Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 21STCV46199, Date: 2023-09-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV46199    Hearing Date: January 17, 2024    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant’s motion for a judgment on the pleadings is DENIED. 

On 12/17/2023, Plaintiff T.K. (Plaintiff) filed suit against DOE 1. On 1/14/2022, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (FAC) alleging: (1) negligence and; (2) negligent hiring, retention, and supervision.

Now, Defendant moves for a judgment on the pleadings.

Discussion

            Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed because they are legally impermissible as a violation of the California Constitution. More specifically, Defendant argues that AB 218—which extended the statute of limitations in child sexual abuse cases and relieved such plaintiffs from the government claim requirement—is unconstitutional, because it purports to retroactively exempt childhood sexual abuse plaintiffs from the Government Claim presentation requirements.

            The Court disagrees. 

The Court in Coats v. New Haven Unified School District (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415 recently took up this question. There, the Court found that the removal of the claims presentation requirement for child sexual abuse cases was constitutional:

The present case, of course, involves revival of a cause of action barred by a claim presentation requirement, not a statute of limitations. But we are aware of no reason the Legislature should be any less able to revive claims in this context, as it expressly did in Assembly Bill 218.” (Id. at 428.) (emphasis added) Legislation reviving the statute of limitations on civil law claims does not violate constitutional principles. (Id. at 425.)

(emphasis added.)

Other courts have affirmed the same. (See Roman Catholic Bishop of Oakland v. Superior Court (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1161 [“It is equally well settled that legislation reviving the statute of limitations on civil law claims does not violate constitutional principles.”]; Liebig v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 828, 830 [“the Legislature has the power to retroactively extend a civil statute of limitations to revive a cause of action time-barred under the former limitations period.”); Deutsch v. Masonic Homes of California, Inc. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 748, 760 [defendants have no “no constitutional right to be free of the obligation to defend stale claims.”].)

 Notably, Defendant did not cite this case in its motion, or distinguish it from the facts here.

Coats also indicates that there is no difference, constitutionally speaking, between a claim previously barred by the statute of limitations and one barred for failure to timely comply with the claims presentation requirement. While Defendant extensively cites Shirk v. Vista Unified School District (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201 to argue that Plaintiff has not complied with the government filing requirement, which is an element of the underlying claims,  that case was superseded by statute. (Rubenstein v. Doe No. 1 (2017) 3 Cal.5th 903, 914 points out that “[t]he legislative history behind the new Government Code section 905, subdivision (m), makes clear the Legislature overruled Shirk.” Moreover, Shirk instructs that “[c]omplaints that do not allege facts demonstrating either that a claim was timely presented or that compliance with the claims statute is excused are subject to a general demurrer for not stating facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Shirk, at 634.) Thus, the significance of the claims presentation requirement being an “element” of a cause of action is simply that Plaintiff must adequately plead compliance in his Complaint. The Legislature’s removal of the claims presentation requirement in Government Code Section 905(m) did not alter Plaintiff’s obligation to prove the District’s negligence and his resulting damages at trial or automatically impose any liability against the District.

Finally, Defendant argues that AB 218 is unconstitutional because it retroactively strips governmental immunity from public entities in violation of Article XVI, section 6 of the California Constitution, which prohibits gifts of public funds. However, there is a difference between reviving a lapsed claim and creating liability against a public entity. In the gift clause context, liability is not “created” here merely because the Legislature revives a stale claim allowing a class of plaintiffs to file lawsuits. Rather, the subsequent determination of liability is still left to a jury or trier of fact.

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion for a judgment on the pleadings is denied.

It is so ordered.

Dated:  January    , 2024

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar.  For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.