Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 22STCL03999, Date: 2024-05-24 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCL03999    Hearing Date: May 24, 2024    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants Steven Meier M.D. and Steven W. Meier M.D., Inc. dba Meier Orthopedic Sports Medicine’s demurrer is SUSTAINED, WITH 15 DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND. The IIED claim is struck from the FAC.

Defendant LA Peer Surgery’s demurrer is SUSTAINED, WITH 15 DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND. The IIED claim is struck from the FAC.

On 6/15/2022, Plaintiff Mahmud Reza Siamizade, as an individual and on behalf of himself and as representative of the Estate of Mahzar Sedghi, (Plaintiff) filed suit against Steve Meier M.D. and Meier Orthopedic Sports Medicine, and LA Peer Surgery Center. On 12/21/2023, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (FAC) alleging: (1) refusal to provide medical records to Plaintiff; (2) refusal to provide medical records to counsel; and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). 

            On 2/14/2023, Defendants Steven Meier M.D. and Steven W. Meier M.D., Inc. dba Meier Orthopedic Sports Medicine (collectively, Defendants) demurred to Plaintiff’s FAC. Defendants also moved to strike portions of the FAC.

            On 4/10/2024, Defendant LA Peer Surgery demurred to Plaintiff’s FAC.

            For ease, the Court has consolidated its analysis into a single ruling.

Discussion 

In order to commence or continue an action as a decedent’s successor-in-interest, fundamentally a plaintiff must first have standing.

Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) Section 377.32 mandates:

(a) The person who seeks to commence an action or proceeding or to continue a pending action or proceeding as the decedent’s successor in interest under this article, shall execute and file an affidavit or a declaration under penalty of perjury under the laws of this state stating all of the following:

(1)  The decedent’s name.

(2)  The date and place of the decedent’s death.

(3)  “No proceeding is now pending in California for administration of the decedent’s estate.”

(4)  If the decedent’s estate was administered, a copy of the final order showing the distribution of the decedent’s cause of action to the successor in interest.

(5)  Either of the following, as appropriate, with facts in support thereof:

(A) “The affiant or declarant is the decedent’s successor in interest (as defined in Section 377.11 of the California Code of Civil Procedure) and succeeds to the decedent’s interest in the action or proceeding.”

(B) “The affiant or declarant is authorized to act on behalf of the decedent’s successor in interest (as defined in Section 377.11 of the California Code of Civil Procedure) with respect to the decedent’s interest in the action or proceeding.”

(6) “No other person has a superior right to commence the action or proceeding or to be substituted for the decedent in the pending action or proceeding.”

(7) “The affiant or declarant affirms or declares under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.”

(b) Where more than one person executes the affidavit or declaration under this section, the statements required by subdivision (a) shall be modified as appropriate to reflect that fact.

(c) A certified copy of the decedent’s death certificate shall be attached to the affidavit or declaration.

            Here, Plaintiff’s FAC fails to comply with this mandatory statute. Although claiming to sue in his individual capacity and as “representative of the Estate of Mahzar Sedghi,” according to the First Amended Compliant (Exhibit E at ¶2, e.g.), no affidavit or declaration has been provided or served which comports with the statutory requirements of CCP §377.32, supra. Further, no supporting facts have been proffered. As such, Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to show he has standing to pursue this claim.

            Plaintiff must allege facts which could show he has standing to pursue this claim as a representative of the Estate of Mahzar Sedghi.

            However, in the interest of prudence and in anticipation of future motion practice, the Court briefly addresses the substance of Defendants’ claims.

Both parties argue that Plaintiff cannot state a claim because the first and second causes of action are not recognized causes of action, and there are insufficient facts to support a claim for IIED.

As for the IIED cause of action, Plaintiff did not seek, nor was awarded, leave to amend to add a cause of action for IIED. Plaintiff also has not alleged any facts which could show that the failure to release medical records—especially given that those records have since undisputedly been released—could rise to the level of conduct “so extreme that it goes beyond all possible bounds of decency.” (CACI 1602.) Accordingly, the IIED claim must be stricken.

As for the first and second causes of action, the Court finds that, assuming Plaintiff can allege sufficient facts to show standing, the facts are sufficient to state a claim as to the first and second causes of action against the Meier Defendants. Plaintiff alleges that he made multiple attempts in writing to obtain his mother’s medical records and that they failed to release them. In their moving papers, Defendants do not appear to argue that Plaintiff failed to properly request the records.  While Defendants contend that they have now released the records, they offer no explanation as to why Plaintiff is not entitled to recover damages, including attorney fees, incurred to secure the release of these records. (See, Akins v. State of California (1998) 61Cal.App.4^th 1, 50.)  Moreover, while Defendants dispute that the released records are incomplete, the Court accepts well-pled allegations as true at the pleading stage. As such, the completeness of the medical records is a factual determination and thus not properly determined at this stage.

Moreover, while Meier Defendants argue that “Failure to Provide Medical Records” is not a cause of action, the Court looks to the substance of the allegations, rather than the label affixed to the claim, when determining whether a claim has been stated. Here, Plaintiff alleges a violation of Health & Safety Code section 123110(b)(1). Meier Defendants do not set forth any authority which could show there is no private right of action to enforce this provision.

However, the Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to support the first and second causes of action against LA Peer Surgery. Plaintiff does not allege that he and/or his mother ever made a written request for medical records to this Defendant (LA Peer Surgery Center) and provided this Defendant (LA Peer Surgery Center) with a written release. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to show that he properly requested the records from LA Peer Surgery, and thus has not alleged facts which could show a violation of Health & Safety Code section 123110(b)(1) as to LA Peer Surgery.

            Based on the foregoing, the Meier Defendants and LA Peer Surgery Defendants’ demurrers are sustained, with 15 days leave to amend.  The IIED claim is struck from the FAC.

It is so ordered.

Dated:  May    , 2024

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

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