Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 21STCV32198, Date: 2023-05-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV32198    Hearing Date: May 5, 2023    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

On 8/31/2021, Plaintiff Israel Hernandez Galan aka Israel Alfonso Hernandez Galan and Edelba Romero Arellano aka Edelba Romero (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed suit against Ted Jones Ford, Inc. dba Ken Grody Ford Corporations and Ford Motor Company, alleging: (1) breach of express warranty; (3) breach of implied warranty; (3) violation of Beverly Act section 1793.2; and (4) negligent repair.

            Now, Ted Jones Ford, Inc. dba Ken Grody Ford (Defendant) moves for summary judgment of Plaintiff’s negligent repair cause of action.

Discussion

            Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot state a claim for negligent repair because it is barred by the economic loss rule, and because they do not have any evidence that Ken Grody caused any damage to their vehicle or that they otherwise suffered damages in relation to Ken Grody’s repair.

The economic loss doctrine precludes recovery in tort where a plaintiff’s damages consist solely of alleged economic losses. (Seely v. White Motor Co. (1965) 63 Cal.2d 9, 17-18.) The rule “prevents the law of contract and the law of tort from dissolving one into the other” by preventing recovery in tort for the breach of a contract when there has not been the breach of a duty other than the duties arising from the contractual obligations. (Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 988.) Examples of damages that go beyond economic loss – and to which the economic loss rule therefore does not apply – include personal injuries and damage to other property that result from the defective product. (Sacramento Regional Transit Dist. v. Grumman Flxible (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 289, 295.) However, consequential damages such as lost profits or income that flow from the damage to the product itself are considered economic losses, and a plaintiff therefore cannot recover for them in tort. (East River Steamship Corporation v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc. (1986) 476 U.S. 858, 872-873.) 

Here, Defendant submitted evidence that Plaintiff has not claimed any personal injury, but only seeks to recover the costs to repair the Vehicle. (SS ¶ 13.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs did not submit evidence showing any harm other than economic losses arising from a broken contractual promise. To take itself out of the economic loss rule, a plaintiff must “demonstrate harm above and beyond a broken contractual promise.” (Food Safety Net Services v. Eco Safe Systems USA, Inc.  (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1130.) While Plaintiffs argue in opposition that Defendant “cannot merely point to the absence of evidence” in support of an essential element of Plaintiffs’ claim, as noted by Defendant in reply, “[Defendant’s] Motion relies upon Plaintiffs’ factually devoid discovery responses, as well as Plaintiffs’ own deposition testimony, to establish that Plaintiffs have not and cannot show that [Defendant’s] repair caused any damage to Plaintiffs’ vehicle or that they otherwise suffered any damages in relation to [Defendant’s] repair.” (Reply, 2: 22-26.) As such, the Court agrees this claim is barred by the economic loss rule.

Defendant also submitted evidence that: Plaintiffs brought their used 2014 Ford Focus to Defendant for repair on one occasion on 4/17/2021. (SS ¶ 1.) The 4/17/2023 repair was performed under warranty at no charge to Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs did not incur any rental car expenses while Defendant was repairing the vehicle, nor did they incur any tow truck expenses before or after Defendant’s repair. (SS ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs admit that the transmission issue they complained of was resolved after Defendant’s repair.( SS ¶ 6.) Thus, even setting aside the economic loss rule, the only reasonable inference supported by the evidence is that Defendant did not cause any damage to Plaintiffs’ vehicle nor did Plaintiffs’ suffer any other damage as a result of Defendant’s repair.

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

It is so ordered.

Dated:  March    , 2023

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. 

            Due to Covid-19, the court is strongly discouraging in-person appearances.  Parties, counsel, and court reporters present are subject to temperature checks and health inquiries, and will be denied entry if admission could create a public health risk.  The court encourages the parties wishing to argue to appear via L.A. Court Connect.  For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.  Your understanding during these difficult times is appreciated.

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

On 8/31/2021, Plaintiff Israel Hernandez Galan aka Israel Alfonso Hernandez Galan and Edelba Romero Arellano aka Edelba Romero (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed suit against Ted Jones Ford, Inc. dba Ken Grody Ford Corporations and Ford Motor Company, alleging: (1) breach of express warranty; (3) breach of implied warranty; (3) violation of Beverly Act section 1793.2; and (4) negligent repair.

            Now, Defendant Ford Motor Company (Defendant) moves for summary judgment of Plaintiff’s Complaint.

Discussion

            Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ claim fails because: (1) the Subject Vehicle was used, and the Song-Beverly Act does not apply to used vehicles; (2) Defendant made a prompt and valid offer to buy back Plaintiffs’ car prior to this suit, which Plaintiffs rejected; (3) Plaintiffs cannot establish that any defect in their car arose within the three-month implied warranty period for used goods as required to establish their implied warranty claim; and (4) there is no evidence that Ford did not comply, willfully or otherwise, with its obligations under the Act such that Plaintiffs are entitled to recover civil penalties.

            Here, Plaintiffs bought a used 2014 Ford Focus on September 29, 2017. (SSUMF 1.) At the time of purchase, the 2014 Focus had 22,790 miles on its odometer. (SSUMF 2.) While some remainder of the manufacturer’s new-vehicle warranty may have transferred to Plaintiffs by operation of law, no new manufacturer warranty was issued to Plaintiffs at the time of their purchase. (SSUMF 9.) Plaintiffs indisputably purchased a previously-owned used vehicle without a full new car warranty.

In Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2022) 77 Cal. App. 5th 209, 215, review filed May 17, 2022, the California Court of Appeal addressed the issue of whether the phrase “other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty” covers previously-owned vehicles with some balance remaining on the manufacturer’s new vehicle warranty. The Rodriguez Court unanimously affirmed the lower court’s conclusion that it does not.

In Rodriguez, the plaintiffs bought a used Chrysler vehicle used from Pacific Auto Center, which is not a Chrysler-authorized retailer. Chrysler was not a party to the transaction between the plaintiffs and Pacific Auto Center, nor did Chrysler issue a warranty in connection with the plaintiffs’ purchase. The vehicle did, however, have unexpired coverage under the warranty that Chrysler had issued in connection with the vehicle’s sale to its original owner. (Id. at p. 209-21). Approximately one year after their purchase, the plaintiffs experienced engine issues that, according to them, Chrysler was unable to repair within a reasonable number of attempts. Based upon allegations that Chrysler had breached the warranty it issued in connection with the vehicle’s delivery to its original owner, the plaintiffs sued Chrysler asserting Song-Beverly claims. (Ibid.) Chrysler sought summary judgment on the Song-Beverly claims, arguing that Song-Beverly did not apply because (1) the vehicle, which plaintiffs bought used, was not a “new motor vehicle,” and (2) Chrysler did not issue a warranty in connection with the plaintiffs’ purchase. The trial court agreed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for Chrysler:

The sole issue in this case is whether the phrase “other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer's new car warranty” covers sales of previously owned vehicles with some balance remaining on the manufacturer's express warranty. We conclude it does not and that the phrase functions instead as a catchall for sales of essentially new vehicles where the applicable warranty was issued with the sale. We therefore affirm.

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the Court should not follow Rodriguez, and should instead construe “new motor vehicle” more liberally, like in Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112 (1995) and Kiluk v. Mercedes-Benz, USA LLC (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 334. However, as noted by Defendant, the Rodriguez court thoroughly discussed and distinguished both Jensen and Kiluk. (Rodriguez, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 223-224.) Moreover, the facts in Jensen and Kiluk are distinguishable from here in important regards.

Jensen involved a lease of a demonstrator vehicle by a manufacturer affiliated dealer who issued a full new car warranty along with the lease. (Jensen, 35 Cal.App.4th atp.  119.) The dealer represented to the plaintiff that she would receive the manufacturer's 36,000 mile warranty “on top” of the miles that were already on the vehicle. (Ibid.) Kiluk involved the sale of a certified preowned vehicle that had a remaining portion of the manufacturer’s original new vehicle warranty, and was sold with an additional manufacturer’s warranty “that would last for one year from the end of the new car warranty.” (Kiluk, 43 Cal.App.5th at 337.)

Here, by contrast, Plaintiffs indisputably purchased a previously-owned used vehicle, were not provided any new or additional warranty coverage, and received only the balance of coverage remaining under the original warranty issued for the vehicle.

As for the implied warranty claim, the Court agrees that Plaintiff cannot establish the claim as a matter of law. Under California law, a plaintiff cannot maintain a cause of action for breach of implied warranty against the vehicle’s manufacturer if the plaintiff bought the vehicle used. (See Nunez v. FCA US LLC (2021) 61 Cal. App. 5th 385, 399  [analyzing Cal. Civ. Code § 1795.5 and concluding, “It is evident from these provisions that only distributors or sellers of used goods—not manufacturers of new goods—have implied warranty obligations in the sale of used goods”] [emphasis added]; Garcia v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (Ct. App. 2018) 231 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123, 130 [noting that Song-Beverly expressly treats manufacturers and retailers as distinct entities, so a buyer cannot sue a manufacturer for the retail seller’s breach of an implied warranty].) Simply put, “only distributors and retail sellers, not manufacturers, are liable for breach of implied warranties in the sale of a used car.” (Nunez, supra, 61 Cal. App. 5th at p. 399 [emphasis added].)

Taken together, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ claims fail as a matter of law because they did not purchase a new motor vehicle. Accordingly, the Court need not reach the remaining arguments raised by Defendant.

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

It is so ordered.

Dated:  May    , 2023

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. 

            Due to Covid-19, the court is strongly discouraging in-person appearances.  Parties, counsel, and court reporters present are subject to temperature checks and health inquiries, and will be denied entry if admission could create a public health risk.  The court encourages the parties wishing to argue to appear via L.A. Court Connect.  For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.  Your understanding during these difficult times is appreciated.