Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 22STCV08091, Date: 2023-09-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV08091    Hearing Date: September 12, 2023    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant’s special motion to strike is GRANTED. Accordingly, Defendant’s pending demurrer set for 9/13/2023 is MOOT.

On 3/4/2022, Plaintiff April Claudia Ponce de Leon filed suit against Secure Nursing Service, Inc., Cha Hollywood Medical Center, L.P., and Crystal Anderson, alleging: (1) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage; and (2) negligent interference with prospective economic advantage.

Now, Crystal Anderson (Defendant) specially moves to strike Plaintiff’s Complaint.

The motion is unopposed.

Legal Standard

On a special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) section 425.16, also known as an anti-SLAPP motion, moving parties have the initial burden to demonstrate that a cause of action is subject to a special motion to strike. (Martinez v. Metabolife Inter. Ins. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 181, 186; Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc. v. Paladino (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 294, 304.) First, the court must determine whether moving parties have made a prima facie showing that the attacked claims arise from a protected activity, including defendants’ right of petition, or free speech, under a constitution, in connection with issues of public interest. (Healy v. Tuscany Hills Landscape & Recreation Corp., (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1, 5; Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 278; Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e).) Moving parties can satisfy this burden by showing (1) statements made before legislative, executive or judicial proceedings, or made in connection with matters being considered in such proceedings, or (2) statements made in a public forum, or other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional rights of petition or free speech, in connection with issues of public interest. (Code Civ. Proc.,­ § 425.16, subd. (e); Equilon Ent., LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 66.) 

If the court finds this showing has been made, it must dismiss the cause of action unless the plaintiff meets its burden to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1); Balzaga v. Fox News Network, LLC (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1336.) This means that the plaintiff must state a legally sufficient claim and must then present evidence that substantiates or sustains the claim. (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 61; see also Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 821 [plaintiff “must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited”].) 

Discussion

            Defendant moves to specially strike Plaintiff’s causes of action for intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage.

            The first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis is met. Here, the premise of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant is that Defendant, in the course and scope of her role as an employee of Secure Nursing, allegedly made “false, unfounded, and potentially defamatory complaints against Plaintiff” to the Board of Nursing, which resulted in the Board initiating disciplinary proceedings against her. (Complaint, ¶¶ 14-17; 30, 37.) Complaints to the Board of Nursing constitute a “written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law,” and thus constitute protected activity within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP provision. This conclusion has been affirmed by other Courts. (See e.g. Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal. 5th 995, 1017 (holding that reporting the plaintiff’s conduct to the Medical Board of California qualified as a “statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration in an ‘official proceeding’” pursuant to California Civil Procedure Code section 425.16(e)(2)).

            Accordingly, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to disclose a probability of prevailing on the merits.

            Plaintiff did not oppose this motion, and thus has failed to meet her burden. However, even assuming Plaintiff had opposed, there is strong reason to believe that the same result would have been reached.

Critically, this Court already sustained Defendant Secure Nursing’s Demurrer as to Plaintiff’s lawsuit in its entirety on the grounds that (1) Plaintiff’s lawsuit appeared time-barred on its face, and (2) Plaintiff could not state a claim because her allegations were based on constitutionally protected speech.  These same conclusions apply with equal force here.

As for the statute of limitations, the Complaint was filed on March 4, 2022, and fails to plead any additional alleged conduct undertaken by Ms. Anderson after 2016.

More importantly, to state a claim for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, a plaintiff must prove “(1) the existence, between the plaintiff and some third party, of an economic relationship that contains the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentionally wrongful acts designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm proximately caused by the defendant’s action.” (Roy Allan Slurry Seal, Inc. v. American Asphalt South, Inc. (2017) 2 Cal. 5th 505, 512.)

Here, filing a complaint with the Board of Nursing is not an “independently wrongful act” because it did not violate any laws. To the contrary, whatever statements Defendant made in connection with a complaint it filed with the Board of Nursing constituted constitutionally protected speech, and thus does not constitute an independently wrongful act. (Mobile Medical Services, etc. v. Rajaram (2015) 241 Cal. App. 4th 164, 168-172) (holding that trial court erred in failing to grant defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike without leave to amend where all of plaintiff’s causes of action were based on defendant’s alleged false statements to the Board of Nursing because such statements constituted constitutionally protected speech under Cal. Civ. Proc. § 425.16 and Civil Code Section 47). 

Moreover, Defendant’s claims to the Board of Nursing, as statements made in the initiation of an administrative proceeding, are absolutely privileged. (See e.g. Lemke v. Sutter Roseville Medical Center (2017) 178 Cal. App. 5th 1292, 1299 (holding that an “absolute privilege” applied to statements made by defendant to the Board of Nursing); see also Long v. Pinto (1981) 126 Cal. App. 3d 946, 948 (holding that a letter sent by the defendant about the plaintiff to the Board of Medical Quality Assurance was absolutely privileged); Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal. 4th 350, 360 (holding that statements to which an absolute privilege applies are barred from “all tort causes of action except a claim for malicious prosecution”); Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2022) 83 Cal. App. 5th 288 (holding that a report to a medical board fell within the litigation privilege and was therefore subject to a motion to strike.)

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s special motion to strike is granted. Accordingly, Defendant’s pending demurrer is moot.

It is so ordered.

Dated:  September    , 2023

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar.  For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.