Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 21STCV38864, Date: 2023-10-24 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV38864 Hearing Date: March 18, 2024 Dept: 17
Superior
Court of California
County
of Los Angeles
DEPARTMENT 17
TENTATIVE RULING
|
CHIDIEBERE
NJOKU vs. GLOBAL
VISION SECURITY, INC., et al. |
Case No.: 21STCV38864 Hearing
Date: March 18, 2024 |
Defendants’ demurrer is SUSTAINED IN PART, OVERRULED IN
PART. Defendants’ demurrer is SUSTAINED, WITH 20 DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND, as to the
fifth, eighth, and twelfth causes of action. Defendants’ demurrer is OVERRULED
as to the remaining causes of action.
Defendants’ motion to strike is
DENIED.
On 10/21/2021, Plaintiff Chidiebere Njoku (Plaintiff) filed
suit against Global Vision Security, Inc. and Jason Arroyo (collectively,
Defendants). On 12/28/2021, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (FAC)
alleging thirteen causes of action. On 5/27/2022, Plaintiff filed a second
amended complaint (SAC), alleging: (1) racial harassment; (2) failure to
prevent and remedy harassment; (3) racial discrimination; (4) retaliation
(FEHA); (5) retaliation (Labor Code section 6310); (6) retaliation (Labor Code
sections 98.6 and 1102.5); (7) unpaid overtime; (8) denial of meal/rest breaks;
(9) inaccurate wage statements; (10) waiting time penalties; (11) intentional
infliction of emotional distress (IIED); (12) assault and battery; and (13)
violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200.
Now, Defendants demur to Plaintiff’s
SAC. Defendants also move to strike portions of Defendants’ SAC.
Discussion
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s
SAC is uncertain and that each of his claims fails.
After review, the Court disagrees
and agrees in part.
As for
the first cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant would frequently
make racially derogatory comments towards Plaintiff at his worksites, including
phrases like stupid Africans,” “stupid Nigerians,” “poor and hungry Nigerians,”
and other phrases the Court declines to repeat here. (See SAC ¶ 22.)
Plaintiff alleges these comments continued from October 2018 to August 2020,
despite that Plaintiff alleges that he informed Defendant Global Vision of
Jason Arroyo’s repeated threats. (Id. ¶ 23.) Defendant advances no
argument as to how this alleged conduct would constitute personnel actions.
Plaintiff’s allegations, accepted as true, are sufficient at the pleading stage
to state a claim for racial harassment. Moreover, while Defendant argues that
Plaintiff cannot maintain a harassment claim against Arroyo directly, FEHA
provides for supervisor liability for harassment. (Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926.) Finally, while Defendant argues that Plaintiff
did not include Arroyo in his DFEH Complaint, the DFEH Complaint attached to
Defendants’ motion clearly includes Arroyo and the alleged conduct. (See Milligan
Decl., Exh. A.)
As
for the second cause of action, this is derivative of the first cause of action
and is adequately pled for the same reasons.
As
for the third cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that he was constructively
terminated because “Plaintiff had no choice but to resign on or
about March 14, 2021, due to the relentless racial harassment, threats of
physical harm, and Defendant GLOBAL VISION’s failure to pay him his wages for
the last three pay periods.” (SAC ¶ 54.)
As such, Plaintiff has alleged that he was a member of a protected class, that
he was subjected to an adverse employment action, and that there was a causal
connection between the two. (See Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc.(2005)
36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1042.) While Defendant argues that “it does not make sense
that Defendant would hire and continue to employ Plaintiff if Defendant
maintained any race biases,” this is inadequate to show that Plaintiff’s claim
is inadequately pled.
As for the fourth cause of
action, Plaintiff alleges that as a result of his complaints about his racial
harassment and discrimination, Defendants “retaliated against him by subjecting
Plaintiff to an adverse work environment and withholding his earned wages.”
(SAC ¶ 65.) Plaintiff alleges that he reported Arroyo’s conduct to Defendant,
and Defendant failed to take action and instead retaliated against him. While
Defendant argues Plaintiff “a disclosure of wrongdoing to the alleged wrongdoer
does not constitute whistleblowing,” the fourth cause of action arises out of
FEHA, not whistleblower retaliation. (Demurrer, 16: 25-26.) Plaintiff’s
allegations are sufficient at the pleading stage to state a claim for
retaliation.
As
for the fifth cause of action, Plaintiff’s claim is based on the same facts
that support the fourth cause of action. California
Labor Code Section 6310 concerns employees who report violations of
workplace safety, and provides that no person shall discharge or in any manner
discriminate against any employee because the employee has done any of the
following:
1) Made
any oral or written complaint to the division, other governmental agencies
having statutory responsibility for or assisting the division with reference to
employee safety or health, their employer, or their representative.
(2) Instituted
or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or relating to their rights or
has testified or is about to testify in the proceeding or because of the
exercise by the employee on behalf of themselves, or others of any rights
afforded to them.
(3) Participated in an
occupational health and safety committee established pursuant to Section
6401.7.
(4) Reported a
work-related fatality, injury, or illness, requested access to occupational
injury or illness reports and records that are made or maintained pursuant to
Subchapter 1 (commencing with Section 14000) of Chapter 1 of Division 1 of
Title 8 of the California Code of Regulations, or exercised any other rights
protected by the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (29 U.S.C. Sec. 651
et seq.), except in cases where the employee alleges they have been retaliated
against because they have filed or made known their intention to file a
workers’ compensation claim pursuant to Section 132a, which is under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board.
Here, Plaintiff alleges
that Jason Arroyo threated Defendant with a gun on numerous occasions. However,
Plaintiff does not allege that he made any oral or written complaint to the
Division of Occupational Safety and Health, or any governmental agencies having
statutory responsibility for or assisting the division with reference to
employee safety or health, his employer, or his representative falling under
the statute. (See Labor Code §6310(a)(1).) Accordingly, Plaintiff has
not alleged sufficient facts to support this claim. Plaintiff will be afforded
an opportunity to allege additional facts which could show that he made a
complaint that fell within the scope of section 6310.
As for the sixth cause of
action, Labor Code §98.6 provides that no employer shall discharge or
discriminate against any employee because that employee engaged in conduct
protected under the Labor Code. Labor Code section 1102.5 provides that “(c) An employer, or any person acting on behalf
of the employer, shall not retaliate against an employee for refusing to
participate in an activity that would result in a violation of state or federal
statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal
rule or regulation.”
Here,
Plaintiff alleges:
On or about September 2018,
Defendant GLOBAL VISION was under investigation by the Department of Labor for
various wage and hour violations. During the investigation, Plaintiff’s
supervisor, CAM MARINER (hereinafter “MARINER”) pushed Plaintiff and other
GLOBAL VISION employees to lie to the Department of Labor. Specifically, GLOBAL
VISION offered to pay Plaintiff and other GLOBAL VISION employees’ money to lie
and say “yes” if the Department of Labor asked them if they were paid on time,
were provided sick hours, of if they received general employee benefits.
Plaintiff refused to lie to
the Department of
Labor, as advised by MARINER. Specifically, Plaintiff told Defendants that
lying to the Labor Board is illegal.
Immediately after Plaintiff refused to lie to the Labor
Board, Defendants began to retaliate against Plaintiff. Specifically,
Defendants reduced Plaintiff’s hours, delayed his paychecks, reduced his pay,
and removed Plaintiff from the schedule. Plaintiff was taken off the schedule
for up to a week at a time. Eventually, Defendants completely removed Plaintiff
from the schedule.
(SAC ¶¶ 80-82.)
These allegations are sufficient at
the pleading stage to support this claim, given that they could show that
Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff for refusing to participate in an
activity that would result in a violation of state law.
As for the seventh cause of action,
Plaintiff alleges that he regularly worked overtime that he was not paid for.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim is improperly supported because “the
SAC does not set forth the amount of wages allegedly due or a means of easily
calculating these sums.” (Demurrer, 19:6-7.) The Court disagrees. Plaintiff’s
SAC sets forth sufficient facts to put Defendant on notice of the supporting
facts of the claim, and the particulars are contemplated by the discovery
process.
As for the eighth cause of action,
Plaintiff alleges that for the entirety of his employment he was not allowed to
take meal or rest breaks. (SAC ¶ 105) While the Court disagrees with Defendant
that these allegations “provide no details” about the instances in which he was
denied meal or rest breaks, the Court agrees that Plaintiff must allege some
facts that could show how and when he was prevented from taking such rest and
meal breaks. Plaintiff will be afforded leave to amend to allege these
additional facts.
As for the ninth cause of action,
Plaintiff alleges he was not provided a compliant wage statement. While
Defendant argues this claim is barred because Plaintiff did not file a claim
within a year of the 10/25/2019 instance in which he was allegedly paid cash
instead of a paycheck, Plaintiff’s claim is not limited to this allegation.
Rather, it is also derivative of Plaintiff’s overtime claim. Accordingly, the
Court finds this claim to be adequately pled at this time.
As for the tenth cause of action,
this claim is derivative of Plaintiff’s other wage claims and thus is
sufficiently pled. To the extent that Defendant contends a good faith dispute
exists as to whether or not the amount was owed, this is a factual
determination not contemplated at the pleading stage.
As for the eleventh cause of action,
Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged discrimination, retaliation, and Labor Code
violations. Whether or not this conduct, in fact, rises to the level of extreme
and outrageous conduct is a factual dispute not properly considered at this
time.
As for the twelfth cause of action,
the elements of assault are: (1) defendant acted to cause harmful or offensive
contact, contacted, or threatened to touch Plaintiff in a harmful or offensive
manner; (2) Plaintiff reasonably believed he was about to be touched in a
harmful or offensive manner, or it appeared to Plaintiff that defendant was
about to carry out the threat; (3) Plaintiff did not consent to Defendant’s
conduct (4) Plaintiff was harmed; and (5) Defendant’s conduct was a substantial
factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm. (See So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal. App.
4th 652, 668-669.)
The elements of a battery claim are similar: (1) defendant
touched Plaintiff or caused Plaintiff to be touched, with intent to harm or
offend Plaintiff; (2) Plaintiff did not consent to the touching; (3) Plaintiff
was harmed or offended by defendant’s conduct; and (4) a reasonable person in
Plaintiff’s position would have been offended by the touching. (See So v.
Shin (2013) 212 Cal. App. 4th 652, 669.)
Here, Plaintiff’s claims are based
on two instances: one in October 2018 when Plaintiff was allegedly threatened,
and in August 2019, when Plaintiff was allegedly battered and assault. However,
pursuant to CCP section 335.1, an action for assault, battery, or injury to an
individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another must be brought
within two (2) years. Given that Plaintiff did not file this action until
October 21, 2021, Plaintiff’s claim appears to be time-barred on its face.
Plaintiff will be afforded leave to amend to allege facts which could show that
this claim is not time-barred, keeping in mind the sham-pleadings doctrine.
Finally, as for the thirteenth cause
of action, this claim for violation of Business and Professions Code section
17200 is derivative of Plaintiff’s Labor Code claims, some of which are
sufficiently pled. As such, this claim is necessarily supported with sufficient
facts to support a claim.
Based on the foregoing, Defendants’
demurrer is sustained and overruled in part. Defendants’ demurrer is sustained,
with 20 days leave to amend, as to the fifth, eighth, and twelfth causes of
action. Defendants’ demurrer is overruled as to the remaining causes of action.
Motion
to Strike
Defendants argue that Plaintiff
improperly seeks Labor Code § 226(e) penalties, punitive damages, and
attorneys’ fees.
The Court
disagrees.
As for punitive
damages, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support his discrimination,
retaliation, and Business and Professions Code section 17200 claims.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has alleged facts which could show “despicable
conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious
disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, §
3294, subd. (c)(1).)
As for the
claims against Jeff Arroyo, Plaintiff has alleged that Arroyo repeatedly called
him racial slurs and threatened him with a gun. Accordingly, Plaintiff has
alleged facts which could support individual liability against Jeff Arroyo.
Finally, as for attorney fees,
Plaintiff’s claims for rest break violations, waiting time penalties, and
failure to issue accurate itemized wage statements are "claims for nonpayment
of wages" entitle a prevailing plaintiff to an award of attorney fees
under California Labor Code § 218.5. Betancourt v. OS Rest. Servs., LLC (2022)
83 Cal. App. 5th 132, 140.) As set forth above, Plaintiff has allege sufficient
facts to support his wage statement and waiting time claims.
Based on the foregoing, Defendants’
motion to strike is denied.
It is so
ordered.
Dated: March , 2024
Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
Judge of the Superior Court
Parties who intend to submit on
this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org
by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court
website at www.lacourt.org.
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number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If all parties to a motion
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please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.