Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 22STCV00171, Date: 2023-05-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV00171    Hearing Date: May 16, 2023    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

            Plaintiffs’ motion to compel further responses to their SROGs is GRANTED.

Defendant’s motions to compel further are DENIED IN PART, GRANTED IN PART, consistent with the rulings set forth below.

            On 1/3/2022, Plaintiff Marjorie Matsuda in and through her successor-in-interest Brian Matsuda and William Picknell filed suit against Pomona Vista Care Center, MJB Partners, LLC dba Pomona Vista Care Center, and Sun Mar Management Services (collectively, Defendants), alleging: (1) dependent abuse; (2) negligence; (3) violation of Health and Safety Code section 1430(b); (4) willful misconduct; and (5) wrongful death.

            Now, Plaintiffs move to compel further responses to move to compel further responses to their SROGs.

Separately, Defendant Pomona Vista Care Center, MJB Partners, LLC d/b/a Pomona Vista Care Center (Defendant) moves to compel further responses to its discovery.

For ease, the Court has consolidated its analysis of all the discovery motions into a single ruling.

Discussion

I.                   Plaintiffs’ SROGs

Plaintiffs move to compel further responses to SROG Nos. 56 and 57. More specifically, Plaintiffs seek an order for Defendant to send out an opt-in letter to request permission from the roommates and responsible parties at Defendant’s facility to allow Defendant to disclose their names and contact information.

In opposition, Defendant argues that Plaintiff is seeking private third-party information which is protected by HIPAA and the California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (CMIA). As a result, Defendant contends that “…absent a court order, it would be violating the law and subjecting itself to substantial fines by turning over the information.” (Opp., 3:10-12.)

Defendant’s argument is premised on a contention that the names, addresses, and telephone numbers that Plaintiffs seek are “health information” under HIPPA. Similarly, Defendant argues that the third-party contact information is protected medical information under CIMA.

The CMIA specifies that “[n]o provider of health care shall disclose medical information regarding a patient of the provider without first obtaining an authorization.” (Id., Civ Code §56.10 subd. (a).) However, In Eisenhower Medical Center v. Sup. Ct. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 430, the court held “a health care provider cannot be held liable under the relevant portions of the CMIA for release of an individual’s personal identifying information that is not coupled with that individual’s medical history, mental or physical condition, or treatment.” (Id. at p. 432.) The court concluded that “medical information” must include a patient’s medical condition or history that is combined with individually identifiable information, and “does not encompass demographic or numeric information that does not reveal medical history, diagnosis, or care.” (Id. at p. 434-435.)

Similarly, HIPAA defines “health information” as “any information...received by a healthcare provider...[that] relates to the past, present or future physical or mental health or condition of an individual, the provision of health care to an individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to an individual.”

Here, Plaintiffs seek the names and contact information of third parties, and do not seek information concerning “the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an individual,” “the provision of health care to an individual,” or “the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to an individual.” As such, the Court disagrees that Plaintiffs’ requests violate either HIPAA or CMIA.

Moreover, as noted by Plaintiffs, even assuming this information was protected health information, Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 164.512(e), permits disclosure of this information in response to a discovery request as long as the roommate(s) have been given notice of the request:

A covered entity may disclose protected health information in the course of any judicial or administrative proceeding:

(ii) In response to a subpoena, discovery request, or other lawful process, that is not accompanied by an order of a court or administrative tribunal, if:

(A) The covered entity receives satisfactory assurance, as described in paragraph (e)(1)(iii) of this section, from the party seeking the information that reasonable efforts have been made by such party to ensure that the individual who is the subject of the protected health information that has been requested has been given notice of the request;

The satisfactory assurance requirement set forth in Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 164.512(e)(1)(iii), is as follows:

(A) The party requesting such information has made a good faith attempt to provide written notice of the individual (or, if the individual’s location is unknown, to mail a notice to the individual’s last known address);

(B) The notice included sufficient information about the litigation or proceeding in which the protected health information is requested to permit the individual to raise an objection to the court or administrative tribunal; and

In Puerto v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1242, the lower court granted a motion compelling the requesting parties to adopt a procedure to protect the privacy of third parties’ in the disclosure of their telephone numbers and addresses in response to discovery request, by sending a notice that would require those individuals to fill out a postcard authorizing a third party administrator to disclose that information to requesting party’s counsel. (Id. at p. 1245.)

            Here, Plaintiffs have attached a sample of the proposed opt-in letter which would provide third-party recipients with the option to affirmatively provide consent to disclosure of their contact information to Plaintiffs’ counsel, and thus waive their privacy rights as a precondition to its disclosure. As such, the Court agrees that any concerns of the Defendant in possibly violating HIPAA or CMIA, or the privacy rights of the residents/responsible parties would be alleviated because the residents’ names will only be disclosed if they give consent to the third party mailing administrator to release their information to Plaintiffs’ counsel’s office.

            Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to SROGs Nos. 56 and 57 is granted.

II.               Defendant’s FROG No. 17 (concerning RFAs Nos. 3, 6, 13, 33, and 39)

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ responses to Defendant’s Form Interrogatory, Set 1, No. 17.1 with respect to Requests for Admission, Set 1, Nos. 3, 6, 13, 33, 39 “either are evasive or entirely miss the mark.” (Motion, 7: 19-20.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that their responses are code-compliant and the fact that Defendant disagrees with their responses does not equate to them being deficient.

After review, the Court agrees in part, disagrees in part with Defendant. The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiffs’ response concerning RFA No. 33 is deficient. The request concerns whether or not there was a physician’s discharge order regarding skin care relating to her CAM boot. Plaintiffs’ response does not answer the question, but states that Ms. Matsuda’s s treating orthopedic surgeon testified at his deposition on December 6, 2022, that it was not hospital custom to issue a discharge order with respect to the cam boot.

ingHowever, the Court finds the remain responses to be substantially code-complaint.  Plaintiffs provide the facts supporting the denial of the Request, provided the persons knowledgeable to the facts and the denial, and supporting documentation supporting the denial. While the Court understands Defendant’s contention that Plaintiffs’ responses often disagree with the premise of the Request, Plaintiffs’ explanations provide a clear indication as to why that is, and what the evidentiary support supporting the disagreement is. For example, RFA No. 13 asks the Plaintiffs to admit when Ms. Matsuda was discharged on February 4, 2021, from the Hospital with a diagnosis of septic shock. Plaintiff disagrees with the RFA by stating, in essence, that while Ms. Matsuda’s discharge diagnosis list included septic shock, it included other conditions and that Ms. Matsuda’s treating orthopedic surgeon testified that based on these labs, she did not have an active infection at that time (thereby casting doubt on the septic shock diagnosis). As such, Plaintiffs have responded to the question, conceding that septic shock was listed on the discharge summary, but have provided supporting facts as to why they disagree with the premise of the question (and have denied the RFA).  

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion is granted as to RFA No.33 but denied as to the remaining requests. In light of this ruling, the Court declines to award sanctions at this time.

III.            Defendant’s RFPS Nos. 8-10, 29, 30, 69, and 70

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs should be compelled to provide further responses to these RFPs which ask Plaintiffs to show document(s) from any health care providers which would support their claim that Defendant caused Ms. Matsuda’s ultimate untimely passing, and that her death was due to Defendant’s conduct.

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that “Defendant’s issue with Plaintiffs’ responses are not so much whether the response complies with C.C.P. § 2031.210, but rather, the Defendant is unhappy with the substance provided in the responses. Plaintiff provided substantive responses and either agreed to produce documents or identified the information from which Defendant could find responsive information. Specifically, Plaintiff refers to the page numbers at the bottom of the Pomona Valley Hospital records. Text recognition can easily identify and make it easy to search the page numbers given. Documents identified as “PVCC” were documents produced by Defendant and refer to Defendant’s page numbers.” (Opp., 5: 13-19.)

The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiffs responses are inadequately labeled. When producing responsive documents, they must be sorted and labeled to correspond with the categories in the document demand C.C.P. §2031.280(a). It is insufficient for Plaintiffs to direct Defendant to general categories of documents,  without identifying where in these categories Defendant can expect to find responsive documents to each request.

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion is granted. Plaintiff is sanctioned $700, jointly and severally, with counsel. ($350/hr x 2 hrs.)

IV.            Defendant’s SROG Nos. 9 and 12

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs should be compelled to provide further responses to these SROGs because the provided responses are evasive.

Defendant’s SROG No.9 asks Plaintiffs to identify “all overnight shift care personnel they believe were not properly trained nor qualified to care for the elders whose lives were entrusted to them.”

Defendant’s SROG No. 12 asks Plaintiffs to state each day the Facility was understaffed during Ms. Matsuda's residency.

In response, Plaintiffs responded that the responsive information is yet to be available to the Plaintiff, and that it would not be able to provide the responsive information “until the Plaintiff was able to conduct the deposition of the Director of Nursing (“DON”) because the Plaintiff has reason to believe that information sought may be provided in detail by the DON.” (Opp., 4: 7-.0.)

As such, the Court agrees that Plaintiffs are not refusing to provide responses but have stated that they are not in the position to provide responsive information at this time, and have indicated that they expect to have the responsive information once the DON is deposed. This is sufficient.

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion is denied. 

V.                Defendant’s RFAs Nos. 6-22, 24-35

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s responses are either evasive or deficient.

As discussed above, the Court found Plaintiff’s RFA responses to be sufficient, with the exception of RFA No. 33.  After review, the Court agrees that, with respect to the remaining RFAs, Plaintiffs’ responses are reasonably and clearly qualified with the supporting information, as required by Code. While Defendant may disagree with the substance of Plaintiffs’ responses, Plaintiffs’ responses are sufficiently responsive and clear.

            Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion is denied. 

It is so ordered.

Dated:  May    , 2023

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. 

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