Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 22STCV08091, Date: 2022-12-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV08091    Hearing Date: December 16, 2022    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

            Defendant’s demurrer is SUSTAINED, WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed, with prejudice.

            On 3/4/2022, Plaintiff April Claudia Ponce de Leon filed suit against Secure Nursing Service, Inc., Cha Hollywood Medical Center, L.P., and Crystal Anderson, alleging: (1) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage; and (2) negligent interference with prospective economic advantage.

            Now, Defendant Secure Nursing Service, Inc. (Defendant) demurs to Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety.

Discussion

            Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred as a matter of law. More specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s allegations all stem from conduct allegedly engaged in by Defendant in 2016, and does not contain any allegations regarding any additional alleged conduct undertaken by Defendant after 2016. Given that Plaintiff did not file this action until 3/4/2022—more than five years later—Defendant argues that this lawsuit is barred by the two-year statute of limitations that applies to interference with prospective economic advantage claims. (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 339(1); Augusta v. United Service Automobile Assn. (1993) 13 Cal. App. 4th 4, 10; Edwards v. Fresno Community Hosp. (1974) 38 Cal. App. 3d 702, 706.)

            Defendant also argues that Plaintiff cannot state a claim for intentional or negligent interference with prospective economic advantage on the merits.

To state a claim for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, a plaintiff must prove “(1) the existence, between the plaintiff and some third party, of an economic relationship that contains the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentionally wrongful acts designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm proximately caused by the defendant’s action.” (Roy Allan Slurry Seal, Inc. v. American Asphalt South, Inc. (2017) 2 Cal. 5th 505, 512.)

Moreover, a plaintiff alleging interference with prospective economic advantage “must plead that the defendant engaged in an independently wrongful act.” (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1158.) “[A]n act is independently wrongful if it is unlawful, that is, if it is proscribed by some constitutional, statutory, regulatory, common law, or other determinable legal standard.” (Id. at p. 1159.)

Here, Plaintiff’s claim centers on the allegation that Defendant filed a complaint against her with the Board of Nursing after Defendant CHA HMC reported concerning behavior about Plaintiff to Defendant and requested that Defendant never place Plaintiff with CHA HMC again. Complaint (¶¶ 14-18, 31, 38.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s action in filing a complaint with the Board of Nursing “disrupted Plaintiff’s economic relationship with the nursing staffing agencies she worked for, as well as the medical facilities in which she had a contract assignment.” (Id. at ¶¶ 30-31, 37-38.)

However, filing a complaint with the Board of Nursing is not an “independently wrongful act” because it did not violate any laws. To the contrary, whatever statements Defendant made in connection with a complaint it filed with the Board of Nursing constituted constitutionally protected speech, and thus does not constitute an independently wrongful act. (Mobile Medical Services, etc. v. Rajaram (2015) 241 Cal. App. 4th 164, 168-172) (holding that trial court erred in failing to grant defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike without leave to amend where all of plaintiff’s causes of action were based on defendant’s alleged false statements to the Board of Nursing because such statements constituted constitutionally protected speech under Cal. Civ. Proc. § 425.16 and Civil Code Section 47). 

Because the second cause of action for negligent interference with prospective economic advantage similarly requires an independent wrongful act, it fails for the same reason.

            Taken together, Plaintiff’s Complaint appears time-barred on its face, and is based on allegations which constitute constitutionally protected speech. As a result, the Court has no reason to believe that these defects could be resolved through leave to amend.

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s demurrer is sustained, without leave to amend.

It is so ordered.

Dated:  December    , 2022

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. 

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