Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 22STCV10179, Date: 2022-10-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV10179    Hearing Date: October 19, 2022    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

            Defendants’ demurrer to the seventh, tenth, and eleventh causes of action is SUSTAINED, WITH 15 DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND.        

            On 3/24/2022 Bonneisha Butts initiated this action. On 7/8/2022, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint (SAC) against United Parcel Services, Inc., Enrique Hardegy, Hector Hernandez, Vincent O’Brian, and Imo Sepoleta (collectively, Defendants). alleging: (1) gender discrimination; (2) medical disability discrimination; (3) failure to reasonably accommodate; (4) failure to engage in the interactive process; (5) racial discrimination; (6) failure to prevent harassment and discrimination; (7) hostile work environment retaliation; (8) retaliation; (9) wrong termination; (10) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (11) negligent infliction of emotional distress.

            Now, Defendants demur to the seventh, tenth, and eleventh causes of action.

Discussion

I.                   Hostile Work Environment

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for hostile work environment because some incidents alleged in support appear to be time-barred on their face, and the remaining allegations fail to constitute harassment as a matter of law.

The Court agrees in part. Here, Plaintiff’s cause of action is supported by allegations that:

-         Defendant Hernandez would make derogatory references to Plaintiff such as “You’re just a lazy black girl!” and was overheard on several occasions commenting that Plaintiff was a “weak woman” and an “airhead” (SAC ¶¶ 35-36.)

-         “On another occasion, Plaintiff was making her rounds and realized that one of her female co-workers needed help with a conveyor that was jammed due to an overflow of packages, so Plaintiff stopped and assisted the co-worker. Soon thereafter, however, HECTOR walked by and said, “That’s a man’s job!”, and continued walking.” (SAC ¶ 36.)

-         Defendants’ manager, IMO, would make derogatory comments toward Plaintiff during team meetings such as, “A monkey could do this. It’s not rocket science.” (SAC ¶ 38.)

-         Defendants’ employee, VINCENT, would verbally abuse Plaintiff on a regular basis and make comments toward her such as, “You’re a woman and you don’t know what you’re doing!” And, on several occasions, VINCENT was overheard by other coworkers commenting that, “All Black people are lazy! (SAC ¶ 45)

-         Furthermore, on or about December 21, 2018, Plaintiff was running late to a phone conference at work, so she parked in VINCENT’s spot, which was located near her office, in the “Circle of Honor”. Soon thereafter, however, when VINCENT arrived at work in his car and saw Plaintiff’s car, VINCENT called Plaintiff’s office phone and yelled at Plaintiff, “Hey, listen! What are you doing parking in my spot? That’s my fucking space! That’s my fucking spot!” As Plaintiff returned to her car to move it, she heard VINCENT nearby telling another employee that, “She’s so stupid! She keeps parking in my fucking space!” Other employees who witnessed the incident prepared reports for Defendants’ management team, stating that Plaintiff was “verbally assaulted” by VINCENT. (SAC ¶ 46)

Accepted as true at the pleading stage, these allegations could support a harassment cause of action. However, Plaintiff must allege when each of these events allegedly took place to clarify concerns over the statute of limitations.

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ demurrer to the seventh cause of action is sustained, with 15 days leave to amend.

II.               Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot state a claim for IIED because it falls within the exclusive scope of the workers compensation scheme, and because the only non-time-barred claim cannot constitute IIED.

The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is comprised of three elements: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff suffered severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) the plaintiff’s injuries were actually and proximately caused by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. (Cochran v. Cochran (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 488, 494.)

“For conduct to be outrageous, it “must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated by a civilized community. … [w]hether behavior is extreme and outrageous is a legal determination to be made by the court.” (Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4^th 166, 171.)

Under the compensation bargain, distress that arises in the course of employment is exactly the kind of distress that is compensable only through workers’ compensation. (Singh v. Southland Stone, U.S.A., Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 338, 367.)  This is true even when the complained-of conduct was “manifestly fair or outrageous.” (Ibid.) “[W]hen the misconduct attributed to the employer is actions which are a normal part of the employment relationship, such as demotions, promotions, criticism of work practices, and frictions in negotiations as to grievances, an employee suffering emotional distress causing disability may not avoid the exclusive remedy provisions of the Labor Code by characterizing the employer's decisions as manifestly unfair, outrageous, har[]assment, or intended to cause emotional disturbance resulting in disability.” (Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 148, 160.)  

In Singh, the employee’s supervisor insulted and physically grabbed the employee in connection with criticism of the employee’s work practices. (186 Cal.App.4th at p. 367.) The IIED claim was barred because such emotional distress was encompassed within the compensation bargain. (Ibid.) 

Here, Plaintiff filed this action on 3/24/2022. The statute of limitations for an IIED claim is two-years. (CCP § 335.1.)  As such, Plaintiff is limited to conduct that took place after or on 3/24/2020. As noted above, there is uncertainty as to when certain alleged events took place. However, the only alleged event in the SAC that took place within the statutory time-period is Plaintiff’s alleged wrongful termination.

Wrongful termination, on its own, is insufficient to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Walker v. Boeing Corp. (C.D. Cal. 2002) 218 F.Supp.2d 1177, 1186) (“Terminating an employee for improper or discriminatory reasons, like many other adverse personnel management decisions, is insufficiently extreme or outrageous to give rise to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”). Moreover, such conduct falls within the course of employment and thus falls within the scope of the exclusivity scheme.

            Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ demurrer to the tenth cause of action is sustained, with 15 days leave to amend.

III.            Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s NIIED cause of action fails for the same reasons as the IIED claim, i.e., that the only alleged act that falls within the 2-year statute of limitations is Plaintiff’s alleged wrongful termination which falls within the workers compensation exclusivity scheme.

For the same reasons set forth above, the Court agrees.

            Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ demurrer to the eleventh cause of action is sustained, with 15 days leave to amend.

It is so ordered.

Dated:  October    , 2022

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

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