Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 21STCV36851, Date: 2024-05-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV36851    Hearing Date: May 16, 2024    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

            Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

            On 10/5/2021, Plaintiff Cynthia Juarez (Plaintiff) filed suit against County of Los Angeles, Billy Nettles, and Andrea Wood, alleging: (1) whistleblower retaliation; (2) civil rights: free speech; (3) failure to provide a safe workplace; (4) failure to provide a safe workplace; (5) failure to provide a safe workplace; and (6) defamation.

            On 4/22/2024, Plaintiff moves for reconsideration of this Court’s denial of her ex parte application to strike Defendants’ MSJ.

Discussion

            Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Court’s 4/18/2024 denial of her ex parte motion.

CCP section 1008 provides that a party may “based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order.” (CCP § 1008(a)-(b).)

Here, Plaintiff’s argument is based on the same argument that she advanced in her ex parte—i.e., that Defendants’ summary judgment motion was not timely served. (See Plaintiff’s Motion at 2:3-4:6.) Plaintiff contends that “new or different facts, circumstances, or law” exists here based on an argument that the Court “had not heard” of the rule providing for two additional days’ notice for electronic service.

First, any suggestion that this Court somehow misinterpreted or misapplied relevant law in its ruling is not a proper basis for reconsideration. (See, e.g., Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500 (“What respondent essentially argues is that section 1008 does not apply when the litigant disagrees with the trial court’s ruling. Since in almost all instances, the losing party will believe that the trial court's ‘different’ interpretation of the law or facts was erroneous, to interpret the statute as the respondent urges would be contrary to the clear legislative intent” of the statute).

            Second, as Plaintiff admits in her Motion, at the hearing on Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Application, Defendants’ counsel confirmed the rule regarding electronic service to the Court (see Plaintiff’s Motion at 4:22-25.) As such, the Court was made aware of the rule at the hearing.

            Third, CCP section 1011 prescribes the manner and method by which “personal service” may be made. Pertinent here, it provides that “if the attorney’s office is not open,” and the attorney’s residential address is not known, “then service may be made by putting the notice or papers, enclosed in a sealed envelope, into the post office or a mail box, subpost office, substation, or mail chute or other like facility regularly maintained by the Government of the United States directed to the attorney at his or her office.” (CCP § 1011(a).)

            Here, as detailed in the Declaration of Oscar A. Bustos in Support of Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Application, Defendants’ counsel personally delivered Defendants’ Motion to Plaintiff’s counsel’s office at 3:40 p.m. on March 29, 2024, and left the Motion at the door of Plaintiff’s counsel’s office because it was closed (even though it was during normal business hours). (See Bustos Decl. ISO Opp. to Ex Parte Application, ¶¶ 2-6.) Because the office was closed and Defendants’ counsel did not know Plaintiff’s counsel’s residential address, Defendants’ counsel also mailed the Motion to Plaintiff’s counsel’s office the same day in accordance with the above provisions of Code of Civil Procedure § 1011. (See Bustos Decl. ISO Opp. to Ex Parte Application, ¶ 8.) In addition, as a courtesy, Defendants’ counsel also provided an electronic copy of Defendants’ Motion to Plaintiff’s counsel by email that same day. (See Bustos Decl. ISO Opp. to Ex Parte Application, ¶ 7.)  Accordingly, the Court finds Defendant’s service to be adequate.

            Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is denied.

It is so ordered.

Dated:  May    , 2024

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar.  For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.  

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff’s motions are DENIED, WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs are instructed to informally meet and confer. Only once such meet and confer has taken place, and only if there are unable to reach an informal resolution, the parties are to contact Department 17 to schedule an IDC.

On 10/5/2021, Plaintiff Cynthia Juarez (Plaintiff) filed suit against County of Los Angeles, Billy Nettles, and Andrea Wood, alleging: (1) whistleblower retaliation; (2) civil rights: free speech; (3) failure to provide a safe workplace; (4) failure to provide a safe workplace; (5) failure to provide a safe work place; and (6) defamation.

            On 4/22/2024, Plaintiff moved to compel further responses to her Form Interrogatories (General) from Defendant Woods and Defendant Nettles.

            As a preliminary matter, the Court requires that parties participate in an informal discovery conference (IDC) before motions to compel further can be heard on the merits.

            Second, the Court concludes there has been inadequate meet and confer prior to the filing of these motions. Indeed, Defendants submitted declarations stating that before filing these motions, Plaintiff never once identified any issues with the respective Defendants regarding their substantive responses to Form Interrogatories Nos. 2.7, 12.1, or 16.1. (Bustos Decl., ¶ 3.) 

            While Plaintiff sent an email to Defendants regarding Form Interrogatory No. 15, the email demanded that Defendants’ counsel advise him “by the end of the day whether [Defendants] will amend the responses to form interrogatory 15.1 ….” (Bustos Decl., ¶ 4.) Such a message amounts to an “ultimatum,” not an invitation to meet and confer to attempt to informally resolve this issue. (Bustos Decl., ¶ 4.)

            Based on the forgoing, Plaintiff’s motions are denied, without prejudice. Plaintiffs are instructed to informally meet and confer. Only once such meet and confer has taken place, and only if there are unable to reach an informal resolution, the parties are to contact Department 17 to schedule an IDC.

It is so ordered.

Dated:  May    , 2024

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar.  For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.