Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 21STCV27685, Date: 2024-04-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV27685    Hearing Date: April 17, 2024    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff is awarded $26,702.50 in attorney fees (Quill is awarded $17,932.50 in reasonable attorney fees, and WPL is awarded $8,770). Plaintiff did not submit a verified memorandum of costs, and thus the Court does not consider a cost award at this time.  

            On 7/28/2024, Plaintiff Debra Mouton filed suit against General Motors, LLC alleging violations of the Song-Beverly Act.

            Now, Plaintiff moves for attorney fees totaling $90,754.78.

Legal Standard

The party claiming attorneys’ fees must establish entitlement to such fees and the reasonableness of the fees claimed.  (Civic Western Corporation v. Zila Industries, Inc. (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 1, 16.) “Except as attorney’s fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties[.]” (CCP § 1021.)

“It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.”  (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623.)  In exercising its discretion, the court should consider a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in handling the matter, the attention given, the success or failure, and the resulting judgment.  (Ibid.)

In determining what constitutes a reasonable compensation for an attorney who has rendered services in connection with a legal proceeding, the court may and should consider the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required and the skill employed in handling the litigation, the attention given, the success of the attorneys’ efforts, their learning, their age, and their experience in the particular type of work demanded the intricacies and importance of the litigation, the labor and necessity for skilled legal training and ability in trying the cause, and the time consumed. (Stokus v. Marsh (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 647, 657 (Stokus).)

In determining the proper amount of fees to award, courts use the lodestar method.  The lodestar figure is calculated by multiplying the total number of reasonable hours expended by the reasonable hourly rate.  “Fundamental to its determination … [is] a careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney … in the presentation of the case.”  (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48 (Serrano III).)  A reasonable hourly rate must reflect the skill and experience of the attorney.  (Id. at 49.)  “Prevailing parties are compensated for hours reasonably spent on fee-related issues.  A fee request that appears unreasonably inflated is a special circumstance permitting the trial court to reduce the award or deny one altogether.”  (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635 (Serrano IV); see also Weber v. Langholz (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1587 (“The trial court could make its own evaluation of the reasonable worth of the work done in light of the nature of the case, and of the credibility of counsel’s declaration unsubstantiated by time records and billing statements.”)

Reasonable attorney fees should be based on an objective standard of reasonableness, i.e., the market value of services rendered, not on some notion of cost incurred. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1090.)  The value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in which the trial court has its own expertise.  (Id. at 1096.)  The trial court may make its own determination of the value of the services contrary to, or without the necessity for, expert testimony.  (Ibid.)  The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.  (Ibid.)

Timeliness

Under California Rule of Court 3.1702, a fee motion “must be served and filed within the time for filing a notice of appeal under Rules 8.104 and 8.108 in an unlimited civil case . . . .” (Rule 3.1702(b)(1).) Under Rule 8.104(a)(1), the “deadline ordinarily falls 60 days after notice of entry of judgment, or 180 days after entry of judgment, whichever is first.” (Kaufman v. Diskeeper Corp. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1, 8.) “The language of the rule thus applies only to a motion to recover all prejudgment attorney fees incurred in an action, and contemplates the filing of such a motion at the conclusion of the lawsuit.” (Carpenter v. Jack in the Box Corp. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 454, 463.)

There is a long history of caselaw pointing toward settlements serving as “judgments.” (See DeSaulles v. Community Hospital of Monterey Peninsula (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1140, 1155 [“As between the parties thereto and for purposes of enforcement of settlement agreements, a compromise agreement contemplating payment by defendant and dismissal of the action by plaintiff is the legal equivalent of a judgment in plaintiff’s favor.”] italics added, citing (Goodstein v. Bank of San Pedro (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 899, 907 907, italics added; see also Madrigal v. Hyundai Motor America (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 385, 399-403).)

Here, rather than take any action after accepting GM’s 998 on June 12, 2023, Quill and Arrow (Quill or QA); and West Point Legal (WPL) waited more than eight months – 261 days to be exact – before filing its fee motion. Such a delay goes entirely unexplained, as Quill and WPL do not address the delay in its opening brief, nor do they offer any explanation for it.

In reply, Plaintiff’s counsel still offers no justification. However, they note that the 998 states that “Plaintiff will file a Request for Dismissal of the entire action, with prejudice, within five business days after receiving all payments from GM due Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel.” As such, according to the terms of GM’s § 998, judgement is not entered until the matter is dismissed with prejudice, and that cannot occur until all payments have been received, of which reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses are a part.

Thus, while the Court finds Plaintiff’s eighth month delay to be unreasonable, the Court declines to rule as a matter of law that Plaintiff has lost its ability to recover attorney fees.

Accordingly, the Court turns to the substance of the motion.

Discussion

Plaintiff seeks attorney fees totally $90,754.78. This amount consists of (1) $31,771.00 in attorney fees for Quill & Arrow; (2) $28,455.00 in attorney fees for West Point Legal; (3) a 1.35 multiplier enhancement on the attorney fees (or $21,079.10); (4) $3,326.98 in costs incurred by QA; (5) $122.70 in costs incurred by WPL; and (6) an additional $6,000 for Plaintiff’s counsel to review Defendant’s Opposition; draft the Reply; and attend the hearing on this Motion.

Plaintiffs’ counsel claims the following hourly rates for the attorneys who worked on this case:

-         Brian Altman: $950/hr

-         Kevin Jacobson: $500/hr

-         Gregory Sogoyan: $500/hr

-         Harry Terzian: $350/hr

-         Nicholas Yowarski: 2021 rate of $350/hour, 2022 rate of $375/hour, and 2023 rate of $395/hour

-         Rebecca Yousefian: $385.00/hour

-         Kim Anglin: $400/hr

In Morris v. Hyundai Motor Am. (2019) 41 Cal. App. 5th 24, 41, the trial court reduced the rates of Bryan Altman of the Altman Law Group, who has 30-plus years of litigation experience with over 100 jury trials, of which 20-plus were as lead trial counsel in lemon law cases, from $650 to $500 per hour, reduced Steve Mikhov of the Knight Law Group from $500 to $400, and reduced all the associates’ rates that ranged from $450 to $350 to $300 per hour. (Id. at 8-9.) In support of the lower court decision, the court of appeal held that:

[E]ven if Morris established that her attorneys’ rates were generally commensurate with other consumer law attorneys with the same level of experience and skill, Morris ignores that there are a number of factors that the trial court may have taken into consideration in determining that reductions in the attorneys’ hourly rates were warranted. The court reasonably could have reduced the rates based on its finding that the matter was not complex; that it did not go to trial; that the name partners were doing work that could have been done by lower-billing attorneys; and that all the attorneys were doing work that could have been done by paralegals.

            (Id. at pp. 23-24.)

            Similarly, Judge Randolph Hammock of the Los Angeles County Superior Court recently found rates of $350 per hour appropriate for an “experienced” lawyer to take a lemon law case all the way through trial. (See Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of N. Am., LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 245-46 [“The court found the requested fee amount “was just not reasonable.”… The court decided that $350 “is a reasonable hourly rate for the services that were done.”].)

            Here, the Court finds the hourly rates to be unreasonable, and, based on case law, reduces the hourly rates for each of plaintiffs’ attorneys to a reasonable blended $400 per hour for all attorneys who litigated this case, consistent with Mikhaeilpoor. This informed by the fact that this case did not address novel or difficult questions, was straightforward and simple, did not go to trial, and involved work that could have been done by lower-billing attorneys.

Hours

            Plaintiff’s counsel claims a total of 128.7 1 hours. However, as detailed in Defendant’s opposition, the billing records indicate duplicative and inflated billings. For example, counsel claims 1 hr drafting templated discovery requests. A substantial portion of the billings are for “review.” For example, Mr. Yowarski “billed” 0.6 hours ($210.00) to review the repair orders and draft a repair order summary. (Jacobson Decl., Ex. 8, pp. 3-4.) Ms. Anglin later “billed” 0.5 hours ($200.00) to review additional client documents and update the repair order summary. A more thorough outline of the unreasonable and duplicative billings is set forth in Defendant’s opposition. (See pp. 12- 16.) 

            The Court finds that Quill is claiming 43.5 hours not reasonably incurred, and WPL is claiming 47.5 hours not reasonably incurred. After adjustment, Quill is awarded $17,932.50 in reasonable attorney fees, and WPL is awarded $8,770 in reasonable attorney fees.

The Court declines to award a multiplier. The hourly rates set forth above capture the skill and the contingent nature. Thus, any multiplier would be duplicative of the calculations set forth above. Furthermore, an analysis of the relevant factors do not justify an enhancement award.

            Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff is awarded $26,702.50 in attorney fees. Plaintiff did not submit a verified memorandum of costs, and Defendant objected to the costs in opposition. Accordingly, the Court does not consider a cost award at this time.  

It is so ordered.

Dated:  April    , 2024

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar.  For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.