.) As such, Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s belief that he was discriminated against is based on speculation and belief.

-         The three comments Plaintiff has identified as evidence of discrimination were not made to Plaintiff, nor were they made about him. Two comments were not made in his presence, and Plaintiff only heard about them second-hand. (SS ¶ 40.)

-         Plaintiff claims he was harassed and discriminated against when certain UCLA Extension employees raised their voices at him, gestured “aggressively,” criticized his job performance, asked him to do too much work, excluded him from meetings, and other such trivial complaint. However, this conduct does not rise to the level of actionable discrimination. (SS ¶ 41.)

Taken together, this evidence supports a reasonable inference that Plaintiff was not subjected to discriminatory conduct based on his race or national origin. More specifically, Defendant’s evidence supports a reasonable inference that Plaintiff was not subjected to any discriminatory comments, the discriminatory comments he alleges were not made to or about him (and are inadmissible hearsay), and his remaining allegations of discrimination are based on speculation and belief.

In support of its second contention that Plaintiff cannot establish that he suffered an adverse employment action, Defendant submitted evidence that:

-         Plaintiff was hired at UCLA Extension on or about April 2011 as a Program Coordinator and Marketing Specialist. (SS ¶ 1.)

-         During Plaintiff’s ten years at UCLA Extension, he was regularly promoted and given raises. In July 2012, Plaintiff was promoted to Marketing Liaison. Plaintiff received a pay increase when he was promoted. In June 2015, Plaintiff was promoted to Marketing Manager. In December 2016, Plaintiff was promoted to Director of Marketing Strategy. He was initially given $16,982 raise when he excepted the promotion, and about a year later, he was given an additional $26,597 raise (bringing his annual salary up to $110,579). (SS ¶¶ 3-6.)

-         In November 2018, Plaintiff was appointed to the interim Senior Director of Marketing position. He received a $16,421 raise at this time (bringing his annual salary up to $127,000). Plaintiff also received an additional stipend to compensate him for undertaking the interim position, which was 15% of his total salary. Accordingly, Plaintiff was receiving an annual salary of over $146,000. (SS ¶ 7.)

-         On August 12, 2019, Plaintiff had a meeting with Mike Flaxman, Associate Director of Human Resources at UCLA Extension, who told him that the interim position was temporary and not a permanent promotion or increase in pay. He was never promised nor guaranteed a permanent position. It was made clear to Plaintiff he was not a “shoe in” for the Senior Director of Marketing position, and he would need to apply for the permanent position. Mr. Flaxman sent Plaintiff an email on August 13, 2019 confirming the content of this meeting. (SS ¶ 8.)

-         In or around October 2019, on his own initiative, Plaintiff submitted a financial analysis to Dr. Emily Carter, which detailed UCLA Extension’s budget, financial performance, and projected revenue. (SS ¶ 9.)

-         Plaintiff shared his financial analysis with Dr. Emily Carter in October 2019 and with Eric Bullard in January 2020. (SS ¶ 10.)

-         Plaintiff alleges that in May or June 2020, as a result of his October 2019 “whistleblower” financial analysis and his participation in an audit, his financial access was removed, he was excluded from meetings, and he was not appropriately reclassified. However, Plaintiff does not know who removed his financial access, and he never requested to have his access restored nor he did not report problems with his financial access to UCLA Extension Leadership or to Human Resources. Further, Eric Bullard denies removing Plaintiff’s financial access. In fact, Mr. Bullard did not have access to the financial system, in which he would have been able to remove Plaintiff’s access (SS ¶¶ 21-24.)

-         In or around March 2020, all UCLA Extension employees transitioned to remote work due to the COVID-19 pandemic. (SS ¶ 14.)

-         During this time, Plaintiff had little interaction with Katrin Kaehler, Ric Zappala, or Eric Bullard. Plaintiff had no interaction with Carla Hayn or Sonia Luna during this period. (SS ¶¶ 15-16.)

-         In or around May 2020, UCLA Extension leadership began searching for most qualified candidate to fill the permanent Senior Director of Marketing position. (SS ¶ 17.)

-         Plaintiff, as the interim holder of the position, was free to apply and be considered for the permanent position. (SS ¶ 18.)

-         Plaintiff expressed to UCLA Extension management his expectation that he would be permanently promoted to the Senior Director of Marketing position without having to apply or be considered among other qualified candidates. (SS ¶ 19.)

-         On May 21, 2020 and May 26, 2020, Plaintiff was informed that UCLA Extension was recruiting for a permanent candidate to fill the Senior Director of Marketing position. (SS ¶ 20.)

-         On June 28, 2020, Plaintiff filed a whistleblower complaint. Plaintiff acknowledges his complaints were investigated by the UCLA Administrative Policies & Compliance Office, which found he had not been retaliated against. (SS ¶¶  27-28.)

-         On September 8, 2020, Plaintiff was again notified about the ongoing recruitment process for the permanent Senior Director of Marketing position. (SS ¶ 29.)

-         Plaintiff never applied for the permanent Senior Director of Marketing Position. (SS ¶ 30.)

-         In October 2020, a Senior Director of Marketing was appointed. (SS ¶ 31.)

-         On October 23, 2020, Plaintiff went on a personal leave of absence for an unrelated orthopedic injury. (SS ¶ 32.)

-         During this time, Plaintiff had no interaction with Sonia Luna, Carla Hayn, Ric Zappala, Eric Bullard, or Katrin Kaehler. (SS ¶ 33.)

-         Plaintiff never returned to work at UCLA Extension. After nearly seven months of leave, Plaintiff voluntarily resigned from his position on May 17, 2021. (SS ¶ 34.)

Taken together, Defendant’s evidence supports a reasonable inference that Plaintiff was not subjected to an adverse employment action. More specifically, Defendant’s evidence supports a reasonable inference that he never applied for the permanent Senior Director of Marketing Position, despite being told his interim appointment was temporary and despite being notified on multiple occasions that UCLA Extension was recruiting for a permanent candidate to fill the Senior Director of Marketing position. Plaintiff then went on leave for an unrelated orthopedic injury, and then voluntarily resigned after nearly seven months of leave. Defendant’s evidence also supports a reasonable inference that his financial access was not denied as part of an adverse employment action. Defendant’s evidence indicates that his access was denied seven or eight months after his financial analysis was provided, and he never requested to have his access restored or reported the problem with the access. Moreover, even assuming that the removal of his financial access was intentional or retaliatory, removal of his financial access or excluding him from meetings would not rise to the level of a materially adverse employment action. (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1054-1055.) Accordingly, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to disclose a triable issue of material fact. 

In opposition, Plaintiff submitted evidence that:

-         Prior interim directors were reclassified as permanent senior director without going through the open recruitment process. (RSS ¶ 21.)

-         Colleagues complained that he was being singled out and pushed out of his position despite being well-qualified and high performing. (RSS ¶ 22,23.)

-         Plaintiff was promised the senior director position throughout a span of two years.  (RSS ¶¶ 15-20.) For example, on or about November 8, 2018, Plaintiff in a meeting with Carla and Tom Oser, Vice Provost, discussed his pay and title. In that meeting, Carla suggested that he take on the Interim Senior Director Marketing role for 2-3 months instead of waiting longer to get C reclassification and then at that time he would automatically step into the Senior Role and new classification. (Ibid.) On or about the week of November 23, 2018, in a meeting with Tom at the UCLA faculty Center Tom told Plaintiff they would give him the Senior title but because they were moving things around and reaching out to make it happen, they wanted Plaintiff to commit to at least 16 months because they did not want to go through the hassle of creating giving him the position and then have him leave. (Ibid.)

Plaintiff’s evidence fails to support a reasonable inference that Defendant’s conduct was motivated by discriminatory animus based on his race or national origin, or that he suffered an adverse employment action.

As to the first element, Defendant submitted evidence that throughout his career Plaintiff received regular raises and promotions to a high-level marketing position, and was never demoted, fired, or given a pay cut. Plaintiff submitted no evidence which could show that he experienced discriminatory remarks, and, as already noted, his evidence of discriminatory comments were neither made about him or to him and are inadmissible. As such, taken together, the evidence does not disclose any basis for concluding that Plaintiff’s race or national origin played any role in Defendant’s conduct toward Plaintiff, and indicates that Plaintiff was regularly promoted and given pay increases throughout his career until he voluntarily resigned after seven months of medical leave. As such, the evidence does not support a reasonable inference that, even assuming there was an adverse employment action, it had anything to do with Plaintiff’s race or national origin.

The evidence also fails to support a reasonable inference that Plaintiff experienced an adverse employment action, or that Defendant’s proffered reason for not offering him the permanent senior director position was pretextual. While Plaintiff submitted evidence that at least three interim directors were promoted to permanent positions without an open enrollment process, Defendant submitted evidence that Plaintiff was informed verbally on 8/12/2019 and expressly in writing on 8/13/2019 that the interim position was temporary and not a permanent promotion and that he would need to apply and go through the formal recruitment process to be eligible for the permanent position. (SS ¶ 30.) Moreover, while Plaintiff contends that he was promised the permanent role at various time, such as in a meeting with Carla and HR to discuss pay and title, these instances all allegedly took place prior to the start of the open enrollment process. As such, Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence to show that he was informally promised the position while the application process for the role was actually open and ongoing, and therefore believed he didn’t need to apply. More importantly,  Defendant submitted a 8/12/2019 email from Mike Flaxman sent to Plaintiff, wherein Mr. Flaxman expressly dispelled any notion that Plaintiff would automatically receive the permanent reclassification, writing:

As discussed yesterday, neither Carla nor the UNEX HR office has a record of any conversations between you and Tom on the matter of a promotion or the promise of a salary increase. Carla also informed me that without Sonia’s and her explicit approval, Tom was not authorized to make any salary promises. Indeed, no salary promises were made to anyone at UNEX unless justified, in writing, for equity issues. Carla did say that you were told that the leadership team would examine your salary. Upon your appointment as interim director, they thought that the salary issue had been addressed for the time being.

Once you receive your merit increase, you will be earning the maximum of the salary range allowed for your classification. In addition, you are earning the maximum stipend for your interim director responsibilities. At this time, it is not possible to increase your salary further under your current classification given that you are making more than the cap.

As has been discussed with you, recruitment for the Marketing Director position will commence only after a new Dean arrives, likely late this year or early next year. We hope that you will continue in your role as Interim Marketing Director. Of course, you will be eligible to apply for a permanent appointment to this position.  

Please let me know if you have any questions or if you would like to discuss this matter further.

            (Defendant’s COE, Exh. Q, emphasis added.)

            As such, even accepting Plaintiff’s contention that he had been repeatedly promised the permanent position, he was expressly told prior to the start of the open enrollment process that any promise to increase his pay or promote him had not been authorized and that it would be necessary for him to apply for the permanent position in order to be appointed to that role. As such, the only reasonable inference supported by the evidence is that Plaintiff knew, prior to the commencement of the recruitment process, that the director position would be subject to open enrollment, and that he would need to apply to be considered.

Plaintiff’s evidence that other interim roles were not subject to the open enrollment process does not disclose an inconsistency. If Plaintiff was able to show that there were interim directors who were appointed to permanent positions despite their failure to participate in the open enrollment process, this would demonstrate an inconsistency which could likely show pretext. However, in the instances identified by Plaintiff, the permanent roles were never put to the open recruitment process at all, and thus there wasn’t an opportunity for the  interim directors to submit applications in the first place. Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence which could establish that Defendant was not entitled to open any role to the open recruitment process, nor has he shown that it was inconsistent for Defendant to put this role, but not others, through the open recruitment process. In other words, in order for Plaintiff’s evidence to rise to the level of a triable issue of pretext, Plaintiff needed to show that other interim directors were appointed to permanent positions even when they failed to submit an application during the recruitment process. The evidence fails to show this, and the fact that other interim directors were made permanent when there was no application process does not negate the fact here that Plaintiff declined to issue an application for an open position despite knowing that the application process was open and that he was eligible to apply.

While Plaintiff contends he did not apply because his complaints were still being investigated, he does not identify any reasonable basis for this belief. Plaintiff admitted in deposition that he was not told by Dr. Carter that he was going to be reclassified to the permanent position, that he understood that there was an ongoing recruitment process for the senior director of marketing position, and that people were applying for the job and being interviewed at the time. As such, the only reasonable inference supported by the evidence is that Plaintiff knew there was an ongoing application process, declined to apply while his complaint was being investigated, and thus was not considered for the senior director role because he did not apply. This evidence does not support a reasonable inference that Plaintiff was denied the position based on discriminatory motive because the only inference supported by the evidence is that Plaintiff didn’t apply, and while he may have had reasons for not applying, there was no way for Defendant to select Plaintiff for the permanent position because he did not apply for it.

            Finally, Plaintiff’s evidence that coworkers complained that he was being treated unfairly is insufficient to show a triable issue because it cannot overcome the fundamental issue here which is that Plaintiff cannot show that he reasonably believed he did not need to apply for the position. To establish a discrimination claim, Plaintiff must be able to show he suffered an adverse employment action. Plaintiff was not demoted, transferred, or terminated and the evidence does not support a reasonable inference that the material terms of his employment were altered. Rather, Plaintiff was not granted a position he did not apply for and he then voluntarily resigned after seven months of leave. Thus, even assuming that Plaintiff was treated unkindly by his superiors during his employment, either by criticizing his job performance, or asking him to do too much work, or excluding him from meetings, he has not submitted evidence that that unfairness actually resulted in some adverse employment action as required to recover under this cause of action. (“Minor or relatively trivial adverse actions or conduct by employers or fellow employees that, from an objective perspective, are reasonably likely to do no more than anger or upset an employee cannot properly be viewed as materially affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment and are not actionable.” Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1054-1055); McRae v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 377, 386-87) (“Workplaces are rarely idyllic retreats, and the mere fact that an employee is displeased by an employer’s act or omission does not elevate that act or omission to the level of a materially adverse employment action.”)

II.               Harassment

Defendant argues Plaintiff cannot establish this claim because he cannot show that he was subjected to any differential or discriminatory treatment based on his race, national origin, or religious creed, nor can he show the conduct alleged was severe or pervasive.

To prevail on his claim of harassment, Plaintiff must prove, inter alia, that he was subjected to unwanted harassing conduct because of his protected status (i.e., race, national origin, or religious beliefs), and that the harassing conduct was severe or pervasive. (CACI No. 2521A.) “Harassment consists of conduct outside the scope of necessary job performance, conduct presumably engaged in for personal gratification, because of meanness or bigotry, or for other personal motives. Harassment is not conduct of a type necessary for management in the employer’s business or performance of the supervisory employee’s job. [citations omitted].” (Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, 645-46.)

Here, Plaintiff’s harassment cause of action is based on allegations of three discriminatory comments, none of which were made to him, about him, or were directed to him. Moreover, Plaintiff worked remotely between March 2020 and October 2020 and had limited or non-existent interaction with the individuals he alleges harassed him during that time. In addition, Plaintiff was on leave between October 2020 and when he resigned in May 2021. Plaintiff admits he had no contact with any UCLA Extension employees during that period. (SS ¶ 33.) As such, by his own admission, Plaintiff did not experience any harassment or discrimination in the last fourteen months of his employment. This supports a reasonable inference that Plaintiff did not experience conduct related to his protected status, and that he did not experience harassment that was severe and pervasive. Accordingly, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to disclose a triable issue of material fact. 

Plaintiff’s opposition fails to support a triable issue of material fact as to this cause of action.  To support this cause of action, Plaintiff  identifies an email sent on 6/6/2020 to show that he complained of harassment and retaliation. In that email he writes,

Once I informed him that I shared this information with you and the investigators, and shared the profile and names of the investigators, the harassment and retaliations escalated and now I am being singled out and efforts are being made to replace my position that I held for over 18 months. For context here are some examples:

1. My financial access has been removed

2. I have been excluded from many meetings I needed to be a part of

3. Many of my one-one-one meetings [sic] with Dean Bullard have been cancelled and response to my emails and attempts to discuss work related matters have been ignored

4. Most recently the Dean has asked me to partake in some financial irregularities that would require me to misuse university funds and help cover-up certain expenses from the university

In another email, sent by Carrie Gibson, one of Plaintiff’s former colleagues, Ms. Gibson writes:

I do not have his email, but Eric Bullard sent a hostile email to Ali at 9pm on a Thursday night in October with others copied complaining about social media and demanding to know who does the social media but wouldn’t say what upset him. He scheduled a meeting about it but kept pushing back the meeting. He finally met with our social media person (who was stressed about this but asked me not to use their name for fear of retaliation by Eric) after Ali went on leave and told him he’s the expert and he’s doing a great job. With Ali gone, there’s no longer an issue.

Harassment typically does not include conduct necessary for management of the employer’s business or performance of the supervisory employee’s job. (Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 40, 647.) Rather, “harassment consists of conduct outside the scope of necessary job performance, conduct presumably engaged in for personal gratification for meanness or bigotry, or for other personal motives.” (Ibid.)  However, “[s]ome official employment actions done in furtherance of a supervisor’s managerial role can also have a secondary effect of communicating a hostile message. This occurs when the actions establish a widespread pattern of bias.” (Roby v. McKesson, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 709.) Accordingly, commonly necessary personnel management actions can support a harassment action, “so long as that evidence [of biased personnel management actions] is relevant to prove the communication of a hostile message.”  (Ibid.) To determine whether a work environment is sufficiently hostile, the court looks at all the circumstances including the “frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” (Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. (1993) 114 S.Ct. 367, 369.)

Here, Plaintiff’s proffered evidence of harassment either falls within the category of managerial conduct or constitutes discrimination and/or retaliation, but not harassment. Plaintiff does not submit any evidence which could take this conduct, such as cancelled meetings or work-related emails, outside of the scope of managerial conduct or which could support a reasonable inference that this conduct was engaged in for personal gratification for meanness or personal motives based on any protected status. The fact that Plaintiff referred to this conduct as harassing is insufficient, on its own, to show that it actually was harassment. Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence which could show that any hostile comments were made to or about him, or that this conduct unreasonably interfered with his performance the conduct. Moreover, harassment is a distinct cause of action, and Plaintiff’s evidence submitted to show that he was subjected to workplace discrimination and retaliation does not show that he experienced harassment.  More importantly, Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence which could show a causal connection between this conduct and Plaintiff’s protected status.

III.            Retaliation (FEHA)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish this causes of action because he did not suffer an adverse employment action, Defendant had legitimate independent business reasons for not reclassifying Plaintiff, and Plaintiff cannot show that Defendant’s actions were pretextual. 

As set forth above, Defendant’s evidence supports a reasonable inference that Plaintiff did not suffer an adverse employment action as to either the removal of his financial access or Defendant’s failure to appoint him as the permanent Senior Director of Marketing.

To show that Defendant had legitimate independent business reasons for not reclassifying Plaintiff, Defendant submitted evidence that:

-          Plaintiff was never promised nor guaranteed the permanent position. (SS ¶ 8.)

-         Plaintiff resigned from his position at UCLA Extension voluntarily. (SS ¶ 34.)

-         Plaintiff failed to apply for the position, thus taking himself out of the running. (SS ¶ 30.)

To show that Plaintiff cannot establish pretext, Defendant contends that Plaintiff “has failed to identify a single fact showing that any word or action taken by any of UCLA Extension’s personnel was due to Plaintiff’s race, national origin, or religious beliefs. He was regularly promoted and given raises, right up until he resigned after failing to apply for the permanent Senior Director of Marketing position.” (MSJ Motion, 21: 21-24.)

Taken together, Defendants’ evidence supports a reasonable inference that Plaintiff was not retaliated against in violation of FEHA. Accordingly, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to disclose a triable issue of material fact.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues he was not reclassified into the permanent Senior Director of Marketing position in retaliation for participating in a financial audit. As set forth above, Plaintiff’s evidence does not support a reasonable inference that he was denied the permanent position based on any improper motive or that he suffered an adverse employment action.  Moreover, as noted by Defendant in reply, Plaintiff was notified he was not guaranteed a permanent position and would need to apply for the permanent Senior Director of Marketing position in August 2019, two months before he produced his “whistleblower” financial analysis to Dr. Carter and participated in the audit. (SS ¶¶ 8,9.) As such, Plaintiff was notified of his need to formally apply for the position before he had shared his financial analysis and participated in the audit. As such, the Court agrees with Defendant that there cannot be any causal nexus between Plaintiff’s participation in the financial analysis and audit and the decision to not reclassify Plaintiff into the permanent position.

IV.            Retaliation (Labor Code section 1102.5)

Plaintiff’s cause of action for Whistleblower Retaliation in Violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 requires Plaintiff to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the employee’s protected whistleblowing was a “contributing factor” to an adverse employment action. Labor Code § 1102.6.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish this claim because Plaintiff cannot show that his complaints were a “contributing factor” to an adverse employment action, and the Regents have shown by clear and convincing evidence that there were legitimate independent business reasons for not reclassifying Plaintiff.

As set forth above, Defendant’s evidence supports a reasonable inference that there was no link between Plaintiff’s financial analysis report and his unreported loss of financial access seven or eight months later, and that he voluntarily resigned and did not apply for the permanent Senior Director of Marketing position. Moreover, Defendant’s evidence supports a reasonable inference that there legitimate independent business reasons for not reclassifying Plaintiff. Accordingly, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to disclose a triable issue of material fact.

In opposition, Plaintiff relies on the same arguments set forth above to support his FEHA retaliation cause of action. For the same reasons set forth there, Plaintiff has failed to disclose a triable issue of material fact as to this claim as well.  

V.                Failure to Prevent Discrimination, Harassment, or Retaliation  

This cause of action is derivative of Plaintiff’s discrimination, harassment, and retaliation claims. Given Plaintiff’s failure to disclose a triable issue of material fact as to any of those causes of action, Plaintiff has necessarily failed to disclose a triable issue as to this cause of action. 

            Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

It is so ordered.

Dated:  April    , 2023

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. 

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