Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 21STCV33267, Date: 2022-10-19 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV33267 Hearing Date: October 19, 2022 Dept: 17
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
DEPARTMENT
17
TENTATIVE RULING
|
JAZZ SERFONTEIN
vs. FORD MOTOR
COMPANY |
Case
No.: 21STCV33267 Hearing Date: October 19, 2022 |
Defendant’s
motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED. This matter is ordered stayed pending
the completion of arbitration proceedings.
On 9/9/2021,
Plaintiff Jazz Serfontein (Plaintiff) filed suit against Ford Motor Company
(Defendant) alleging violations of the Song-Beverly Act.
Now, Defendant moves to compel
arbitration of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Legal Standard
Where the Court has determined that an agreement to
arbitrate a controversy exists, the Court shall order the petitioner and the
respondent to arbitrate the controversy …unless it determines that… grounds exist for rescission of the
agreement.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.) Among the grounds which can support
rescission are fraud, duress, and unconscionability. (Tiri v. Lucky Chances, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 231, 239.) The
Court may also decline to compel arbitration wherein there is possibility of
conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. (Code Civ. Proc., §
1281.2 (c).)
Discussion
The party moving to compel arbitration “bears the burden
of proving [the] existence [of an arbitration agreement] by a preponderance of
the evidence.” (Rosenthal v. Great
Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.) The moving party
also bears the burden of demonstrating that the claims fall within the scope of
the arbitration agreement. (Omar v.
Ralphs Grocery Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 955, 961.)
A.
Existing Agreement
Defendant
submitted evidence that on 9/21/2019, Plaintiff entered into a purchase
contract (RISC) for a new 2019 Ford Fiesta. The Purchase Agreement is a
single-page, two-sided document with a title in bold font that reads “RETAIL
INSTALLMENT SALE CONTRACT – SIMPLE FINANCE CHARGE (WITH ARBITRATION
PROVISION).” (Polyakov Decl., Exh. 2.)
On the first
page, Plaintiff signed a box explaining:
Agreement to
Arbitrate: By signing below, you agree that,
pursuant to the Arbitration Provision on the reverse side of this contract, you
or we may elect to resolve any dispute by neutral, binding arbitration and not
by a court action. See the Arbitration Provision for additional information
concerning the agreement to arbitrate.
(Ibid.,
original emphasis.)
Plaintiff
also signed the following provision:
YOU AGREE TO
THE TERMS OF THIS CONTRACT. YOU CONFIRM THAT BEFORE YOU SIGNED THIS CONTRACT,
WE GAVE IT TO YOU, AND YOU WERE FREE TO TAKE IT AND REVIEW IT. YOU ACKNOWLEDGE
THAT YOU HAVE READ BOTH SIDES OF THIS CONTRACT, INCLUDING THE ARBITRATION
PROVISION ON THE REVERSE SIDE, BEFORE SIGNING BELOW. YOU CONFIRM THAT YOU
RECEIVED A COMPLETELY FILLED-IN COPY WHEN YOU SIGNED IT.
(Ibid.,
original emphasis.)
In
opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendant has no standing as a non-signatory
to invoke arbitration because there is no principal-agent relationship, no
third-party beneficiary relationship, and because the doctrine of equitable
estoppel does not apply. In particular, Plaintiff alleges that the agreement
was purely between Plaintiff and the non-party selling dealership, and that his
claims against Defendant in no way reference the underlying RISC.
Where a nonsignatory seeks to enforce an
arbitration clause, the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies in two circumstances:
(1) when a signatory must rely on the terms of the written agreement in
asserting its claims against the nonsignatory or the claims are
“intimately founded in and intertwined with” the underlying
contract [citations], and (2) when the signatory alleges
substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct by
the nonsignatory and another signatory and “the allegations of
interdependent misconduct [are] founded in or intimately connected with the
obligations of the underlying agreement.” (Felisilda v. FCA US LLC (2020)
53 Cal.App.5th 486, 495.)
For several
reasons, the Court is persuaded that the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies
here.
First, Plaintiff’s Complaint not only assumes the
existence of the underlying vehicle sales contract, but necessarily relies on
this contract’s existence in order to assert causes of action under the
Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. While Plaintiff may argue otherwise,
Plaintiff received the Subject Vehicle and manufacturer warranties when he
executed the RISC. If Plaintiff did not enter into the RISC, he would not have
received the Subject Vehicle or the corresponding warranties and certifications
from Defendant. Defendant’s duty to
comply with warranties arose only after Plaintiff purchased the vehicle.
Second, Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly claims all directly relate
to the “condition” of the subject vehicle that Plaintiff alleges violated
warranties received via the sales contract.
Specifically, Plaintiff’s Complaint
alleges the Subject Vehicle contained structural, suspension, and electrical
system defects and nonconformities (Complaint ¶ 10) and Defendant was unable to
conform the Subject Vehicle to its express warranties and failed to disclose
these defects (Complaint ¶¶ 22-23.) As
such, Plaintiff’s claim are intimately founded in and intertwined with the
underlying contract and the condition of the vehicle bought subject to that
contract.
In sum, all of Plaintiff’s claims center on the
condition of the Subject Vehicle, whether for breach of warranties or alleged
fraud arising from the purchase of the Subject Vehicle. Given that Plaintiff’s
claims are intertwined with the “purchase or condition” of the vehicle, and
given that Plaintiff’s claim relies on the existence of the underlying sales
contract, the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies. (Felisilda, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p.
495.)
B.
Covered Claims
As set forth
above, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant arise out of the purchase and
condition of the subject vehicle, and thus fall within the scope of the
arbitration agreement.
Given that
Defendant has established by a preponderance of the evidence that an
arbitration agreement exists, and that Plaintiff’s claims are covered by that
agreement, the burden shifts to the Plaintiff to establish that the arbitration
clause should not be enforced. (Pinnacle
Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55
Cal.4th 223, 236. (Pinnacle).)
II.
Plaintiff’s Burden
The party
opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the
evidence any defense, such as unconscionability or duress. (Pinnacle, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 236.)
Here,
Plaintiff did not advance any substantive arguments other than those set forth
above.
As
a result, Plaintiff has not met her burden to prove any defense to enforcement.
Based on the
foregoing, Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration is granted. This matter is
ordered stayed pending the completion of arbitration proceedings.
It is so ordered.
Dated: October
, 2022
Hon. Jon R.
Takasugi
Judge of the
Superior Court
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must
send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org
by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court
website at www.lacourt.org. If a party submits
on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must
identify the party submitting on the tentative.
If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this
tentative as the final order. If the department
does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the
tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed
off calendar.
Due to Covid-19, the court is
strongly discouraging in-person appearances. Parties, counsel, and court reporters present
are subject to temperature checks and health inquiries, and will be denied
entry if admission could create a public health risk. The court encourages the parties wishing to
argue to appear via L.A. Court Connect.
For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213)
633-0517. Your understanding during
these difficult times is appreciated.