Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 21STCV46429, Date: 2022-07-27 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV46429 Hearing Date: July 27, 2022 Dept: 17
County of Los
Angeles
DEPARTMENT 17
TENTATIVE RULING
|
PIERRE DEMIAN
vs. MONTEBELLO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et
al. |
Case
No.: 21STCV46429 Hearing Date: July 27, 2022 |
Defendants’
demurrer is OVERRULED.
The Court does not consider the
sufficiency of Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages.
On 12/20/2021, Pierre Demian
(Plaintiff) initiated this action. On 3/11/2022, Plaintiff filed a first
amended complaint (FAC) against Montebello Unified School District, the
Montebello Unified School District Board of Education, Anthony Martinez,
Marisol Madrigal, Joanna Flores, Edgar Cisneros, Alejandro Ramirez, Jr., and
Jennifer Gutierrez (collectively, Defendants), alleging violation of the
California Whistleblower Protection Act.
Now, Defendants demur to Plaintiff’s
first cause of action and the prayer for punitive damages.
Discussion
Defendants argue that they are
entitled to immunity under California Government Code sections 815 and 820.2.
Section 820.2 “immunizes a public employee from liability
for acts or omissions resulting from the exercise of the discretion vested in
the public employee,” despite abuse of discretion. (Scott v. County of Los
Angeles (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 125, 140.) “This ‘discretionary act’ immunity
extends to ‘basic’ governmental policy decisions entrusted to broad official
judgment.” (Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972, 976.) Generally,
“a discretionary act is one which requires the exercise of judgment or choice.”
(Kemmerer v. County of Fresno (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1426, 1437.)
Here, Plaintiff’s allegations against individual District
Board Members involve their actions in a disciplinary proceeding which led to
Plaintiff’s termination. Courts have found that the decision of a department
head to institute disciplinary proceedings, and what discipline to impose,
constitutes policy decisions involving the exercise of discretion. (See Kemmerer, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 1438; Nicole
M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist. (N.D.Cal. 1997) 964 F.Supp. 1369,
1389–90; Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972.) Indeed, in Caldwell,
the Court specially addressed the “narrow but important issue: are individual
members of an elected school board immune from a suit seeking damages against
them personally for their successful votes to terminate the employment of the
school district's superintendent…?” The Court concluded that the board members
were immune even where the dismissed official alleges that the members' votes
were cast for reasons that violated FEHA.” (Id. at p. 976.)
However, in opposition, Plaintiff argues that there is an
exception to discretionary immunity for whistleblower actions. In support, he
cites Defendant’s own case: Caldwell. In Caldwell, the Court distinguished
FEHA and whistleblower laws and wrote:
Insofar as such whistle-blower statutes focus in
particular on those who act to suppress or punish revelations of fraud,
corruption, or illegality in government business, the core statutory objectives
might well be obviated by a conclusion that cover-up efforts by a public
official are eligible for immunity.
(Caldwell, supra, 10 Cal. 4th at 986 n.7,
988.)
Likewise in Conn v. Western Pacer Unified School
District (2010) 186 Cal. App. 4th 1163, 1179, the court refused to apply
discretionary act immunity to a whistleblower retaliation claim asserted by a
teacher who was denied tenure. The plaintiff in Conn brought suit
against the school district and several individual district employees under
California Education Code section 44113, which bars employees from “directly or
indirectly us[ing] or attempt[ing] to use the official authority or influence
of the employee for the purpose of intimidating, coercing, commanding, or
attempting to intimidate, threaten, coerce, or command any person for the
purpose of interfering with the right of that person to disclose to an official
agent matters within the scope of this article.”
In reply, Defendants now concede that discretionary
immunity does not apply to claims brought under the California Whistleblower
Protection Act (CWPA). Instead, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged
sufficient facts to state a claim under the CWPA, and thus discretionary immunity
applies. However, Defendants did not raise this argument in their original
motion, and Plaintiff was not provided an opportunity to oppose these
arguments. Accordingly, the Court may not properly consider it.
Moreover, a challenge to a prayer
for damages is properly raised through a motion to strike, not a demurrer. (See Code
Civ Proc., §§ 435-437) Accordingly, the Court cannot properly consider the
sufficiency of Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages here.
Based on the
foregoing, Defendants’ demurrer is overruled. The Court does not consider the
sufficiency of Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages.
It is
so ordered.
Dated: July
, 2022
Hon. Jon R.
Takasugi
Judge of the
Superior Court
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