Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 21STCV44732, Date: 2023-01-30 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 21STCV44732    Hearing Date: January 30, 2023    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

 

DEPARTMENT 17

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

CHRISTOPHER CALLAHAN

 

         vs.

 

THE WAGS CLUB LLC

 

 Case No.:  21STCV44732

 

 

 

 Hearing Date:  January 30, 2023

 

 

The Court awards Plaintiff $6,765 in reasonable attorney fees.

 

On 12/8/2021, Plaintiff Christopher Callahan (Plaintiff) filed suit against the Wags Club, LLC (Defendant), alleging: (1) failure to pay wages; (2) failure to provide meal and rest periods; (3) failure to pay minimum wage; (4) failure to pay overtime wages; (5) failure to pay wages due upon termination: waiting time penalties; (6) failure to issue accurate itemized wage statements; (7) unlawful/unfair business practice; (8) wrongful termination; (9) retaliation; (10) failure to reimburse business expenses; and (11) failure to deliver personnel file.

 

            On 5/10/2022, the Court granted Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration.

 

            On 10/24/2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to vacate arbitration.

 

            Now, Plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees in the amount of $36,465 and costs in the amount of $120.00.

 

Legal Standard

 

The party claiming attorneys’ fees must establish entitlement to such fees and the reasonableness of the fees claimed.  (Civic Western Corporation v. Zila Industries, Inc. (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 1, 16.) “Except as attorney’s fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties[.]” (CCP § 1021.)

 

“It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.”  (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623.)  In exercising its discretion, the court should consider a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in handling the matter, the attention given, the success or failure, and the resulting judgment.  (Ibid.)

 

In determining what constitutes a reasonable compensation for an attorney who has rendered services in connection with a legal proceeding, the court may and should consider the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required and the skill employed in handling the litigation, the attention given, the success of the attorneys’ efforts, their learning, their age, and their experience in the particular type of work demanded the intricacies and importance of the litigation, the labor and necessity for skilled legal training and ability in trying the cause, and the time consumed. (Stokus v. Marsh (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 647, 657 (Stokus).)

 

In determining the proper amount of fees to award, courts use the lodestar method.  The lodestar figure is calculated by multiplying the total number of reasonable hours expended by the reasonable hourly rate.  “Fundamental to its determination … [is] a careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney … in the presentation of the case.”  (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48 (Serrano III).)  A reasonable hourly rate must reflect the skill and experience of the attorney.  (Id. at 49.)  Prevailing parties are compensated for hours reasonably spent on fee-related issues.  A fee request that appears unreasonably inflated is a special circumstance permitting the trial court to reduce the award or deny one altogether.”  (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635 (Serrano IV); see also Weber v. Langholz (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1587 (“The trial court could make its own evaluation of the reasonable worth of the work done in light of the nature of the case, and of the credibility of counsel’s declaration unsubstantiated by time records and billing statements.”)

 

Reasonable attorney fees should be based on an objective standard of reasonableness, i.e., the market value of services rendered, not on some notion of cost incurred. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1090.)  The value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in which the trial court has its own expertise.  (Id. at 1096.)  The trial court may make its own determination of the value of the services contrary to, or without the necessity for, expert testimony.  (Ibid.)  The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.  (Ibid.)

 

Discussion

 

            Plaintiff seeks attorney fees pursuant to CCP § 1281.99(a) which provides:

 

The court shall impose a monetary sanction against a drafting party that materially breaches an arbitration agreement pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 1281.97 or subdivision (a) of Section 1281.98, by ordering the drafting party to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees and costs, incurred by the employee or consumer as a result of the material breach.”

 

Rates

 

            Mr. Roven claims an hourly rate of $850/hour. Mr. Roven has been practicing labor and employment law since 2013. Mr. Roven argues that while he was awarded $500 hour by Arbitrator Edmund Towle for work on a case that was performed and arbitrated in 2021, $850 is now reasonable in light of inflation increasing costs. After a consideration of the relevant factors, including the duration of the litigation, the difficulty of the litigation, and the skill required, the Court finds $550 to be a reasonable hourly rate for an attorney with similar skill and experience. (Stokus v. Marsh (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 647, 657 (Stokus).)

 

Hours

 

            Mr. Roven claims 29.6 hours on this matter. However, Plaintiff is not entitled to recover all hours spent in this matter. Rather, Plaintiff is only entitled to recover that amount incurred as a result of the material breach. A review of the billing entries indicates at least 13.3 hours on matters that are unrelated to the breach. (See Opp., 12: 6-13: 5.) Moreover, the Court finds many of Mr. Roven’s billing entries to be vague (e.g.., “Email to Client”, “Client Discussion”, “Research regarding discussion and email regarding arbitration.”) As such, the Court is unable to assess the reasonableness of these hours.

 

Given the Court’s power to make “across-the-board percentage cuts either in the numbers of hours claimed or in the final lodestar figure,” the Court finds only 12.3 hours reasonably claimed. (Gonzalez v. City of Maywood (9th Cir. 2013) 729 F.3d 1196, 1203.)

 

Lodestar Enhancement

 

Plaintiffs request a 1.5 lodestar enhancement based on the contingency nature of the case and the quality of the work performed.

 

Relevant factors to determine whether an enhancement is appropriate include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.  (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

 

Here, the hourly rates set forth above capture the skill and the contingent nature. Thus, any multiplier would be duplicative of the calculations set forth above. Furthermore, an analysis of the relevant factors do not justify an enhancement award.

 

Costs

 

The Court could not locate a verified memorandum of costs. As a result, the Court is unable to corroborate Plaintiff’s claimed costs, and thus does not consider the cost request.

 

Conclusion

 

The Court awards Plaintiff $6,765 in reasonable attorney fees ($550/hr x 12.3 hours.)

 

It is so ordered.

 

Dated:  January    , 2022

                                                                                                                                                          

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

 

 

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. 

 

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