Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 21STCV29386, Date: 2022-08-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV29386    Hearing Date: August 25, 2022    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

            Reganyan’s demurrer is SUSTAINED IN PART, OVERRULED IN PART. Reganyan’s demurrer is SUSTAINED, WITH 15 DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND as to the first, third, and fifth causes of action. Reganyan’s demurrer is OVERRULED as to the third cause of action.

Reganyan’s motion to strike is DENIED.

            On 8/10/2021, Plaintiff Tina Reganyan (Plaintiff) filed suit against Sabrina Siddiqui, Kiki Kostic, Dusan Langura, and Gregory Letare, alleging: (1) conversion; (2) trespass to chattels; (3) trespass; (4) civil theft; (5) property damage; (6) civil conspiracy; and (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress.

            On 3/1/2022, Sabra Siddiqui (Siddiqui) filed a cross-complaint against Tina Reganyan (Reganyan), alleging: (1) assault; (2) battery; (3) stalking; (4) false light; (5) defamation per se; and (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress.

            Now, Reganyan demurs to Siddiqui’s first, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth cause of action. Reganyan also moves to strike portions of Siddiqui’s Complaint.

Factual Background

            This action arises out of a dispute between former friends and roommates.

Discussion

I.                   Assault

The elements of a cause of action for assault are: (1) the defendant acted with intent to cause harmful or offensive contact, or threatened to touch the plaintiff in a harmful or offensive manner; (2) the plaintiff reasonably believed he was about to be touched in a harmful or offensive manner or it reasonably appeared to the plaintiff that the defendant was about to carry out the threat; (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the defendant’s conduct; (4) the plaintiff was harmed; and (5) the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s harm. (Carlsen v. Koivumaki (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 879, 890.)

Here, Siddiqui’s cross-complaint is uncertain as to the precise conduct that supports this cause of action. However, Siddiqui alleges that Reganyan intentionally replaced her hair conditioner with the hair removal product “Nair” causing Siddiqui to suffer burnt hair and scalp and the loss of hair. (XC ¶ 12A.) Siddiqui also alleges, without further elaboration, that Reganyan committed “[a]ssault wherein on at least one occasion, Cross-Defendant TINA REGANYAN came extremely close to Cross-Complainant's face and screamed at her….” (XC ¶ 12B.)

However, as to the Nair incident, Siddiqui does not allege that she reasonably anticipated the harmful contact. Rather, she alleges that she realized that Nair was in her conditioner after she was already harmed. For an assault to be legally sufficient, the person who is fearful or anxious about a contact must be aware of the possibility of the harmful or offensive contact. (Carlsen, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 890.) As such, the facts sound in battery, not assault. 

            As for the allegation that Reganyan screamed in her face, Siddiqui must allege additional facts that could show this amounted to assault. The act of screaming in another’s face, on its own, is insufficient to state a claim for assault. Rather, Siddiqui must allege additional facts which could show that Reganyan acted with the intentional to make harmful or offensive contact or threatened to do so.

            Based on the foregoing, Reganyan’s demurrer to the first cause of action is sustained, with 15 days leave to amend.

II.               Stalking

The elements of stalking are: (1) the defendant engaged in a pattern of conduct with the intent to follow, alarm, place under surveillance, or harass the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff reasonably feared for his or her safety or the safety of an immediate family member or suffered substantial emotional distress that a reasonable person would suffer as a result of that pattern of conduct; and (3) the defendant, as a part of the pattern of conduct, made a credible threat with either the intent to place the plaintiff in reasonable fear for his or her safety or the safety of an immediate family member, or reckless disregard for the safety of the plaintiff or that of an immediate family member. (Civ. Code, § 1708.7(a).)  

“Pattern of conduct” is defined as “conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose.” (Id., § 1708.7(b)(1).)  

            Here, Siddiqui alleges that Reganyan was enraged that Siddiqui had begun a relationship with Reganyan’s former fiancé. Siddiqui alleges that:

-         In November 2019, Siddiqui’s then fiancé Marc Greenspoon informed her that Raganyan had called him over 10 times from a blocked telephone number, and conveyed false information including that Siddiqui “was cheating on Marc Greenspoon with other men which was false, and offering to let Marc Greenspoon inside the Apartment to take Cross-Complainant's belongings so that Marc Greenspoon could retaliate against [Siddiqui] for being unfaithful, forwarding provocative photographs of [Siddiqui] to Marc Greenspoon, sending Marc Greenspoon screen shots of text messages between Cross-Complainant and [Reganyan], and offering to meet with Marc Greenspoon to provide further disparaging information about [Siddiqui].” (XC ¶ 13.)

-         In or about December 2019, due to her fear [Reganyan], Cross-Complainant was escorted to the Apartment by Los Angeles County Sheriff deputies on several occasions to obtain her personal belongings. (XC ¶ 17.)

-         In July 2020, Reganyan allegedly called Siddiqui’s place of employment. Upon confirming that Siddiqui was still employed there, Reganyan allegedly sent anonymous e-mail and text messages to Siddiqui’s employer which “indicated, negative information concerning Cross-Complainant and her employment with Rodeo Drive Dermatology would be supplied to the tabloid television show TMZ. In July 2020, Cross-Complainant was then terminated from her employment.” (XC ¶ 22.)

-         “In or about July 2020, [Siddiqui]and Kevork Kouyoumjian had plans to travel to Las Vegas with friends. [Reganyan] somehow accessed one of Kevork Kouyoumjian's accounts without authorization and e-mailed the itinerary travel plans with a negative message to [Siddiqui’s] former fiancé, Marc Greenspoon.” (XC ¶ 23.)

-         “[Siddiqui] is informed and believes and thereon alleges that [Reganyan] has conducted clandestine surveillance upon Cross-Complainant and Kevork Kouyoumjian. This conduct by [Reganyan] has frightened [Siddiqui] and has caused her to suffer emotional distress.” (XC ¶ 26.)

Accepted as true at the pleading stage, these allegations are sufficient to state a claim for stalking.

            Based on the foregoing, Reganyan’s demurrer to the third cause of action is overruled.

III.            False Light

The claim of “false light,” is a one of four forms of privacy invasion: (1) intrusion upon one's physical solitude or seclusion; (2) public disclosure of private facts; (3) false light in the public eye; and (4) appropriation. (Kapellas v. Kofman (1969) 1 Cal.3d 20, 35, fn. 16.) The false light variety of privacy invasion, which rests on the false nature of the publications, is substantially equivalent to a libel claim, and it should meet the same requirements. Id. Hence, to prevail on a false light invasion of privacy claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant made statements placing him in a false light that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and that the defendant had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the statement. (Fellows v. National Enquirer, Inc. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 234, 238.)

Here, it is uncertain what precise allegations are meant to support this cause of action. However, in the general allegations portion of her XC, Siddiqui alleges that Reganyan “published a negative post and video on Instagram concerning [Siddiqui], falsely claiming that [Siddiqui] had stolen from [Reganyan].” (XC ¶ 24.) Siddiqui also alleges that Reganyan sent anonymous e-mail and text message communications to Siddiqui’s employer. (XC ¶ 22.)

Reganyan argues these allegations are insufficient as a matter of law because they do not set forth facts beyond vague references to purported statements or publications. The Court agrees in part. Siddiqui’s allegations that Reganyan published a negative post on Instagram falsely claiming Siddiqui had stolen from her is sufficient—the XC identifies the alleged statement, the alleged medium, and accepted as true could be highly offensive to a reasonable person. However, Siddiqui’s allegations as to Reganyan’s statements to her employer are insufficient. Siddiqui alleges that Reganyan made statements which “contained false information” but provides no additional facts which could show this. As such, Siddiqui’s related allegations are overly conclusory.

Based on the foregoing, Reganyan’s demurrer to the false light cause of action is sustained, with 15 days leave to amend. Reganyan must clarify which specific acts support the false light cause of action, and allege facts which could show that Reganyan’s statement amounted to a false light invasion of privacy.

IV.            Defamation Per Se

The elements of a defamation claim are (1) a publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and (5) has a natural tendency to injure or causes special damage. (See Wong v. Tai Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1369.)  

Generally, statements that fit within the category of injury to business reputation reflect on the integrity and competence of the plaintiff, such as statements of unethical activity or incompetence. (See Regalia v. Nethercutt Collection (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 361, 369.) The statements must prejudice the plaintiff in the special profession or business in which he is actually engaged. (See id.) 

With respect to injury to profession, slander is actionable per se if the statement has a natural tendency to injure a person’s reputation with respect to his occupation. (Id.)

Here, Siddiqui’s claim is based on Reganyan’s alleged statements to Siddiqui’s employer. As set forth above, the Court has concluded that Siddiqui’s allegations related to this act are overly conclusory. Siddiqui must allege additional facts which could show that the statements made to her employer could constitute defamation per se.

             Based on the foregoing, Reganyan’s demurrer to the defamation per se cause of action is sustained, with 15 days leave to amend.

Motion to Strike

            Reganyan argues that Siddiqui cannot support a claim for punitive damages. However, Reganyan did not demur to Siddiqui’s intentional infliction of emotional distress and battery causes of action. Accordingly, Siddiqui has alleged facts which, accepted as true, could show that Reganyan engaged in conduct that subjected Siddiqui to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(2).)

            Based on the foregoing, Reganyan’s motion to strike is denied.

It is so ordered.

Dated:  August    , 2022

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. 

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